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
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
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
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












ANNALS  
OF THE  
HONORABLE EAST-INDIA COMPANY,  
FROM THEIR  
ESTABLISHMENT BY THE CHARTER  
OF  
QUEEN ELIZABETH,  
1600,  
TO  
THE UNION OF THE LONDON AND ENGLISH  
EAST-INDIA COMPANIES,  
1707-8.

---

By JOHN BRUCE, Esq. M. P. AND F. R. S.  
*Keeper of His Majesty's State Papers, and Historiographer to the Honorable  
East-India Company.*

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1810.



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YRABEIJ  
XONUL GROPNATZ ONA.EIJ  
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## CHAPTER II.

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REVIEW OF THE ANNALS OF THE LONDON EAST-INDIA COMPANY, FROM THE RESTORATION OF THEIR PRIVILEGES BY KING CHARLES II., IN 1660-1, TO THE REVOLUTION, 1688-9.

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*jore at this juncture. . . . . Third object of Aurungzebe ; or the en-*  
*largement of the resources of the Mogul Empire.*

## INTRODUCTION.

---

**I**F the Annals of the London East-India Company, from its foundation, to its re-establishment at the Restoration, have exhibited the enterprizes and perseverance of a commercial nation, the Annals of this Company, from the Restoration to the Revolution, in 1688, will open, on a larger scale, the progress of the same commercial and political interests.

In the first of these periods, an authorised and profitable commerce to the realm, intrusted to a Company of privileged Merchants, has been discovered to be exposed to opposition and to oppression, not only by an European ally, and commercial rival, in the East-Indies, but by the insidious interference of Private Traders, sometimes licensed, and, at other times, protected by the Crown, from which the chartered rights and privileges of the Company had issued; and yet this Company, amid such foreign and domestic burdens, by its prudence, and by its fortitude, preserved to the kingdom a right to a great foreign trade, and what, in later times, will be

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## INTRODUCTION.

and more valuable, an extensive and productive outlet to  
national enterprize and industry.

In the period which we are about to review, we have  
known the London East-India Company, by their exertions  
and public spirit, preserving the same valuable sources of  
wealth to their country, in times when its constitution,  
and then its relations with the continental maritime powers,  
were frequently unhinged; and when their trade and foreign  
possessions were again to be upheld, by their own steady  
persevering character, favoured by the Crown, which had  
restored them to their rights and privileges.

To bring under review the Annals of the London East-  
India Company, during this eventful period, it may be proper,  
in general manner, to advert to the vicissitudes of the  
European maritime powers, and to the political and com-  
mercial characters of the countries within the Company's  
reach, with the object of ascertaining the wisdom, or the  
necessity of the London East-India Company's efforts, to  
maintain, and to maintain, the possession of their commercial  
possessions, and their connexions with the powers by whom those  
countries were governed.

With this preliminary knowledge, we can continue the  
history of the Company, and be qualified to draw from them,  
(the preceding Chapter) political and commercial Results,  
regarding the real state of Indian affairs, at the æra of the  
formation of the constitution of Great-Britain.

In

I.—In adverting to the vicissitudes of the European maritime powers, during the reigns of Charles II. and James II., the political and commercial measures which had been introduced during the Interregnum, must be kept in view; for they were important in their spirit, however disastrous in their sources, or however guilty the agents were, who conducted them:—we shall thus understand the treaties which regarded the relations of the European states with each other, or the Eastern commerce of England, after the Monarch had restored their Charter, and their exclusive privileges of trade, to the London East-India Company.

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It ought to be recollected, that while the struggle between Charles I. and the factions which subverted his throne, continued, the political and commercial relations, between England and the maritime powers of Europe, were often suspended, to make way for truces, accommodated to the predominant influence which each of the European contending nations, from time to time, acquired.

At the death of Charles I., if the English nation had not any new political and commercial relations to form, it had the ancient relations, of both descriptions, to accommodate to the existing aspect of its government, and to the bold and interested schemes of the Usurper.

During the  
reign of King  
Charles II.

By the Navigation Act, of 1651, Cromwell gave a consistency to the Maritime Code of England, which ascertained the paramount influence of the English navy and shipping  
over

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*Introduction.*

over those of the other European maritime kingdoms and states; and, what is memorable in this transaction, is, that the establishment of power, in this instance, was accommodated to the preservation and extension of commerce. The wisdom of this measure was so positive, that, at the Restoration of the Monarchy (which, with narrow and uninstructed minds, would have led to a contradiction of a system devised by rebels), it was deemed wise and prudent, as one of the first measures, to adopt this Navigation System, as one which, in its spirit as well as in its practice, had been the source of the commercial and naval glory of Great-Britain.

It may be observed, however, that notwithstanding the political wisdom which could devise this system, the Usurper failed in the means which could carry it into practice; for though jealous of the Dutch, whose commercial encroachments in the West and in the East-Indies had narrowed, if not crushed, the English interests in both, he engaged in wars with that people (the natural ally of these realms); and though he obtained reparation for commercial and political aggressions, yet, in those proceedings, without probably intending to do so, he increased the means of France (the natural enemy of England), and allowed her to add to her northern frontier, possessions wrested from Spain, which opened an entrance to her ships into the Narrow Seas, and lessened the barrier against her future aggrandizement. This political error is the more remarkable, from the consideration,

tion, that this barrier gave an outlet to the French cruisers into the North Sea, or gave them ports, on the coasts opposite to England, from which they could effectually distress our coasting trade.

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This political error was in direct contradiction to the wise policy of Elizabeth, which had created and fostered the States General, to keep in check the preponderance, either of the French or Spanish monarchies.

It was in this situation of European relations, that King Charles II. found his kingdoms, on his Restoration; and though his proceedings, in preserving or improving them, be not a subject of historic doubt, it must be admitted, that he rather acted with levity, than on the broad principles of political or commercial wisdom, so necessary for the prosperity of the kingdom.

One of his first acts, regarding the political and commercial relations of England with the continent, or with foreign powers, proceeded from the adoption and improvement of the Act of Navigation, of 1651. The object of this Act was to encourage and employ British-built shipping, and British seamen navigating those ships, to the exclusion of foreigners, from the carrying trade of British staples, or British merchandize, domestic or colonial, to the countries with which these kingdoms might have commercial intercourse. <sup>(1)</sup>

This

(1)—Act for the general Encouragement and Encrease of Shipping and Navigation, 12 Car. II, cap. xviii.



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This Act, or the foundation of our naval superiority, will be found branching out, in its spirit and in its provisions, in the following treaties with the European powers.

It was natural for the English nation, after the disappointments which had arisen, from the predominance of factions, during the reign of the unfortunate Charles I., and during the political ascendancy, and bold, but criminal measures, of the Usurper, to wish for the continuance of such parts of these measures, as were favorable to trade; and it was not less natural for the King to renew the political and commercial relations of the Crown with the States General, and to give to those relations (as far as might be practicable) the same aspect which they possessed, before the subversion of the Monarchy. The King, thus, could gratify his subjects, by improving on those events which might give vigor to the trade of England, because the legal government of the kingdom could now sanction the foreign relations of his Crown.

Philip IV. of Spain (as has been stated in the Introduction to this work) was the first prince who acknowledged the restored sovereign, and revived the treaties of alliance and commerce with England, concluded at Madrid in 1630, and at London in 1604. <sup>(1)</sup>

It

(1)—Original Commission to Prince Louis of Nassau, and others, dated 5th October 1660, to conclude a Treaty with England.— Articles of Peace concluded between England and Holland, at Whitehall, 4th September 1662. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

It has been, also, noticed, that the States General, the natural ally of England, had so far returned to the renewal of their connexion, as to send Prince Louis of Nassau, and others, as envoys, to negotiate the revival of treaties; and, more particularly, the commercial relations with the English in the East-Indies, and their right to the Island of Polaroon; that is, the States were disposed to re-admit them to a participation in the trade to the Spice Islands. <sup>(1)</sup>

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It became more difficult for Charles to extend the Navigation Act, to the towns of the Hanseatic League; and therefore, with modifications, accommodated to the Act, and to their constitutions, he restored, by conventions and explanations, the commerce with them; but neither abandoned the the spirit of the Act, nor depressed the trade between England and the Hanse Towns. <sup>(2)</sup>

The treaty with Sweden, of the 21st October 1661, was a confirmation, or rather renewal of the treaty made by Cromwell, in 1654, by which, though the general trade between the two kingdoms was restored, the exceptions of the seizure of vessels, conveying naval or military stores to the ports

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of

(1)—Original Commission to Prince Louis of Nassau, and others, dated 5th October 1660, to conclude a Treaty with England.—Articles of Peace concluded between England and Holland, at Whitehall, 4th September 1662. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

(2)—Draft of Concessions relative to the Act of Navigation, dated in August 1661, granted by King Charles II. to the Cities of Hamburg, Dantzic, and Lubec. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

CHAP. II. of the enemies of either, were acknowledged by each, and  
*Introduction.* the ships declared to be lawful prizes. <sup>(1)</sup>

The treaty with Portugal, in June 1661, proceeded from a desire in both Crowns, to renew their ancient political and commercial connexions, and, at the same time, on the part of Portugal, to uphold its declining power in the East-Indies, by an alliance with England, that the English fleets might assist in preserving the remaining possessions of Portugal, or in recovering those which that Crown had lost, during its unfortunate union with Spain.

To open to view the sources of this treaty with Portugal, in its spirit and in its provisions, as far as they regarded the London East-India Company, it is necessary only to mention, that the Duke of Braganza had, in 1640, reclaimed this sovereignty from Spain, and had been engaged in long wars with that power, seeking to wrest it from him.

As Charles I., in the year 1642, had recognized, by treaty, the right of the Duke of Braganza, and as, in 1650, a part of the fleet, which had retained its allegiance to Charles II., had gone to Lisbon, a war was threatened by Cromwell, which terminated in a treaty, signed in July 1654; its King being then unable to defend himself against Spain and England.

Soon after the Restoration of Charles, the connexion between the two Crowns was strengthened, by a general treaty of  
 alliance,

(1)—Original Treaty between Charles II. and Charles XI. King of Sweden, dated 1st October 1661. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

alliance, commerce, and marriage; in which it was agreed, that all the treaties subsisting between Portugal and England, from the year 1641, should be confirmed and ratified; that Portugal should cede to England, its claims on the city and port of Tangier, and that an English fleet should be sent to take possession of the place; and the more effectually to consolidate the friendship between the two Crowns, that a marriage should be solemnized, between Charles and the Infanta Catherine of Portugal, who was to have, as a portion, an immediate payment of 2,000,000 of Portugal crowns. The political arrangements, however, in this treaty, discover not less sources of union between Great-Britain and Portugal, than of disputes between both Crowns, and the States General, in the East-Indies.

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By this treaty, the King of Portugal ceded the Island of Bombay and its dependencies to the Crown of England; granted permission to the English to trade to Diu, Goa, and Cochin; agreed, that if, by their joint forces, Ceylon should be recovered from the Dutch, the English should have right to what conquests might be made on that island (the town and fort of Columbo excepted), and that they should have a participation in the cinnamon trade.

By a secret article, Charles agreed to mediate a peace between Portugal and the States General, and to direct, that the force sent out to take possession of Bombay, should co-operate with the Portuguese, in defending their settlements; and

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that, from the date of the refusal to accept his mediation, whatever places the Dutch might conquer from the Portuguese, the forces of the King were to assist in recovering. <sup>(1)</sup>

Two leading objects, at this juncture, appear equally to have guided the English councils, and both were intimately connected with the preceding treaty:—on the one hand, Charles wished to support Portugal, in recovering its weight in the political balance of Europe, against any depression it might experience from Spain; and, on the other, to check any farther encroachments of the Dutch, on the Portuguese Asiatic possessions. These objects were wise and politic, considered in themselves; but improvident and impracticable, under the political and commercial relations between England, Spain, France, and the States General. Spain was in possession of the Netherlands, and, in fact, of the barrier between France and the States:—France, at this juncture, had no Asiatic interests, and, therefore, no political antipathy to Portugal:—the States General had Asiatic interests, and these were not more opposed to the renovation of the Portuguese power and trade, than to the progress of the trade of the London East-India Company:—so that, at home, Charles had

(1)—Original Ratification, by the King of Portugal, of the Treaty of Peace and Commerce between England and Portugal, and of Marriage between King Charles II. and the Infanta Catherine of Portugal; with the Secret Articles, relative to King Charles mediating a Peace between Portugal and the States General: concluded at Whitehall, 23d June 1661. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

had the alternatives, either to support the Dutch, who were depressing the English power in the East ; or to assist Spain in maintaining the Netherlands ; or to unite with France, in the project of extending its limits into this latter country, and to upset the barrier, and subsequently to depress the Dutch.

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Amid these difficulties, Charles, unhappily for himself and his kingdoms, sold Dunkirk (which had been taken possession of by Cromwell) to France, and thus opened to that rival country, an entrance into the Narrow Seas. This event took place at the very time, when, by his treaty with Portugal, he had agreed to unite the forces sent to the East-Indies to take possession of Bombay, with those of Portugal, to resist the encroachments of the Dutch. The narrowing of the Spanish barrier in Europe, alarmed the Dutch at home ; and the co-operation of the British and Portuguese forces in the East, alarmed them abroad, for the safety of their Asiatic trade and conquests:—the Dutch, at once, foresaw the probability of a war with England, and this war, in fact, took place in 1665.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was this war which led to an alliance between the Dutch and France, in which the object of Holland was to strengthen itself against the northern confederacy between England, Sweden, and Denmark, and to keep in check the English maritime power ; while that of France was to call off  
the

(1)—Original Treaty for the Sale of Dunkirk to France, 27th October 1662.—  
English Declaration of War against Holland, 22d February 1665. (Preserved in the  
State Paper Office.)

CHAP. II. *Introduction.* the attention of England from the necessity of the barrier of the Spanish Netherlands, and to facilitate its favorite object, of extending its northern frontier. The effect of these transactions was the reverse of what any of the parties in them expected; for it produced peace between Spain and Portugal, by the mediation of England; and though, by the memorable naval engagements between the Dutch and English, during this war, the strength of both was, for a time, diminished, the experience which both acquired in naval affairs, prepared them to resist the subsequent naval armaments of France, to depress each. These events, which affected the commercial interests of the Dutch and English in the East-Indies, will throw light on the Annals of the London East-India Company, and explain the efforts of both nations, in endeavouring to maintain their respective shares of Asiatic relations and trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Treaty of Alliance between England and Sweden, concluded at Stockholm, 1st March 1665; and original Ratification by the King of Sweden, of the Secret Article.— English Declaration of War against Denmark, 19th September 1666.— French Declaration of War against England, 27th January 1667.— English Declaration of War against France, 9th February 1667.— Original Treaty of Peace between England and Spain, concluded at Madrid, 23d May 1667, and Secret Articles, and King of Spain's Ratifications.— Original particular Treaty between the Kings of England and Spain, for making a Truce between Spain and Portugal for forty-five years, concluded 23d May 1667.— Original Treaty of Peace between Spain and Portugal, by the Mediation of England, dated 13th February 1667-8, with the original Ratification of the Prince and Queen of Portugal. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

The peace, at this juncture, between Spain and Portugal, by the mediation of England, gave to King Charles great influence on the continent, and prepared Europe for the Peace of Breda, which was to give tranquillity to England, to France, to Holland, and to Denmark. The sources of the Treaty of Breda (31st July 1667) are rather to be perceived in the actual situation of the belligerent powers, than in the mediation of Sweden; the influence of which could not have compelled England, or the States General, to open the negotiation, whatever effect it might have had in bringing Denmark to pacific terms.

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In order to perceive more readily the nature and objects of the Treaty of Breda, it may be proper, first, to advert to the substance of the treaty, between England and the States General; next, to that between England and France; and lastly, to that between England and Denmark.

The treaty between England and the States General assumed two aspects,—that of alliance, and that of commerce; the substance of the former is, as follows:—The possessions of the two countries to be restored to the basis on which they rested on the 21st of the preceding May. As the Island of Polaroon had, during the war, been seized on by the Dutch, it had become the property of the States General, and all disputes, as well regarding the East-Indies, as other parts, were agreed to be wholly obliterated: Surinam was yielded to the Dutch, and New York to the English, upon the principle of the



CHAP. II. the *Uti Possidetis*; and the Dutch consented to pay the  
*Introduction.* honors required to the English flag.

The substance of the treaty of commerce was, in general; the repeal of all prohibitory acts and proclamations issued during the war;—the explanation of the effect of the Act of Navigation, as far as regarded the States General, or that the produce of Germany, brought by the rivers which passed through the territories of the States General, should be deemed the produce of Holland;—Commissioners to be appointed, to examine and decide on commercial disputes;—and, in the mean time, the rule to be (altering the terms so as to render them applicable to the States General and to England) the regulations established, between France and Holland, from the 26th to the 42d article inclusive, or that neither of the contracting parties were to supply the enemies of the other with naval or military stores, but might carry on their commerce freely.

The substance of the treaty between France and England is, as follows;—cessation of hostilities;—edicts against either nation to be abrogated;—the oblivion of injuries;—free navigation and commerce;—release of prisoners, without ransom;—the restitution of the Island of St. Christopher's to England, and of the province of Acadia to France;—and restitution, in general, of the possessions of the two Crowns, as before the war.

The substance of the treaty between England and Denmark, was;—the cessation of hostilities;—the restitution of  
 places

places captured during the war;—and the oblivion of all injuries.

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The Treaty of Breda was formally guaranteed by an Act of the Ambassadors of the King of Sweden, dated at Breda, 27th August 1667.<sup>(1)</sup>

This treaty had scarcely been ratified, when the jealousies and opposing interests of the European powers again involved them in negotiations, and wars; with this difference only, that the powers which had been in alliance, previously to the Treaty of Breda, were to shift their relations, and to range themselves under the principle of maintaining the barrier of the Netherlands, by associations, which, had they preceded the Treaty of Breda, would have preserved the ancient line of Flanders, and not given an opportunity to Louis XIV., on his northern frontier, to occupy portions of that country, which, under a powerful monarchy, like Spain, were necessary to balance the power of France, to keep open the communications between Germany, the Netherlands, and the States General, and to preserve the ties of connexion between the Dutch and English, to the exclusion of the French marine from the Narrow Seas.

It was evident, even at this time, that both the Spanish and French ships of war could proceed against the trade,

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equally

(1)—Printed Copy of the Treaty of Breda, between England, Holland, France, and Denmark, 31st July 1667.— King of Sweden's original Guarantee of the Treaty of Breda, dated 27th August 1667. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

**CHAP. II.** *Introduction.* equally of England and the States General. The urgency of this circumstance led to the Triple Alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden, the accession of which last power can only be traced to so remote a cause as the Spanish interests in the Netherlands, in which the combined forces were to repel, and keep in check, the armies of France.

This event, or the Triple Alliance, proceeded from the conduct of Louis XIV., who, at the time he was negotiating the Treaty of Breda, and publicly in alliance with Holland, was making rapid conquests of the towns in Spanish Flanders, and approaching the Dutch frontier. This measure induced England to enter into a treaty of Defensive Alliance with the States General, dated 23d January 1668, and with Sweden, (influenced by Spain), to stop the French conquests, if not to recover them, as forming a part of the barrier. By this treaty, England and the States united those very fleets against France, which had improvidently been employed to destroy each other, and stipulated the military forces, (six thousand foot and four hundred horse each,) with which they were to defend the Netherlands. To this treaty the King of Sweden acceded, on the 25th April 1668.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Original Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Charles II. and the State General, dated 23d January 1668, with Separate Articles and Ratifications.—Original Treaty of Triple Alliance, between England, Holland, and Sweden, dated 25th April 1668, with Separate Articles and Ratifications. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

The treaty of Defensive Alliance between England and Holland was accompanied by a Marine Treaty, or Treaty of Commerce, dated 17th February 1668, of which the substance is ;—that the ships and vessels of the contracting powers should have free access to the ports of the respective countries, and be at liberty to carry all articles, warlike stores excepted ;—that, to prevent disputes, passports, authorized by the King and the States General, should be granted, the production of which was to be deemed a protection for the cargo ;—that the ships of war, of either power, were to keep without cannon shot of the trading vessels of each, and to send an officer only to examine their passes ;—and that these regulations were to apply to the vessels of both countries, even in the event of either of them being at war with any kingdom or state, the allies of the other. <sup>(1)</sup>

From these political and commercial circumstances of the contracting powers, it is natural to infer, that they had taken a decided line of conduct, or that the members of the Triple Alliance, and Spain, had determined to recover Spanish Flanders ; but the shifting politics, both of France and of England, at this juncture, distracted the views of the other powers, and led to the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, 15th April 1668, between England, Holland, and France ; and

D 2

this

(1)—Original Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between Charles II. and the States General, dated 17th February 1668. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

**CHAP. II.** this treaty gave Spain the alternative, only, of renewing its  
*Introduction.* claims to the late French conquests, or of narrowing its frontier from Dunkirk, in a line to the Bishoprick of Leige, which last alternative was accepted by Spain, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, between France and Spain, 2d May 1668: France, thus, gained the only advantage, while the other powers were left in a narrower situation, to resist the future aggressions of that Crown.<sup>(1)</sup>

In this state of the European balance, England formed treaties of commerce with Denmark and with Spain, to adjust the disputes in America, and in the West-Indies; while France, which, in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, had evidently no other view than to extend its frontier, persuaded Charles into an alliance, for the subjugation and division of the United Provinces; still leaving the flimsy pretext, of allowing the Spanish barrier to remain: but if this conquest had been made, that barrier would no longer have been of any value. That Charles was deceived by Louis XIV. in this transaction, appears, from the frivolous reasons assigned by him, for the war, *viz.* the irregular proceedings of the Dutch, at Surinam and the East-Indies, which had obliged him to join with France  
in

(1)—Original Treaty between England, Holland, and France, for mediating a Peace between France and Spain, concluded at St. Germain-en-Laye, 15th April 1668, with Separate Article and Ratifications.— Original Treaty of Peace between France and Spain, by the mediation of Holland and England, concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle, 2d May 1668, with Separate Articles and Ratifications. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

in subverting that very power, in Europe, which, from the reign of Elizabeth, had been the means of upholding the independence, and balancing the powers of the greater European states; while the pretext of Louis XIV. was only, that his farther toleration of the interferences of the Dutch with the greater powers of Europe, was inconsistent with his glory. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

The war, of course, between France and England on the one part, and the States General, on the other, took place. In this detail, it is necessary only to state, that the French army made a conquest of the provinces of Guelderland and Utrecht, while the troops of the Bishop of Munster (the ally of England) took possession of Overryssel, Zutphen, and Groningen, leaving to the States General the provinces of Holland and Zealand only; and that the battle of Solebay, whether considered as a victory or as a defeat, weakened the maritime powers, whose union and efforts had, hitherto, averted the universal monarchy projected by France.

The projects of Charles II. and Louis XIV. were not confined, at this crisis, to the destruction of the States General, as a sovereignty, in Europe, but went to the subver-  
sion

(1)—Original Ratification by the King of Denmark of a Treaty of Commerce with England, concluded at Copenhagen, 11th July 1670.— Original Treaty between England and Spain, relative to America and the West-Indies, concluded at Madrid, 18th July 1670.— Original Treaty of Alliance between Louis XIV. and Charles II., concluded at Whitehall, 12th February 1672, with Secret Articles and Ratifications. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)— English and French Declarations of War against Holland, dated 17th March and 6th April 1672.

**CHAP. II.** sion of their power and commerce in the East-Indies;—with  
*Introduction.* this view, a project of a treaty was concerted, for bringing  
 in the Prince of Portugal to be a party in the war, both that  
 he might have the temptation of recovering the possessions  
 in the East-Indies, of which the Dutch had dispossessed  
 that Crown, and that he might be secured against  
 farther losses of territories, or commerce, in that distant  
 quarter.

By this project, France was to furnish ten ships of war,  
 England ten, and Portugal twenty gallies and gallions:—the  
 fleets were first to seize on the Dutch colony at Saldanha  
 Bay; they were then to rendezvous at Goa; Cochin and  
 Cannanore were to be conquered, and restored to Portugal;  
 Ceylon was next to be reduced; Punto de Gallé ceded to  
 England, Negambo to France, and Columbo to Portugal, and  
 the cinnamon trade to be equally divided; Polaroon and Am-  
 boyna were to be obtained for England; and, in the event  
 of Spain attacking Portugal, France and England were to  
 unite their arms in its defence; and this treaty was to be fol-  
 lowed up by a commercial treaty between England and Por-  
 tugal. This transaction was to be kept secret, till the combined  
 fleets should put to sea. <sup>(1)</sup>

**During**

(1)—Project of an Offensive and Defensive Treaty between England, France, and Portugal, against the States General, 1673.—Project of a Treaty of Commerce between England and Portugal, January 1673. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

During this war, the united powers of France and England were opposed by the States General, in consequence of the assistance which they received from the Emperor, the Elector of Brandenburg, and the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, till the commencement of the year 1674; when, by the mediation of the Marquis del Fresno, the Spanish Ambassador, a separate treaty between England and Holland was concluded, at Westminster, on the 17th February 1674, of which the substance is:—cessation of hostilities within a limited period; satisfaction to be made to the English, respecting the ships and property detained at Surinam; the Marine Treaty of 1668 to be continued, until a new one could be formed; and the appointment of Commissioners, to settle disputes regarding the possessions and trade of both countries in the East-Indies.

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Introduction.

The Marine Treaty with Holland, to which reference was made in the eighth article of the Treaty of Peace, was concluded at Westminster, 11th December 1674, on the basis of the Marine Treaty of 1668.

It was found more difficult to settle the disputes, regarding the possessions and trade of the two nations, in the East-Indies. The Commissioners of each nation met, at London, agreeably to the ninth article of the Treaty of Peace; but as they could not come to an agreement within three months, as specified in the treaty, it was settled, that ten days farther time should be allowed, that is, from the 9th to the 19th

December



**CHAP. II.** December 1674: but it was not till the 18th of March following, that they fixed, in general terms, to refer the disputes to an arbiter, and agreed, that the ninth article of the Treaty of Peace had been fulfilled.<sup>(1)</sup>  
*Introduction.*

These treaties of peace and commerce between England and the States, in fact, only delivered the Dutch from one of their most powerful opponents, but left the barrier of the Netherlands exposed to the armies of France; and as it was followed by a commercial treaty between Charles II. and Louis XIV., an opportunity was given, to supply the French fleet with naval stores, to enable them to combat with, and destroy the Dutch navy; an evil, which, had it taken place, would have probably rendered the fleet of France superior to that of England, and not only destroyed the balance among the European powers, but endangered the marine and commerce of Great-Britain. The marriage, however, of the Prince of Orange with the Princess Mary, the King's niece, produced a more strict alliance with the States General; and the talents of that Prince, who now began to be considered

(1)—Original Commission from the States General to the Marquis del Fresno, to mediate a Peace between England and Holland, 12th February 1674.— Original Ratification of the Treaty of Peace between England and Holland, concluded at Westminster, 11th December 1674.— Original Marine Treaty between England and Holland, concluded at Westminster, 11th December 1674, with the Ratification and Agreements.— Original Declaration of the English and Dutch Plenipotentiaries, respecting the fulfilment of the Ninth article of the Treaty of Peace, relative to the East-Indies. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

sidered as the Preserver of the liberties of Europe, brought forward the Congress of Nimeguen, in 1678, for the general pacification of Europe, under the mediation of England and Holland.

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Introduction.

The treaty between France and Holland was signed at Nimeguen, 10th August; that between France and Spain, on the 17th September 1678; and that between France and the Emperor, on the 3d February 1679.<sup>(1)</sup>

It does not appear, that Charles, during the remainder of his reign, made any alterations in the relations established by the Treaty of Nimeguen, between England and foreign powers; for though he did not recede from his partiality towards France, yet he had either become too indolent, or too absorbed in pleasure, again to risk the perilous results of uncertain war.

There did not occur, during the short reign of James II., any event affecting the foreign relations of England, except the treaty with Louis XIV., for a neutrality in America, dated 16th November 1686, by which the foreign possessions of the two Crowns (even in the event of a war) were to be left unmolested by either; and as the French were, at this time, beginning to form a trade and factories in the East-Indies, this neutrality

During the  
reign of King  
James II.

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was

(1)—Printed Copy of the Treaty Marine between England and France, 14th February 1677.— Original Treaty of Defensive Alliance between England, and for procuring a general Peace, 26th January 1678; with the original Separate Articles and Ratifications; and printed Copies of the Treaties of Nimeguen, 1678. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

was deemed, by Louis XIV., favourable to his project of trade in the countries within the London Company's limits; anticipating, that, as he might there be opposed by the Dutch, his relations with England would be sufficient to afford protection to his subjects or factories in that distant quarter. This scheme, however, as well as the obvious intentions of France, to aggrandize itself in Flanders, Germany, and Holland, was the source of the league of the German Princes, at Augsburgh, formed, at this time, by the Prince of Orange; a measure which led to the Revolution, of 1688, in Great-Britain.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sketch of the political and commercial characters of the Native Powers in the Peninsula of India, during the reign of Aurungzebe.

II.—Having referred to the political and commercial relations of Great-Britain with the European powers, from the Restoration, to the Revolution, as a necessary preliminary to explain the sources of the proceedings of the London East-India Company, either in forming factories, or carrying on their commerce, we have to re-assume the historical abridgment of the actual political state of the countries within their limits, that from a knowledge of the great facts regarding them, we may measure the value and the extent of the Company's transactions.

In

(1)—Original Ratification, by Louis XIV., of the Treaty of Neutrality in America, concluded at Whitehall, 16th November 1686. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

In the Introduction to this work, we took a general survey CHAP. II.  
of the political character of the countries, from the Cape of *Introduction.*  
Good Hope to the Straits of Babelmandel, and of those bordering on the Gulfs of Arabia and Persia, with the object of ascertaining the practicability of trade with them; and, extending this survey to the Peninsula of India, sketched out the origin and progress of the Mogul Empire, from the reign of Acbar to the accession of Aurungzebe; a period coinciding, in chronology, with the Annals of the East-India Company, from their establishment, to the Restoration of King Charles II.; and the events, which we have detailed, have illustrated the character of the chiefships to the eastwards of the Peninsula of India, including Malacca, and such of the Eastern Islands (the Bandas, Moluccas, and Japan) with which the Europeans had hitherto temporary political and commercial intercourse: for, as yet, we do not find, that any direct trade had been practicable with China; on the contrary, that the interchanges with that country had come through the connexions between its junks, and the islanders in the farther Indian seas, and through them, in a very inferior degree, with the European traders.

With the object of throwing light on the Annals of the East-India Company, from the Restoration of Charles II. to the Revolution in England (1688), we must continue the general review of the political and commercial circumstances of the countries within the Company's limits;

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and, as the reign of Aurungzebe terminated only one year before the Union of the London and English East-India Companies, in 1708, it will be necessary to keep this detail unbroken, that we may trace the rise of those powers, in the Peninsula of India, which appeared during this reign, partly from the Hindoo States and Princes reclaiming their independence, and partly from the officers, who had commanded in the Mogul Provinces, beginning to lay the foundations of those lesser sovereignties, which we shall find contributing, in the sequel, to the subversion of the Empire.

State of the  
Mogul Em-  
pire, at the  
accession of  
Aurungzebe.

Aurungzebe became Emperor, under the title of Al-  
lumguire I., in 1659, and though Shah Jehan lived seven  
years after his degradation, he was a prisoner in the castle of  
Agra.<sup>(1)</sup>

The dominions of the Moguls, during the period of Shah  
Jehan's confinement, were considerably extended; for, at his  
death, in 1666, they stretched from Cabul to the Nerbuddah;  
westward of this river, to the Indus, and, to the eastward,  
comprehended Bengal and Orissa, and in the intermediate  
region, or the Decan, the countries of Brampore, Aurung-  
abad, Ahmednagur, and Beder, which had been reduced and  
consolidated into one government, bounded on the east, by  
Bahar,

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, page 3.—Dow's History of Hindostan (Edit. 1803) page 275.—Rennel's Introduction, page 61.—Bernier's History of the Revolution in the Mogul Empire.—Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 9, dates the accession of Aurungzebe, in 1657.

Bahar, on the west, by the hills of Concan, and on the south, by Golcondah and Visiapore. <sup>(1)</sup>

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Introduction.

Aurungzebe, after he became Emperor, affected the same devotion which had marked him in his contest with his brothers, and discovered a strength of understanding, and a knowledge of the characters of the people over whom he was placed, which qualified him to give a splendor to the Mogul Government, which it had not exhibited during any preceding period of its history.

Three objects marked the reign of Aurungzebe;—first, the suppression of the parties which adhered to his father's and to his brothers' interests; next, making conquests in the Decan, and, in general, the enlargement of his frontier; and, lastly, the consolidation of the Mogul system of government, and the enlargement of its resources.

The *first* of these objects, or the establishing himself permanently on that throne, which his ambition had led him to seize, may be traced in the following events.

His first object, or the consolidation of his power.

Aurungzebe's brothers had numerous adherents:—the popular character of Sultan Darah, as well as his residing at the capital, recommended him to the inhabitants of the central provinces:—at Delhi, in particular, he had many friends; and he was not, as yet, so positively ruined, but the shifting favors of fortune might again bring him forward, to reward the attachment and fidelity of his adherents:—he had also an  
army;

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, sect. 1. page 4, note 2d, in which the Indian authorities are enumerated.

CHAP. II. army; and his son, Soliman, was hastening with another to  
*Introduction.* join him:—aware of the active character of Soliman, Aurungzebe determined to destroy his army:—he knew how easy it was to detach the Indian soldiery from their allegiance, and he, therefore, sent his emissaries among them, to work partly on their fears, and partly on their avarice, and succeeded so completely, that, in a few weeks, desertion became so general, that this army was no longer formidable.

This unexpected reverse broke the high spirit of Darah, who abandoned an advantageous post, which he had taken on the banks of the Bea, and retreated from the province of Lahore.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sultan Sujah, during these transactions, assembled a considerable force at Allahabad, and marched to meet the army of Aurungzebe:—the conflict was long and obstinate:—the guards of the Princes, commanded by themselves, in person, encountered each other, with the most obstinate perseverance:—victory at last declared for Aurungzebe:—after his defeat, Sujah fled first to Patna, and next to Mongheer, and Aurungzebe returned towards Delhi, leaving his son, Mahomed, to pursue Sujah with ten thousand horse.<sup>(2)</sup>

Darah, who had passed the Desert, again made his appearance at the head of an army:—in his flight, he applied  
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(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii. pages 286, 290, 292.—Bernier's History of the Revolution in the Mogul Empire.

(2)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii., pages 296—304.—Orme's Historical Fragments, note 10.—Bernier's History of the Revolution in the Mogul Empire:

to Shah Nawaz, the governor of the province of the Guzzerat ; and was joined by the troops of the Maha-Rajah, who had lately revolted from Aurungzebe ; but this chief was easily seduced, and, in an unexpected and critical moment, deserted the cause of Darah.<sup>(1)</sup>

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Aurungzebe approached the camp of Darah, who had taken an advantageous position in Agimere, which was fortified and defended by a small body of European artillery, composed of Portuguese, French, and English, whom he had collected for this service. On this occasion, Aurungzebe had recourse to stratagem, and having among his followers two Indian chiefs, who had formerly been attached to the army of Soliman, Darah's son, employed them in the scheme of surprising his brother's camp ;—these men were sent to Darah, with professions of penitence for their past treachery, and with an offer to betray Aurungzebe, as a proof of their new sincerity :—Darah listened to the plausible tale, and confided in their promises :—it was agreed, that they should march out of Aurungzebe's camp, as if they intended to attack that of Darah, and then throw off the mask, and join his army :—Darah, the following morning, beheld their approach, with anxious hopes of the important change in his favor, which it would have produced :—they marched up to his trenches, entered them without opposition, but, instead of turning on his

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii., pages 308—315.— Orme's Historical Fragments, Note 10.— Bernier's History of the Revolution in the Mogul Empire.



**CHAP. II.** his enemy, opened a passage for Aurungzebe's army :—a complete defeat was the consequence ; Darah's army was dispersed, and his misfortunes were now drawing to a close.

*Introduction.*

Darah fled towards the Desert of Scindi, where his friends forsook him :—after a thousand hardships, he reached its other extremity, and took refuge with Jihon-Chan :—Jihon made fair promises to support him, but secretly sent offers to Aurungzebe to deliver him into his power :—Aurungzebe hesitated not a moment to accept this offer, and Darah and his son became his prisoners :—as soon as they were in the tyrant's power, he conducted them to Delhi, and ordered them to be led, with every mark of ignominy, in his procession through the streets of that capital, and then employed two Afghans, to enter Darah's prison the following night, and put him to death, on the 11th September 1659.<sup>(1)</sup>

The fate of Sujah seems to have been equally tragical :—After his defeat, he retreated towards Tanda, where he had made a halt, expecting to be reinforced with troops which had been levied in the lower Bengal ; to prevent a surprise on his camp, he had collected, like Darah, a small train of European artillery, and hoped, by this expedient, to hold out, till he should bein force to meet his enemies in the field. Mahomed, whom Aurungzebe had left to pursue his uncle, was joined by the Vizier Jumlah, and by the greatest part of the Imperial

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii., pages 316—334. — Orme's Historical Fragments, Note 10. — Bernier's History.

Imperial army ; the destruction of Sujah seemed now certain : and was only warded off, for a short time, by an incident ; Mahomed, anterior to these fatal wars, had been the lover of Sujah's daughter ; to this Sultan, therefore, he deserted. Jumlah, on this occasion, took the decisive step of leading the army to battle : this, alone, could prevent their desertion, as individuals, or stop them, as a body, from taking part with the Prince.

CHAP. II.  
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The army of Jumlah was superior to that of Sujah, in discipline and in numbers ;—the battle was bloody, but the victory, on the part of Jumlah, was decisive, and Sujah escaped in the pursuit :—in this situation, Aurungzebe again had recourse to artifice and to intrigues :—he knew that Sujah was naturally suspicious and credulous, and therefore sent his emissaries, to report, that the conduct of Mahomed was in concert with his father, and that both of them had formed a scheme for his destruction ; Sujah fell into the snare, and seized on Mahomed as a traitor, and sent him prisoner to Aurungzebe.

The conduct of Aurungzebe towards his son, convinced Sujah, though too late, of his error :—the unfortunate Mahomed was thrown into prison, there to bear a long and unmerited punishment : Jumlah, on the other hand, had the highest encomiums for his wise and decisive conduct bestowed upon him ; for this stern and unfeeling officer was a fit servant for Aurungzebe, and his future conduct justified the increased confidence which was reposed in him.

CHAP. II. Sujah, driven out of the Bengal provinces, fled into  
*Introduction.* Aracan :—Jumlah, as he could not follow him into that coun-  
 try, sent to its Rajah, and by operating, partly on his fears,  
 and partly on his avarice, persuaded him, first to distress the  
 Sultan, and then to pursue him with a force, which his few  
 followers could neither resist nor repel, and in his flight he  
 was driven into a river, where he perished. <sup>(1)</sup>

Aurungzebe had now either enclosed in prisons, or cut  
 off, the pretenders to the Crown, and, at last, considered  
 the possession of it to be secure :—he soon, however, found,  
 that the same sources from which he had drawn down misery  
 on others, were about to pour it on himself :—his second son,  
 Mahomed Mauzim, had already secretly begun to indulge the  
 hopes of finding means and opportunity to dethrone his  
 father :—Mauzim had talents and hypocrisy, equal to his  
 ambition ;—for a time he kept his intentions concealed, but as  
 they ripened, and were drawing near to execution, they could  
 not escape the notice of Aurungzebe's emissaries, nor be con-  
 cealed from himself :—the affectation of forgiveness in the  
 father, was followed by pretensions of gratitude in the son :  
 —Aurungzebe, soon after this event, was seized with a  
 fever, and this disorder, easily magnified itself, in the ima-  
 gination of the Prince, to be dangerous and mortal ;—the  
 near

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii, pages 336—352. — Orme's Historical  
 Fragments, page 69, Note 31. — Bernier's History of the Revolution in the Mogul  
 Empire.

near and unexpected appearance of possessing the throne, convinced Aurungzebe that his son was still taking measures to seize on it :—Jehan was still alive, though in prison, and Aurungzebe was apprehensive, that a war with his son might draw on a new and serious contest ; and, therefore, had recourse to his usual address, and, instead of using force, extricated himself out of this difficulty, by a seeming reconciliation with his son. Shah Jehan's death, soon after this event, relieved him from one of his anxieties, and lowered Mauzim's hopes ;—it was the general opinion, that he died by poison, administered to him by Aurungzebe's orders : be that as it may, Aurungzebe made this event subservient to a scheme of recommending himself to his subjects, by pretensions to filial affection, and compunction for his past crimes. <sup>(1)</sup>

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Introduction.

The *second* object of Aurungzebe's reign was to reduce the Decan, and, in general, to enlarge the frontiers, and, at the same time, the resources of his empire.

His second object, or the conquest of the Decan.

To trace the progress of Aurungzebe, in his acquisition of territory, we must take a chronological view of his mixed military and political projects. The wars in the northern parts of his dominions prevented this Prince, at his accession, from prosecuting his plan of conquest in the Decan, which he had originally projected, at the time he was Governor of the dependent countries of Brampore, Aurungabad, Ahmednagur, and Beder, which had been reduced by the Moguls into one

F 2 government,

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii, pages 358, 359.—Bernier's History of the Revolution in the Mogul Empire.

CHAP. II. *Introduction.* government. As the time approached when he was to realise this plan, a new power was rising up in that quarter of the Peninsula, which, from local circumstances, or from the number of its inhabitants, furnished the means of opposing his army, and, in the sequel, “able to retaliate, on his successors, the injuries of his sword.” <sup>(1)</sup>

Origin and progress of the power of Sevagee.

This new power took its origin in the active mind and talents of Sevagee, the founder of the Mahratta Empire. Sevagee was descended from the highest cast among the Rajpoot Tribes, that of Chitore; he had been employed, with his brothers, in the service of the King of Visiapore, but being suspected by the ministers of that Prince, had retired with a few followers to the mountains near the sea coast;—the security of this retreat, and his influence in the army of Visiapore, brought numbers into his service, while his lineage induced many of the Rajpoots to attach themselves to him:—he offered them the plunder of the open country, and interested their religious prejudices, by carrying on war against their oppressors, the Mahomedans. The King of Visiapore sent a considerable force against him, under Abdul, whom Sevagee seduced into a conference, and, while making submissions to him, stabbed him:—a body of Sevagee’s followers, who lay in ambush, at the moment rushed on the retinue of this general, and cut them to pieces. <sup>(2)</sup>

Aurungzebe,

(1)—Orme’s Historical Fragments, page 5.

(2)—Orme’s Historical Fragments, pages 5, 6.—Scott’s History of the Decan (Edition 1794) vol. ii, page 8.

Aurangzebe, who, at this time, commanded in the Decan, congratulated Sevagee on his success against Visiapore, in the hope that he might render it an easy conquest to himself;—to add to Sevagee's power, he gave him two or three forts, on the limits of Visiapore, on his promising that, if he conquered that country, he would hold it of the Mogul.

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

Sevagee next directed his arms against Pannela, one of the strongest fortresses in the Decan, and took it by stratagem: he then defeated the army, sent against him, under Abdul's son, and persuaded a considerable body of that general's cavalry to join him:—he next marched up to the walls of Visiapore, but was obliged to fall back towards Pannela, which Siddee-Jore, who held the government of Danda-Rajahpore, under the King of Visiapore, was then besieging:—by another stratagem, at the moment this town was disposed to surrender, Sevagee got into Danda-Rajahpore, and thus, instead of losing his former conquest, made a new one, of the capital of the besiegers.

Sevagee next attempted to get possession of the fortified island of Gingerah and of Rajahpore:—it was defended by the heir of Siddee-Jore, who treated with the generals of Aurungzebe in the Guzzerat and in the Decan, and offered to surrender it, and the whole fleet of Visiapore, to them: these offers were readily accepted, and, in return, he was appointed Admiral of the Mogul, with an annual assignment of the revenues

CHAP. II. revenues of Surat, and was to be assisted in defending himself,  
*Introduction.* in his new situation, against Sevagee. <sup>(1)</sup>

Affairs were in this situation, at the accession of Aurungzebe; so that, now, the opposition, which he had dreaded from Visiapore, had become less formidable to him, and, in 1661, his schemes of conquest, in that quarter, were apparently more practicable. The King of Visiapore the following year died, and left his dominions to his son, a minor: Sevagee (as we shall afterwards find) soon reduced the dominions of Visiapore, along the sea coast of Concan, and, at the same time, encouraged the piratical practices of the inhabitants of the remaining sea coast, and laid the neighbouring districts under contribution. Aurungzebe, who had hitherto considered Sevagee as an useful instrument, in 1663 began to discover, that he had been fostering and encouraging an enemy, who could more effectually check his schemes of conquest, than that power which he had weakened, and, in a manner, subverted; Chaest-Chan, the maternal uncle of Aurungzebe, was therefore sent to oppose him, with a considerable army. Sevagee, who had hitherto been held as depending on the Moguls, and the enemy of the King of Visiapore, now directed his attacks against the Siddee, who had become their professed vassal: he began his new career, by laying waste the country between Ahmednagar and Aurungabad:—it was on this occasion, that Aurungzebe sent Chaest-Chan with instructions to stop Sevagee in his predatory incursions, and, if possible, to extirpate him and

(1) Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 7—11.

and his adherents; Chaest easily reduced Sevagee's lesser outposts, and, at last, besieged Chagnah, situated in the open country, but on a rock, inaccessible by assault, which he took by stratagem. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

In the next campaign, Aurungzebe reinforced Chaest-Chan's army, by sending the troops of the Maha-Rajah of Joudpore to join him. These generals were at variance with each other;—the Maha-Rajah, to gratify Sevagee, undertook to assassinate Chaest:—the murderers broke in on Chaest, who escaped with a severe wound; but his son was slain:—this event checked the progress of Aurungzebe's army, during the remainder of the campaign:—Sevagee took this opportunity to form the sieges of Bassein and Chaul, but his real object was Surat:—he entered this city by surprise, and though not able to reduce the castle, carried off an immense booty. On this occasion, the English, under Sir George Oxinden, defended their factories, preserved their property, and, as will appear in the sequel, obtained exemptions from the payment of customs, and new commercial privileges.<sup>(2)</sup>

To revenge this injury, Aurungzebe, in 1664, sent the whole of the Decan army against Sevagee's territories: the command was given to Jysing, the Rajah of Abnir,—the  
secret

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii, pages 364—367.— Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 12, 13, Notes 10, 11.

(2)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 14—16.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 10. — Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 1663-64.



CHAP. II. *Introduction.* secret instructions of this officer were to entice Sevagee into an agreement to go to Delhi :—Aurungzebe, afterwards, gave him the strongest assurances of safety ; but, on Sevagee's arrival at the capital of the Mogul, the wife of Chaest-Chan, in revenge for the defeat of her husband, solicited Aurungzebe to put Sevagee to death : Sevagee complained to the Emperor of this intended treachery : Aurungzebe renewed his assurances, and asked Sevagee to assist him in the war against Candahar, to which he assented, provided he could bring his own army into the field, and was allowed to send for them :—by this expedient, he escaped from Delhi to his advanced parties, crossed the Jumna, and after a well planned flight, joined his army in the Guzzerat, and again pillaged Surat.<sup>(1)</sup>

The campaign against Sevagee, in 1665, was opened by an army, composed of all the troops in Aurungabad and Ahmednagur :—Sevagee kept to his original plan of desultory warfare, with the object of conquering the country between the hills and the sea :—after so many proofs of romantic bravery and political address, Aurungzebe was satisfied he could neither reduce nor assassinate Sevagee, and therefore laid a plan for his destruction, with great address and foresight :—it was agreed with his son, Mauzim, that he should revolt and join Sevagee, then seize him, and send him to Delhi.

Mauzim,

(1)—Orme's *Historical Fragments*, pages 16—20, Note 12.—Dow's *History of Hindostan*, vol. iii, pages 388—394.—Scott's *History of the Decan*, vol. ii, pages 13—16.

Mauzim, for this purpose, marched into the Decan, at the head of a large army, with which he lay in a state of inaction, at the time Sevagee was sending his parties to the gates of Visiapore :—the Mogul soldiers murmured at this apparent misconduct of Mauzim, and their generals sent complaints against him to Aurungzebe :—the Emperor openly expressed his suspicions of his son's intentions, but answered the complaints of his generals, by ordering the most implicit obedience to be paid to Mauzim, that his real intentions might be discovered :—this dissimulation was not even suspected, and Mauzim thought this the time to apply to Sevagee for his assistance, but Sevagee was afraid of treachery, and was confirmed in this opinion, not from any intelligence he could collect by his spies at Delhi, but from Aurungzebe's inactivity ; though the adherents of Mauzim were severely punished by the Emperor.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Persian frontier had always been an object of attention to the Moguls, and it became particularly so in 1666, during the reign of the Sophi, Shah Abbas II., who threatened an invasion by Candahar :—both nations were preparing for the contest, when the death of Shah Abbas restored peace, and left the Patan tribes of Pishwar and Cabul, who had engaged to take part with the Persians, open to an attack by Aurungzebe.<sup>(2)</sup>

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In

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 21—27.

(2)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 27, 28.—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii, pages 399—410.

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

In 1667, Mauzim was removed from the command of the army, which was entrusted to Bahadar Chan:—Sevagee was, at this time, in possession of the territory from Goa to Damaun, in length about two hundred and forty miles:—a chain of mountains, at no place more than fifty, or less than thirty miles from the sea, runs along this coast:—these hills are like a connected wall; and the *Gauts*, or passages from them, are inaccessible, except by winding and intricate paths:—he likewise possessed several of the strongest towns; Pannela, Saler Molier, on the Tapti, and Rairee; and, except Chaul, which was occupied by the Portuguese, commanded the sea coast, from the river of Rajapore to the river Pen.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sevagee, in 1669, appeared unexpectedly before Surat, which obliged Aurungzebe to reinforce the army, and to order ships to be built, to carry troops for making descents on the shores of the Concan; and yet, in 1670, Sevagee entered the town of Rajapore, and plundered the inhabitants.<sup>(2)</sup>

Sevagee again appeared before Surat, in 1671, and levied heavy contributions on the inhabitants:—this event produced an order to Delhire Chan, to invade the upper, or northern country of Sevagee, who took Penna Chaukna:—to stop his progress,

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 28, 30.

(2)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 33—35, Note 18.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 25.— Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 30th March 1670.

progress, Sevagee threw supplies into Saler-Molier, at the time Delhire Chan was expecting an attack from him at Jenneah: Sevagee next sent off the greatest part of his army to burn the Mogul fleet, commanded by the Siddee, at Surat :—in this attempt, however, his general, Morar Pundit, failed :—Sevagee was more successful himself, in seizing on the districts of Gour and Ramnagur, and in laying the Portuguese settlement at Damaun under contribution.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

After a confinement of two years, Mauzim was again entrusted with the command in the Decan, and Delhire Chan accompanied him, to watch over his conduct :—during this stage of the war, the hostilities of the European Powers, having commercial interests in the East-Indies, were supported by considerable armaments, and their contests began to appear of consequence to the Native Powers:—Sevagee, having been foiled in his project of capturing or destroying the Siddee's fleet, looked to the Europeans for assistance, and the following events gave him the opportunity :—

The Dutch, having narrowed the power of the Portuguese, were, in their turn, opposed in India, by the united squadron of France and England. Monsieur De la Haye, the French commander, attempted to form an establishment at Trincomalé, but was repulsed by Rickloff van Goens, Governor of Ceylon: De

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la

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 35—38.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 28.

CHAP. II. *Introduction.* la Haye, after this repulse, landed on the Coast of Coromandel, and took St. Thomé from the King of Golcondah; and while this Prince was preparing to retake the place, Sevagee, at the head of ten thousand horse, attacked Golcondah, prepared for an irruption into the Carnatic, appeared before Hyderabad, which he laid under a heavy contribution, and with this treasure returned to Rairee, without any interruption from Sultan Mauzim, then advancing from Aurungabad, towards Golcondah; while the Siddee, as the officer of the Mogul, attempted to enter the harbour of Bombay, and to pillage the Corlahs, or districts, in its vicinity.<sup>(1)</sup>

The death of the King of Visiapore, at this crisis, and the assumption of the Crown by a collateral Prince (not the heir of the late King) were events from which Sevagee hoped to derive advantage, by making conquests along the Malabar Coast:—for this purpose he endeavoured to create dissention among the dependents on the Crown of Visiapore, and then suddenly descended the Gauts, with an army, into the country on the eastern side of the mountains, near Carwar and Goa:—this tract abounded with manufacturing villages, which traded to the capital and to the sea:—the booty which he carried off was immense:—after conveying his plunder to Rairee, he put in execution his principal plan, or an attack on the country, situated south of Carwar, and still a part of the kingdom of Visiapore.

The

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 38—42.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 31—35.

The Phousdar of Carwar, in 1673, revolted from Visiapore:—Sevagee watched till the army of that country was sent to reduce this chief, and then made a sudden attack on Sattarah, which surrendered to him, and added, by its being a deposit of riches, to the plunder with which he was filling his treasury.

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Introduction.

The next object of Sevagee was the siege of Pundah, which was saved by the strength of the fortifications, and though he continued before it till the following year, retired, after making a kind of truce with its governor; if unsuccessful in this attempt, he carried his general point, of reducing all the coast, from Rajahpore to the island of Bardez, belonging to the Portugueze, and separated only by the harbour from the city and island of Goa.

It was on this success, that Sevagee assumed the title of *King of the Mahratta Nations*:—he had recovered the ancient territories to the Hindoos, on the sea-coast, from the Island of Bardez, which belonged to the Portuguese, to the river Tapti; though Chaul, Bassein, and Damaun still remained to them, and Surat was in the hands of the Mogul. <sup>(1)</sup>

In this state of power, the Mahrattas made their first demand of the *Chout* from the districts of the Portuguese round Bassein. The *Chout* signified the fourth part of the revenues of the countries which the Mahrattas invaded, and was

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 46—57, Note 25.

CHAP. II. was paid to procure an exemption from their depredations :  
*Introduction.* —they founded this demand on a pretended right, that these districts, in ancient times, had belonged to a Mahratta Rajah : it does not, however, appear, that the Governor of Bassein complied with the demand. <sup>(1)</sup>

The attention of Aurungzebe, in 1675, was divided by a new, but not less dangerous enemy, than Sevagee, the Patans of Pishwar and Cabul ; who, in 1673, had cut off several detached parties of the imperial troops, and obliged the Mogul Governor of Pishwar to pass the Indus, with his army, to stop their farther inroads ; who, instead of effecting this service, was, with his army, surrounded and destroyed, in the defiles of the mountains.

Enthusiasm and political intrigue were the distinguishing characters of the Patans, of which they gave frequent proofs ;—and to embarrass Aurungzebe, in his plan of reducing them to obedience, they set up a soldier, who happened to resemble in face, person, and manner, the unfortunate Sujah, and published that this Sultan had been miraculously preserved among them, and was now to re-appear, and to assert his just right to the Crown of Delhi :—with this view, they proclaimed this adventurer, King of Hindostan, and were ready to support him with a powerful army : Aurungzebe, aware of the danger, took the field in person, and required all the Mahomedans to join him ;  
 and

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 62, 63.

and Sultan Mauzim was recalled from the Decan, to take charge of the Government, during the Emperor's absence from the capital.

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

Aurungzebe conducted a formidable army beyond the Indus :—his advanced guard was cut off; but when the main army advanced, the Patans evaded a general engagement, and confined their operations to the defence of their posts, and to assaults on his camp, during the night, and by this caution protracted the war for fifteen months :—the Patans, at last, retired from the habitable vallies to their inaccessible mountains, to which Aurungzebe found it impracticable to pursue them, and therefore established a chain of posts, to check their future irruptions, and returned to Delhi, in 1678, after an absence of twenty-seven months, leaving a force, under Cossim Chan, an experienced officer, to awe this people into obedience. <sup>(1)</sup>

During Aurungzebe's absence, the state of affairs, on the side of the Decan, was by no means improved :—the Governor of Pundah, when he found Sevagee engaged in distant hostilities, returned to his dependence on Visiapore :—this perfidy Sevagee punished; and, giving a large bribe to Bahadar Chan, the Imperial commander, for a cessation of hostilities, marched against Pundah, and got possession of it, in April 1675. Having secured his principal object, he laid waste the whole territory of Pundah, burnt

Continuation  
of the wars  
between Au-  
rungzebe and  
Sevagee in the  
Decan.

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 62, 72, 91, and 92, notes 31, 32, and 45.



**CHAP. II.** burnt the town of Carwar (the English factory excepted),  
*Introduction.* reduced the whole country, to the river Mirzeon, the northern limit of the kingdom of Canara, and then marched to Rairee.<sup>(1)</sup>

Aurungzebe, on his return, in 1675, from the Indus, issued orders to Bahadar-Chan and to the Siddee, to prosecute the war against Sevagee with vigour:—Bahadar sat down before Gallian:—this place, with the country below the hills, stretches as far north as Damaun, and (the districts of the Portuguese excepted) had been reduced by Sevagee, but lay exposed to the Mogul army;—to prevent the desolation with which it was threatened, Sevagee gave Bahadar a bribe of ten thousand pagodas:—the Siddee was not included in this agreement, but sailed along the coast, and burned the town of Vingorlah, near Goa:—to oppose the Siddee, Sevagee had been equipping a fleet, which amounted to fifty-seven sail, fifteen of which were grabs, the remainder gallivats:—this fleet sailed from Geriah and Rajahpore, to meet that of the Siddee, who had already proceeded to the relief of Gingerah:—during this interval, in 1676, Siddee Cossim's fleet, which rode off Mazagong, was detached to reinforce Gingerah, which Morah Pundit, descending the Gauts, was approaching with ten thousand men.<sup>(2)</sup>

Sevagee, in 1677, marched, with his whole army, to attack the kingdom of Visiapore: his route lay by Tripety,  
 and

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 72 and 73.

(2)—Ibid. - - - - - pages 74—78.

and he approached within fifteen miles of Madras :—on this occasion he took Gingee and Volcondah, and other forts, in the month of July, while his parties plundered the country of Mysore, as far as Seringapatam. The Mogul considered that Sevagee had in view a predatory incursion only ; but he soon found that his real object was to form a permanent establishment ; for he fixed on Gingee, as the capital of his new conquests, and appointed Hargee-Rajah to be his vicegerent, and remained in the Carnatic, till 1678, that he might more effectually consolidate his power. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

It is difficult to account for the politics of Aurungzebe, in permitting Sevagee to invade and establish himself in the Carnatic ; because Visiapore became as much exposed to attacks from that quarter, as it had been from the Concan, while the countries to the south of the Coleroon were open to the irruptions of Sevagee's troops from Gingee ; and it was to repair this fault, that Aurungzebe sent Delhire Chan with a separate command, and orders to press the conquest of Visiapore, if he could not make impression on the dominions of his opponent.

Sevagee, who took advantage of every event to aggrandize his own, and to check the progress of the Mogul power, now thought it the proper time for him to offer his assistance to the King of Visiapore :—by this address, he both kept the

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Mogul

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 82—87, Notes 35—39.

**CHAP. II.** Mogul at a stand, and Visiapore as a barrier to his own dominions. <sup>(1)</sup>  
*Introduction.*

As the talents and success of Sevagee had hitherto been the principal check on the progress of the Mogul, and on the operations of the Siddees, after the Visiapore Government had alternately leaned to the one side, or to the other, it is impossible to have a clear estimate of Aurungzebe's reign, during this active period of it, but by bringing into view the characters of the different powers with which he had to act, or to contend.

*Origin of the Siddees.*

The Siddees owe their origin to a few natives of Abyssinia, who having gained some ascendancy over a King of Visiapore, and being Mahomedans, had collected numbers, both of their countrymen, and of the Coffrees, from Africa, and, by their valour and enterprize, had been useful in defending the maritime districts of that kingdom. When Sevagee revolted from it, three of its principal provinces were governed by Siddees, of whom the admiral was one:— he had under his jurisdiction a considerable extent of coast, to the north and south of Gingerah, at the very time when Sevagee got possession of Danda-Rajahpore:—it was from their dread of Sevagee's power, that we have seen the Siddees putting themselves under the protection of the Mogul Government, but reserving Gingerah as their particular retreat:—

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 94, 95, Note 42.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 46—49.

treat :—Siddee-Sambolee was the head of them, but his captains preserved a distinct command over their crews and dependents, and a council of them decided on the affairs of this singular association :—they were considered as the navigators of India, and held themselves to be not inferior to the Europeans :—Siddee-Cossim commanded the fleet, in 1675, which visited Bombay, and relieved Gingerah ; and Siddee-Sambolee, at the same time, sailed from Surat, on a cruize against the Mahratta coasts. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

The Visiapore Government, we have already seen, had become a common sacrifice to the ambition of the Mogul, and to the successful attacks of Sevagee ; and was weakened, equally by its alliances, and by its opposition to either :—we have, in particular, referred to its losses on the side of Sevagee's country, as well as to the acquisitions which that chief had made from it, on the side of the Carnatic.

The Carnatic, about 1656, was divided between the sovereigns of Visiapore and Golcondah : to Visiapore, belonged Vellore, and all the forts in the valley of Viniambadi ; it had also the strong holds on the hills on each side, as far as Darmapuram :—from thence, eastward, it comprehended the districts of Volcondah, and along the river Valara, on which is situated the town of Porto Novo : from thence it ran along the coast, to the north, as far as the Coleroon :—Visi-

State of Visiapore and Golcondah, at this juncture.

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apore

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 78—81.

**CHAP. II.** apore had also the forts and districts between Conimere and  
*Introduction.* Vellore, but it does not appear that Tanjore belonged to it.

Golcondah comprehended all the hilly country which stretches north of Vellore, from Gundicottah, toward the sea coast, between the rivers Penar and Palliar, that run into the sea at Nellore and Sadras.<sup>(1)</sup>

*Progress of  
Aurungzebe,  
in subjugating these  
kingdoms.*

Such were the powers against whom Aurungzebe had to contend; and, from their force and situation, it was evident that they might furnish him with active scenes, which would retard his favourite plan of enlarging and consolidating the Mogul Empire

The Siddees, in 1678, still retained Gingerah, and laid waste the Mahratta coasts:—as the fleet of the Siddee had found shelter at Bombay, a force was sent to destroy his ships in the harbour:—this was successfully opposed, as will appear in the sequel, by the English ships, and by the garrison:—Dowlat Chan, who commanded Sevagee's ships, on this occasion, burnt several villages in the Portuguese districts, because the Governor of Bassein had refused him permission to cross to the island of Bombay, by Tannah: he sent also a part of his troops, by Pannela to Damaun, and to plunder round Surat, while Sevagee himself conducted the ineffectual siege of Gingerah.<sup>(2)</sup>

Aurungzebe,

(1)—Orme's *Historical Fragments*, pages 83—86, Note 38.

(2)—*Ibid.* . . . . . pages 96—100, Note 44.

Aurangzebe, who had so many enemies to resist, took, at this juncture, a line of conduct, which seems hardly compatible with his policy, or to extirpate the inoffensive worship of the Hindoos:—in this project he proceeded, first by bribing a few petty Rajahs to embrace the Mahomedan faith, and then persecuted the Hindoos with relentless severity, for what he considered to be an obstinate adherence to their superstition:—many of them, to avoid the horrors of martyrdom, left their houses for obscure retreats, and abandoned agriculture and the useful arts:—his revenues were consequently diminished, and his officers in the provinces explained this persecution to be the cause of the deficiencies.

CHAP. II.

*Introduction.*

His persecution of the Hindoos, the source of their union against the Mogul government.

Abnir, which adjoins to the west of the province of Agra, and to the north of Agimere; Chitore, which lies to the west of Malwah; and Joudpore, which is situated to the west of Chitore, and extends to the Indus, were the principal seats of the Hindoo religion:—the Rajahs of these countries were able to bring two hundred thousand fighting men into the field:—Jysing, the Rajah of Abnir, and Jesswont-Sing, the Rajah of Joudpore, had contributed to the elevation of Aurungzebe; but no mention, in this transaction, is made of the Ranah, or Rajah of Chitore, who held the first rank among them:—Jysing was poisoned soon after this period, and it was supposed by the emissaries of Aurungzebe:—his son, Ram-Sing, was at Delhi, at the time of his father's death, and was obliged to submit to a capitation tax in his dominions:—by this con-

cession

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

cession Aurungzebe held himself to be his lord paramount, and proposed that Ram-Sing “ should no longer strike coin in his own name; that the Pagodas should be demolished, or converted into Mosques; and that justice should be administered according to the Alcoran: if these terms were refused, his whole people were to be subjected to the general capitation of the Hindoos.” The Ranah remonstrated, and prepared for war :—in October 1678, Aurungzebe took the field with two armies ;—one conducted by himself, against Chitore and Joudpore; the other by Sultan Mauzim against Sevagee, who had joined the confederacy of his countrymen :—the Ranah, and the widow of the Rajah of Abnir, called upon all the Hindoos to defend their liberties and their religion :—Sultan Mauzim advanced to Brampore, and soon afterwards fixed his residence at Aurungabad.<sup>(1)</sup>

The conflict between the armies would have been immediate and bloody; but it was averted by an event, which predicted ruin to the Hindoo allies :—Sambagee, the son and heir of Sevagee, secretly corresponded with the Imperialists, and, at last, deserted with two thousand horse, from Rairee to Aurungabad; nor was this unexpected blow to Sevagee, single: Bullull-Chan, the Minister of Visiapore, and Cowis-Chan, one of the Siddees, had been assassinated, and their successors took part with Sultan Mauzim: a mind, less intrepid and vigorous than that which Sevagee possessed, would have been  
overset

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, page 100—106, Notes 48, 49.

overset by these dangers ; but they served only to rouse him to greater exertion :—he detached a large party to lay waste the country round Surat; collected a fleet of twenty two-masted grabs, and forty gallivats, and took possession of the small islands of Kenery and Henery, within a short distance of the harbour of Bombay, to force the Governor of that island into a neutrality.

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

Sevagee next endeavoured to procure a passage for five thousand men, by Bassein, into the Island of Bombay, but was refused by the Portuguese ; and a negotiation for peace was opened, between him and the Governor of that island.<sup>(1)</sup>

During these transactions, Sevagee marched towards Visiapore, at the head of twenty thousand horse :—a general action ensued, in which his son fought against him ; and for the first time, he was defeated, but not conquered :—this misfortune he endeavoured to repair, by uniting with the discontented Rajah of Berar, and they laid waste the country between Aurungabad and Brampore, and plundered the English factories at Chupra and Dongong, while Morah-Pundit, his general, desolated the villages round Surat, and kept the field till the close of the year.

Notwithstanding so many adverse circumstances to prevent his great object, or the conquest and conversion of the Hindoos, Aurungzebe found, that he had to contend with a people, equally

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 107—117,—— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 51.



CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

equally fruitful in expedients, and intrepid in the field with himself; and though he pursued, with a large force, the Ranah, and the Rajah of Marwar to their inaccessible mountains and defiles, he was himself inclosed, and in danger of seeing his army perish by famine, or of being taken prisoner; but, at this crisis, the Ranah withdrew his troops, and Aurungzebe left the army under the command of his sons, Azim and Mauzim, and retired to Agimere, that he might, from time to time, send them the necessary instructions.

The Mogul army, on the side of Visiapore, carried on an equally fruitless war; for Sambagee, at this time, abandoned Aurungzebe, and, with four hundred horse and a thousand foot, marched to Pannela, where he was reconciled to Sevagee, and entrusted by him with the command of that fortress. <sup>(1)</sup>

Death of Sevagee, and Accession of Sambagee.

The events, in 1680, were equally indecisive:—the Siddee and Dowlat-Chan, Sevagee's admiral, had several partial encounters at sea, but the latter still kept possession of the two small islands of Kenery and Henery; and a treaty was, this year, (to be detailed in the subsequent annals), concluded between the Governor of Bombay and Sevagee. It was in this season, that Sevagee took a large convoy, with money and stores, which Aurungzebe had sent to Aurungabad; but his excessive fatigue, on this excursion, brought on an inflammation in his breast, of which he died.

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(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 117—122, Notes 51, 52.—Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 51—53.

The kingdom of Sevagee, at his death, comprehended, on the western side of India, all the coast, with the country stretching to the hills, from the river Mirzeon to Versal, "except Goa, to the South, and Bombay, Salsette, and the "country between Damaun and Bassein, to the North," and, in the whole, included a territory, about four hundred miles in length, and one hundred and twenty in breadth. Three hundred miles distant from the seat of his government, towards the Eastern Sea, he was in possession of half the Carnatic, which, at his death, became a permanent sovereignty, connected by language, customs, religion, and manners, with his other dominions. (1)

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

Aurungzebe, on hearing of Sevagee's death, directed the army, under his son Azim, to make an attack on Chitore, which he carried:—the Ranah, on this event, removed his residence to Oudépore, then deemed impregnable; the Siddees kept possession of the island of Henery; and Dowlat-Chan, the Mahratta Admiral, occupied Kenery:—several actions took place between their ships, without either obtaining any decided superiority. (2)

Progress of  
the War be-  
tween Au-  
rungzebe and  
Sambagee.

Aurungzebe, now advanced in life, began to feel the political evil in the constitution of the Mogul Government, of which he had originally availed himself, in ascending the

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throne;

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 123—134, Notes 53, 54, 55, 56.—  
Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 54, 55.

(2)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 125—138.

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*Introduction.*

throne; his sons, the competitors for the succession, had those opposite qualities, which rendered the ultimate success of any one of them uncertain. Sultan Mauzim, the eldest, was the favorite of the army; Acbar was restless and turbulent, and disposed to embarrass the administration of his father, and to excite the jealousy and hatred of his elder brothers, Mauzim and Azim:—Acbar, with the assistance of thirty thousand Rajpoots, projected to seize on Aurungzebe in Agimere, and then to proclaim himself Emperor:—a superstitious prejudice, of not commencing the enterprize till a fortunate day, discovered the plot:—Aurungzebe, on this occasion, addressed a letter to Acbar, admonishing him of his undutiful conduct, but this letter Acbar answered, by one of defiance:—Mauzim and Azim made rapid marches to support their father's interests: Acbar fled to the country of the Maha-Rajah, and soon afterwards to the districts adjoining to the Guzzerat: Mauzim was ordered to pursue, and, if possible, to take him prisoner; but Acbar escaped to Pawleegur, a fort at the foot of the Gauts, opposite to Bombay, and afterwards joined Sambagee at Rairee.

Aurungzebe, alarmed at the support which Acbar was receiving from Sambagee, made peace with the Ranah, and then prepared to attack Sambagee with his whole force; for this purpose, Sultan Azim's army rendezvoused at Ahmednagur, Sultan Mauzim's at Aurungabad, and Aurungzebe's at Bram-pore;

pore ; while the Mogul fleet was directed to join the Siddees at Surat. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

The Siddees, in 1682, defended Gingerah against the repeated attacks of Sambagee's fleet, while the army of Sultan Mauzim proceeded to join the camp at Jenneahgur, and to reduce Sambagee's country, towards Salsette and Bombay. Having forced the Gauts, at Decir, Mauzim encamped at Gallian, in February 1682. In this emergency, Sambagee, accompanied by Sultan Acbar, returned to Rairee, leaving a considerable force to continue the attack on Gingerah ; warned the Governor of Bombay not to shelter the Siddee's fleets, threatening, if he received them, to fortify the island of Elephanta ; and, with great severity, reprobated the conduct of the Portuguese at Chaul, and ordered his fleet at Rajahpore to take possession of the Island of Angedivah, both that he might obstruct the trade at Goa, and protect his own at Carwar ; and placed five thousand men on the shores of the river Pen, fifteen thousand in the country from Negotan to Chaul, ten thousand at Danda-Rajahpore, and thirty thousand on the side of the Gauts, and stationed twenty thousand horse towards Sattarah :—Sambagee's fleet, at this time, amounted to one hundred and twenty gallivats and fifteen grabs. <sup>(2)</sup>

The Mogul fleet at Surat was nearly equipped and ready for sea :—to cut off the communication with the Siddees,

I 2

Dowlut-

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 139—152, Note 59, 62, 63.

(2)—Ibid - - - - - pages 152—159.

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*Introduction.*

Dowlut-Chan, Sambagee's admiral, received orders to invade Bombay:—the militia were embodied, and ready to oppose him, when he offered to enter into a treaty with the Governor.

During the negotiation, the Siddee's fleet laid waste the corlahs on the island; and that of the Mogul, in consequence of a recommendation from the President at Surat, sailed, in November, into the harbour, and landed three thousand men at Mazagong:—the Mogul fleet, after leaving Bombay, made several ineffectual descents on Sambagee's coasts, while that of the Siddee kept cruising to protect Gengerah.

Sambagee, disappointed in his scheme of taking possession of the Island of Angedivah, descended the Gauts, at the head of thirty thousand men, and invested Chaul. The Viceroy of Goa led out an army of twelve hundred Europeans and twenty-five thousand native troops, to oppose him:—with this force the Viceroy laid siege to Pundah, and would have reduced it, had not Sambagee and Sultan Acbar advanced from the neighbourhood of Chaul, to its relief:—the Portuguese army was, in the sequel, defeated, and retreated to Goa; and this event furnishes the first example of a war between the Europeans and Mahrattas.

It appears to have been Sambagee's intention to have taken Goa from the Portuguese; and Aurungzebe resolved to prevent its falling into his hands, foreseeing that the addition

tion it would make to the power of the Mahrattas, and to the pretensions of Acbar, might be of material weight in the issue of the war. Fifteen thousand men, however, passed the Gauts, in December, and laid waste the Portuguese country, between Bassein and Damaun;—it was at this juncture, that the Mahratta gallivats took possession of the Portuguese Island of Caranjah, situated at the bottom of the harbour of Bombay. <sup>(1)</sup>

Aurungzebe, that he might more effectually check the growing power of Sambagee, sent Sultan Mauzim with a large army, of which forty thousand were cavalry, to act against him:—Mauzim, descending the Gauts, almost surrounded Sambagee's army, at Rajahpore, and desolated the whole country between Goa and the river Cary, destroying the pagodas, and sacking Vingorlah, for having given refuge to Sultan Acbar:—the Mogul fleet, to co-operate with the army, attempted to penetrate into the harbour of Goa, and to get possession of the city:—this attempt required time; and as the provisions of the Mogul fleet were exhausted by the month of March, Mauzim was compelled to re-pass the Gauts;—he took, however, a station, from which he could either join the army of Azim, acting against Visiapore, or return, and carry on the war against Sambagee:—these events disposed the Portuguese to offer terms to Sambagee, and to abandon the Mogul interest; but their offers were re-  
jected,

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 161—180.

**CHAP. II.** jected, unless they would pay a ransom of five millions of  
*Introduction.* rupees. (1)

Aurangzebe  
 conquers Vi-  
 sispore and  
 Golcondah at  
 this juncture.

The country of Mysore had been divided between the Kings of Visiapore and Golcondah :—it had been subjected to several rajahs, of which that of Seringapatam was the chief; but had paid irregular tributes to Visiapore :—the arms of that country were now no longer able to compel these chiefs to payments; it was, therefore, agreed, that the King of Golcondah should possess the tract from Gundicotta, and its frontier, to the south-west, and, in return, that this government should pay a large sum to Visiapore, and another, to induce Sambagee to act against the Moguls, who were continuing their invasions of this country.

Sultan Mauzim, while this arrangement was made, remained with his army near the Gauts of Goa, and Sambagee desolated the country to the west of that city, and attempted to reduce Bassein. The Emperor had now armies in every quarter of this large field of war :—Aurangzebe himself was at the foot of the Gauts, about one hundred and thirty miles to the south-west of Sambagee; and Sultan Azim was in the northern division of Viziapore, where he took the strong fort of Solapore by treachery :—Mauzim, on this event, advanced towards Visiapore, and took Gocuck, Hubely, and the strong citadel

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 189—198.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 59.

citadel of Darwar ;—but fifteen thousand horse, from the main army of Sambagee, hung on his rear, to cut off his convoys.

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Sultan Azim advanced from Solapore, but was twice defeated :—these checks obliged Aurungzebe to order a cessation of hostilities, till he should himself take the command.<sup>(1)</sup>

In December 1685, a junction was formed between the armies of Aurungzebe, Mauzim, and Azim :—Mauzim was detached against Golcondah, and began his operations with the reduction of Malquer, the principal barrier of the capital :—the king was next forced to take refuge, with twelve thousand of his best troops, in the city.

Aurungzebe, by a like successful progress, made himself master of Visiapore :—the other forts of that country submitted, as soon as they knew that the capital could no longer support them ; and the King now became a prisoner, and appeared, in silver chains, before the conqueror. Sambagee, during these calamitous reverses of his allies, had sent a force across the Tapti and Nerbuddah, and had taken Broach :—to embarrass the schemes of Aurungzebe, Sultan Acbar was proclaimed Mogul :—Sambagee, however, was forced by the Soubahdar of Ahmedabad to retreat towards Rairee :—the success of the Emperor convinced Acbar, at last, that he in vain looked for the crown, through the efforts of Sambagee, and therefore he retired into Persia.<sup>(2)</sup>

The

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 198—206, Notes 69, 70.

(2)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 208—211, Notes 71—73.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 62, 63.



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The event of Acbar's flight lessened the importance of the war against Sambagee; and induced Aurungzebe to break the treaty, lately made by Sultan Mauzim, with the King of Golcondah, who fled into the fortress. Aurungzebe fixed his quarters at Hyderabad :—the siege was long, for it continued till April 1687 :—the capture of the place would have been impracticable, had not Azim, to whom the enterprize was committed, corrupted some of the officers in the fort, and having scaled the walls in the night, reduced this capital, and made the King a prisoner. <sup>(1)</sup>

Sambagee, during these revolutions, prepared for vigorous exertions, for he could no longer look for terms from a monarch who had no feelings, and no principles, to influence or direct him. The conquests which Sambagee and his father had made in the Carnatic, it was evident, would become the next object of Aurungzebe's arms; for Visiapore and Golcondah had fallen, and no powers now remained, with whom he could league, either to divert or to divide the storm :—collecting, therefore, troops from the garrisons of Sattarah, Pannela, and Pundah, Sambagee made a successful attack on the western frontier of Visiapore, and detached twelve thousand horse to Gingee, with secret orders to seize on Hargee Rajah, who had governed that country from the time it had been

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 211—218.—Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 66—72.

been conquered by Sevagee, but whose fidelity he began to suspect.

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Aurungzebe, alarmed at this expedition, detached an army from Golcondah, by the west of the Carnatic mountains, which invested and took Bangalore:—the Mahratta generals, for a moment, were reconciled to each other, and Hargee-Rajah conducted himself, in this affair, with the most politic prudence:—to conciliate Sambagee, he sent two generals, at the head of eighteen thousand horse, to make an irruption into the Mysore country, at the time when Aurungzebe detached a force to reduce the maritime provinces, from Masulipatam to Ganjam.

Sambagee, in person, conducted the war on the side of Visiapore:—the countries south of Pannela submitted to him, and his army, at the close of the year, had advanced among the mountains, beyond the Gauts, to the westward. <sup>(1)</sup>

Early in 1688, Aurungzebe left Delhi, determined to conduct the war against Sambagee, and sent another army by Cudapah:—in its progress it took Chittapet and Coverpauk, but the troops of Hargee-Rajah still retained possession of the country to the north of the Palliar:—the army, at last, moved on from Golcondah into the Carnatic, under the command of Mahomed Sadick:—it consisted of twelve thousand Mogul cavalry, and a great number of irregular infantry:—on its

Death of  
Sambagee.

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K

approach,

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 219—225.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 74—76.

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approach, the Mahrattas retreated from Conjeveram, but occupied the posts on each side of the Palliar :—after strengthening the garrisons of Poonamalee and Vandevash, the Moguls encamped near this last place, and sent detachments to the gates of Madras :—the Mahratta army was at Chittapet :—both armies seemed cautious of risking a general engagement, and wasted their time in frequent, but indecisive skirmishes :—Aurungzebe had remained at Visiapore, to watch the motions of Sambagee ; and though he reduced the towns in the open country, the strong holds among the mountains remained to the Mahrattas. Pannela was next invested by Aurungzebe, but in vain ; seeing, therefore, no probability of the war being terminated in the field, he resorted to the project of getting Sambagee betrayed into his power :—one of his generals accepted a bribe, and delivered Sambagee to the Emperor, who ordered him to be put to death. <sup>(1)</sup>

State of the  
war after this  
event.

The events, towards the close of the reign of Aurungzebe, cannot be so fully ascertained, from the authors who have written on Indian History, as the recent period in which they happened, would have led us to expect :—it will appear, however, from the documents on which the Annals of the London East-India Company proceed, that after he had conquered Golcondah and Visiapore, and had murdered Sambagee, he either considered his favourite scheme, of enlarging

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 225—233, Note 78.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii. pages 77, 78.

enlarging the Mogul empire, to have been accomplished, or that, worn out with active and dangerous expeditions, he directed his attention to his plan for improving the empire, or consolidating his power, by introducing a regular system of administration in its widely extended provinces.

CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

The death of Sambagee by no means effected the change which Aurungzebe expected it would produce, or the dissolution of the Mahratta power, which, on the contrary, increased, though not with so rapid a progress as during the reign of its founder, Sevagee, or that of his son; and this increase became, subsequently, one of the principal causes of the fall of the Mogul empire.

Sambagee was succeeded by his son, Sahoo, or Sahogee, whose vigour of mind, and long reign of fifty years, enabled him to give consistency to the empire which the Mahrattas had established. Sahogee possessed the talents of Sevagee, and the enterprizing spirit of Sambagee; and Aurungzebe was soon made sensible of the character of this Rajah, and could not but observe the national aversion of the Hindoos to their Mogul masters, which events had confirmed into a fixed hatred and abhorrence:—this, indeed, was a natural effect of Aurungzebe's cruelty to Sambagee; instead, therefore, of being able to return to Delhi, the Emperor was obliged to keep the field in Visiapore, for a considerable time after the death of his Hindoo rival.

Accession of  
Sahogee, as  
chief of the  
Hindoo con-  
federacy.

There must have been produced, in the mind of the new Mahratta Rajah, a fixed attention to every incident in the

**CHAP. II.** situation of the Moguls, which could be seized on, or turned  
*Introduction.* to the re-establishment of the Hindoo interests; and the  
 disputes between Aurungzebe's sons, for the succession, af-  
 farded one of the events which Sahogee watched for, and  
 steadily improved on :—in the sequel, Sahogee mingled in  
 their disputes, and thus preserved his influence on the side of  
 the Carnatic, as well as extended his dominions on the west of  
 the Peninsula.

State of Tan-  
 jore at this  
 juncture.

The Hindoos, anterior to this period, had established  
 themselves at Tanjore, under Eccogee, a brother of Sevagee :  
 —Eccogee had held a command at Visiapore, before the fall of  
 that kingdom, and had marched with a body of troops to the  
 assistance of the Naig of Tanjore, then at war with the Naig  
 of Tritchinopoly :—after defeating this chief, he seized on  
 Tanjore, which he had been called to defend :—the pretext  
 was, to collect the money required for defraying the expences  
 of the war. Eccogee must have been King, or Rajah of Tan-  
 jore, at the time when Sambagee, his nephew, was put to  
 death ; but it is doubtful, whether he was acting as a member,  
 or as an officer, of the Hindoo confederacy : he continued,  
 however, superior of this district to his death, and was  
 succeeded by his son, Shahgee, the ancestor of the Rajahs  
 of Tanjore.<sup>(1)</sup>

This establishment of the Hindoos in Tanjore, and the con-  
 tinuance of their vicinity to the other parts of the Carnatic,  
 discovers

(1) — Orme's Historical Fragments, Note 76.

discovers an important fact, or the basis on which their interests were placed, after the death of Aurungzebe. Such CHAP. II.  
Introduction. seems to have been the situation of Aurungzebe's conquests in this part of India, that they required his personal presence to preserve them; for he was kept almost always in the field, during the last years of his life.

The frequent and long absence of the Emperor from the seat of government produced an irregularity in the administration of the Empire, and this circumstance gave a beginning to those disorders, which afterwards contributed to its subversion. The Rajpoots of Agimere first rebelled, but were checked, in what has been termed the second rebellion of the Rajpoots:—the Patans, towards the Indus, renewed their attacks, and were rather resisted than subdued:—a new race, the Jats, appeared in the province of Agra, and from having been a banditti, were becoming a considerable people.<sup>(1)</sup>

The talents of Aurungzebe, however, supported his empire, as they were fitted for his situation. He died in 1707, after a reign of fifty years, leaving the Mogul empire in the full measure of its extent:—his authority reached from the tenth to the thirty-fifth degree of latitude, and nearly as much in longitude, with a revenue exceeding thirty-two millions sterling.<sup>(2)</sup>

The

(1)—Rennel's Introduction, page 63.

(2)—Scott's Memoirs of Eradut Khan, page 10.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 123.— Rennel's Introduction, page 63.

## CHAP. II.

*Introduction.*  
Third object  
of Aurung-  
zebe, or the  
enlargement  
of the re-  
sources of the  
Mogul Em-  
pire.

The *third* great object of Aurungzebe's reign seems to have been the consolidation of the Mogul system of government, and the enlargement of its resources.

It does not appear, from any of the authorities which have reached Europeans, that Aurungzebe, though he was continually new-modelling the branches of his administration, ever attempted to alter the general character of the government established by Acbar, but rather that he held any other system as incompatible with the permanency of the Mogul power :—the same divisions of the provinces which had been introduced by Acbar, the same forms of justice which that wise Mogul had established, and the same ultimate appeals to the decision of the sovereign, were continued :—the provinces which had been subdued in the Decan, were placed under Soubahdars, and their subordinate Nabobs, or Hindoo Rajahs, were allowed to retain their stations.

The copies of the Phirmaunds for a Duan's commission ; for the gift of a Jaghire ; for a grant to a Zemindar ; for a Phirmaund to a Cazi, or superior judge ; for one to a Cutwal, or magistrate of a city ; for the Perwannah to a Crorie, who had the superintendence of the inferior officers of revenue and police ; and to the Chowdries, the Canangoes, &c. were all kept in the ancient and fixed forms :—the difference, therefore, between the administration of Aurungzebe and of his predecessors, seems to have rested entirely on the superiority of his understanding, and on his energy, which never lost sight  
of

of the two great objects of a sovereign, the preservation of the established system of government, and the strict application of laws in courts of justice

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*Introduction.*

The capacity of Aurungzebe for the administration of government, must not, in an estimate of his reign, be confounded with the defects of the political system of which he was the head: it had been raised on conquests, and it could only be supported by an established military force: a religion, different from that of the vanquished, was to be engrafted on this system:—and, to these points, the whole of the Emperor's efforts were directed.

In all the transactions of Aurungzebe, he appears to have had a perfect knowledge of his subjects:—in his choice of governors for the provinces, he selected men of capacity, but on no occasion trusted to their integrity, being himself a stranger to that quality: and he spared no money to procure the most certain intelligence of the conduct of his civil and military officers:—he established roads from Cabul to Aurungabad, and from the Guzzerat to Bengal, and maintained spies in every department;—in public affairs, he portioned out his time in a manner that was suited to give him a proper knowledge of them:—in the morning, business of lesser moment, as the disposal of offices, was brought before him: in the evening, he entered the Gussel-Chana, or bathing chamber, arranged the important concerns of the state, and issued his orders to the various departments of it.

The



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*Introduction.*

The laws, as well as the maxims of jurisprudence, introduced by Aurungzebe, seem all to have arisen from the circumstances in which he was placed, and from his knowledge of the prevailing passions of the various orders of his subjects:—he had early been trained in habits of observation by Shah-Jehan, whom he always attended, while that Emperor sat distributing justice, and by whom he was appealed to, though then at a period of life at which young men are scarcely beginning to discriminate:—when Emperor, he not only sat every day himself to administer justice, but was attended by those who were the most distinguished for their knowledge of the laws:—men of learning made up reports of the cases, but the Emperor himself examined them, before he pronounced judgment:—that he might diffuse the administration of justice over the whole Empire, he had an officer in the principal courts in the provinces; and whenever he received any complaint, respecting the conduct of a judge, he brought the accused before him, put the accusation in his hands, and if he found him guilty, degraded and banished him.

Aurungzebe was equally attentive to the sources of his revenue: that arising from the lands, in a particular manner, was under the strictest regulations:—he allowed of no variation from the ancient tenures, but held it to be a maxim, that the raising of the rents, on those who had improved their farms, was as impolitic in the prince, as unjust to the subject.

The

The situation of the useful arts and manufactures, towards the close of this reign, may be judged of, from the encouragement, which not only the subordinate princes, on the sea coast of the Peninsula, were giving to the Europeans, but from the different Phirmaunds which the Emperor had granted, during his long reign.<sup>(1)</sup>

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*Introduction.*

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii. pages 420, &c.



## CHAPTER II.

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REVIEW OF THE ANNALS OF THE LONDON EAST-INDIA COMPANY, FROM THE RESTORATION OF THEIR PRIVILEGES BY KING CHARLES II., IN 1661, TO THE REVOLUTION, 1688.

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*1688-89.—Court determine to make Bombay the chief seat of their trade and power, and reduce Surat to an Agency. . . . . Approve of the Provisional Convention with the Governor of Surat. . . . . Fortifications at Bombay to be strengthened, and duties levied, to defray the charges. . . . . Factories on the Malabar Coast to be fortified. . . . . Commercial instructions for rendering Bombay the general depôt of*

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*the Company's goods. . . . . Encouragement to be given to the Armenians, in Persia. . . . . The Government of Madras blamed for not co-operating in the war in Bengal. . . . . Directions to farm St. Thomé from the Nabob. . . . . Sir John Child to proceed to Bengal, as Supervisor of the Company's Affairs. . . . . Settlers at St. Helena encouraged to remove to Bombay. . . . . Interesting proceedings of the East-India Company, during the successive events which terminated in the Revolution. . . . . Political and commercial events at Surat and Bombay . . . . . The Convention between Muchtar Khan and Mr. Harris, an artifice to gain time. . . . . Muchtar Khan seizes the Company's servants and property at Surat. . . . . Sir John Child intimates to the Siddee, that the movement of his fleet would be considered as an act of hostility against Bombay. . . . . Court's order to occupy Salsette impracticable, and the delivery of their letter to the Mogul, inexpedient. . . . . Bombay acts on the defensive. . . . . Sir John Child attempts negotiation with Ettimand Khan, the new Governor of Surat, and sends envoys to the Mogul, at Visiapore. . . . . Death of Sir John Child, and succession of Mr. Harris, at this time a prisoner at Surat. . . . . The Phirmaund granted by Aurungzebe, at this period, reduces the Presidency of Surat to the most degraded situation. . . . . The Siddee's fleet and forces invade Bombay, but evacuate the Island, on payment of the fine imposed by the Phirmaund. . . . . The revenues and trade*

at

*at Bombay depressed by these events. . . . . Trade in Persia obstructed by the Dutch, and by Pirates. . . . . Affairs of Fort St. George and Bengal blended, at the period of the disastrous Phirmaund of Aurungzebe. . . . . Proceedings of Captain Heath in Bengal, who retires with the Company's servants to Madras. . . . . Report of the Agent and Council of Bengal, on the failure of the attack on Chittagong. . . . . Expedients of the Agency of Fort St. George on this emergency. . . . . Mogul's order for expelling the English from his dominions. . . . . Sambagee betrayed, and put to death by the Mogul, and succeeded by the Ram-Rajah, who granted to the English liberty of trade at Comere. . . . . Stipulations regarding Madras evaded in the Mogul's Phirmaund. . . . . The new Nabob of Bengal's offer to the English, to resettle their Factory at Hughly, declined. . . . . Revolution in Siam obviates the necessity of the war against that country. . . . . The commercial efforts at Fort St. George, and its subordinate stations, depressed by these political events; and by the appearance of English pirates on the Coromandel Coast. . . . . State of the trade of the European Maritime Powers in the East-Indies, at this juncture. . . . . Report on the improving state of Fort St. George and the town of Madras. . . . . Trade at Bencoolen and Indrapore increased, and the Settlement in an improving condition. . . . . Interesting proceedings of the Company's foreign Settlements, on receiving intelligence*

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- CHAP. II.** *gence of the successive events which terminated in the Revolution.....*  
**Contents.** *Results, from the preceding detail of events, ascertaining the Com-  
pany's Rights, from the Restoration of King Charles II. to the  
Revolution, 1688-89.*

## CHAPTER II.

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REVIEW OF THE ANNALS OF THE LONDON EAST-INDIA COMPANY, FROM THE RESTORATION OF THEIR PRIVILEGES BY KING CHARLES II., IN 1660-1, TO THE REVOLUTION, 1688-9.

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1661-62.

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**H**AVING traced the political relations between England and the maritime states of Europe, as preliminary subjects, required to explain the transactions of the London East-India Company, after they had their Charter and exclusive privileges renewed by King Charles II., and having prospectively followed up those relations, during this, and the subsequent reign, that reference might be made to them, in explaining the annual proceedings of the Company, during the second period of their progress; and having, also, with the same object, traced the political and commercial relations

CHAP. II.

1661-62.

Bombay ceded by Portugal to England, by the Treaty of Marriage between Charles II. and the Infanta of Portugal.

of



CHAP. II. of the principal kingdoms and states in the East-Indies with  
 1661-62. which the London Company were to have connexion, not only during this period, but during the long reign of Aurungzebe, which continued nearly to the Union of the London and English East-India Companies, we are prepared to resume the Annals of the London East-India Company, and to connect their proceedings with those of the government, on which they were dependent in Europe, and with those of the powers, at whose ports and dominions they were to revive and carry on the direct trade between England and the East-Indies.

The Charter of King Charles II. to the London East-India Company had scarcely been recorded when their affairs assumed a new aspect, by the event of the Island of Bombay, (within their limits,) having been ceded by the Crown of Portugal to the King, as part of the dowry of the Infanta Catherine, whom the King married, in June 1661, two months after he had granted to the London East-India Company the renewal of their Charter.

Commercial  
 jealousy of  
 the Dutch on  
 this event.

This acquisition of the King, was held to be an extension of the dominions of his Crown, which would afford to the English a port, at which their trade could be in security, and more immediately under the royal protection :—this was viewed with jealousy by the States General, as calculated to connect, more strictly, the London East-India Company with the Crown, and to revive the rivalry of the two European powers in the East-Indies, by assimilating the Company's interests with those of the

the State, in the same manner as the Dutch Companies had been with the States General, and therefore to render the rivalry of the two nations in the East-Indies, more immediately connected with the relations which subsisted between them, in Europe.

CHAP. II.  
1661-62.  
Terms of the  
treaty with  
Portugal, re-  
lative to the  
cession of  
Bombay.

By the eleventh article of the Treaty of Marriage between King Charles II. and the Infanta Catherine of Portugal, dated 23d June 1661, the Crown of Portugal ceded and granted to the Crown of England, the Island and Harbour of BOMBAY, in full sovereignty; and it was understood, that this grant would enable the two Crowns to maintain their respective dominions in the East-Indies, against any future aggressions and encroachments on their subjects and trade, by the Dutch Company.

By the Secret Article of this treaty, the King of England obliged himself to guaranty to the King of Portugal, the possessions of that Crown, in the East-Indies; and to mediate a peace between Portugal and the States General, with the object, that the respective possessions of the two nations, in that quarter, might be ascertained; and then explained, that should the States General refuse to accept of such mediation, the King would employ his forces and fleets, to compel the States to accede to these conditions, and to obtain restitution to the Crown of Portugal, of such Portuguese settlements in the East-Indies, as the Dutch might, subsequent to this treaty, become possessed of.<sup>(1)</sup>

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On

(1)—Original Ratification by the King of Portugal, of the Treaty of Peace and Commerce, between England and Portugal, and of Marriage, between King Charles II. and

CHAP. II.  
 1661-62. The Earl of Marlborough and Sir Abraham Shipman sent by the King, with an armament, to take possession of Bombay.

On the basis of this treaty, and to render Bombay an immediate dependency on the Crown of England, the King, in March 1661-62, dispatched a fleet of five men of war, under the command of the Earl of Marlborough, and embarked on them five hundred troops, under the command of Sir Abraham Shipman, who was appointed to be General on shore;—on board this fleet also proceeded a Viceroy of the King of Portugal, authorised to deliver the ceded island, and its dependencies, to the King of England.

Sir Abraham Shipman's particular instructions were, to take under his command the forces raised in England, for the King's service in the East-Indies, and, on his arrival at Bombay, to receive possession of the island and its dependencies, from the Portuguese Governor, with the view of "gaining a free and better trade in the East-Indies, and to enlarge the King's dominions in those parts:"—he was farther directed to encourage the King's subjects, and strangers, to settle, and carry on trade at Bombay, and to administer to the inhabitants of the island the oath of allegiance to the King.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Company appoint Sir George Oxinden to be President of Surat, with authority to seize all unlicensed traders.

In this new relation of the London East-India Company with the Crown, we have to trace the proceedings of the Court of Directors, or the measures which they adopted, for restoring

the Infanta Catherine of Portugal, concluded at Whitehall, 23d June 1661, with the Secret Article, dated the same day, (Preserved in the State Paper Office).

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Earl of Marlborough, 19th March 1661-62.—Historical Account of the Transactions between the English and Portuguese, regarding Bombay, octavo, printed in 1724.

restoring their privileges and trade in the East-Indies, and to accommodate the Company's interests with the new possessions which the Crown had acquired, within their limits :—

CHAP. II.  
1661-62.

With these objects, the Company appointed, on the 19th March 1661-62, Sir George Oxinden to be President and chief Director of all their affairs “ at SURAT, and all other their factories, “ in the north parts of India, from Zeilon to the Red Sea,” with a salary of £300 per annum, and a gratuity of £200 per annum, for the purpose of removing all temptations to engage in that private trade, which the Company had found so injurious to the sales of their exports, and to the purchase of their investments :—and that the transactions of Sir George Oxinden might be placed in full connexion with those of the Earl of Marlborough and Sir Abraham Shipman, the Company obtained from the King a Warrant, under the Privy Seal, to Sir George Oxinden, authorising him, in the Company's name, to seize on such persons, not in their service, as might be engaged in private trade, or in navigating the vessels of the country powers, and to send them to England.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Company, under these circumstances, did not, as on former occasions, when grants from the Crown were given to them, protecting their exclusive privileges against the inter-

Equipments  
and trade on  
a limited  
scale.

P 2

ferences

(1)—Commission and Instructions of the Court to Sir George Oxinden, on being appointed President of Surat, 19th March 1661-62.— Warrant, under the Privy Seal, for seizing unlicensed Persons in India, 21st February 1661-62.— Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 19th March 1661-62.

CHAP. II.  
1661-62. ferences of the Private Traders or Interlopers, or when the licences had been withdrawn from traders of this description, form any new stock, or enlarge their equipments, to the extent which might have been expected; but, on the contrary, discovered a commercial caution, proceeding, probably, from the disappointment and heavy losses they had experienced, in trusting to the stability of re-grants of privileges; and therefore, though Sir George Oxinden, and their shipping, were to proceed with the King's fleet, the Court resolved to narrow the line of their trade, and to confine it to the Presidencies of Surat and of Fort St. George, and the factory at Bantam, and to their respective dependencies.

Sir George Oxinden was, in particular, to endeavour to preserve the Factories and Agencies on the Malabar Coast, and to restore the trade between Surat and Fort St. George, and between the Fort and Bantam, for which ships would be dispatched, at the proper seasons, from England, to bring home goods, suited to the home sales:—he was also to specify, distinctly, the prices at which the exports from England could be sold.

The attention of the President was, in a particular manner, to be directed to put a stop to the private trade of the Company's servants, who, under the pretext of acting for the Company, had been engaged in dealings on their own account, to the detriment of the Company's sales and purchases:—such of those servants whom he might find engaged in this  
illicit

illicit trade, were to be dismissed the Company's service, and, under the authority given to him by the King's warrant, to be sent home to England. CHAP. II.  
1661-62.

Sir Edward Winter was appointed, in February 1661-62, to be Agent at FORT ST. GEORGE:—the Agencies and Factories in BENGAL were placed under his immediate superintendence, and were ordered to transmit to him regular accounts of their proceedings:—by a Warrant, under the Privy Seal, he was also empowered to send all persons to England, who might have gone to India, and acted as Private Traders, or as seamen in the country ships; and further, he was particularly to suppress private trade in the Company's servants, and, when found engaged in it, to dismiss them the service; and to require, by proclamation, all subjects of the King, who might have gone to India, to repair to Madras, where they would receive protection, provided they did not interfere with the Company's exclusive trade. <sup>(1)</sup>

Sir Edward Winter appointed Agent at Fort St. George, with similar powers, to seize unlicensed Traders.

Similar powers, under a like warrant, were sent to the Agent and Council at BANTAM, and ordered to be observed in all the dependencies on that Eastern seat of the Company's trade, enforced with the Court's printed declaration against Private Traders. <sup>(2)</sup>

The Agent at Bantam vested with the same authority.

### The

(1)—Commission and Instructions to Sir Edward Winter, on being appointed Agent at Fort St. George, 20th February 1661-62.— Letter from the Court to the Presidency at Fort St. George, 20th February 1661-62.— Copy of Warrant, under the Privy Seal, for seizing unlicensed persons in India, 21st February 1661-62.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 21st March

## CHAP. II.

1661-62.

The Governor of Surat and the Private Traders continue their oppressions of the Surat trade.

The uncertainty which, in this season, prevailed in all the Company's foreign Presidencies and Factories, respecting the actual situation, either of the government in England, or of the powers which might remain with the Company, sufficiently accounts for their servants at SURAT continuing to act under the former instructions of the Court, by calling in their Out-factories and Agencies, and confining their efforts to provide a limited investment for the homeward shipping. In discharging the first of those duties, they had not been able, from want of shipping, to bring off the Company's estate, either from Persia or Bussora, and had been exposed, from the debts due by the Merchant Adventurers, or as they are termed in the dispatches from Surat, "*Open Traders*," to the most unreasonable demands by the Governor of Surat, by whom, at one time, they had been shut up in their Factory, till he could extort money from them, under pretext of the payment of those debts:—in this situation, they could only direct their ships to touch at Goa, Cochin, Carwar, and other places on the Malabar Coast, to purchase pepper, or any goods they might think suited to the home market.

The Agency of Bengal exposed to the oppression of Meer Jumlah.

If, in the preceding year, the conduct of Meer Jumlah, the

1661-62, inclosing Copy of Warrant under the Privy Seal, for seizing unlicensed persons in India, 21st February 1661-62.

the Mogul general in Bengal, to the English Factory, for <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> having imprudently seized a Junk, afforded a view of the 1661-62. rigour with which, while the government of Aurungzebe was establishing, the Factory at Hughley were treated, the events at Surat and its dependencies, this year, ascertain the hardships to which they were exposed, from being situated near the theatre of the war, between Aurungzebe and Sevagee. The Dutch, from their superior naval force, overawed both of those powers, and escaped the hardships to which the Factories and shipping of the London Company were exposed ;—to avoid any rupture with Sevagee, the English President and Council had sent Agents to him, who were seized, and made prisoners, at Rajahpore, and though large sums had been offered for their release, they had been refused ; the Presidency, therefore, gave it as their opinion to the Court, that unless large supplies of shipping, men, and stores, should be sent from England, and unless a station could be obtained, which would place the Company's servants and property out of the reach, either of the Mogul or Sevagee, and render them independent of the overbearing influence of the Dutch, it it would be more prudent to bring off their property and servants, than to leave them exposed to continual risks and dangers. <sup>(1)</sup>

As the homeward ships of the Company had been obliged,

(1)—General Letter from the President and Council at Surat to the Court, 7th December 1661.



**CHAP. II.** obliged, not only to come in fleets, but to make a circuitous  
**1661-62.** voyage, till they should receive intelligence from England,  
we discover the reason why the Court, in this year, remained  
ignorant of the state of their affairs at **FORT ST. GEORGE** and  
at **BANTAM**, and their dependencies.

## 1662-63.

IN the season 1661-62, the acquisition of BOMBAY, from Portugal, by the Crown, which necessarily connected the transactions of the East-India Company, with the orders given by King Charles to the Earl of Marlborough and Sir Abraham Shipman, rendered it expedient to accommodate to those orders, the instructions given to Sir George Oxinden, who had been appointed President at Surat, that he might afford his best services to the armament, which had been dispatched by the Crown, to take possession of Bombay.

In this season (1662-63) an event took place, or the grant of a Charter to the Duke of York, the King's Brother, for forming a New African Company, which still farther connected the affairs of the State with those of the London East-India Company; because part of the possessions on the Coast of Africa, granted to the New African Company, belonged to the London East-India Company, in consequence of their coalition with the Assada Merchants, in the early part of the Interregnum.

Though it may appear, at first sight, to be a digression from the Annals of the East-India Company, in this year, to look back to the sources of this African trade, the original objects of which were foreign to the trade to the East Indies,

CHAP. II.  
1662-63.  
Instructions to Sir George Oxinden, to assist the King's General and Admiral, in taking possession of Bombay.

The Duke of York establishes the Royal African Company, and obtains a grant of the settlements which the India Company possessed on the Coast of Africa, in consequence of their Union with the Assada Merchants.

**CHAP. II.** it is not possible to bring under review the transactions, be-  
**1662-63.** tween the East-India Company and this African Company, and  
 the Colonies which the Duke of York projected to establish,  
 without adverting to those interesting commercial facts.

During the reign of Queen Elizabeth, a commercial speculation prevailed, that gold, elephants' teeth, and labourers, might be obtained on the Coast of Africa, and that the gold and ivory might become important articles of trade, and the labourers employed, with advantage, in cultivating the West-India Islands. Queen Elizabeth granted exclusive privileges to what was termed the First African, or Guinea Company, and this grant is interesting, as marking the first commercial relations between England and the Coast of Africa.

In the preceding detail it has appeared, that the Assada Association had been formed, and the London Company compelled to unite with them; and, on this event, the London East-India Company formed settlements at Cape Cormantine, Benin, &c. After the capture of Jamaica, the English settlements having increased, it became impracticable to cultivate them, except by means of a large proportion of African labourers, denominated slaves, whose constitutions were fitted to cultivate the valuable produce brought from the West-Indies to England:—this led to the employment of capital and shipping in the African trade, and to considerable demands for British manufactures, for maintaining and clothing these labourers, who were found not only necessary to enable the  
 planters

planters to cultivate the produce of the soil, but to serve as auxiliaries, in defending them against the original inhabitants, and in colonizing the West-Indies:—these circumstances led to the grant to the Duke of York, constituting the New African Company, and to the transfer, to this Company, of the possessions of the East-India Company, on the Coast of Africa, which they had been obliged to establish, after their connection with the Assada Merchants.

CHAP. II.  
1662-63.

In this situation, but under the obligation of having recently obtained from the King the restoration of their Charter and exclusive privileges, the possessions of the London East-India Company, on the Coast of Africa, were transferred to the Duke of York, and to the Royal African Company, now established by Charter.

The London East-India Company, therefore, were obliged to cede their African possessions to this new Royal Company, and to sell off their property at their African Factories, and to wind up their affairs on that Coast, with that rapidity, which marks a commercial concern, when compelled by events to relinquish a part of their trade, and to realize such value as it would bring, which was transferred either to their Indian Presidencies, or Agencies, or to St. Helena, which the Company, at this crisis, were colonizing and cultivating, by every practicable effort, as the Dutch had already taken possession of, and colonized, the Cape of Good Hope.

CHAP. II.  
 1662-63. Agreement  
 between the  
 Royal African  
 Company  
 and the East-  
 India Com-  
 pany.

The Court of Committees, or Directors, on this occasion, sent instructions to their Factors on the Coast of Africa, founded on an agreement, dated the 16th of October 1662, between the London East-India Company and the Royal African Company, of which the following is the substance :—

That the East-India Company should be allowed to the 25th of March 1663, to dispose of their goods and estate on the Coast of Guinea, and that they might leave two Factors there, to superintend and manage the sale;—that the African Company should be allowed ten per cent. by the East-India Company, for all goods sold after the said 25th of March;—that Fort Cormantine, Fort Wyamba, and the Factories at Cape Coast Castle, and Benin, should be delivered, by the East-India Company, to the Royal African Company, with all military stores, &c. on the 25th of March 1663, who were to take into their employ, the soldiers of the East-India Company, serving at those stations;—that the Royal African Company should pay to the London East-India Company the purchase-money of Cape Coast Castle;—that the East-India Company should be allowed to send a ship, within twelve months after the said 25th of March, to take off the remains of their goods, and that all household furniture, and spare stores, belonging to the East-India Company, should be taken off by the Royal African Company, at a fair valuation.<sup>(1)</sup>

It

(1)—Articles of Agreement between the Royal African Company and the East-India Company, dated 16th October 1662, enclosed in a letter from the Court to the Factors

at

It was under these circumstances, that the London Company sent out the following instructions to their servants at Fort Cormantine :—to sell off all the goods and property belonging to the Company, on such terms as they could obtain ;—to endeavour to dispose of as much of them as possible, to the Dutch Company, and to vest the proceeds in gold, to be sent, this season, to their Factories in India ;—to purchase from the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, and adventurers from every country, gold, at £3. 10s. per ounce, and to grant bills on the Company for the amount :—as the Court expected £25,000, in gold, would be collected by these sales, the Factors were to dispatch a ship to India, with the value ;—another ship was to proceed from England, for the Coast of Africa, in one month after these orders had been sent off ; on this ship the Factors were to send the amount of all the stores of the Company, which might remain, which were to be sold for whatever price they would bring, in gold ; and that such of the Company's servants, as might wish to return to England, were to be allowed a passage to St. Helena, (which, since the year 1657, the Company had been endeavouring to settle and colonize, as a station at which their ships might touch for fresh water and provisions, and which was granted to them, in full possession, by the Charter of King Charles II., in 1661) to which Island orders had

CHAP. II.  
1662-63.  
Court's Instructions to their Factors, at Fort Cormantine, in Africa, on this agreement.

at Fort Cormantine, 27th October 1662.—Anderson's History of Commerce, vol. ii, page 473.

CHAP. II. had been sent, to accommodate them with a passage to  
1662-63. England. <sup>(1)</sup>

Captain Mitchell, of the ship *Castle Frigate*, on account of the great mortality of the Company's servants on the Coast of Africa, had been appointed the Company's chief Agent there, with instructions to wind up their affairs, and to sell the whole of the Company's stock, either to the Royal African Company, or to individuals, but to take gold, rather than to grant bills on England :—the gold, with the elephants' teeth which might remain unsold, were to be forwarded to Madras :—after delivering over the forts, and the troops in the Company's service, to the Royal African Company, Captain Mitchell was to consign whatever goods might remain to four factors, who were to reside at Fort Cormantine, till they could dispose of them, and finally wind up the Company's affairs on the Coast of Africa.<sup>(2)</sup>

During the period in which the East-India Company occupied stations on the Coast of Africa, besides the gold, elephants' teeth, &c. which they sent to their factories at Madras and at Bantam, they also embarked a proportion of African labourers, both to assist in erecting their houses of trade, and forts ; and, from being foreigners, and dependant on  
their

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Factors at Fort Cormantine, 27th October 1662.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Factors at Fort Cormantine, 2d January 1662-63.

— Commission and Instructions from the Court to Captain Mitchell, of the *Castle Frigate*, 2d January 1662-63.

their factors, were to be trained to the use of arms, and to assist in the defence of their establishments, when attacked by the natives. In the sequel, we shall discover, that the descendants of those Africans formed a constituent part of the military guards of the Company's principal establishments.

CHAP. II.  
1662-63.

After explaining the relations between the Crown and the Company, in so far as regarded the acquisition of Bombay, in the preceding season, and the transfer of the Company's African Settlements to the Royal African Company, we have to trace the proceedings of the Court, with respect to the equipments and stock appropriated to each of their foreign Presidencies, and the instructions which they gave to their servants, as to the mode of reviving their trade:—on these subjects it may be observed, that, during the confusions which had preceded the re-establishment of their Charter and exclusive rights, their funds for trade were frequently kept out of view, that they might neither attract the notice of the ruling factions, nor bring on questions, respecting their rights; but when those rights were restored, all difficulties of this kind were removed, and the trade of the Company returned to its original principles.

Equipments,  
stock, and  
commercial  
instructions  
of this season;

The equipments for this season, consigned to SURAT, —to Surat. consisted of two ships, and the stock and money was estimated at £65,000. The instructions of the Court open with a reference to the treaties which had been concluded, between the King and the States General, and the prospect that, on the



CHAP. II. the basis of those treaties, the differences between the East-  
1662-63. India Companies of the two powers would be adjusted :—after approving of the precautions which this Presidency had taken, in observing the former orders to call in the out-stations, they recommended, that if the factories had been withdrawn from Agra and Ahmedabad, persons, properly qualified, might be occasionally sent to those towns, to purchase indigo, cloths, &c., suited to the Europe market ; and farther recommended, after examining the details which they had received, of the arbitrary manner in which the Governor of Surat had shut up their servants within their house, and obstructed them in obtaining investments, that they should, by every prudent expedient, endeavour to conciliate his favor ;—that the measure, however, of sending an Agent to congratulate the Emperor, was unwise, both because the expences (which had been calculated at twenty thousand rupees) were great, and because the project of obtaining, through this mission, farther exemptions from the payment of duties of customs at the port, might bring on new demands, which they neither had the power, nor the means to satisfy ; and, as this Presidency was still exposed to the interference of the Private Traders, the Court left it to the discretion of the President and Council, to dispose of the English broad-cloths and manufactures at small profit, which would depress the sales of the Private Traders in those articles.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 25th September 1662, 24th March 1662-63, and 4th April 1663.

The equipments and stock of this season, consigned to CHAP II.  
 FORT ST. GEORGE, amounted, in bullion, British staples, and 1662-63.  
 merchandize; to £28,300. After referring, as in the preceding —to Fort St.  
 George.  
 case, to the treaties between the King and the States, and the  
 expected consequences of them, the Court informed the Agent  
 and Council, that they had received a commission from the  
 King, and from the States General, empowering the Company  
 to take possession of the Island of Polaroon, and that one of  
 the vessels, intended for Bantam, was to proceed with this  
 authority, to take possession of it.

In so far as regarded the relations between Madras and  
 the Native Powers, the Court prohibited any farther expences  
 being incurred, for presents to the King of Golcondah, no  
 adequate return, in privileges, having, as yet, been obtained  
 from that sovereign, notwithstanding the large presents which  
 he had frequently received. In regard to the relations between  
 Madras and Bengal, it was the intention of the Court, that the  
 whole of the trade and establishments in that country should,  
 in future, be subordinate to the President and Council of Fort  
 St. George, and that it would be proper to reduce the number  
 of Agencies and Factories in Bengal;—that the establishment at  
 Hughly was, however, to be kept up, for the purpose of obtain-  
 ing taffaties and saltpetre; but instructions were to be given to  
 the Agent at that station, to purchase the taffaties in an un-  
 gummed state, as they could receive this improvement in  
 England, in a superior manner; a successful experiment having

CHAP. II. been tried, which made the Bengal silks pass in the market,  
 1662-63. as Italian silks:—when the assortments obtained in Bengal should reach the Fort, one proportion of them was directed to be sent to Bantam, at which they were in demand, and the other, to make part of the investment for Europe;—the purchase of Coast cloths was, however, to be abridged, from the exports of them to the Spice Islands having become impracticable; but cloths, suited for the Persian market, were to be bought, it being in contemplation to revive and re-establish that trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

Letter of King Charles II. to the King of Bantam, soliciting protection for the Company's servants.

The King, during this season, having received a congratulatory letter, on his Restoration, from the King of BANTAM, had been graciously pleased to send an answer, to be forwarded by the Company, with a present of arms, consigned to their Agent at Bantam;—in this letter, His Majesty recommended his subjects, the servants of the East-India Company, to the protection of the King of Bantam, and trusted that this recommendation would obtain for them his particular favor:—the Company, at the same time, transmitted the commission from the King and the States General, for the occupation of Polaroon, with the orders of the States to the Dutch Governor General at Batavia, and the Governor of Banda, to re-deliver the Island of Polaroon to the English; but, aware of the evasions of the Dutch, and that they would

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, dated 31st December 1662, and 20th and 26th February 1662—63.

would try every means for retaining, or recovering this settle-  
 ment, the Court directed the Agent, on getting possession, to  
 erect a fortification, and place a proper guard in it; and, at  
 the same time, to take measures for cultivating the soil, that  
 a proportion of the finer spices might be raised, to make up an  
 investment, and to restore this branch of the Company's trade.

CHAP. II.  
 1662-63

Neither the shipping, nor stock, sent to Bantam this  
 season, are specified, from the low state of the trade, at this  
 place; for some years, having rendered the speculation a  
 matter of experiment only.<sup>(1)</sup>

The foreign transactions of the East-India Company, in  
 this season, at SURAT, are so intimately blended with those of  
 the Earl of Marlborough, and Sir Abraham Shipman, who  
 had been sent to take possession of BOMBAY, that they form  
 but one subject.

The Portu-  
 guese evade  
 the cession of  
 Bombay and  
 its dependen-  
 cies to the  
 King's Gene-  
 ral and Ad-  
 miral.

To bring this subject into distinct view, we must follow the  
 transactions of the fleet, during the voyage, and till it reached  
 the place of its destination; and then advert to the measures  
 adopted by the King's officers, and by Sir George Oxinden, in  
 their endeavours to get possession of Bombay, and to support,

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at

(1)—Copy of a Letter from King Charles II. to the King of Bantam, 28th March  
 1663. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 226.)— Letters from the  
 Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 23d January, and 20th March 1662-63.

CHAP. II. at the same time, the Company's rights and trade at Surat,  
1662-63. and at its dependencies.

Before the fleet under the Earl of Marlborough, and the Company's ships under its convoy, left England, an agreement had been made, between the Commissioners of the Navy and the East-India Company, that three of the King's ships (the Dunkirk, Mary Rose, and Convertine) should, after landing the troops at Bombay, be at the disposal of the President at Surat, to bring goods to Europe on their account, and that the Leopard frigate, which had been victualled by the Company, and sent to Lisbon, to bring over the Portuguese Viceroy, who was to attend the Earl of Marlborough to Bombay, with powers to see the articles of the treaty, for the cession of it, fulfilled, should, after this service, proceed to Goa, and be offered to the Viceroy, to bring a cargo, on his account, or on that of the merchants of Goa, to Lisbon, at such rates as might be agreed on, between the Viceroy and Mr. Aungier, who was to be dispatched by Sir George Oxinden to Goa, for this express purpose.

Mr. Aungier, on the fleet arriving at Johanna Roads, was sent with instructions from Sir George Oxinden to Goa, on this service:—in the event of the Portuguese Viceroy accepting the offer, the money which the Company had expended, in victualling the ship, was to be repaid at Lisbon, at the rate of seven shillings and six-pence per mill-rea, out of the freight paid by the Portuguese:—in the event of the Viceroy declining  
this

this offer, the Company were to have permission to freight the ship, on their own account, for England; it being explained to the Viceroy, when this offer was made, that unless the ship should be employed to bring a cargo to Europe, under his authority, that a King's ship could not be engaged by the merchants, and that the rate of the freight, to be paid by him, should be from £18 to £22 per ton, according to the bulk of the goods:—if an agreement with the Viceroy could not be made for the whole tonnage, on account of the King of Portugal, the sum of £9000 might be asked, and £6000 taken, from the merchants, and the rate for the passage of individuals fixed at £40, that sum being deemed equivalent to the tonnage which a passenger would occupy; but that £30 per ton was the least that could be accepted:—the whole of the instructions to Sir George Oxinden, it was settled, should be carried into effect, in concert, and with the approbation of, the Earl of Marlborough.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Earl of Marlborough's fleet, and the Company's ships under Sir George Oxinden, reached Johanna Roads, from which Sir George, with the Company's fleet, sailed for Surat, on the 16th August 1662, leaving Mr Aungier to accompany the Earl to Bombay. The King's fleet sailed from  
 Johanna

(1)—Commission and Instructions from Sir George Oxinden to Mr. Gerald Aungier, to negotiate with the Viceroy of Portugal, relative to the freight of the Leopard Frigate, 16th August 1662.

CHAP. II. 1662-63. Johanna on the 22d August, and arrived at Bombay on the 18th September 1662, and demanded the cession of the Island, and of its dependencies, conformably to the treaty between the King and the Crown of Portugal:—the Portuguese Governor of Bombay evaded the cession of the Island, and the Viceroy, who had come out in the English fleet, refused to interpose his authority, till he should proceed to Goa, and receive instructions from the Portuguese Viceroy of the Indies. It now appeared, that the English Admiral had interpreted the terms of the treaty to signify Bombay, *and its dependencies*, or the Islands of Tannah and Salsette, and that the Portuguese Viceroy interpreted the treaty to signify the cession of the Island of Bombay *only*, not the cession of the dependencies situated between Bombay and Bassein, because that would lay open this principal Portuguese station, to the English at Bombay.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Earl of Marlborough demanded, in the first instance, the cession of Bombay, which was admitted to be within the terms of the treaty:—this was objected to, by the Portuguese Governor, on the pretext that Sir Abraham Shipman, the commander of the English troops, had not arrived; and therefore he refused to allow the troops to be landed, though the Earl of Marlborough stated the length of the voyage, and

(1)—Letter from Captain Browne, of the Dunkirk, to Sir Geroge Oxinden, dated Bombay, 20th September 1662.— Letter from Mr. Aungier to Sir George Oxinden, dated Bombay, 26th September 1662.

and the number of men which were daily dying from the want of refreshment.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1662-63.

Sir Abraham Shipman arrived in October 1662, and having produced his full powers, demanded from Don Antonio de Mello de Castro, that the cession should be made, agreeably to the treaty :—this was objected to, by his alleging that the form of the Letters, or Patent, of the King, did not coincide with the usages observed in Portugal, in like cases ; but offered to retain the Island, for the King of England, till sufficient authority should be obtained from Lisbon, and from England, empowering him to make the cession.

The Earl of Marlborough and Sir Abraham Shipman, under these embarrassments, applied to Sir George Oxinden, to solicit permission for them to land the troops at Surat ; but, the President represented, that such an application would give offence to the Mogul Governor; who, if it should be attempted, might probably seize on the Company's investment, and expel their servants from that port.<sup>(2)</sup>

In this state of affairs, the Earl of Marlborough made preparations for returning, with the King's ships, to England, explaining to Sir George Oxinden his intentions to carry the King's

The Earl of Marlborough determines to return to England with the fleet.

(1)—Letter from the Earl of Marlborough to Sir George Oxinden, 6th October 1662.

(2)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Earl of Marlborough, 8th October 1662.— Letter from the Earl of Marlborough to Sir George Oxinden, 18th October 1662.— Reply of Don Antonio de Mello de Castro, to Sir Abraham Shipman, relative to the surrender of the Island of Bombay, 16th October 1662.



CHAP. II. King's troops to the Mauritius, and to leave them there, till  
 1662-63. orders came from England. On learning this resolution, Sir  
 George Oxinden held a consultation at Surat, at which it was  
 resolved, to request the Earl of Marlborough to leave the Con-  
 vertine man of war, at Surat, to take on board the invest-  
 ment, for England, that the Company might have some return  
 for the heavy charges incurred; and, in the mean time, to  
 postpone sending the Company's ships or goods to Bantam,  
 leaving the investments at that place to come to England  
 on the ships destined to that port, till they should receive  
 instructions from the Court.<sup>(1)</sup>

Plan of Sir  
 George Ox-  
 inden, to  
 open a com-  
 mercial inter-  
 course with  
 the Viceroy  
 of Goa.

Mr. Aungier, it has already been mentioned, had been  
 sent from Surat to Goa, to offer to the Viceroy to carry a  
 Portuguese investment to Lisbon, on freight:—Though he was  
 favorably received, the conduct of the Viceroy was neither con-  
 formable to the intentions of the Commissioners of the Navy,  
 to accommodate the Portuguese, by receiving their goods on  
 board the King's ship Leopard, nor to the expectations of the  
 Company, of receiving from the freight a compensation for  
 the charges they had incurred, in sending this ship to Lisbon,  
 to accommodate the Viceroy, and to carry this officer to  
 Bombay.

After a tedious negotiation, respecting the freight, Mr.  
 Aungier offered it, at the rate of £21. 3s. 6d. per ton, to  
 the

(1)—Surat Consultations, 22d October 1662.

the Portugese merchants, who refused to give more than £8 per ton ; the transaction, therefore, was broken off, and the Leopard returned from Goa to Surat.<sup>(1)</sup> CHAP. II.  
1662-63.

Sir George Oxinden, in this situation, gave instructions to the commander of the Leopard to sail for Porcat and Carwar, to take on board the investments provided at those factories, under the impression, that the Dutch, at those places, would shew a greater degree of respect to a King's ship, than to a vessel of the Company ; and informed the Factors, that Sir Abraham Shipman had been obliged to land the troops on the Island of Angedivah, twelve leagues from Goa, and therefore it would be expedient for them to explain to the Native Chiefs, or Governors, that the object of the Company, in landing the troops on this island, was to remove the seat of the Company's trade from Surat to a station, at which they could carry on trade more profitably with their ports.<sup>(2)</sup> King's troops obliged to land on the Island of Angedivah.

By these events, the projects of the King, respecting Bombay, and of the Company, for bringing home investments on the King's ships, failed :—events which gave to the Dutch the opportunity of embarrassing every branch of the Company's trade on the Malabar Coast ; for they had got possession

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S

(1)—Letter from Mr. Aungier and Mr. Gary to the Presidency of Surat, dated Goa, 27th October 1662.

(2)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to Captain Richard Mynors, 6th December 1662.— Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Factors at Carwar and Porcat, 6th December 1662.

CHAP. II. of Cochin and Cannanore, and, in fact, excluded the English  
 1662-63. from every port, except Carwar, at which, also, they were  
 establishing a factory.<sup>(1)</sup>

Trade on the  
 Coromandel  
 Coast imped-  
 ed, by the  
 war in the  
 Carnatic.

The Company's affairs at FORT ST. GEORGE remained nearly in the same situation, in which they were described in the season 1660-61, that is, with the funds they had received, but embarrassed in the application of them, both in their sales and in their purchases, by the wars in the Carnatic between the Country Powers; and therefore directed their efforts, on the one hand, to improve the trade between the Coromandel Coast and Bengal, and, on the other, to revive the trade between the Coast and Bantam, till the arrival of Sir Edward Winter, in September 1662.

Proceedings  
 of Sir Ed-  
 ward Winter  
 on his arrival  
 at Fort St.  
 George.

In the home transactions of last season, the powers with which Sir Edward Winter was vested, under the Charter of Charles II., have been explained. On entering on his duties, he found, that the Company's servants, over whom he had been appointed, had been much reduced in number, by mortality; and, therefore, one of his first demands was for persons, properly qualified, to fill up his Council, and to be Agents at the Out-factories, as, from his present situation, in point of assistance, it was necessary to withdraw the Agencies from Verasheroon and Pettipolee: at a time when his efforts were required, if possible, to restore the trade at Masulipatam and Madapollam.

On

(1)—General Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 6th April 1663.

On reviewing the state of the Company's affairs on the Coast, it was, on consultation, resolved to recommend to the Court, to furnish their Factors at Fort St. George with, what Sir Edward Winter termed, a *Double Stock*, that is, not only with funds sufficient to purchase the investment for the season, but with funds sufficient to procure goods, to be ready, on the arrival of the ships in the subsequent year:—such a resource would enable him to purchase Coast cloths, and other Coromandel goods, at the periods when such purchases could be made at low rates, and, therefore, with most advantage to the Company.

As BENGAL had been made subordinate to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, Sir Edward Winter had dispatched an Agent to Hughly, to endeavour to adjust the unhappy dispute which had arisen, between the former factors at that station and Meer-Jumlah, on the subject of the junk which had been seized, as an expedient for recovering the debts due to the Company:—this Agent was directed to fix branches of the Company's trade at Ballasore and Cossimbuzar, and instructed, with the stock committed to his management, to provide taffaties, raw-silk, and saltpetre, to be sent round to Madras, as a necessary addition to the investment for Europe, and to take in Coast goods, to make up his assortment from Madras.<sup>(1)</sup>

His instructions to the Agent in Bengal, to adjust the dispute with Meer-Jumlah, and to fix Factories at Ballasore and Cossimbuzar.

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It

(1)—Letter from Sir Edward Winter to the Deputy Governor of the East-India Company, 2d January 1662-63.— Fort St. George Consultations, 26th February 1662-63.

CHAP. II.  
 1662-63.  
 Evasions of  
 the Dutch to  
 cede the Is-  
 land of Pola-  
 roon, and dif-  
 ficulty of pro-  
 curing an in-  
 vestment at  
 Bantam.

It might have been expected, from the treaty in Europe, between the King and the States General, and the commission of the States to the Governor General of Batavia, and the Governor of Banda, and from the powers with which the Agent and Council at BANTAM had been vested, under authority from the King, that the Island of Polaroon would have been ceded, as soon as these full powers should have been produced; but, so far from this being the case, the Dutch Governor at Polaroon refused to deliver up the Island, till he should receive instructions from the Governor of Banda, to which he was more immediately subordinate:—When application was made to the Governor of Banda, and the same orders produced to him, he, in like manner, refused to deliver the place, till he should receive instructions from the Governor General of Batavia:—these evasions the Agent and Council at Bantam endeavoured to counteract, by remonstrances, and by a resolution to send home to the Court, for the information of the King, this glaring breach of treaty; but, instead of receiving satisfaction, he was informed, that the private orders from Europe, to the Governor General of Batavia, were to postpone the delivery of the Island of Polaroon to the English, whatever public orders they might produce to that effect.

Under such oppressions, and with reference to the great force which the Dutch possessed, by having troops at Batavia, sufficient to control the Native Powers to an observance of their monopoly of the pepper trade, and with reference to their  
 naval

naval power, which had excluded the English, both from the CHAP. II.  
 Bandas and Moluccas, and to the very inferior force, of either 1662-63.  
 description, which the English possessed, the Agency of Bantam  
 were reduced to great distress, for they had no means of obtain-  
 ing any quantity of pepper, or the finer spices, for an invest-  
 ment, or of procuring Malabar or Coromandel goods, required to  
 revive the southern markets ; beside, under the pretext of the  
 cargoes of the English ships including Portuguese property, the  
 Dutch had seized and pillaged those ships : oppressions which  
 would explain the reason of the small investment which the  
 Agency of Bantam could this season procure, either for the  
 Company's, or for the King's ships, which had arrived at  
 Bantam to receive them.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council of Bantam to the Court, 30th September 1662, and 25th May 1663. — Letter from the Agent and Council of Bantam to the President and Council of Surat, 18th August 1663.

## 1663-64.

CHAP. II. **THE transactions of the London East-India Company, in**  
 1663-64. **this season, continued to be mixed with those of the State; and**  
 Remon- **the events, in which the Court and the King's ministers were**  
 strance of the **concerned, become necessary preliminaries to the full under-**  
 King to the **standing of the instructions, which the Court of Committees**  
 Portuguese **sent to their foreign Presidencies and Factories.**  
 Ambassador,   
 on the con-   
 duct of the   
 Viceroy of   
 Goa, in re-   
 fusing the   
 cession of   
 Bombay and   
 its dependen-   
 cies.

In the foreign transactions of the preceding year, it was mentioned, that on the refusal of the Portuguese Governor of Bombay and the Viceroy of Goa, to deliver up Bombay and its dependencies to the Earl of Marlborough and Sir Abraham Shipman, and on finding it impracticable to land the troops, for refreshment, at Surat, which would have excited the jealousy, if not the direct opposition of the Mogul Governor, the Earl of Marlborough set sail with the King's ships for England, with the exception of the Leopard frigate. On his arrival, the Governor and Committees of the London East-India Company waited on him, to express their acknowledgements, for the care which he had taken of their shipping, on the outward voyage, and for the support which he had afforded to Sir George Oxinden, on his assuming the administration of the Presidency of Surat; and, particularly, for his protection to  
 their

their shipping in that quarter of India, against the aggressions of the Dutch.

CHAP. II.  
1663-64.

The King, on receiving information of the proceedings of the Portuguese, at Bombay and Goa, in refusing to cede the Island, conformably to treaty, ordered a memorial to be presented, in July 1663, to Don Francisco Rebello, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, stating, that His Majesty demanded justice from the Court of Portugal, on the Viceroy of Goa, who had, in defiance of the treaty, and of the instructions which he had received, refused to surrender the Island and its dependencies, and to be refunded the charges incurred, amounting to £100,000, in fitting out the armament, and detaining it in India :—the King further required, that orders should be immediately sent to the Viceroy of Goa, not only to cede the Island of Bombay, but its dependencies, the Islands of Salsette and Tannah, to the King's forces, which had been detained in India, for that express service. This memorial, however, does not appear to have produced any effect, but only evasive explanations, that, by the treaty, the Island of Bombay was intended to be ceded, *but not its dependencies* :—in answer, it was insisted, that the Island, *and its dependencies*, were comprehended in the treaty, because Bombay, alone, would, in a commercial view, neither give to the English, in the East-Indies, a station that would enlarge their trade, nor, in a political view, add to the naval influence of England, or enable the two Crowns to fulfil the secret article



CHAP. II. cle of the treaty, for counterbalancing the commercial and  
1663-64. naval superiority of the Dutch in the East-Indies.<sup>(1)</sup>

Remon-  
strance to the  
States Gene-  
ral, on the  
Leopard Fri-  
gate being  
obstructed, in  
procuring an  
investment of  
pepper at  
Porcat.

When the Earl of Marlborough sailed from the Malabar Coast, with the King's fleet, for England, he had consented to leave the Leopard frigate at Surat, to take in part of the Company's investment, and to proceed to Porcat, under the idea, that the Dutch would be less disposed to resist a King's ship, than they would to obstruct a vessel belonging to the Company :—It would appear that, at this time, the Dutch had so far succeeded in their war against the Rajah of that place, as to have got possession of the port, and that they had prevented the Leopard from taking in the Company's investment which had been provided at that place; upon which the Leopard had returned to Surat :—this breach of the subsisting treaty, between the King and the States General, produced a remonstrance from Sir George Downing, the King's Ambassador at the Hague, in substance, that, admitting the Dutch to have acquired possession of Porcat, or having it ceded to them by the Rajah, they had no right to interfere with the English Factory in its trade, or to prevent the putting the investment, which had been prepared for Europe, on board the ship. In the conferences of the Ambassador with the Pensionary De Witt, the States General and the Dutch Directors were so much assimilated,

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 10th August 1663.— Historical Account of Bombay, pages 9, 10, in which copies of the Memorials and Answers are printed.

assimilated, that they took a common part, in their endeavours CHAP. II.  
 to evade granting that redress, of which, in this case, 1663-64.  
 they admitted the justice, which proves the necessity under  
 which the Court of Directors were placed, to give to Sir  
 George Oxinden instructions to act with such caution towards  
 the Dutch, as would prevent their having opportunities to  
 bear down, either by violence or evasion, the Company's  
 trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

Under these circumstances, the Company presented a  
 petition to the King, praying that His Majesty would be  
 pleased to obtain orders from the States General to the Gover-  
 nor General of Batavia, requiring him to prevent, in future,  
 the Dutch fleets from any farther aggressions on the English  
 trade and settlements.

Another source of the instructions of the Court, to  
 their foreign settlements, was, the information which they  
 had received, that the French were fitting out eight armed  
 vessels, intended to proceed to the East-Indies, under the  
 command of Hubert Hugo, whom the Court described to be  
 a Dutch pirate. Without presuming to know the object of  
 this armament, the Directors, from its magnitude, and from  
 the character of the commander, deemed it prudent to  
 send

Alarm of the  
 Company, at  
 the equip-  
 ment of a  
 French squa-  
 dron for the  
 East-Indies.

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send

(1)—Copy of Letter from Sir George Downing, the British Ambassador at the  
 Hague, to the East-India Company, relative to his conferences with the Pensionary De  
 Witt, and the Directors of the Dutch East-India Company, 18th March 1663-64. (East-  
 India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 225 B.)

**CHAP. II**  
**1663-64.** send orders to their foreign Presidencies, that the homeward ships should sail as a fleet, and be prepared to defend themselves against any enemy.<sup>(1)</sup>

*Instructions to Sir George Oxinden, for the trade on the Malabar Coast, and in Persia.*

The particular instructions to Sir George Oxinden, respecting the trade at Surat and on the Malabar Coast, enjoined, that the sales of English produce should be effected, at as low rates as possible, to bear down the Private Traders, and the investment collected, partly at Surat, and partly on the Malabar Coast; that, though it would be expedient to keep up the Company's right to the moiety of the customs at Gombroon, the other Factories in Persia ought to be withdrawn, and two or three persons only left at Gombroon, to wait opportunities for the trade renewing, and allowed five per cent. on such customs as they might recover, to defray all expences; but if this plan should not be practicable, the President was annually to send an Agent from Surat to Gombroon, to demand, and to receive, the money due to the Company on that account.<sup>(2)</sup>

*Orders to Sir Edward Winter, to strengthen the garrison of Fort St. George, and to revive the trade between Madras and Bantam.*

The Court, not having heard of the measures which Sir Edward Winter had adopted at FORT ST. GEORGE, under the instructions which he had received in the preceding season, after repeating the information which they had conveyed to Surat, on the subjects of the negotiation between the King  
and

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 9th and 17th March 1663-64.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 10th August 1663.

and the States General, and the alarm which the large armament preparing in France had occasioned, directed this Agent and his Council to put the Fort in the best state of defence, and to reduce the Factory at Masulipatam to a temporary Agency :—as the conduct of the Portuguese soldiers had been treacherous, and no confidence could be placed in them, on the arrival of the thirty English recruits embarked on the ships for Fort St. George, the Portuguese at that station were to be discharged. The trade between Madras and Bantam, notwithstanding the obstructions of the Dutch, was to be revived, from the expectation that profits might arise, from the sale of Coast goods, which would facilitate the investment in pepper and the finer spices. The Bengal produce having answered in England, one-fourth of the funds sent to Fort St. George was to be appropriated to the trade at Hughly; but, to reduce the charges, the Factories at Patna, Cossimbuzar, and Ballasore, were to be discontinued, and all sales and purchases, on the Company's account, made at Hughly. <sup>(1)</sup>

Similar information with that given to Surat and Fort St. George, respecting the Company's affairs in Europe, was communicated to the Agent and Council at BANTAM. The proceedings of Agent Hunter, at that station, in retiring from Polaroon, without making a spirited effort to get pos-

Mr. Quarles-Browne appointed Agent at Bantam, and directed to take possession of Polaroon, and to increase the pepper trade.

T 2

session

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 16th December 1663.

CHAP. II. session of it, when the crew of his vessel was superior in  
 1663-64. numbers to the small Dutch garrison, was considered by the Court to be so improper, that they recalled him; as they were of opinion, from a conversation with the Dutch Ambassador at London, that he had been bribed by the Dutch, and that he had been guilty of a breach of trust. Mr. Quarles Browne was appointed to succeed him:—the instructions to Mr. Browne were, to take decisive measures to get possession of the Island, and not to be prevented from asserting the Company's right to it, by any Dutch force which it might be within his power to subdue. The more effectually to secure Polaroon, Major Francis Willoughby was appointed to be Lieutenant, or Governor, of the Island, at a salary of £50 per annum, for five years:—he was furnished with a plan, for erecting a fortification for the defence of the place, and was to receive all his orders from Agent Browne and the Council at Bantam.

It being of the utmost consequence to the East-India Company, to revive the trade at Bantam, the Court signified their intention to send shipping sufficient to bring home two thousand tons of pepper, annually, from this port, and from Jambee, and such proportions of the finer spices, as could be procured from Maccassar:—the spices, however, to be sent to Bantam regularly, as they were obtained, to make part of the investment from that place:—as soon as this tonnage could be filled up, it was the intention of the Court to increase it; and they

they recommended to Agent Browne, if he should find it practicable, to open a trade with Siam and Japan.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1663-64.

While the King's troops, which had proceeded to India under the command of Sir Abraham Shipman, were cooped up in the Island of Angedivah, and the Portuguese continued to refuse to this officer compliance with the stipulations in the treaty between the two Crowns in Europe, the affairs of the London East-India Company, at SURAT, were necessarily blended with those of the commander of the King's troops, it being not only the duty of Sir George Oxinden to assist them, but a compliance with the instructions of the Court of Committees; and yet, in the discharge of those duties, Sir George Oxinden was under restraints, from the necessity under which he was placed, to avoid exciting jealousy, or incurring danger to the Factory at Surat, or the stations depending on it, from the resentment of the Mogul, or of any of the Native Chiefs.

King's troops at Angedivah much reduced, and Sir Abraham Shipman proposes to cede the King's rights to Bombay, to the Company.

The King's troops on the Island of Angedivah, from the want of accommodation, and of the necessary supplies of provisions, had been so reduced by sickness, that their numbers and capacity of service were daily diminishing:—these events

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 30th June 1663 and 29th February 1663-64.— Commission and Instructions from the Court to Mr. Browne and Major Willoughby, 1st July 1663.

CHAP. II.  
1663-64. events induced Sir Abraham Shipman to make a proposition to Sir George Oxinden and the Council of Surat, to cede the rights to Bombay to the Company, if the Viceroy of Goa could be brought to assent to this arrangement.

This offer refused, Sir George Oxinden not having authority from the King or the Company to accept it.

On consultation, it was resolved by the President and Council to reject this offer, from its being doubtful, whether, without fresh instructions from Portugal, the Viceroy could consent; and because the Presidency had not a force which could occupy or protect the Island; and, besides, the cession of the right to the Company, could be made by the King only:—these reasons Sir George Oxinden stated to Sir Abraham Shipman, to prevent him, under the distressed circumstances in which he, and the troops, were placed, from disposing of the right to any other power; and to preclude the Company from being involved in so perilous a question, as the propriety of accepting the Island from any source, but from the King.

The prudence of this resolution (though it left Sir Abraham Shipman and the King's troops in a perishing state) was confirmed, by the actual circumstances of the President and Council at Surat. The Mogul Governor of this port had persevered in drawing frequent small sums from the Factory, for permission to carry on their sales and purchases; and the only restraint on his exactions, from the English and from the Dutch, was, the superior naval power of  
both,

both, which the Prèsident emphatically describes to be “the  
 “ only hold which they had to defend them.”<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
 1663-64.

With the object of bringing before the Court the commercial situation of this Presidency and its dependencies, on the Malabar Coast, Sir George Oxinden explained, that it would be expedient to send, on the next ships, a proportion of lead, copper, quicksilver, coral, and English broad-cloths, to keep open the purchases in the interior, and, if possible, sales and purchases in Persia;—that the order of the Court, to withdraw the Factory from Ahmedabad, might easily be obeyed, because, as common merchants, they might have sent Agents to that city; but, by relinquishing the Factory, they might lose the right to resettle it;—that withdrawing the Agency from Agra would preclude them from the purchase of haftaes, mercoles, or derebauds, portions of which, with drugs, cotton-yarn, and callicoes, were required for the Europe investment, and were essential in any experiment to re-open the trade with Persia;—that the proportion of the investment from the Malabar Coast, or pepper, cardamoms, &c. had, in this season, been with difficulty obtained at Porcat and Batticolo;—for, at Carwar, purchases had been impracticable, from the civil wars between the Rajahs and Princes; though, on this Coast, the sale of lead and broad-cloths had continued, and pepper, cardamoms, and dungarees, been  
 procured

State of trade  
 at Surat, and  
 its dependencies.

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 14th November 1663, and 28th January 1663-64.



CHAP. II.  
1663-64. procured in exchange; and that the ships, as they arrived, had been dispatched, to take in these assortments. <sup>(1)</sup>

As the Dutch power extended over almost every port on the Malabar Coast, Sir George Oxinden, at this juncture, listened to an offer made by the Government of Acheen, to grant to the Company the whole of the trade of that port, provided the English would undertake to defend it against the Dutch;—this offer was referred to the Court, the Presidency not having the force this protection required; but after stating to them the value of the trade which might be established between Sumatra and Surat, desired instructions on the subject.

Surat attacked and pillaged by Sevagee, and the Company's Factory defended by Sir George Oxinden.

These commercial arrangements were unexpectedly interrupted, in January 1663-64, by a sudden attack on Surat, by Sevagee's army, commanded by this chief, in person. On his approach, the Governor shut himself up in the castle, while the inhabitants fled, either in boats, or into the adjoining country:—in this emergency, Sir George Oxinden, and the Company's servants, shut themselves up in the Factory, with their property, which they estimated at £80,000, and, after fortifying it, called in the ships' crews for its defence:—when attacked, they made a brave and obstinate resistance, and this opposition not only preserved the Factory, but the town, from destruction:—Sevagee, however, carried off an immense booty. On

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 28th January 1663-64.

On the arrival of the Mogul army, Sir George Oxinden received the thanks of the commander, for his fidelity to the Mogul, and an extension of the privileges of trade to the English, with an exemption from the payment of customs for one year.

Soon after this event, Surat was again menaced with the approach of Sevagee's army:—Sir George Oxinden seized this opportunity, while the Mogul's officers were again looking for the assistance of the English, to send Mr. Goodier, and two other of the Company's principal servants, to Broach, to solicit from the King's uncle, Mahabut Cawn, at this time Governor of the Guzzerat, the farther confirmation of the Company's privileges, and received a Perwanna from the Mogul, granting to the English the whole of the customs of Surat, for one year, and an abatement of one per cent. on the rate which they were subsequently to pay at Surat.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Company's trade in PERSIA continued to decline, the Agent at Gombroon having represented to the President and Council of Surat, that the grants from Ispahan, the acquiring of which had cost so much money, were now attended with no beneficial consequences; but whether this proceeded from secret orders sent to Gombroon, to disregard them, or from the naval force of the Dutch, and the large imports by them

CHAP. II.  
1663-64.  
Privileges granted by Aurungzebe to the English at Surat, for their conduct on this occasion

Trade in Persia on the decline, from the ancient grants being disregarded by the Persian officers.

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of

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 28th January 1663-64.— Perwanna from Aurungzebe, granting remission of customs, &c. to the English at Surat, 1663-64.

CHAP. II. of copper, tin, spices, &c the English character had sunk  
 1663-64. in the estimation of the Persians, and the President had not power to enforce the observance of treaties ;—that, in the opinion, both of the Agent at Gombroon, and of the Presidency, it was in vain to seek grants, without power sufficient to command the observance of them ; and therefore, they had been obliged to recur to the expedient of sending country vessels, with small assortments, to be disposed of at Gombroon, and to return with Persian produce to Surat ; a measure intended rather to keep up the right to the moiety of the customs, than calculated to afford any profitable result.<sup>(1)</sup>

Trade on the Coromandel Coast precarious, from the opposition of the Dutch.

Sir Edward Winter, in the preceding season, had, under his instructions, adopted such temporary measures at FORT ST. GEORGE, as, with the limited funds which he then possessed, appeared to him requisite for reviving the Company's trade on the Coast of Coromandel, and carrying it eastwards to Bantam, and had sent an Agent to Bengal, to adjust the unhappy dispute which had occurred, respecting the seizure of a junk. The death of the Nabob in this year, and the uncertainty respecting the person who might succeed him, notwithstanding the protection expected from Aurungzebe, again left the grants to the Company, at Fort St. George, in a precarious situation ; and yet, it was under these circumstances,

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 14th November 1663, and 28th January 1663-64.

stances, that we first discover the intemperate proceedings of Sir Edward Winter; who, after the experience of the consequences of retaliation on the ships of the Native Powers, proposed to the Court this same measure, to convince them, that the English were as powerful at sea, as they, with their armies, were on shore, and this, at the very time, when he described the inefficiency of the treaty in Europe between the King and the States, to establish any equality in the trade of the two nations in the East-Indies, and to be calculated only to confirm the Dutch system of reducing the English trade, and monopolizing that on the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts, in the same manner as they had done the trade at Java and in the Spice Islands; and at the time, also, when the Dutch had instigated the chiefs at Porcat, &c. to delay the goods in their transit to the English Factories, that they might be delivered in a damaged state, and might not bear a comparison in Europe with the Dutch imports, or arrive in time to meet the home sales, or till the Dutch goods, of superior quality, had glutted the market.

In this season, the ships from England, and from the Coast of Africa, had arrived at Madras, and had brought the assortments of goods from the former, for sale at Madras and its dependencies, and gold from the latter, which was estimated at £92,300: funds which, but for the convulsed state of the country, from the death of the Nabob, already referred

CHAP. II.  
1663-64.

Project of opening a Trade, through Siam, with Japan, Tonquin, and China.

CHAP. II. to, would have been adequate to the restoration of the **Coro-**  
 1663 - 64. mandel trade, as well as to the extension of that in **Bengal** ;  
 but which, from the state of the markets at **Masulipatam**,  
**Madapollam**, &c., could not be employed on the **Coast**, and,  
 therefore, led to the project of employing a proportion of  
 them in establishing a trade at **Siam**, at which sales of **Coast**  
 goods could be effected with profit, and returns had of pro-  
 duce from **Japan**, **Tonquin**, and **China**.

In regard to the Fort itself, the Agent and Council re-  
 quested a supply of arms for the garrison, and the appoint-  
 ment of an officer to command it.<sup>(1)</sup>

The trade be-  
 tween **Ban-**  
 tam, the **Co-**  
 romandel  
 Coast, and  
 the **Southern**  
 Islands, ob-  
 structed by  
 the **Dutch**.

The **Dutch**, this season, availing themselves of the in-  
 efficiency of the treaty between the **King** and the **States**  
**General**, to prevent their encroachments on the trade at  
**Bantam**, got possession of **Cranganore** and **Cochin**, on the  
**Malabar Coast**, and prohibited the **Natives** from trading  
 between **Cochin** and **Cape Comorin**, without their passes,  
 by which means they not only excluded the trade between  
**Bantam** and the **Malabar Coast**, but the trade between that  
 port and the **Southern Islands**.<sup>(2)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 6th and  
 10th January 1663-64.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, 25th August 1663.

## 1664-65.

IN connecting the Annals of the East-India Company with the existing relations between Great-Britain, and the maritime powers of Europe, and with the political and commercial circumstances of the seats of the Company's trade in the East-Indies, we have discovered the sources of the measures which the Court of Directors adopted, for preserving their trade, and retaining their factories, at this juncture, under the shifting political events of the European and Asiatic nations.

Early in the season 1664-65, the Court anticipated, from their applications to Government for protection, against the monopolizing and violent projects of the Dutch in the East-Indies, and from other political circumstances, more immediately within their notice, that a Dutch war was approaching:—aware of the superiority of the naval power and funds of the Dutch in the East, they had been taught, by experience, that in that distant quarter, the British commercial interests were more exposed to hazard than in Europe; and therefore they instructed their President at SURAT to lose no time, in putting the investment on board their ships, and ordered the commanders to hasten from the Indian Seas, and during the whole of their

CHAP. II.  
1664-65.  
Court's instructions to their foreign Settlements, on the appearances of a war with the Dutch.

CHAP. II. their voyage, to keep themselves prepared against the enemy,  
1664-65. and to avoid touching at Dutch ports.<sup>(1)</sup>

The uncertainty of a Dutch war continued, during the subsequent summer, from the circumstance of an Ambassador having arrived in London, to accommodate the disputes between the States and the King, and from an English envoy having been sent to the Hague, to meet those pacific overtures; but as His Majesty had expressed his determination to obtain redress for the grievances which his subjects (particularly those in the East-Indies) had experienced, and as the Court were, by no means, sanguine in their expectations of such redress, the great naval preparations, both in England and in Holland, produced an opinion, that though peace might be the result of negotiation, war was the more probable event:—for this reason, the Court intimated their intentions to the President of Surat, to send out one ship only to that port, and directed him to dispose of the Company's country vessels to the best advantage; not to hazard a coasting trade, and to transmit lists of what chintzes, calicoes, and Lahore indigo, they expected to be able to ship for Europe.

French East-India Company formed, and instructions of the Court regarding it.

It was, at this crisis, that the Court discovered they had to meet a new European rival in a French Company, the equipment of the ships of which, in the last year, they had conjectured might be intended for piratical purposes; but  
it

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 27th May 1664.

it now appeared, that large subscriptions had been raised for this association, and a plan projected by the French minister for its support :—the Court therefore recommended, that much caution should be observed, in transactions with these new European adventurers, to prevent any political discussions between the two Crowns, which might lead to new embarrassments in the prosecution of the English trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

Events in Europe, during the remainder of the year, gave evidence, rather of an approaching war between England and the States General, than of an adjustment of differences ; for captures in the European seas had commenced, and the English fleet had sailed to meet the Dutch fleet, should it move from port, or should a declaration of war take place : it was therefore ordered, that the Presidency of Surat should call in their Out-factories, and prepare themselves for war, and endeavour to purchase investments for two ships, intended to be dispatched from England, one to Surat, and one to Fort St. George ; and that frugality should be observed, and care taken, in providing investments for the ships of the ensuing season.<sup>(2)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1664-65.

Precautions  
to be observed  
at Surat,  
should a war  
take place  
with Holland.

The Court subsequently informed this Presidency, of the almost certainty of a Dutch war, though this opinion proceeded rather from the warlike preparations of the two countries, than from the actual commencement of hostilities :—  
hence

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 1st August 1664.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 24th December 1664.



CHAP. II. hence it was ordered, that the Presidency should act as if war  
1664-65. was inevitable, narrow in the Factories, and place the Com-  
pany's funds at interest; but not vest money in Indian produce,  
the transit of which, to Europe, might be perilous, if not  
ruinous.

King's troops  
at Angedivah  
ordered to be  
transferred to  
Fort St.  
George. These instructions were accompanied with orders from the  
Duke of York, then Lord High Admiral, to the captain of  
the Chesnut sloop of war, who was dispatched to bring off  
the King's troops who had survived, from the Island of  
Angedivah, and to allow such of them, as might be disposed  
to go to Fort St. George, on a country vessel, to be embodied  
into the garrison of that place.

Equipments  
and stock of  
this season li-  
mited. This state of affairs in Europe, explains the limited equip-  
ments of the Company, this season, which consisted of two  
ships only, with an investment of £16,000.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sir Edward  
Winter su-  
perseded, and  
Mr. Foxcroft  
appointed  
Agent at Fort  
St. George,  
with orders  
to reduce the  
Out-agencies. The instructions to FORT ST. GEORGE of which Mr. Fox-  
croft, was appointed Agent, (the Court not having approved of  
the measures of Sir Edward Winter, and granted him leave  
to return to Europe,) in the season 1664-65, were similar to  
those sent to Surat;—they stated the probability of a Dutch  
war; described the gross amount of stock sent on two ships to  
be about £18,000; desired that one of them might be as  
speedily dispatched to England as possible, with the saltpetre  
and

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 17th March 1664-65. —  
Warrant from the Duke of York to the Commander of the Chesnut Pink, dated 15th  
March 1664-65.

and Bengal goods; that it might leave India before the news of a war could reach the Dutch settlements, and that the captain should keep clear of the enemy's ports, and hold his ship always ready for immediate action; that, in the event of a sufficient cargo not being provided at the Fort, notice should be sent to Masulipatam, to have the goods there ready to be put on board, but that no ship was to be dispatched to Sumatra or Java:—should a Dutch war actually take place, one ship only would be sent from England, in the following season, with a cargo not exceeding £15,000; in the mean time, the fort was to be put in a state of defence, (a supply of ordnance and small arms having been embarked, and fifteen recruits for the garrison) and the inhabitants of the town, and such natives as could be trusted, were to be embodied:—that all the small vessels should be sold; the Out-factories reduced; and the Company's cash placed at interest, but with permission to borrow £10,000, to enable them to provide an investment, to be ready for the ship of the following season; and, under the present circumstances, the settlement of a Factory at Siam to be postponed. <sup>(1)</sup>

The instructions to BANTAM, in the season 1664-65, vary only from those which have been detailed, in so far as regarded the goods expected to be ready at that port (principally pepper):—the friendship of the Kings of Bantam and

The Agent at Bantam directed not to attempt the recovery of Polaroon, if not already ceded.

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Jambee

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 21st December 1664.

CHAP. II.  
1664-65. Jambee was to be cultivated, and the ships were to be dispatched in the shortest possible time:—if the island of Polaron should not have been ceded, the attempt to obtain possession of it was to be postponed; but, if acquired by the Presidency of Bantam, every effort was to be made for its defence;—and no farther stock was to be sent to Maccassar, or the other dependencies of Bantam, while the uncertainty of a war continued. <sup>(1)</sup>

The death of Sir Abraham Shipman induced his Secretary, Mr. Cooke, to accept Bombay on the terms prescribed by the Portuguese.

While the events, which have been detailed, were occurring in Europe, the situation of the Company's foreign settlements discover only despondency, from all their measures having been checked, if not frustrated, by the superior naval and commercial means of the Dutch, even when they could not have anticipated a war between the two maritime powers in Europe.

The distressed situation in which Sir Abraham Shipman and the King's troops were left, on the Island of Angedivah, in the preceding season, after Sir George Oxinden had, on consultation, refused to accept the Island of Bombay, on the ground that the Viceroy of Goa had not power to transfer the rights to the Island, from the King to the  
Company,

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 2d September 1664.

Company, and from an apprehension, that such a transaction might involve the Company, at home, in hazardous political discussions with the Crown, prepares us to look for the events, which attended the fate of this unfortunate armament, and the effects which they produced on the Presidency of Surat, and on the Company's Factories on the Malabar Coast. CHAP. II.  
1664-65.

In the year we are reviewing, Sir Abraham Shipman, and the greater part of the troops, died, at the Island of Angedivah, from want of provisions and accommodation, and from the unhealthiness of the climate:—under these circumstances, Mr. Cooke, who had been Secretary to Sir Abraham Shipman, to preserve his own life, and the lives of the troops which remained, had been compelled to accede to a treaty with the Viceroy of Goa, in November 1664, on such terms as he would grant. By this convention, Mr. Cooke renounced, on the part of England, all pretensions to the dependencies on Bombay (Salsette, &c.), and accepted the cession of the Island of Bombay only, on the same terms which its governor had proposed, on the arrival of the Earl of Marlborough; with the additional article, that the Portuguese, resident in Bombay, should be exempted from the payment of customs, and have liberty of trade from Bundera, and the other creeks of Salsette. <sup>(1)</sup>

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The

(1)—Historical Account of Bombay, page 14.

## CHAP. II.

1664-65. Return of the King's troops landed at Bombay, and estimate of their expences.

The events which followed this agreement, affecting the remains of the armament, discover, not more their defenceless situation under Mr. Cooke, than the diminished numbers which actually left Angedivah, and proceeded to Bombay.

Mr. Cooke, on concluding this agreement with the Viceroy of Goa, made application to three of the captains of the Company's ships, then lying at Carwar, lading pepper for Europe, to take on board the King's troops and stores, and accommodate them with a passage from Angedivah to Bombay:—these ships being already laden, and under orders to return to Surat, the captains explained to Mr. Cooke, that they were not at liberty to deviate from their orders, and that they trusted Sir George Oxinden, to whom notification of the treaty had been sent, would dispatch shipping from Surat to Angedivah, for this service.

From an original return, signed by Mr. Cooke, dated Angedivah, 3d December 1664, it appears, that the King's troops which embarked in England, in February and March 1661-62, amounted to four companies, of one hundred men each, exclusive of officers, and that the charges for levying these troops, and their pay, from the period of their embarkation in England, to the time when they left Angedivah for Bombay, amounted to £13,166. 17s. 11d., and that, by casualties, during this period, they were reduced to one hundred and three privates.

By direction of Sir George Oxinden, on the arrival of the

the troops at Bombay, a general muster and inventory of stores, was taken by Captain Gary, on the 25th February and 3d March 1664-65, and the numbers were,—Mr. Cooke, governor, one ensign, four serjeants, six corporals, four drummers, one surgeon, one surgeon's mate, two gunners, one gunner's mate, one gun-smith, and ninety-seven privates; and twenty-two pieces of cannon, eight hundred and seventy-eight rounds of shot, and various articles of stores. <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> (1) 1664-65.

This unfortunate termination of the measures which had been adopted, by the Crowns of England and Portugal, for ensuring to the former an independent seat of trade in the East-Indies, and obtaining for the latter, the co-operation of the English force, to balance the superior military and naval power of the Dutch, instead of relieving the Company's Presidency of Surat from those oppressions, of which they had, for so many years, complained, tended to increase them.

Effect of this event on the Company's settlements and trade.

Several large Dutch ships arrived at Surat, from Batavia, Cochin, and Japan, and others from Persia, with cargoes of articles, suited to the Surat and Indian markets, and these arrivals depressed the English sales and purchases, at the time when the misfortunes at Angedivah and Bombay, of which the Mogul government were fully informed, had lowered the English

(1)—Letter from Captain Bowen, Captain Barker, and Captain Higgenson, to Mr. Cooke, dated Carwar, 28 November 1664.— Account of Pay and Disbursements to the King's Troops, from February 1661-62 to 3d December 1664.— Muster taken at Bombay, by Mr. Gary, 22d February 1664-65. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, Nos. 228, 229, 230, 235.)

**CHAP. II.** English character for power, in the opinion of the Na-  
**1664-65.** tives, and discovered their inferior means for reviving the trade.

The situation of the Out-stations had become equally precarious :—the Dutch had excluded the English from making purchases of pepper, and other Malabar goods, at Porcat, and had, at this time, got possession of Calicut, and expelled the Company's Agent from that port; Sir George Oxinden, therefore, informed the Court, that unless an effectual interposition by the King with the States General, should take place, and orders be sent out to the Dutch Governor General, to desist from farther aggressions, the Company's trade on the Malabar Coast must be given up; and unless a sufficient naval force should be dispatched from England, to counter-balance that which the Dutch had in the Indian Seas, it would be impracticable for the Presidency of Surat to proceed with the trade at that port, or to preserve even their claims to those rights, which, at so much expence and danger, had been recently ceded to them by the Mogul.

In this critical situation, information reached Sir George Oxinden, that the Company's Factory in Bengal was experiencing the most heavy exactions and obstructions from the Nabob; with a request, that the President, from his influence at the court of the Mogul, would solicit a Phirmaund for the protection of that branch of the Company's trade. This application the Presidency of Surat referred to the Court,

on

on the ground that it must be attended with considerable expence, and that it might lead to discussions, in which the Presidency of Surat might be deprived of the exemptions from the payment of Customs, which they had obtained in the preceding year.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1664-65.

Sir Edward Winter, when he received information from the Court, that an Agent might be expected to succeed him at FORT ST. GEORGE, endeavoured to throw the whole blame on his Council, of the Company's trade not being prosecuted with sufficient zeal, for they had thwarted his best efforts, which had been directed to make retaliation on the vessels of the petty Chiefs, whose depredations, inland, prevented the Company's sales and purchases :—this plan he had, in the preceding season, recommended to the Court, and notwithstanding what had happened in Bengal, had required their authority to sanction it :—to support this project, he referred to the practice of the Dutch, whose large stock and naval power, he asserted, would not have given them the trade which they enjoyed, had they not kept in awe the Native Powers ;—that when he had represented to one of the country Chiefs the depredations committed by his followers on the goods passing to Madras, as well as the arbitrary duties imposed on them, he received for answer, that “ when the English horns and teeth grew, he “ would then free them from the duty ;”—Sir Edward, there fore,

Trade at Madras depressed, from the Agent not having authority to use forcible measures against the Natives, and for want of a double stock.

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 31st March and 5th April 1665.



CHAP. II. fore, concluded, that neither the trade at Madras, nor at  
 1664-65. the Out-agencies, could be expected to revive, unless strong  
 measures of this kind were adopted.

The Court's order, for discharging the Portuguese soldiers serving in the garrison, could not be carried into execution, on account of the great mortality among the English recruits; but, independently of this misfortune, these soldiers had lately, when the town was besieged by Yecknam-Khan, behaved with much bravery, and had enabled the Agent to preserve the place; it therefore became more necessary to retain them in the service, as he had received information of the probability of a Dutch war, and of the French equipment intended for the East-Indies.

The funds for the trade of this Agency, which had been increased, by receiving gold from the Coast of Africa, the Agent estimated at 220,000 pagodas, of which proportions had been sent to Bengal and Bantam; the remainder, therefore, would be insufficient for providing the investment, without the aid of a loan:—this state of affairs induced him to repeat the measure he had formerly recommended, that one moiety of a Double Stock should remain in the treasury, to purchase goods in the months of January and February, and the other to make payments at the time the investment was completed:—in illustration, he referred to the trade in Bengal, in which profitable purchases (particularly of saltpetre) could only be made at certain seasons of the year; and that a part of the  
 money

money in the treasury must be applied to build and maintain boats on the river, to bring the saltpetre from Patna to Hughly, and the silks and muslins from Cossimbuzar to the English Factory, as otherwise the Nabob's boats would exact an exorbitant freight. The plan of inducing the weavers to come to Hughly had failed, from Cossimbuzar being more immediately under the observation of the Nabob; it was, therefore, by a Double Stock only, that the trade, either at Madras or in Bengal, could be revived or extended; and, on the Coast, by a naval force, to counterbalance, at sea, the obstructions and arbitrary demands of the Chiefs on shore.

The investment for the season was estimated at 192,000 pagodas, which sum had exhausted the treasury, allowing for the proportion of the money remitted to Bengal and to Bantam. The five ships which were to sail with this investment had, agreeably to the Court's directions, received orders to keep together, as a fleet, and to act for the common defence.<sup>(1)</sup>

The attention of the Agent and Council at BANTAM, in 1664-65, was directed to the recovery of the Island of Polaroon from the Dutch; the forming a settlement on the Island of Damm, situated within a few leagues of Banda; and to the re-opening the trade with Japan.

Polaroon delivered to the Agent at Bantam, but in a desolated state.

During the whole of this season, the evasions of the Dutch, to comply with the treaty in Europe, continued; and

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it

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 12th January 1664-65.

CHAP. II.  
 1664-65. it was not till the 25th March 1665, that the cession of the Island of Polaroon actually took place; but it was delivered up in so desolated a state (the whole of the spice-trees being destroyed) that this station, which had been the subject of so many negotiations and treaties in Europe, and of so many unjustifiable evasions at Batavia, was rendered useless for eight years; that time being considered, by the Agent and Council of Bantam, as requisite to render the cultivation of it productive.

The Agent at Bantam forms a settlement on the Island of Damm, but is expelled by the Dutch.

The next object of this Agency was the forming a settlement on the Island of Damm, to which the ship *Royal Oak* had been dispatched. On her arrival, the Chiefs entered into a treaty with the Commander, by which they stipulated, to hold the Island of the King of England, on condition of being protected against the Dutch, or any other enemy:—as a mark of their allegiance, it was agreed, that the Chiefs of the Island were to deliver to the King, a nutmeg-tree, with the earth adhering to it, as a pledge of their homage. It was calculated, that this Island would produce nutmegs, mace, &c., in sufficient quantity, to form the requisite proportion of the finer spices, with the pepper from Bantam; but that considerable charges must be incurred, to fortify it, and a proper guard of soldiers sent from England, for its garrison. These expectations, however, in the short space of fifty-two days, were disappointed, three Dutch ships having arrived, and, under a pretended contract with the Islanders, dated a few days before that

that with the English, expelled the Company's servants, who could only offer an unavailing protest against their conduct:— this event, therefore, instead of relieving the Agent and Council of Bantam from the embarrassment into which they had been thrown, by the desolated state in which Polaroon had been delivered up to them, in fact, rendered even their pepper trade more difficult ; the stock of £12,800, which the Agent had received, to invigorate it, and to connect, with it, the trade from Polaroon, not being sufficient, either to support the trade against the superior stock of the Dutch, or to obtain the requisite quantity of this article, to meet the demands at Surat, or in the Europe market :—these circumstances had made it impracticable to comply with the Court's orders for pepper this season, the Dutch having engrossed the whole of the best quality, and allowed the English Agents only to purchase the inferior kinds, that they might, in the East, monopolize the valuable part of the trade, and in Europe the profitable sales.

The third object which had been recommended by the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, was to institute an inquiry, how far it might be practicable for the Company to obtain a share in the trade to JAPAN. Mr. Quarles Browne, who, at this period, was Agent at Bantam, and who was the only surviving Company's servant who had been at Japan, conducted this enquiry, and, in general, reported to the Court; that they must adopt the plan which the Dutch had followed,

CHAP. II.  
1664-65.

Report, by  
Agent  
Browne, of  
the practica-  
bility of trade  
at Japan

CHAP. II.  
1664-65. when they introduced themselves into a share of the Japan trade;—which, in substance, was, to establish Agencies at Siam, Cambodia, and Tonquin, to collect the produce which was in demand in the Japan market, and at which it would be received, from the subsisting relations between the Chiefs in those countries, and the Japan Government:—in the prosecution of this plan, however, a considerable stock must be employed, and authority given (after the example of the Dutch), to entrust proportions of it to three or four native merchants, to form contracts with the inhabitants, for bringing in, at fixed seasons, buffaloes' and deer's hides, of which these kingdoms furnished immense quantities, at the annual inundations, when those animals descended from the mountains to the banks of the rivers;—that, with the Dutch, these contractors had regularly fulfilled their engagements, by which expedient, the goods suited to the Japan market, were ready for the ships on their arrival;—that, with those articles, the ships sailed for Japan, and obtained, in exchange, Japan goods, particularly silver, with which they made large purchases of produce at Java, and in the Spice Islands, and sent a proportion of it to be invested in the Malabar and Coromandel Coast trades;—the goods obtained on those coasts, were again, in part, brought to Java, and to the Spice Islands, and a considerable profit drawn from these circuitous exchanges.

Mr Browne, the Agent at Bantam, after submitting this plan to the Court, recommended its adoption; and that persons,

sons, properly qualified to judge of the value of the Japan goods, <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> particularly silver, should be sent from England, otherwise the <sup>1664-65.</sup> Japanese would impose baser metals on strangers, whom they would soon discover to be no judges of their intrinsic value.

In this critical situation of the Company's affairs, Mr. Quarles Browne died, and the project of the Japan trade was necessarily retarded, by the loss of this able and highly informed servant of the Company.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council of Bantam to the Court, 16th July, and 30th and 31st December 1664.— Letter from the Agent and Council of Bantam to the Presidency of Surat, 28th July 1665.

## 1665-66.

CHAP. II.  
 1665-66.  
 Effect of the  
 war with  
 Holland and  
 France on  
 the measures  
 of the Com-  
 pany.

IN reviewing the instructions which the Company gave to their foreign Presidencies, in the season 1665-66, we have to refer, not only to the war which took place between the King and the States General, but, towards the close of the season, between England and France, and to the rise of a new commercial Company in France, whose rivalry was to give a new character to the commerce of the Europeans in the East-Indies ;—and to these circumstances, we have to add the measures which the King adopted, on receiving intelligence of the disgraceful conditions, on which Bombay had been surrendered to the Crown of England.

The narrative given by the Court of Directors, of events in Europe, will explain the source of the instructions transmitted to the foreign Presidencies in this season : it is stated, that the English fleet, amounting to one hundred sail, had blockaded the Texel, and, for a time, prevented the junction of the Texel and Zealand fleets ;—that, on the return of the English fleet to port, the Dutch fleets had united, and approached the coasts of England ;—that, on the 3d June 1665, the English fleet had been victorious, in the great battle of Solebay, and, among the casualties in the action, mentioned with regret,

the

the death of the Earl of Marlborough, who had been formerly sent to Bombay, to take possession of it in the King's name; —that the French had sent military assistance to the Dutch, to enable their armies to resist the forces of the Bishop of Munster, who was the ally of the King, and that this circumstance had brought on a war, between France and England.

CHAP. II.  
1665 - 66.

In 1663-64, it was mentioned, that the Company had taken an alarm, at the equipment of eight armed ships, in France, said to be intended for the East-Indies, though, at that time, the object of this equipment could not be ascertained. In 1664-65, this uncertainty of the Court, respecting the views of France, in the East-Indies, disappeared, on receiving intelligence, that a large Subscription had been raised in France, for the formation of a French East-India Company. It was in this year, that the celebrated Colbert, the French Minister of Finance, procured an Arrêt of Louis XIV. for the establishment of this Company, the limits of which were to be, from the Cape of Good Hope, eastwards, to the farther Indies, and from the Straits of Magellan and Le-Maire, westwards, into the South Seas; that funds were provided to support this trade, and a moiety of them actually paid for the first equipment :—Colbert, at the same time, projected new plans for the French trade, in the West-Indies, and on the Coast of Africa, for each of which French Companies were, this year, instituted :—the London East-India Company, therefore, as well, as the King, viewed these events (more particularly

Establishment of the French East-Indian, West-India, and African Companies.



CHAP. II. 1665-66. larly in a state of war with France) as subjects of anxiety, which rendered them the source of fresh instructions, not only to the new Governor for Bombay, (whose appointment we shall immediately notice,) but to the Company's Presidencies and Agencies in the East-Indies.

Sir Joseph Williamson, at this period Secretary of State, described the constitution of this French Company to be,—that every proprietor, holding 6000 livres stock, was to have a vote in the management of its affairs, which were placed under the patronage of the King, and the administration of twelve Directors, of whom Colbert was the President : they were elected in March 1665-66, and had, subordinate to them, Directors at the principal sea-ports of France.<sup>(1)</sup>

Mr. Cooke's Convention with the Portuguese disavowed by the King, and Sir Gervase Lucas appointed Governor of Bombay.

These public and interesting commercial events evidently influenced the resolution of the King, on receiving intelligence of the manner in which Mr. Cooke had agreed to receive the Island of Bombay from the Viceroy of Goa, to disavow the convention, as contrary to the terms of the treaty between the Crowns of England and Portugal, and to appoint Sir Gervase Lucas to be Governor of Bombay, giving, at the same time, assurances to the Company, that protection would be afforded to their Factories and trade, by his forces occupying the Island.

On

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 15th June and 18th September 1665, and 7th March 1665-66.— Sir Joseph Williamson's MSS. Notes, relative to the French East-India Company, 1665. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 234).— Anderson's History of Commerce, vol. ii, page 148.



CHAP. II. Majesty, or not, it was their opinion, that, it would “ be  
 1665-66. improper to incur any great expence upon it,” and there-  
 fore recommended, that a reinforcement of sixty men should  
 be sent, under a Lieutenant, who was to have Captain’s pay,  
 or eight shillings per day, and a supply of clothes, ammuni-  
 tion, and stores, and a small vessel, to be attached to the  
 garrison :—the whole expence of which, with eighteen  
 months’ pay and provision for the troops, was estimated at  
 £11,498. 16s.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sir Gervase Lucas embarked on board the Company’s  
 ship Return, and obtained from the Company, at the King’s  
 desire, a credit for £1,500 on the Presidency of Surat, for  
 which he was to grant bills on England, at thirty day’s sight.<sup>(2)</sup>

Court’s in-  
 structions to  
 Sir George  
 Oxinden, on  
 the occasion.

Under these circumstances the Court gave it as a general in-  
 struction to Sir George Oxinden, to observe the same precautions  
 against the French, as against the Dutch ; and to endeavour,  
 if it should be practicable, to keep a Factor both at Porcat and  
 at Carwar, that, in the event of a peace, they might not, in  
 any treaty, pretend to have an exclusive right to those ports ;—  
 and, from the state of affairs in Europe, that one ship only  
 was to be consigned to Surat, with a cargo, in broad-cloths  
 and

(1)—Original Report of the Duke of Albermarle, Lord Arlington, and Sir William  
 Coventry, to the King, relative to Bombay, 26th March 1666. (East-India Papers in  
 the State Paper Office, No. 236.)

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 24th and 31st March  
 1665-66.

and ingots of gold and silver, estimated at £20,600, to be dispatched as speedily as possible, with an investment for England.<sup>(1)</sup> CHAP. II.  
1665-66.

The instructions to the Agent and Council of FORT ST. GEORGE were equally concise, and the equipment limited also to one ship, of three hundred tons :—they were to take every measure for putting the place into a state of security, a proportion of recruits having been embarked on this ship, to enable them to defend the Fort, in the event of any attack, either from a Native or an European enemy :—the ship was to be dispatched immediately to Europe, with an investment of two hundred tons of saltpetre, which, from the superior quality of it, was to be brought, by junks, from Bengal, that Agency being declared to be subordinate to the Fort, and directed to send all their dispatches to it, to be forwarded to England ; —the remaining tonnage was to be filled up with Bengal silks, or Coast calicoes, of the best kinds.<sup>(2)</sup> —to the  
Agent at Fort  
St. George.

The situation of the Agent and Council of BANTAM, from the superior power of the Dutch in the Island of Java, had prevented the Court, both in the last and in this year, from dispatching any ship direct from England to that port, and therefore, they ordered the Agent and Council to cultivate, by —to the  
Agent at  
Bantam.

Z 2 every

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 7th March 1665-66.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, 18th September and 18th December 1665, and 7th March 1665-66.

**CHAP. II.**  
**1665-66.** every practicable means, the friendship, and obtain the protection of the King of Bantam :—with regard to the investment, they were to purchase pepper, with whatever funds they might possess ; and, in the orders for sending it to England, an expedient was adopted, which we, for the first time, meet in the transactions of the London East-India Company ;—that, if no ships should arrive from the Company's other settlements, the Agent and Council were to take up two country-built ships, and, if proper officers and crews could be found to navigate them, to dispatch them direct for England, with instructions, not to touch at St. Helena, but to make for the first port in England, or Ireland, and there to wait for orders from the Court.<sup>(1)</sup>

Effect of the war in Europe on the Company's trade at Surat, and on the Malabar Coast.

The effects which the information of the war in Europe, between the King and the States General, and of the war between England and France, and the rise of the French East-India Company, in 1665-66, produced on the Presidencies, Factories and trade of the London East-India Company, must (as with the domestic transactions of the Court) be viewed as the source of the measures which the foreign settlements were obliged to adopt.

The Presidency of SURAT stated, that they considered the Dutch war in no other respect prejudicial to their interests, than

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 7th March 1665-66.

than as it increased the risks of the outward and homeward shipping, and more immediately exposed the country ships to capture, on which portions of the investment came to their chief settlements. Four large Dutch ships had arrived at Swally, which had obliged the President and Council to detain the Company's fleet, ready to proceed to Europe, that the vessels and the cargoes might have protection in a Mogul port:—on the Malabar Coast, the Dutch had got possession of Cochin, and had prohibited the country vessels, belonging to the native merchants, to sail, unless protected by a Dutch pass; or to supply the English with pepper and cardamons, under penalty of confiscation:—at Calicut, though the Zamorin had hitherto been able to preserve his power, or had not been subjugated by the Dutch, they had so effectually checked all imports, as to make exchanges for pepper impracticable, obliging the merchants to sell the pepper at three half-pence per pound, in exchange for opium, which they sold at an exorbitant price:—the effect of this extortion was, that they had nearly got as complete a monopoly of the Malabar pepper, as they had done of the finer spices, and could under-sell the Company in Europe:—to render this exclusive trade more positive, they had erected block-houses along the coast, in which they had stationed guards, to prevent contingent exchanges on shore; that, on receiving intelligence of hostilities in Europe, they had seized on the English Factory and servants at Porcat and at Tutacorin; so that, at this period, Batticolo only remained open

CHAP. II.  
1665-66.

CHAP. II.  
1665-66. open to the Company's ships; but this port would scarcely supply the demands of the Portuguese, should they again attempt trade on that part of the coast.

Trade depressed, from the interference of the French Agents.

The information of the large French equipments for the East-India trade, and of the probability of a French war, had reached the Presidency, but, in this season, they had *not* heard of the establishment of a French East-India Company; though French Agents had arrived, who had come through Persia, had obtained privileges of trade in that kingdom, and had dispatched one of their number, to solicit privileges from the Mogul; which had so much weakened the political and commercial influence of the Presidency of Surat, that the preservation of their rights and trade had become precarious, if not hopeless.<sup>(1)</sup>

The possession of Bombay precarious, from the impositions of the Portuguese, and the jealousy of the Mogul Government.

Having followed the effects which the wars and rivalship of the maritime powers in Europe had on the situation of the Presidency of Surat, in this season, we have to trace the relation between the King's garrison at BOMBAY, and the Company's interests at Surat, and on the Malabar Coast. At the close of the foreign events, in the preceding year, Mr. Cooke, under the Convention with the Viceroy of Goa, had got possession of the Island of Bombay only, but not of its dependencies, or of Salsette, &c.; and a muster had been taken by Mr. Gary, one of Council of Surat, of the troops and ordnance brought from Angedivah,

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 16th March 1665-66 and 4th April 1666.

Angedivah, and found at Bombay. The Portuguese, instead <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> of assisting the English or enabling them to render Bombay 1665-66. either a retreat for their trade, or a place of defence, had made Mr. Cooke, and the garrison, immediately feel, by heavy imposts on their boats passing by Caranjah or Tamnah, the effects of being deprived of the dependencies of the Island, which had been ceded to the King, by treaty; for they levied from the boats, from ten to twelve per cent. duty on the merchandize and provisions which they brought from the continent, which obliged Mr. Cooke to put soldiers on board the boats, to resist this demand.

Sir George Oxinden soon discovered, that the Mogul Government had become jealous of the English possessing an Island, and forming a garrison on it, in the immediate vicinity of Surat, one of the most important sea-ports in the empire; but it was his duty to furnish provisions, and every requisite aid, to the King's forces, and to advance money to them, under the orders of the Court of Directors, to enable them to preserve the place, till His Majesty's pleasure should be known.

This jealousy of the Mogul Government was heightened by Mr. Cooke, who had invited the native merchants to settle at Bombay, under the protection of the English garrison:— a measure which convinced the Governor of Surat, that the whole was a scheme of the President and Council, to remove the factory to Bombay, it being unintelligible, what-

ever



CHAP. II. ever names the English might assume, that there could  
 1665-66. be two distinct bodies, belonging to the same nation, the officers and servants of the King, and of a Company of Merchants, who had hitherto professed trade to be their only object, but who were now affording provisions and aid to a garrison, with which they pretended not to have a common interest.

The President of Surat recommends, that permission should be obtained from the King to erect a Company's Factory at Bombay.

The President and Council of Surat, under these embarrassing events, recommended to the Court of Directors, to solicit the King's permission to build a Factory at Bombay, to which goods might be brought from the Decan, or Coast of Coromandel, as well as from the Malabar Coast, and from Surat; that it might become a depôt for the goods brought from both sides of Cape Comorin, to be ready for the ships, on their arrival at Swally or at Bombay; explaining, however, that this project would be impracticable, unless proper arrangements should be introduced into the government of the Island, and persons, properly qualified, appointed to administer it, under fixed regulations.

Disputes between Sir George Oxinden and Mr. Cooke, on the authority assumed by the latter, as a King's Officer; a distinction unintelligible to the Natives.

An event occurred at this crisis, which confirmed the jealousies of the Mogul Government, and endangered the Factory and Company's privileges at Surat:—When Sir Abraham Shipman was at Angedivah, in 1663-64, he had, without the knowledge of the Presidency, dispatched the King's sloop, Chesnut, to Bantam, to purchase pepper and Java goods, on his own account, and on that of Mr. Cooke,

his

his secretary: this vessel returned to Surat, and, instead of lodging the goods in the Company's warehouse, had trusted them to a Native Merchant, whose house and stores had been pillaged by Sevagee:—after Mr. Cooke got possession of Bombay, this Native Merchant made application to the President and Council, to refund the value of these goods, which being refused, after reiterated demands for the amount, Mr. Cooke, in January 1665-66, seized a junk, belonging to the Governor of Surat, that, by stress of weather, had put into Bombay, to reimburse his loss:—The Governor of Surat, on receiving information of this proceeding, threatened the President and Council with the seizure of their Factory, and with imprisonment, unless the junk should be immediately restored, and the offenders against the Mogul's dignity punished:—Sir George Oxinden, in this situation, sent a remonstrance to Mr. Cooke on his conduct, and, in answer, Mr. Cooke stated himself to be possessed of superior power, and that the Company were subordinate to him, and, at the same time, addressed a letter to the Governor of Surat, representing the Company as his dependents:—this irritated the Mogul Governor, who threatened to seize the Company's property, and to punish their servants:—at last, however, in April 1666, Mr. Cooke found it expedient to restore the junk.

CHAP. II. This is the first instance, in which the English appeared  
 1665-66. in the two distinct characters of King's and Company's servants; a distinction, which, though intelligible to themselves, was perfectly unintelligible to the Native Powers.<sup>(1)</sup>

State of the  
 Trade at Su-  
 rat this sea-  
 son.

Sir George Oxinden, after acknowledging his own, and the satisfaction of his Council, at the approbation of the Court, for the resistance they made during the attack of Sevagee, and specifying, that the year's customs at Surat, and the exemption from the payment of duties by the Phirmaund of Aurungzebe, amounted to 25,000 rupees, and that he had continued his applications for further privileges, requested to be recalled, as soon as a person, properly authorised, should arrive to take charge of the Presidency, that he might answer the accusations which had been made against him, of being concerned in Private Trade.

The investments of this season were obtained by the employment of a Native Merchant, who had provided an assortment of pepper, at his own risk, and made different purchases of cloths and indigo, in small quantities:—the sales of the Europe goods had been better than could have been expected, particularly the copper, which had sold high, from the Dutch not having that article in the market; the quick-  
 silver

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 1st January and 16th March 1665-66, and 4th April 1666.— Letter from Mr. Cooke to the President and Council of Surat, 21st February 1665-66.— Letter from the President and Council of Surat to Mr. Cooke, 1st March 1665-66.

silver had sold at a moderate profit, and the corals, being in great demand, with profit, and the price of them still rising: —while the homeward ship was dispatching, the Presidency had also made a considerable purchase of indigo, at cheap rates; and though the Dutch had obstructed direct purchases of pepper, they continued the expedient of employing the Native Merchants, and had embarked a moderate assortment.<sup>(1)</sup>

If the improvident conduct of Mr. Cooke at Bombay, in placing the King's power in opposition to the Company's rights at Surat, had endangered the English interests, the events which took place at FORT ST. GEORGE, in the season 1665-66, threatened to subvert the trade of the Company, on the Coromandel Coast.

Sir Edward Winter had been appointed chief Agent at Fort St. George, and was entrusted with the confidence of the Court of Directors; but doubts had arisen, at home, of his fidelity, or rather that he was engaged in Private Trade for his separate interests, contrary to his duty; and, therefore, under this impression, they had appointed Mr. George Foxcroft to succeed him in the Agency, who arrived at Fort St. George, in June 1665.

Sir Edward Winter, before he heard of this appointment, had requested to be recalled, as his term was nearly expired;

2 A 2

but

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 1st January and 16th March 1665-66, and 4th April 1666.

CHAP. II.  
1665-66.

Mr. Foxcroft, Agent at Fort St. George, seized and imprisoned, on a pretended accusation for sedition, and the government of the Fort usurped by Sir Edward Winter.

CHAP. II. but it now appeared, this request had only been made, that  
1665-66. the Court might solicit him to continue in his Agency :—the arrival of Mr. Foxcroft brought out the fact, for Sir Edward Winter, to retain his power, proceeded to acts of violence, which the Court could neither have anticipated, nor prevented : —Mr. Foxcroft, on presenting his commission, was received by Sir Edward Winter with affected respect, and was directed by his instructions to allow him to act as Second in Council, till his departure :—on the 14th September 1665, however, Mr. Foxcroft, his son, and Mr. Sambrooke, were attacked, wounded, and put in confinement, under an accusation of having uttered seditious and treasonable expressions against the King's government, and Mr. Dawes was killed in the conflict :—the government of Fort St. George was then re-assumed by Sir Edward Winter, assisted by Mr. Proby, a merchant, and Mr. Chuseman, the Lieutenant of the troops in garrison :—Sir Edward Winter, to vindicate this conduct, explained to the Court, that he could bring proofs of the disloyalty of Mr. Foxcroft, on the affidavits of the Chaplain, and Mr. Farley, a Factor, who had heard the seditious and traitorous words uttered. The first circumstance which raised suspicion of the truth of this accusation, was Sir Edward Winter's application to Mr. Cooke, at Bombay, for his advice, instead of referring to Sir George Oxinden, the Company's President at Surat; next, his addressing letters to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and to the King, professing loyalty, as the motive of his conduct,

duct, without allowing those letters to pass through the Com-  
pany, at home, whose servant he was, or reflecting that the  
effect of such letters might be, the exciting, in the King's  
Government, suspicions of the loyalty of the servants, with  
whom the Court had entrusted their Factories.

Mr. Foxcroft, during his confinement, applied, by letters, for assistance and advice, to the Agent at the subordinate Factory of Masulipatam, and, through him, to the President at Surat, for his interposition; and so fully were both satisfied of the unfounded pretext, upon which Mr. Foxcroft had been excluded from his Agency, and made a prisoner, that they remonstrated with the persons who had assisted Sir Edward Winter in this violence, and informed them that the result probably would be, either that the Fort would fall into the hands of the Moors, and the Company's property and rights be lost, or that it would become an easy acquisition to the Dutch, or the Viceroy of Goa, who, since the disputes respecting Bombay, had been inimical to the English. <sup>(1)</sup>

In this state of the Company's affairs at Fort St. George, Sir Edward Winter gave assurances to the Court, that efforts  
would

Sir Edward Winter's statement of this event to the Court;

(1)—Letter of Sir Edward Winter and his Council to the Court, 30th September 1665.— Letter of Sir Edward Winter to the Governor of Bombay, 29th September 1665.— Letter of Sir Edward Winter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 28th September 1665.— Letter of Agent Foxcroft to the Court, 30th September 1665.— Letters from the Factory of Masulipatam to the Presidency of Surat, 1st and 2d November 1665.— Letter from the Presidency of Surat to Mr. Proby and Mr. Chuseman, at Fort St. George, 13th December 1665.— Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Factory of Masulipatam, 12th December 1665.

CHAP. II. would be made by him, to preserve their rights, and provide  
 1665-66. investments for their shipping;—that the meditated attack on  
 the Fort, by Yecknam Khan, had been prevented, by his forces  
 being called off by the King of Golcondah, on other service;  
 —that the influence of the Agency had declined at Golcondah,  
 from his not having the authority of the Court, either to send  
 envoys there, or to make presents to the King, or to his mi-  
 nisters;—that the orders to withdraw the Out-agencies (Ma-  
 sulipatam excepted), though obedience should be given to  
 them, would abridge the Company in their influence and  
 trade, for the Natives would contrast such proceedings with  
 those of the Dutch, who took every opportunity to add to  
 their Out-agencies, and who were establishing Factories in  
 every country, at which there was the prospect, either of  
 profitable purchases, or sales.

and his com-  
 plaint against  
 the Agent in  
 Bengal, for  
 disobedience  
 of orders.

Sir Edward Winter next represented, that the withdraw-  
 ing the Out-agencies in BENGAL would produce similar evils,  
 and, therefore, he had left this measure to the discretion of the  
 Agent and Council at Hughly, as he could not lay down rules  
 for them, which it might be contrary to the Company's inte-  
 rests to carry into execution;—that the orders for maintaining  
 the Company's Fort, against the Native Powers, or an Eu-  
 ropean enemy, should be fully obeyed, but, in so far as re-  
 garded the Country Powers, who were formidable by land,  
 he could only defend himself by having two or more armed  
 vessels, to act against the trade of the Natives, which would  
 have

have a greater effect in promoting the Company's influence, CHAP. II.  
 than either the strength of the Fort itself, or of several forts; 1665-66.  
 —that the trade, however, could not proceed on the small  
 stock in the treasury, to provide investments, it being imprac-  
 ticable to borrow £10,000, either at Madras or Masulipatam ;  
 —and that the ships, besides, could not be filled, in the short  
 time prescribed, with Coast goods, or with saltpetre, or Ben-  
 gal goods, from the numerous ships of the Dutch, ready to  
 seize on those of the Company, bringing Bengal produce to  
 Madras. <sup>(1)</sup>

BANTAM, in the season 1665-66, was in a perilous situa-  
 tion, both from the Dutch, who were, every day, acquiring  
 an ascendancy in that quarter of the Indies, and from neither  
 the funds nor the force, which the Agent and Council  
 possessed, being sufficient to maintain the influence and trade  
 of this Establishment ;—hence the Company's servants were  
 left without either instructions or support :—in illustration,  
 they added, that the influence of the Dutch, at Jambee, had  
 enabled them to purchase the whole produce ;—that the low  
 state of the English stock had prevented the procuring of  
 pepper at Bantam, which had been offered to them, and, on  
 their refusal, given to the Dutch ;—that they had been unable  
 to afford assistance to the settlers at Polaroon, which the  
 Dutch had re-possessed, and now asserted their exclusive right  
 to

Polaroon re-  
 occupied by  
 the Dutch,  
 and the trade  
 at Bantam on  
 the decline.

(1)—Letter from Sir Edward Winter and his Council at Fort St. George to the  
 Court, 9th January 1665-66.



CHAP. II.  
1665-66. to the trade at Siam and Cambodia ; and, farther, to depress the English Agent and Council at Bantam, that they had propagated accounts of the success of their arms in Europe:— events, the ruinous effects of which, with respect to Bantam, were only averted by the circumstance of a probable war between the Dutch and the King of Maccassar, who had assisted the chiefs at Ternate, and other Spice Islands, in throwing off the Dutch yoke; and by the apprehensions which the Dutch themselves had begun to entertain, of the interference of the French in their trade, any participation in which, by the French, they were determined to oppose, as they had previously done that of the English. <sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—General Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, 8th May 1666.

## 1666-67.

It will be necessary, in this season (1666-67), to refer to public events, as they regarded the war in Europe, to enable us to ascertain the sources of the measures, which the Court of Directors adopted, and the instructions which they sent to their foreign Presidencies, particularly to SURAT, in its relation to the King's Island of BOMBAY.

CHAP. II.  
1666-67.  
Court's detail  
of the events  
of the war  
with Holland.

The Court continued the account of the events of the war, from the period when their details of the preceding year concluded;—specified the captures which had been made of the Dutch merchant fleets, particularly the convoy which had taken shelter at Bergen, in Norway, and the intercepted convoy on the Dutch coast;—adverted to the circumstances which required a division of the English fleet, under Prince Rupert, to be stationed off Rochelle, and the advantage the Dutch took of this circumstance, which led to the memorable conflict off Ostend; and, lastly, mentioned the successful attack, under Sir Robert Holmes, on the Dutch shipping in the Vlee, with the incredible loss (as they described it) which they had suffered, from that well executed enterprize.

CHAP. II.  
 1666-67.  
 Loss sustained by the Company at the Fire of London.

During these public events, the Fire of London made a deep impression on the proceedings of the Court of Directors, for, by this calamity, they lost their saltpetre warehouses, and the pepper in their vaults under the Royal Exchange, though their other warehouses escaped the conflagration.

The consultations of the Court, from these circumstances were suspended for some months, but in April, on the arrival of their shipping, they altered the destinations of the outward vessels.

Court makes an application to the King, to issue orders to Sir Gervase Lucas, to disavow the proceedings of Mr. Cooke at Bombay.

On receiving information of Mr. Cooke's proceedings at Bombay, and of Sir Edward Winter's at Fort St. George, the Court adopted strong measures to restore their affairs, both on the Malabar and Coromandel Coasts. To remedy the evils on the Malabar Coast, they applied to the King, for orders to Sir Gervase Lucas, to disavow Mr. Cooke's conduct, in capturing the junk belonging to the Governor of Surat, and, for its restoration; also to afford his assistance and protection to the Presidency of Surat, in preserving the rights and trade of the Company; in return, this Presidency was authorised to advance £1000 to Sir Gervase Lucas, at the exchange of five shillings and sixpence per rial of eight.

As no information, at this time, would have been received by the King, of the measures taken for preserving Bombay, in the preceding year, it would appear, that Government relied on their proving effectual; the Court, therefore, in this season,

consigned

consigned one vessel only to Surat, with a cargo estimated at **£16,000**, and ordered the investment to consist of a proportion of saltpetre, and the remainder of the tonnage to be filled up with indigo, and different kinds of calicoes; and though, for some years, the trade to PERSIA had been lost sight of, it appears, under this narrow state of affairs at Surat, that this Presidency was instructed, if possible, to obtain from Persia a quantity of Caramania wool.<sup>(1)</sup>

When information arrived of the proceedings of Sir Edward Winter, at FORT ST. GEORGE, the Court, on consultation, applied to the King, to interpose his authority, and appointed Mr. Clavell, who was vested with special powers by the King and by the Company, to proceed directly on a ship consigned to Surat:—he was to consult with Sir George Oxinden, and if Sir Edward Winter should be in possession of the Fort, he was to proceed to Masulipatam, and, by a messenger from thence, to intimate to him, the powers and authority with which he was vested, demand the release of Mr. Foxcroft, and that this Agency, and the Company's concerns on the Coast, might be delivered over to his administration.

Address the King and Council to issue a proclamation against Sir Edward Winter and his adherents.

With the object of recovering Fort St. George from the hazardous state in which it was placed, the Court referred the whole subject to the King and Council, and obtain-

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ed

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 31st August, 14th September, and 5th October 1666.

CHAP. II. ed His Majesty's pardon to Sir Edward Winter and his adhe-  
 1666-67. rents, on condition of their returning to their duty, and reinstating Mr. Foxcroft in the Agency; they, farther, addressed separate letters to Sir Edward Winter, intimating to him the King's pardon, and their positive order, that Mr. Foxcroft should be immediately vested with the government; a moderation which evinces, that they considered this settlement, and the trade on the Coromandel Coast, to be in great hazard, if Sir Edward Winter should persevere in resisting their authority.

The ship, which had been intended for Madras, and ordered to touch, on her outward passage, at St. Helena, with recruits for that Island, was countermanded, and directed to proceed to Surat, to receive information of the actual state of affairs on the Coromandel Coast, and to deliver the twenty recruits, intended for Madras, as a supply to the King's garrison at Bombay:—if information should be obtained at Surat, that Madras was open, and Mr. Foxcroft in the possession of the Agency, the ship was to take in, as an investment, Bengal saltpetre with the Coast goods, and directions were given, that three hundred tons of saltpetre should be annually provided at Hughly, to meet the ships on their arrival.<sup>(1)</sup>

It

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 31st August, 14th September, and 28th December 1666, 31st January 1666-67, and 16th April 1667.— (Duplicate.) Pardon from His Majesty to Sir Edward Winter and his

It does not appear, from the Company's records, that any dispatches were sent to the Agent and Council at BANTAM, during the season 1666-67. CHAP. II.  
1666-67.

Before adverting to the effects which the war between the maritime States of Europe produced in the East-Indies, in this season (1666-67), it will be expedient to examine, from the letters of Sir Gervase Lucas to Lord Arlington, and of Sir George Oxinden to the Court of Directors, the respective interests of the King's Settlement at BOMBAY and the Company's Presidency of SURAT.

Sir Gervase Lucas protests against the conduct of Mr. Cooke at Bombay.

When Sir Gervase Lucas arrived at Bombay (5th November 1666) and took charge of the government, he began with instituting an enquiry into the proceedings and conduct of Mr. Cooke, and found, that instead of carrying the revenues to His Majesty's account, he had extorted the sum of 12,000 Xeraphins from the inhabitants of the Island, and converted it to his own private use, which was proved by his receipts; and that he had taken possession of the estate of the late Sir Abraham Shipman, and charged the executrix with fifteen per cent. commission, amounting to the sum of £663, which Sir Gervase Lucas formally demanded of him, and,

Adherents, for usurping the Government of Fort St. George, and imprisoning the Agent, dated 28th January 1666-67. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 240).

CHAP. II. and, by a protest, gave notice of his intention not to suffer  
 1666 - 67. Mr. Cooke to leave the Island, till he had repaid the money  
 thus fraudulently extorted.<sup>(1)</sup>

Dispute be-  
 tween Sir  
 Gervase Lu-  
 cas and Sir  
 George Ox-  
 inden, rela-  
 tive to issu-  
 ing passes in  
 the King's  
 name.

It would appear, that Sir Gervase Lucas had considered, that, in his administration, it was not his duty to communicate the circumstances which have been detailed, to Sir George Oxinden, or to the Presidency of Surat, who observing Mr. Cooke still resident on the Island, without being able to account for this indulgence, became jealous of the conduct of Sir Gervase Lucas, as if, instead of removing Mr. Cooke, he had taken him into his confidence; and therefore interpreted the demand of a passage for him, for Europe, on a Company's ship, (after having obliged him to give an account of his transactions) as evidence that he had entrusted him with his dispatches to Government, and, for this reason, refused him the passage:—this circumstance irritated Sir Gervase Lucas, and induced him to send his subsequent dispatches by Persia, and created that coolness between him and the Presidency of Surat, which proceeded from jealousy, on the one part, and from reserve, on the other.

Sir Gervase  
 Lucas's re-  
 port on the  
 state of Bom-  
 bay.

The account which Sir Gervase Lucas, subsequently transmitted, not only of the importance and value of the Island of Bombay, but of its exposed situation to the Mogul  
 Power

(1)—Protest by Sir Gervase Lucas, against Mr. Humphrey Cooke, dated Bombay, 15th December 1666. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 239).

Power on the continent, affords evidence of the improvident convention which Cooke had formed, by receiving the Island from the Viceroy of Goa, without the King's rights being ascertained, or a statement given of the extent of them, as transferred to the Crown of England. In his letter to Lord Arlington, of the 21st March 1666-67, Sir Gervase Lucas stated his apprehension of the jealousy of the Mogul, on observing the encreasing strength and prosperity of Bombay, and the necessity that existed, of both ships of war and merchant vessels being sent, to defend the place, and to encrease the trade of the Island;—that he was making every effort to encrease the King's revenues on the Island, but, from the indefinite conditions on which Cooke had received it, it was impracticable to ascertain which of the inhabitants were legally possessed of sufficient titles to their estates, no stipulation having been made, relative to the King's sovereignty of the soil;—that Cooke's conduct, in taking bribes from the inhabitants, had sullied the King's government, and been detrimental to his revenue, as some of the best estates in the Island refused to pay rent, and produced titles, which could not be disputed, though believed to be fictitious;—that the Island, when properly cultivated, and the rights ascertained, would be very productive, though it had been reported, that the King, on the representations of the East-India Company, and their Presidency of Surat, intended to give it up; and added, that it was not his intention to send his dispatches to Europe,

CHAP. II.  
1666-67.



CHAP. II.  
1666-67. Europe, through the Presidency of Surat, as their conduct had not met his approbation, but to find a conveyance through Persia:—this last circumstance explains the measure which he adopted, of insisting, that all passes for vessels should be issued by him, in the King's name, and that those of the President of Surat should be discontinued; a proceeding which Sir George Oxinden held to be an infringement on the Company's rights, but, at the same time, advanced the sums which had been ordered by the Court to Sir Gervase Lucas, for which bills had been granted on Lord Southampton, in favour of the Company.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was necessary to refer, in this season, to the events which had occurred at Bombay, to understand the proceedings of the President and Council of Surat, as it appears, that a misunderstanding had prevailed between Sir Gervase Lucas and Sir George Oxinden, which, during the preparations for shipping the investment for Europe, had constantly varied the means to which this Presidency resorted:—these means were partly affected by the war in Europe, and partly by the prevailing wars in Hindostan.

The

(1)—Letter from Sir Gervase Lucas to Lord Arlington, dated Bombay, 21st March 1666-67. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 241).— Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 26th March 1667.— Letter from Sir Gervase Lucas to the President and Council of Surat, and their Answers, 9th, 16th, 22d, and 24th November, 4th and 10th December, and 26th March 1666-67.

The war in Europe afforded to the Dutch (notwithstanding their having a Factory at Surat) a specious reason for blockading the English ships in that harbour, and this blockade obliged the President and Council, notwithstanding the demorage, to detain the ships within the bar, and to observe the like caution with one of the ships which was at Diu; but as it was expected the Dutch fleet would sail with the Monsoon, it was then hoped, the Company's ships might be dispatched to Europe:—these circumstances would explain to the Court the cause of the delay; but, independently of them, the goods which were obtained in the inland provinces (indigo, saltpetre, &c.) could not be ready to be shipped before the months of January or February.

The subsisting wars between the country powers had often rendered it impracticable to dispatch the ships, at the periods ordered by the Court; and a reference to the actual state of the wars, between Sevagee and Aurungzebe, were adduced, to explain to the Court, that obedience to their orders, for the sailing of their ships, frequently exceeded the powers of this Presidency;—Sevagee, who had gone to Delhi, under promises of safety, on discovering the insidious intentions of Aurungzebe, had escaped from that city, and was again at the head of an army, ready to recommence the war against the Mogul:—Aurungzebe, exposed to a war with this formidable opponent, was also threatened with an invasion by the King of Persia, and made the extraordinary demand on the Presi-

CHAP. II.  
1666-67.  
Company's  
ships at Sur-  
rat blockaded  
by the Dutch.

The purchase  
of an invest-  
ment diffi-  
cult, from the  
wars between  
Aurungzebe  
and Sevagee.

CHAP. II. dency, for Engineers and Artillery-men, to direct his ordnance  
 1666-67. in the sieges to which these wars might lead his armies; a  
 requisition with which they could not comply, unless the Court  
 should send out officers of this description, with authority for  
 them to be employed on such service.

Comparing, therefore, the situation of this Presidency, in their relations with Sevagee, and with the Mogul, the Factory and trade of the Company were equally depressed by both:—Sevagee was menacing an attack on Surat, and the Presidency had not the same number of persons, as formerly, to act as a guard to the Factory:—the Mogul had withdrawn his treasure from Surat, and had become indifferent to the fates of the inhabitants; and yet the English, if they did not resist Sevagee, would be deemed rebels by the Mogul, and lose all the privileges, which, with so much expence, they had purchased.

The Factories subordinate to this Presidency, were, at this juncture, in equal danger; for the Agent at Carwar, foreseeing the probable incursions of Sevagee, had been obliged to call in the articles purchased for the Company's trade, to bring them to sale, and to vest the produce in bills, or to consign the remaining goods to Signor Johan de Prado, the confidential correspondent of the Presidency, at Goa. The Agent at Calicut, who had continued to be protected by the Zamorin, had been obliged to remove the goods from that port, inland, and to make large presents to this Prince, to purchase the continuance of the English trade in his dominions.

The

The Company were, at this time, equally exposed to their European rivals, and enemies :—four, only, of the large Dutch fleet, expected at Swally, had arrived, the remainder having been left blockading Goa, to prevent the sailing of a Portuguese armament, which expected to be joined by some English frigates from Europe. CHAP. II.  
1666-67.

The French Agents, though they had not been able to obtain privileges from Aurungzebe, had published at Surat their expectations of a large fleet arriving from France, with funds which would give them a superiority in the trade; but, as neither the ships, nor the funds arrived, the expectations of them had a considerable effect on the market :—and as the ships did not appear at the close of the season, the disappointment of the Native Merchants excited, in the government, a contempt for the Europeans in general. <sup>(1)</sup>

Trade also affected, by the exaggerated accounts by the French Agents of the magnitude of their stock and shipping.

We can only collect, from indirect evidence, the situation of the Company's establishments, at FORT ST. GEORGE, and BANTAM, during this season. Sir Edward Winter, at the former, still maintained his power, and kept Mr. Foxcroft in confinement; and apprehensions were entertained by the Presidency of Surat, that his object was to deliver up the Fort to the Dutch Governor of Ceylon, who had provided a

2 C 2

vessel

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 10th and 25th September, and 24th November 1666, and 26th March 1667.— Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Factory at Carwar, 17th October 1666.— Letter from the President and Council at Surat to the Factory at Calicut, 20th October 1666.

CHAP. II. vessel for him to make his escape. Affairs at Bantam, at this  
1666-67. time, were equally precarious; for though the Presidency of  
Surat entertained no apprehensions of the fidelity of the Agent  
and Council, they were doubtful, whether they would be able,  
(as no relief could be afforded to them,) to preserve the Fac-  
tory against the influence of the Dutch over the Natives, or  
against their fleets in the Southern Seas, being without any  
English armament to resistt hem. <sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 26th March 1667.

## 1667-68.

THE relations between Government and the London East-India Company, in 1667-68, were of such importance, as to produce a change on the system of trade, which the former had hitherto encouraged, and the latter had provided funds to support.

When the conferences for the Treaty of Breda were first held, the long agitated questions, between the Dutch and the London East-India Company, became subjects of discussion; and Mr. Thompson and Mr. Papillon, two of the Directors, were permitted to attend the King's Ambassadors, that they might inform them fully of the Company's claims on the Islands of Polaroon and Damm, and, in general, on their rights, which had been, in every part of the East-Indies, narrowed, if not subverted, by the Dutch; and to insist, that regulations for the two Companies might, under the treaty, be established, to serve as principles to each, for their future participation in the trade.

While affairs were in this train, in June 1667, the Dutch made the unexpected attack at Chatham, which, for a time, suspended the progress of the negotiations, and induced

CHAP. II.

1667-68.

The Islands of Polaroon and Damm ceded to the Dutch by the Treaty of Breda.

CHAP. II. induced the Court to order the two Directors to return to  
1667 - 68. England.<sup>(1)</sup>

When the treaty was concluded (31st July 1667), the terms in it, which proceeded on the principle of the "*Uti Possidetis*," were, in general, favorable to the King, but the application of this principle to the actual situation of the English and Dutch East-India Companies, confirmed the pretensions of the latter, to the Islands of Polaroon and Damm, and left the former equally exposed to the Dutch encroachments, as they had been previously to the war.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Island of  
Bombay  
granted by  
the King to  
the Com-  
pany.

Whether it was to remove the discontent which the London East-India Company experienced on this occasion, or from the difficulties which had attended the maintenance of Bombay, as a King's possession, or from both, it is unnecessary to enquire, but, in this season, the King, by Letters Patent, dated 27th March 1668, transferred the Island of Bombay from the Crown to the East-India Company.

By this Charter, the King granted the Port and Island of Bombay to the London East-India Company, in perpetuity, "with all the rights, profits, and territories thereof, in as full manner as the King himself possessed them, by virtue of the treaty with the King of Portugal, by which the Island was  
ceded

(1)—Letters from the Court to Mr. Thomson and Mr. Papillon, two of the East-India Directors, at Breda, 17th, 24th, and 31st May, 7th, 14th, and 21st June, and 5th July 1667.

(2)—Treaty of Breda, 31st July 1667. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

“ ceded to His Majesty, to be held by the Company of the CHAP. II.  
 “ King, in free and common soccage, as of the manor of East 1667-68.  
 “ Greenwich, on payment of the annual rent of £10, in gold,  
 “ on the 30th September in each year”—the Company were  
 neither to sell, nor part with the Island:—the King also  
 granted to them, all the stores and arms remaining on the  
 Island, and agreed to pay the troops, till the Island should be  
 taken possession of by the Company, for which purpose a  
 vessel was to be directly dispatched from England:—the Com-  
 pany were empowered, by this Charter, to entertain officers  
 and men, as a garrison for the Island; to appoint and dismiss  
 governors and officers; to make laws for the better govern-  
 ment thereof, and to exercise martial law in it:—all per-  
 sons born in Bombay, were to be accounted natural subjects  
 of England; and the Company were to enjoy all the privileges  
 and powers granted by this Charter, in any place they might  
 purchase or acquire, in or near the said Island.<sup>(1)</sup>

This grant of the Island of Bombay to the Company was  
 intimated to Sir Gervase Lucas, by a letter from the Court of  
 Directors, accompanied with an authenticated copy of the  
 King’s grant, empowering him to deliver the Island of Bom-  
 bay to Sir George Oxinden and the Council of Surat:—the  
 Court, at the same time, sent a commission to Sir George  
 Oxinden, to receive the Island, as granted to the Company by  
 the

Court’s In-  
 structions to  
 Sir George  
 Oxinden, to  
 receive the  
 Island of  
 Bombay from  
 Sir Gervase  
 Lucas.

(1)—Letters Patent, granting the Island of Bombay to the East-India Company, 27th  
 March 1668. (Printed Collection of East-India Charters, page 80.)



CHAP. II.  
1667-68. the King, and to vest one of the Council of Surat with the civil and military administration of it:—an estimate of the revenues of the Island, amounting to £2,833 per annum, was also transmitted to Sir George Oxinden, who was authorised to give receipts to Sir Gervase Lucas, for the King's stores on the Island:—Sir George Oxinden was farther directed to engage any of the King's troops, who might be disposed to enter into the Company's service, and to call in the guards of the Factory at Bantam, and a proportion of the companies serving at Fort St. George, to fill up the garrison at Bombay; and, as a farther encouragement, these soldiers were to be allowed half pay, on condition of their becoming settlers on the Island, and affording their labour for the cultivation of it; and, annually, new settlers were to be sent from England, but twenty soldiers only were to be allowed to return to Europe, in any one year.

With the object, also, of improving the cultivation of Bombay, (that the produce might be equal to the charges of the government), Sir George Oxinden was instructed to invite such of the Natives as might chuse to resort to, and settle on the Island, to encourage them, by taking the most moderate profits on trade, and to endeavour to open a commerce between Bombay, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea, for each of which one small vessel, laden with Company's goods, was to be dispatched, and powers given to the commanders, to offer to the Natives,

at

at the ports at which they might touch, a free passage to CHAP. II.  
Bombay, and full protection when they should arrive, to 1667-68.  
enable them to carry on their trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

While the Company were disappointed, on the one hand, with the terms of the Treaty of Breda, and encouraged, on the other, by the grant of the Island of Bombay, they adopted a more extensive commercial plan, in this season, than they had done since the restoration of their Charter, and were determined to obtain, by commercial competition with the Dutch, an equality of trade in the East-Indies, and not to be deterred, either by their opposition, or by their subterfuges; but, on the contrary, should they proceed to acts of hostility, to resist them, as far as their means would allow; and, if these should not be sufficient, to take regular protests against any hostilities they might commit, to become the foundation of remonstrances by the King to the States General.

Equipments  
and stock for  
Surat enlarged,  
on account of the  
grant of Bombay.

With these views, early in the season, the Court consigned three ships to Surat, with a stock estimated at £60,000, and, in return, ordered an investment of Surat cloths, indigo, drugs, pepper, and such quantity of the finer spices, as this Presidency could procure; but not to attempt, in future, the purchase of saltpetre, as it had been resolved to bring

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that

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 27th March 1668.— Letter from the Court to Sir Gervase Lucas, Governor of Bombay, 27th March 1668.— Commission from the Court to Sir George Oxinden and the Council of Surat, to receive possession of the Island of Bombay, 30th March 1668.

CHAP. II.  
1667-68. that article from Bengal. If the stock should not be sufficient for providing the investment, the Presidency were authorised to borrow money, without being limited, either in the amount, or the rate of interest.

In the spring of 1668, three more ships were consigned to Surat, with cargoes of broad-cloths, copper, lead, tin, and bullion, to the amount of £70,000, under similar orders, as the autumn ships, respecting the investment; and that the trade between Surat and Bantam might be revived, the ship Bantam Pink, about a hundred and fifty tons burden, with a cargo of £8,000, was dispatched to Surat direct, with orders to purchase goods, suited to the Bantam and Maccassar markets, and under instructions to the Agent and Council of Bantam, to return this vessel with spices, pepper, &c.

The orders, respecting the Factories subordinate to Surat, were,—to re-establish those at Carwar, Rajahpore, Calicut, Porcat, Acheen, and Batticolo; and, in general, to fix stations for trade, at whatever ports on the coasts of India it might be practicable; and, if the French ships should arrive, not to afford them any commercial encouragement, but to avoid giving them any offence, which might bring on complaints in Europe, at a time when the two Crowns were at peace.

As these new arrangements of the Company's affairs required the talents and experience of Sir George Oxinden to establish them, the Court, in consideration of his services, and those of his Council, in preserving the Factory from being  
plundered

plundered by Sevagee, conferred on him a gold medal, and a remuneration of £200, and sent £400 to be distributed among the Council and subordinate servants, who had been active on that occasion, with the Court's request, that he would remain in the administration of their affairs for three years longer, or till the Company's rights and trade could be re-established.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Court of Directors remained, during the whole of this season, without any information, respecting the actual situation of their affairs at Fort St. George, and though, (as will be subsequently specified,) they consigned shipping and stock to the Coromandel Coast, the instructions were framed, rather to connect the joint efforts of the President and Council of Surat, and the Agent at Musulipatam, than as rules for the conduct of Mr. Foxcroft and the Council at Madras. On the presumption, however, that Mr. Foxcroft might be in possession of the Fort, the letters which were addressed to him and to his Council, prefaced the instructions for his conduct with a similar detail of the events in Europe, which had been conveyed to the Presidency of Surat; but these orders were conditional, and suited to the probability of Sir Edward Winter being still in possession of the Fort, or of events having occurred, which had placed Agent Foxcroft in that station. The commanders of the ships were ordered to proceed direct to Masulipatam,

CHAP. II.  
1667-68.

Precautions to be observed by the Company's officers, in case Sir Edward Winter had delivered Fort St. George to the Dutch.

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and

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 26th August and 4th October 1667, and 27th March 1668.

CHAP. II. and if, on reaching that port, they should discover that Sir  
1667-68. Edward Winter had delivered up the Fort to the Dutch, before  
the 10th May, which the Treaty of Breda had stated as the  
day, on which the "*Uti Possidetis*" was to take place, the  
Agent at Masulipatam was, in that case, to make application  
to the King of Golcondah, to have the place restored to the  
English, agreeably to the conditions upon which it had origi-  
nally been granted to them; but if Sir Edward Winter had  
ceded it to the Dutch, subsequently to the 10th May, a pro-  
test, upon the basis of the treaty, was to be taken, that the  
Dutch had refused to deliver it up, agreeably to the Treaty of  
Breda. In the event, however, of Sir Edward Winter remain-  
ing in possession of the Fort, one or more of the Company's  
ships, as the service might require, were to be stationed off  
Madras, and completely to blockade that port, or to prevent  
the entrance or departure of any ships from it:—if all of these  
measures should prove unavailing, the Agent at Masulipatam,  
and the commanders of the Company's ships, were, on consul-  
tation, to make an application to the King of Golcondah, for  
the cession of St. Thomé to the Company, and authorised to  
pay for such grant, to the amount of 5,000 pagodas:—if this  
place should be obtained, they were to land ordnance and  
military stores, and to fortify themselves in it, and await the  
Court's instructions for their future conduct:—if, however,  
on the arrival of the fleet, the remonstrances of the Company,  
through the Agent at Masulipatam, to Sir Edward Winter,  
to

to resign the Fort, or the plan to acquire St. Thomé, should prove ineffectual, the Agent of Masulipatam, and the commanders of the ships, were, on consultation, to endeavour to form an establishment at some other port on the Coromandel Coast, at which goods, suited to the Bantam market, and that of Europe, could be purchased, both to revive the trade at that port, and to form part of the home investment.

These general orders, applicable to so many probable cases, were strengthened by a commission from the King, directed to the Captains of the Company's ships, and to the Factors embarked on them (the senior captain being appointed commodore of the squadron), to form the soldiers and seamen into five companies, and to train them to the use of ordnance and small-arms, to make an attack on the Fort, by sea and land; with secret instructions, (not to be opened till they should reach Madras Roads,) to offer to the seamen and soldiers, who should be active in recovering the place to the King's obedience, an establishment for themselves, if they chose to settle at the Fort, and a provision for the wives and families of those who might suffer in reducing it; also a promise of pardon and of reward to the adherents of Sir Edward Winter, who might return to their duty, and contribute to the recovery of the place:—if all of these expedients should fail, and the Fort still hold out, and if it should appear, on consultation, impracticable to reduce it, the soldiers employed in this service were to be embarked for Bombay, and one

CHAP. II.  
1667-68.

Company's officers empowered, by the King's commission, to attack Fort St. George.

CHAP. II. one or more ships, fully armed, were to keep Madras in a  
 1667-68. state of blockade.

Equipments  
and stock for  
the Coroman-  
del Coast.

This uncertainty of the Court, respecting the situation of their settlements, or of their servants, on the Coast of Coromandel, or whether Mr. Foxcroft, and the Council they had approved of, were in possession of Madras and its dependencies, did not alter their resolution to send a large stock and tonnage for that part of their trade:—five ships were consigned to Fort St. George, under the preceding instructions, with a cargo of British staples, bullion, and a large proportion of quicksilver, estimated at £75,000:—the ships were equipped for war, as well as for trade, and on each was embarked a proportion of soldiers, and also sixteen factors and eight writers, to form a more enlarged civil establishment. The Agent at Masulipatam (should the Fort still be in Sir Edward Winter's possession) was directed to make the largest practicable investment in Coast cloths, and in a new species of cloths, or gingham, specimens of which were sent, as found in one of the Dutch prizes:—two of these ships were to be dispatched for Bengal, with a proportion of stock and money to obtain saltpetre, taffaties, and raw-silk; and one ship was to proceed from the Coromandel Coast to Bantam, with an investment of £10,000, in Coast cloths, &c. to revive the trade at that port and at Maccassar, and under instructions to bring, in return, pepper and the finer spices, and then to go to Acheen, to take in goods at that port, and to engage

engage that, in the subsequent season, shipping and stock should be sent from England, to re-establish that trade. <sup>(1)</sup> CHAP II.  
1667-68.

In the measures recommended to Sir George Oxinden and the Presidency at Surat, it was specified, that purchases of saltpetre, on the West Coast of India, should be discontinued, the Court having determined to employ a large proportion of the stock, intended for the Coromandel Coast, to restore the trade between it and Bengal; and to consign two ships to the Coast and to Hughly, with the object of opening sales of Europe goods in Bengal, and of obtaining saltpetre, silks, &c. in return: another proportion was to be sent to Bantam, to revive the Company's trade at that port, in the Islands and countries situated in the farther Indian seas.

The separate instructions of the Court to the Agents and Factors at HUGHLY, were chiefly commercial:—they informed them, that one-third of the stock sent for the Coromandel Coast was intended for Bengal, and, in return, required from eight hundred to a thousand tons of saltpetre, and two thousand pieces of taffaties; but, as Fort St. George was, if possible, to be reduced by force, the goods were, in  
the

Commercial  
instructions  
to the Agents  
at Hughly.

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, 26th April 1667, and 24th January 1667-68.— Commission from King Charles II., for reducing the Government of Fort St. George to the obedience of the East-India Company, 31st January 1667-68.— Instructions from the East-India Company (approved by the King) to the Commanders of their Ships, relative to the reducing Fort St. George to obedience, 24th January 1667-68.



CHAP. II. the first instance, to be forwarded to Masulipatam :—  
 1667-68. portion of them, also, was intended for Bantam and  
 southern markets, and therefore one of the ships was  
 to proceed, first to the Coast, with an assortment, and from  
 to Bantam ; and, to prevent the failure of returns from  
 Bantam, as well as from Masulipatam, the Agents were  
 empowered to take up £10,000 each, at interest. <sup>(1)</sup>

Large equip-  
 ments to Ban-  
 tam, to coun-  
 teract the  
 monopoly of  
 the Dutch.

It will be recollected, that the communications between  
 BANTAM and England had been interrupted, from  
 1665-66 to October 1667, and during this period, all trade  
 to the southward of that port had been suspended :—the  
 Company, however, resolved to revive this branch of their commerce  
 to resist the farther aggressions of the Dutch, by whom  
 not only the trade, but the Company's servants, had, for some  
 time, been oppressed. To relieve the Agent at Bantam from  
 the difficulties under which he must have laboured, during  
 the Dutch war, by the interruption of the Court's correspondence  
 with him, it has already been noticed, that a vessel (the *Indi*  
*Pink*) had been dispatched from England, in the beginning  
 of the season, with intelligence of the restoration of peace  
 in Europe ; and that, though the terms had, by no means, been  
 so favourable to the English commerce in those seas, as  
 might have been expected (the islands of Polaroon and Damma  
 had been given up to the Dutch) yet still those circumstances  
 enabled

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agency at Hughly, 24th January 1667.

enervated the Company, who were determined to renew the trade with an increased stock, and with two thousand tons of shipping, to bring to Europe, direct, such accumulation of pepper, as might be in the Company's warehouses, at Bantam, Jambee, and Maccassar, with what might possibly be procured at Sumatra; and, besides, the Court hoped, that a large investment would be provided, comprehending a proportion of gum benjamin, sugar, and sapan-wood:—the trade with Maccassar, and at such other ports as the Agent and Council might deem it expedient, was to be opened:—and any opposition from the Dutch was not to be regarded, unless they proceeded to actual hostility; and should this hostility be experienced, it was to be resisted, as much as the guards and shipping of the Company could effect; but, if a sufficient force could not be collected, protests were to be taken, and authenticated copies of them sent home, to enable the King to apply to the States for redress. <sup>(1)</sup>

In the progress of the season, five ships were accordingly dispatched for Bantam, with stock, chiefly in silver, a proportion of warlike stores and fire arms, and a small quantity of English cloth, which, with the goods to be forwarded to Bantam from the Coast of Coromandel and Surat, would make up a stock, estimated at £40,000. Mr. Turner was appointed Chief at Bantam, with a Council, and accompanied by Factors, Writers, and Apprentices, and intrusted with a letter

Letter from King Charles to the King of Bantam, recommending the Company's servants to his protection.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 4th October 1667.

CHAP. II. from King Charles II. to the King of Bantam, and a present  
 1667-68. of three brass cannon, and accoutrements, valued at £1,500, to request his protection to the East-India Company; and with letters, also, from the Court, expressing their resolution to cultivate his friendship :—these letters were accompanied with a quantity of arms and cloth, either to be sold to the King of Bantam, or, from time to time, given in small presents, to conciliate his favor :—similar letters and presents were sent to the King of Jambee.

This fleet had orders to sail in company, and to endeavour to arrive at Bantam at the same time, that their appearance might make an impression on the Natives, of the large scale upon which the Company intended, in future, to conduct that trade :—the orders to the captains were, to avoid all quarrels with the Dutch ; but if they met with opposition, to make the most vigorous resistance, and, if overpowered by superior force, to take protests, in the manner already specified.

An Agent, also, was this season appointed, with a stock of £10,000, to proceed to Maccassar; but should the wars, between the Dutch and the Natives of the Spice Islands, still subsist, the English were to confine their operations to the protection of their own trade, and not to risk the stock, in situations where such wars might render trade hazardous.

First order of  
 the Court to  
 import teas.

This dispatch furnishes a novel and interesting event, or the first order of East-India Company to their Agent at Bantam, “ to send home, by these ships, 100 lb. waight of  
 “ the

“ the best tey (tea) that you can gett ” ;—a circumstance <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> the more memorable, from this article having, in subsequent 1667-68. times, become the principal import from China, and the most valuable branch of the Company's trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

The commercial enterprizes of the Company, in this season, were extended, if not to new, at least to ports from which, for many years, the Dutch had excluded them. The Company had formerly attempted trade at Sumatra, and obtained a proportion of pepper, to counteract the monopoly of the Dutch at Java, and they now resolved to revive this trade, and therefore sent the Zant frigate, and a stock of £3,000, under the charge of Mr. Newman, the supercargo, with instructions to re-open the trade at Sumatra, particularly at Priaman and Tekoo; but, in the event of his not being able to obtain pepper at those ports, he was to proceed to Bantam, fill up his tonnage, and return thence direct to England.<sup>(2)</sup>

Trade to be again attempted at Sumatra.

2 E 2

The

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Bantam, 24th January 1667-68.— Letter from the Court to the King of Bantam, 24th January 1667-68. — Letter from King Charles II. to the King of Bantam, 28th January 1667-68.— (Note.) Mr. Wisset, in his “ Compendium of East-India Affairs,” mentions, that the Court had ordered the Secretary, in August 1664 and in 1666, to obtain small quantities of tea, as a present to His Majesty; but the letter, above quoted, to Bantam, 24th January 1667-68, appears to be the first *public* order from the Court for the importation of tea into England.

(2)—Instructions of the Court to Mr. Thomas Newman, for his voyage to Sumatra, 27th March 1668.— Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Bantam, 27th March 1668.

## CHAP. II.

1667-68.

Death of Sir Gervase Lucas, at Bombay, communicated to the Secretary of State, by Sir George Oxinden.

The transactions of the foreign Settlements of the Company, in 1667-68, furnished only a continuation of the measures which had been adopted in the preceding season. When Sir Gervase Lucas took charge of the Government of Bombay, and when the unhappy misunderstanding prevailed between him and Sir George Oxinden, the Company's President at Surat, the King's and Company's interests were unhappily at variance with each other, and could not be affected by the events which had taken place in Europe, either in consequence of the Treaty of Breda, or of the grant of the Island of Bombay to the Company; the Presidency of Surat, also, could not have learned the resolution of the Company, to revive the trade, by large funds and equipments; hence, in the west of India, we have only to trace the series of events at BOMBAY and at SURAT, as they affected the King's or the Company's interests.

It would appear, that, early in this year, an explanation had taken place, on the subjects in dispute between Sir Gervase Lucas and Sir George Oxinden, and that the efforts of both were directed to promote His Majesty's and the Company's interests:—the death of Sir Gervase Lucas, however, on the 21st May 1667, again involved the Government of Bombay in embarrassing circumstances. Sir Gorge Oxinden communicated to Lord Arlington the circumstance of Sir Gervase Lucas's death, and, at the same time, informed him

him of the reconciliation which had taken place between them, previously to this fatal event, and his regret for the loss to the public, of an officer, whose exertions and probity had been highly honorable.

CHAP. II.

1667-68.

When Sir Gervase Lucas assumed the Government of Bombay, he appointed Captain Henry Gary to be Deputy Governor, and this officer seems to have proceeded on the same plan with his predecessor, or that of ascertaining the Royal rights in the Island, and improving its revenue and trade. In the preceding season, Sir Gervase Lucas had dismissed Mr. Cooke, for having appropriated part of the revenues to his own use, and endeavoured to defraud the heir of Sir Abraham Shipman; on this event, Mr. Cooke had gone to Goa, and placed himself under the protection of the Jesuits:—on hearing of the death of Sir Gervase Lucas, Mr. Cooke, by letter, addressed Mr. Gary, and claimed his right to succeed to the Government: this Mr. Gary and his Council rejected, which brought Mr. Cooke to Bundera, on the Island of Salsette, at which he endeavoured to assemble a force, assisted by the Jesuits, to re-establish himself in the Island of Bombay:—Mr. Gary proclaimed him a rebel and a traitor, and he was refused any countenance or protection from Sir George Oxinden.

The appointment of Mr. Gary, to be Deputy Governor of Bombay, opposed by Mr. Cooke.

These mixed transactions, however, would be of inferior consequence, if the source of them could not be traced to an event, which took place during the administration of Sir Gervase

CHAP. II. Gervase Lucas. At the time when Mr. Cooke acceded to the  
 1667-68. terms, upon which the Viceroy of Goa agreed to cede the Island, either he had not examined the rights to the lands held of the Crown of Portugal by the inhabitants, or he had considered that the ascertaining of those rights would become a source of emolument to himself:—the Jesuits' College at Bundera claimed a considerable extent of land, and of rights, in the Island, which Sir Gervase Lucas refused to admit; on which they had recourse to force:—this, the Governor conceived to be an act of treason against His Majesty's Government, and declared the lands and rights to be forfeited to the King; a decision which explains the reception and encouragement given to Mr. Cooke by the Jesuits of Bundera; Mr. Gary, therefore, proclaimed Mr. Cooke a traitor, and Sir George Oxinden refused to receive or encourage him at the Factory of Surat. The whole of these parties referred the matters in dispute, by letters, to the King, to the Lord Chancellor, and to the Secretary of State; and Mr. Gary determined to maintain his right to the administration of the Island, till the King's pleasure should be known.

Mr. Gary's  
 Report on the  
 revenues of  
 Bombay.

In making these communications to the King and to the Secretary of State, Mr. Gary transmitted a statement of the revenues of the Island, as improved by Sir Gervase Lucas and himself:—this statement is the more interesting, as it ascertains the value of the grant of Bombay, as made by the King to the East-India Company, and is as follows;

Rent

	Xeraphins	
Rent of Mazagon .....	9,300 0 40	
Mahim .....	4,797 2 45	
Parella .....	2,377 1 56	
Vadela .....	1,738 0 40	
Sion .....	790 0 60	
Veroly .....	571 1 34	
Bombaim .....	6,344 2 61	
	<hr style="width: 100px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/> 25,920 1 18	
Rent of the Tobacco Stanck or Farme .....	9,550 0 00	
Rent of the Taverns.....	2,400 0 00	
The Account of Customes .....	18,000 0 00	
The Account of Coconutts .....	18,000 0 00	
	<hr style="width: 100px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/> Xeraphins .. 73,870 1 18	
	More may be advanced .. 1,129 1 62	
	<hr style="width: 100px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/> Total, Xeraphins .. 75,000 0 00	
Which, at thirteen Xeraphins for 22s. 6d. } sterling, amounts to..... }	} £6,490 17s. 9d.	

To this account of the revenue, Mr. Gary subjoined, in his letter to the King, the state of the Treasury at the time, and the measures he had taken, by laying in provisions, and adding such men to the garrison, as he could draw together, for its defence:—the amount of treasure was 16,000 Xeraphins, or £1,384, and the numbers of the garrison were two hundred



CHAP. II. dred and eighty-five; but these were composed, pr  
 1667-68. of French, Portuguese, and Natives, there being onl  
 three English, officers included.<sup>(1)</sup>

Phirmaund  
 obtained  
 from Au-  
 rungzebe, for  
 reducing the  
 customs pay-  
 able by the  
 English at  
 Surat, to two  
 per cent.

The preceding view of the state of Bombay, juncture, connected with the misunderstanding and r  
 ation of Sir Gervase Lucas and Sir George Oxinden, the reason, why the President and Council of SURAT  
 any interference with the King's officers and servants bay, and rather turned their attention to obtain new p  
 at Surat, and in its dependencies. In this year, Sir Oxinden, availing himself of the services he had ren  
 the Mogul Government, in repelling the attack of continued his applications to Aurungzebe, and ob  
 Phirmaund, dated 25th June 1667, which reduced the payable by the English, from three to two per cent. :-  
 preamble to this Phirmaund, the Emperor referred to vices of the English, as his motive for granting the privile  
 it is remarkable, that the concession of exacting two in

(1)—Letter from Sir George Oxinden to Lord Arlington, dated Surat, 1667.— Correspondence between Mr. Cooke and Captain Gary, and the Bombay, 9th and 30th August, and 8th, 9th, and 10th October 1667.— Pr  
 of Captain Gary, declaring Cooke a Traitor, 15th October 1667.— Lette  
 Gary to the King, dated Bombay, 12th December 1667.— Letter from M  
 the Earl of Clarendon, dated Bombay, 12th December 1667.— Letter fron  
 to Lord Arlington, dated Bombay, 12th December 1667.— Statement of th  
 of the Island of Bombay, inclosed in the preceding letters.— (East-India  
 the State Paper Office, Nos. 243, 245, 246, 248, 249.)

three rupees in the hundred, is explained to be the placing the English in the same favored situation which the Dutch had enjoyed, though, on the invasion of Sevagee, the Dutch had not assisted, to repel his depredations.<sup>(1)</sup>

FORT ST. GEORGE, in this season, appears to have continued under the power of Sir Edward Winter, and it is remarkable, that when he first imprisoned Mr. Foxcroft, under the pretext of having uttered seditious expressions against the King's Government, instead of applying to Sir George Oxinden, for approbation or advice, he opened a communication with Mr. Cooke, (at that time the King's Governor of Bombay,) for his assistance: It does not appear, however, that any communications took place between Sir Edward Winter and Sir Gervase Lucas, yet no sooner was Mr. Gary Governor of Bombay, than we find him approving of Sir Edward Winter's conduct, and issuing a proclamation against Mr. Foxcroft and his adherents, whom he described to be rebels and traitors against the King's Government; a circumstance which shews, that both Sir Edward Winter and Mr. Gary had in view, to continue themselves in the administration of their respective Governments, on the ground of loyalty to the King. This explains the motives of Sir Edward Winter and his Council, not only for continuing in their resistance to the orders of the

CHAP. II.  
1667-68.

Sir Edward Winter supported by Governor Gary, in his usurpation of the Government of Fort St. George.

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2 F

Court,

(1)—Copy of Phirmaund from Aurungzebe, in favor of the English, reducing their Customs from three to two per cent., dated 25th June 1667.—(MSS. in the Indian Register Office, vol. xxv. No. 2321.)

CHAP. II.  
1667-68. Court, but for rejecting the propositions of the Agent at Masulipatam, founded on the King's commission, requiring the liberation of Mr. Foxcroft, and the vesting him with the administration at Madras. These orders Sir Edward Winter and his Council treated as gross forgeries, intended to betray them into a dereliction of their duty, and instead of entering into any proofs of such forgeries, returned to the charge against Mr. Foxcroft, of treason to the King; and asserted, that the Company must ascribe the failure in the sale of their exports, particularly the lead, (used for the defence of the Fort) to their having listened to the misrepresentations which had been made of Sir Edward Winter's conduct;—and that, to the same cause, they must ascribe the want of an investment from the Fort this season, it being impracticable to provide one, because Sir George Oxinden had withheld both the stock, and the Court's instructions on that subject; proceedings which had compelled him to send, through His Majesty's Governor at Bombay, information of the actual state of the Company's affairs at the Fort. Under all these difficulties, however, Sir Edward Winter expressed his determination to adhere to his loyalty to the King, and to his duty to the Company, and to resist every attempt which the Dutch might make on the garrison, till he should receive His Majesty's commands, and instructions from the Court of Directors.<sup>(1)</sup>

There

(1)—(Copy.) Proclamation of Captain Gary, Governor of Bombay, against Mr. Foxcroft

There does not remain in the Company's records, any document, to shew that the Agent and Council of BANTAM <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> 1667-68. had received information, either of the Treaty of Breda, of the grant of Bombay by the King to the Company, or (what was of more importance to them) the enlarged equipment and funds upon which it had been resolved to revive the trade at that place, and at Maccassar, and therefore the situation of the Southern settlements of the Company were, during this season, unknown to the Court.

Foxcroft and his Adherents, at Fort St. George, 8th August 1667.—(East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 244).— Letter from Sir Edward Winter, at Fort St. George, to the Court, 29th October 1667.

## 1668-69.

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CHAP. II.

1668-69. Memorial of the Court to the Privy Council, requesting explanations of the Treaty of Breda, and decision of the Council on the subject.

THE relations between England and the Maritime Powers were, at this juncture, constantly varying; and these variations had an influence upon the proceedings of the London East-India Company, both at home and abroad.

The Treaty of Breda, (referred to in the preceding season,) having left the Dutch in possession of the Islands of Polaroon and Damm, and the London Company exposed to encroachments on their settlements, and on their trade, gave rise to new questions, which were not distinctly solved in the terms of the Treaty of Commerce, or "Treaty Marine," between England and the States General. Though the terms regarding Europe, were sufficiently explicit, or "that the produce of Germany, passing by rivers through Holland, was to be deemed the produce of Holland," and though commissioners were to be appointed, to judge on all commercial disputes, and neither of the contracting parties (though they might carry on their commerce freely), were to supply the enemies of the other with naval or military stores, this general provision did not sufficiently apply to the relative circumstances of the English and Dutch, in the East-Indies;—the Court of Directors, therefore, presented a memorial to the Lords Committees for Trade,

on

on the points applicable to the East-India Company, "which <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> were either doubtful, impracticable or unprovided for, in the 1668-69. "Treaty Marine." The substance of this memorial, with the remarks of the Lords of Trade on it; is,—that it was doubtful by the eighth article of the treaty, whether such ships as did not trade in contraband goods, or to an enemy's port, were obliged to have certificates or not, and that there was a material variation, in the form of the English and Dutch certificates, required by the eighth article; on which their Lordship's observed, "that the form of the certificate should be made equal, in every circumstance, or rather, that traffique and commerce might be managed without any certificates at all." The Court farther stated, that the words in the treaty, "besieged, blocked up, or invested," required a specific explanation, or else a few ships, lying before any place, on any pretence, might hinder all commerce:—to which observation their Lordships assented, and agreed, that a specific explanation was necessary. On the subject of the particulars not provided for by the treaty, the Court suggested, "that either Company, having a fort or castle on any coast, country, or river, should not hinder the other Company from trading with the natives, or from passing such river, though under the command of the others fort or castle:"—to which their Lordship's assented; as they likewise did to the articles which the Court proposed, "that if either Company should have a contract for the sole buying of any commodity from the natives, it should not hinder the other

CHAP. II. 1668-69. “ other Company from trading with them, and that such trade  
 “ should not be interrupted ;—that neither Company should fur-  
 “ nish the enemies of the other, with whom they might actually  
 “ be at war, with ships of war or soldiers ;—and that the passes  
 “ of each Company, legally and properly signed, should be  
 “ mutually respected by the Commanders, Agents, or Factors,  
 “ of the other.”

This memorial of the Court of Directors, with the obser-  
 vations of the Lords of Trade on it, was submitted to the con-  
 sideration of His Majesty in Council, on the 15th July 1668 ;  
 and, after a full discussion, it was ordered, “ that instructions  
 “ should be given to Sir William Temple, who was going to  
 “ Holland, as Ambassador to the States General, to insist  
 “ upon the modification of the Treaty Marine, according to  
 “ the points specified in the Court’s memorial.<sup>(1)</sup>”

Instructions  
 to Sir George  
 Oxinden on  
 this decision.

This resolution of the King in Council, though satisfac-  
 tory, with respect to the line of conduct which the Company’s  
 shipping and settlements were to observe in the East-Indies,  
 the Court considered to be a temporary expedient only ; and  
 this opinion they drew from the Triple Alliance, between  
 England, Holland, and Sweden, which was formed at this time,  
 with the object of preserving the Barrier of the Netherlands ; and  
 from a Treaty of Peace having taken place, between France  
 and

(1)—Order of Council, relative to the Alterations desired by the East-India Com-  
 pany in the Treaty Marine with Holland, 15th July 1668.—(East-India Papers in the  
 State Paper Office, No. 254).

and Spain, notwithstanding this Barrier had been narrowed, and, of course, opportunities for farther encroachments afforded to the French Monarchy:—the Court, therefore, gave it as their opinion to Sir George Oxinden and the Council of SURAT, that though negotiations were still proceeding between the European Powers, it was impossible to foresee whether they would terminate in a system of peace, or in the renewal of hostilities. <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> (1) 1668-69.

Connected with this general view of the Company's situation, in Europe, were the large funds and equipments of the French Company, at this juncture acting immediately under the protection of Louis XIV., who had made considerable advances of money for its support;—the Presidency of Surat, therefore, were to be careful, in avoiding all interferences with a competitor in the Indian markets, which might lead to troublesome questions in Europe, between the two Crowns. (2)

While BOMBAY was a dependency of the Crown, the events regarding it necessarily preceded the instructions of the Court to the President and Council of Surat, because a leading part of them was to conform to the King's views respecting that Island, and to advance money, from time to time, to His Majesty's officers; but, after Bombay had been granted by the King to the Company, and the President of  
Surat

Equipments  
and stock for  
Surat and  
Bombay.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 4th August 1668.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 10th March 1668-69.



**CHAP. II.** Surat appointed its Governor, and one of the Council, of his  
 1668-69. selection, Deputy Governor, to reside in Bombay, and to take his instructions and orders from Surat, the measures, which the Court annually prescribed to the President and Council must necessarily precede the subordinate orders which were conveyed, through them, to the Deputy Governor of Bombay and his Council.

The Court, in this season (1668-69), signified to the President and Council of Surat, their determination to persevere in enlarging their system of trade on the West of India, and their opinion, that measures should be taken for re-opening the trade to PERSIA.

The equipments intended for Surat amounted to twelve hundred tons of shipping, and the stock, in goods and money, was estimated at £70,000:—this tonnage is subsequently explained to be divided among three ships, and the stock to amount to £75,000, of which the proportion of broad-cloths, (the staple of the kingdom,) was considerable, with orders to make every effort to promote the sale of them:—the other articles were tin, to be sold at prime cost, with simple interest, and a considerable quantity of sheet copper; the remainder in bullion:—it was directed, that the investment should consist of Surat cloths, and as large a proportion as could be obtained, of Malabar Pepper, at the ports of which Coast (Carwar, Calicut, Porcat, &c.) Agencies were to be established, as well as at the other ports of the Native Princes

or States, to which the Company had not hitherto traded :— CHAP. II.  
 these Agents were to purchase goods from the Native in- 1668-69.  
 land merchants, and not to be deterred by the Dutch, though  
 they might have Factories at the ports at which such Agencies  
 might be formed. <sup>(1)</sup>

For several years, the Company had, in a great measure, Mr. Rolt appointed Agent in Persia, under instructions to revive that trade.  
 relinquished the Persian trade, and the only intercourse with  
 that country was by an Agent, remaining at Gombroon, to  
 keep up their claim to the moiety of the customs at that port.  
 In this season, the Court appointed Mr. Rolt to be Agent  
 in PERSIA, and to take charge of their trade and interests  
 in that kingdom ; but, at the same time, he was to receive his  
 instructions from the President and Council of Surat, who  
 were also directed to make an estimate of the number and  
 kind of armed vessels which would be required in the Persian  
 Gulf, to protect trade, and to enforce the payment of the  
 customs at Gombroon. <sup>(2)</sup>

The Court, in this season, appointed Sir George Oxinden Sir George Oxinden appointed Governor and Commander-in-chief of Bombay.  
 to be Governor and Commander-in-Chief at BOMBAY, with  
 power to nominate a Deputy Governor from his Council, to  
 reside on the Island, with such assistants as the service might  
 require :— but the transactions of this Deputy and of his  
 Council were to be under the control of the President and  
 Council of Surat.

VOL. II.

2 G

Having

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 4th August 1668.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 10th March 1668-69.

CHAP. II.  
 1668-69.  
 Regulations  
 for the Go-  
 vernment of  
 Bombay.

Having made the requisite appointments for the administration of Bombay, the Court framed the following general regulations, with the view of rendering the Island an English colony :—the fort, or castle, was to be enlarged and strengthened ; a town was to be built on a regular plan, and to be so situated, as to be under the protection of the fort ; inhabitants, chiefly English, were to be encouraged to settle in it, and to be exempted, for five years, from the payment of customs :—the following articles were to be permanently exempted from the payment of duties, *viz.* callicoes manufactured in Bombay ; raw, wrought, and thrown silks ; cotton yarn ; bullion (gold and silver) ; jewels, bezoar stones, musk, amber, and ambergrease :—the revenues of the Island (amounting, according to Mr. Gary's estimate, to £6,490 per annum), were to be improved, without imposing any discouraging taxes ; the Protestant religion was to be favoured, but no unnecessary restraints imposed upon the inhabitants, who might profess a different faith ; manufactures of all sorts of cottons and silks were to be encouraged, and looms provided for the settlers ; a harbour, with docks, was to be constructed ; a proportion of soldiers, with their wives and families, were annually to be sent from England ; and an armed vessel, of about one hundred and eighty tons, was to be stationed at Bombay for the protection of the Island and of its trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 24th August

1668.

The resolution which the Court of Directors had taken, in the preceding year, to extend their trade, and enlarge their equipments to the Coromandel Coast, was not shaken or altered during this season, notwithstanding the uncertainty whether Sir Edward Winter had yielded to their orders and to the commands of the King, signified by his commission, to release Mr. Foxcroft from imprisonment, and to vest him with the administration of the Company's affairs at FORT ST. GEORGE.

CHAP. II.  
1668-69.  
Equipments  
and Stock for  
the Coroman-  
del Coast en-  
larged.

It was the practice of the Court, to form an estimate of the shipping and stock proposed to be sent to each of their Settlements abroad, at the commencement of the season, and to dispatch the smallest of the vessels, with information of their resolutions, and of the stations to which the ships were to be consigned, and the proportions of the stock applied, for obtaining the investment :—the projected equipments of this season, for the Coromandel Coast, were four ships, and the estimated stock £90,000 ;—the appropriation of this sum was, one-fourth of the bullion, or £24,000, for the Bengal trade, and £10,000 for the trade from the Coast to Bantam. As the season advanced, the shipping were increased to five sail (or the Castle Frigate, the Antelope, the Morning Star, the John and Martha, and the Crown), and the stock, consisting partly of broad-cloths, and of tin, quick-

2 G 2 silver,

1668, and 10th March 1668-69.— Letter from the Court to the Chief and Council at Bombay, 10th March 1668-69.

CHAP. II. silver, &c. but chiefly of bullion and foreign coins, amounted  
 1668 - 69. to £103,000, applied as follows; the proportion for Hughly, or Bengal, to be one quarter part of the bullion, and a considerable part of the broad-cloths and lead, which, with the sum this Agency was allowed to borrow on interest, it was estimated would furnish it with a stock of £34,000; and it was calculated, that the proportion to be vested in Coromandel goods, to be sent to the Bantam and Maccassar Settlements, would amount to £10,000. It was expected by the Court, with these funds, not only that a large assortment of Coast goods might be purchased for the Europe market, but that the investment might be increased, by the quantities of silks, taffaties, and saltpetre, obtained in Bengal; by the pepper accumulated at Bantam and Jambee, and by the finer spices procured at Maccassar, and the adjoining countries and Islands.<sup>(1)</sup>

Establishment of pilots for the navigation of the Ganges.

The Court, at this time, first took into its consideration the difficulties of the navigation of the Ganges, from the importance of maintaining the trade between that river and Fort St. George:—considerable expences had been incurred, as well as risks, in carrying the Europe goods up to Hughly, and in bringing down the investment from that place, to be put on board the ships at the mouth of the river; orders, therefore, were given to the Agent at HUGHLY, to

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, 26th October and 20th November 1668.

to build a pinnace, to be manned with intelligent seamen, engaged from the Indiamen, who were to be formed into a class of pilots, whose duty it should be to take charge of the Company's ships up and down the river; it having been found, from experience, that the want of pilots, and of proper charts, pointing out the depths and soundings of the river, had not only exposed the ships to hazard, but the Company to great expences for native pilots: it was to be an instruction to these pilots, to examine the currents, soundings, and general navigation of the river Ganges, up to Hughly; and to render this knowledge more perfect, such of the Captains of the Company's ships, as navigated their vessels with safety, in the Ganges, were to receive ten shillings per ton, as a remuneration.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was left to the discretion of the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, to carry into effect the project of establishing a Factory at Acheen, and to allot a proportion of the stock, in presents to the Government of that place, provided it could be ascertained, that two hundred and fifty, or three hundred tons of pepper could annually be collected at that port:— in return, a larger investment was expected, in Coromandel goods, Bengal produce, and pepper from Acheen.<sup>(2)</sup>

Trade to be revived between the Coast of Coromandel and Acheen.

The

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factor at Hughly, 20th November 1668.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 26th October 1668.

CHAP. II.  
 1668-69.  
 Equipments  
 and Stock for  
 Bantam en-  
 larged.

The instructions, in 1668-69, and the magnitude of the equipments and stock consigned to BANTAM and to its dependencies, evince that the Court were determined to revive this trade, it being of much importance to their home sales;—with this object, besides the ship which was ordered to proceed from Fort St. George, with a stock of £10,000, two ships, of from four to five hundred tons each, were consigned direct from England to Bantam, with a stock, chiefly in bullion, and some necessary stores, estimated at £25,000, with instructions to the Agents and Councils of Bantam and Jambee, to employ every possible means to obtain the protection of the Chiefs at those ports, and to purchase as large a proportion of pepper as might be practicable, not only to fill up their tonnage, but to be in readiness for two thousand tons of shipping, intended to be annually consigned to them, to connect, as much as circumstances would allow, the trade of Maccassar with that of Bantam. Towards the close of this season, the London, an additional ship, was dispatched to Jambee, with a cargo valued at £10,000, to obtain pepper, but the commander was to avoid giving offence to the King of Bantam, lest he might become jealous of the intentions of the English, to remove the trade from Bantam to Jambee:—at the same time, he was ordered to prosecute this trade, at whatever ports it might be practicable, and not to be deterred, by the opposition or menaces of the Dutch.

It

It having been found, that, in a state of war with CHAP. II.  
 the Dutch, the English Factory at Bantam had been exposed 1668-69.  
 to alarm and to danger, the Agent and Council were directed to solicit from the King of Bantam a piece of ground, near the mouth of the river, on which the Company might erect a Factory and store-houses, sufficiently strong to protect their property and servants from any sudden attack.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Court, in this season, again formed the project of opening a trade with JAPAN, which had been laid aside since the death of Mr. Quarles Browne, their Agent at Bantam. Project of re-  
viving the  
trade to Ja-  
pan.  
 The able report of this intelligent officer, which has been detailed, had pointed out the practice of the Dutch to be the only rule which ought to be followed by the Company, in any speculation for opening a trade to Japan; the Court, however, in this season, stated the following questions to the Agent and Council at Bantam:—Whether a recommendation from the King of Cambodia, would not be the best means of introducing the English to a trade at Japan?—Whether it might not be preferable to send ships, with Surat and Coast goods, and a proportion of Europe produce, direct from Bantam to Japan, and to endeavour to establish exchanges and trade with that country?—And whether opening a trade for skins, to be obtained in Cambodia and Formosa (at this time in possession

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council of Bantam, 16th December 1668, 30th January 1668-69, and 2d and 10th April 1669.



CHAP. II. session of the Chinese), might not facilitate the speculation of  
 1668-69. a trade to Japan ?

These questions the Court, in this season, appear, in part, to have answered, by ordering a Factor, with a small stock, to be sent to Cambodia, to examine the practicability of establishing a trade between this place and Japan, and also a trade to Manilla and to China.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Island of St. Helena confirmed by Charter to the Company, and Captain Stringer appointed Governor.

In reviewing the Annals of the London Company, during the reign of James I., it was ascertained, that one of their captains having touched at Saldanha Bay, for water and refreshments, had taken possession of the Cape of Good Hope, in the King's name, "to be held by whatever title His Majesty " might be pleased to give it ; " and this event establishes the prior rights of the Crown of England to those of the Dutch, to the great Promontory of Africa. The civil wars, in the reign of Charles I., having depressed equally the Crown and the Company, no measures were adopted to form an English Colony at the Cape, and the prior rights of the Crown were neglected.

The Dutch, having possessed themselves of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, the London East-India Company, about the year 1651, (after the Dutch had relinquished St. HELENA, and carried the colonists to the Cape), took possession of this Island. King Charles II. confirmed the Company's right to St. Helena, by the Charter of the 3d April 1661, by which

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 10th April 1669.

which he empowered “ the Company to erect castles, fortifications, and forts, in the Island of St. Helena, and to furnish them with stores and ammunition, and to engage such number of men as they should think fit, to serve as a garrison.”

Jealous of the English occupying a station, which might facilitate the navigation to and from the East-Indies, the Dutch, in 1665, retook St. Helena, but were expelled from it in the same year. From this period, it became a station at which the Company’s ships touched for refreshments, and to which the foreign Settlements were ordered to send, on the homeward ships, live stock, seeds for cultivation, and slaves, to facilitate the means of rendering the soil productive;—it was also an instruction to the Agent and Council of Bantam, to collect nutmeg-plants, and forward them to St. Helena; the Court conceiving that the climate and soil would be favorable to the cultivation of them, and that, in time, they might become a valuable part of their investments.

In the season 1668-69, Captain Stringer was appointed to be Resident Governor of St. Helena, with a surgeon, to take charge of the settlers, and to assist the crews of the homeward shipping that might touch at the Island:—from this circumstance, and from the Court’s directing, that all the captains of their regular ships, when at St. Helena, should act as members of Captain Stringer’s Council, while they remained at the Island, it appears, that a permanent Council for St. Helena, was not, at this time,

CHAP. II. formed; and, it is worth notice, that in the appointment of  
1668-69. Captain Stringer, the captains of the ships who were to act  
as his temporary council, were twenty-two, which ascertains  
the number of the Company's regular ships at this period.

The Court, in this season, established the following regulations for the colony at St. Helena:—two hundred acres of land were to be held as the exclusive property of the Company, and to be under the management of the Governor; the remaining lands were to be allotted to the settlers, in the proportion of fifteen acres to each family, and the lands for which settlers could not be found, were to be common, on which the inhabitants, in general, were to have the privilege of pasturage for their cattle, till the Court should be able to form the whole into a regular colony. In a few months, subsequently to this arrangement with Captain Stringer, Captain Coney was appointed Governor, and it was then ordered, (without excepting the Governor) that the settlers should derive their subsistence from their lands only, but be allowed a proportion of cattle and slaves, to accelerate the cultivation of them, and not entitled to require supplies from the Company's ships, but to exchange them for fresh provisions; farther, such passengers in the Company's ships, as might be disposed to settle in the Island, were to have lands allotted to them for cultivation.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Governor of the Island of St. Helena, 10th February 1668-69 and 9th March 1669-70.— Commission from the Court, for planting

The large equipments and stock which had been sent from England, consigned to Sir George Oxinden and the Presidency of SURAT, and the commission to him, to take possession of the Island of BOMBAY under the King's warrant, it might have been expected, would, in this season, have rendered the foreign transactions of this Presidency of much importance ; but it appears, only, that the Bantam Pink had arrived, with the stock intended to open a trade between Surat and Bantam, and that the large equipments did not reach the Presidency, in sufficient time, to carry the Court's intentions of extending their trade into execution, either on the Malabar Coast, or in the Gulf of Persia ;—and that Sir George Oxinden was obliged to conform to the actual state of his means, and confine his transactions to such expedients, as were calculated to prepare for, rather than to carry into effect, the Court's views, regarding the trade at Surat, or at the out-stations.

Project of  
Sir George  
Oxinden for  
reviving the  
trade with  
Mocha ;

Among those expedients was the sending forward the Bantam Pink, with a stock of Surat goods, to open the trade at Bantam, and at Maccassar ; but the Dutch, having got possession of Maccassar, and, of course, excluded the English

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from

ing the Island of St. Helena, 10th February 1668-69.— Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council of Bantam, 30th January 1668-69.— Anderson's History of Commerce, vol. ii., pages 417—483.

CHAP. II. from that station, Sir George Oxinden deemed it more prudent  
1668-69. to employ this armed vessel, mounting eight guns, on a service which he considered would be acceptable to the Mogul Government, or sending her as convoy to the Surat vessels, which annually carried Pilgrims to Judda and Mocha, expecting for this service, the continuance, if not the extension, of the Company's privileges at Surat.

On the return of the Bantam Pink from the Red Sea, the President, the more effectually to meet the Court's orders, dispatched this vessel to the Malabar Coast, as far as Carwar, to take in what pepper and Malabar produce had been collected, to be reladen on board the Company's Europe ships, at Swally.

— with  
Acheen;

The Presidency of Surat, having received the Court's orders to establish a Factory at Acheen, to encrease their pepper investment, sent Mr. Matthew Gray, one of their number, to negotiate a treaty with the Queen, on the principle, that if a preference should be given to the English trade at that port, at Tekoo, and at Priaman, he might agree, on the part of the Company, to afford the assistance of the English, in protecting Acheen against the depredations of the Orankayes, or superiors of districts; and, was ordered to remain twelve months at Acheen, to observe, and report on the practicability of this trade;—the Pink, however, was to return to Surat, with such quantities of pepper, benjamin, &c., as could be procured, to make part of the investment for Europe.

The

The Bantam Pink was accompanied to Acheen by the ship Charles, which was to proceed from this port to Quedah, on the Coast of Malacca, and, with the assistance of Mr. Davies, who was appointed Agent at Quedah, to endeavour to obtain tin, for which he was to barter Surat produce: if he could establish a trade at that port, he was to engage, that the Company's ships should annually resort to it:—but if he should find this project impracticable, he was to proceed with the ship Charles to Johore, in the Straits of Singapore, and to try a similar barter in that country.

The transactions, thus, of the Surat Presidency, as far as they regarded the extension of the Company's trade, were confined to expedients only, preparatory to the arrival of their large stock and equipments.<sup>(1)</sup>

The important event of the cession, under the King's Warrant, of the Island of Bombay to the London East-India Company, to be held by them, under the tenure specified in the Letters Patent, took place on the 23d September 1668, Sir George Oxinden having sent a deputation from the Council of Surat to Bombay, to complete this transaction.

Sir George Oxinden takes possession of Bombay, in the name of the Company.

Mr.

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 24th February 1668-69.—Commission from the President and Council of Surat to Mr. Gray, for attempting trade with Acheen, dated 19th April 1669.—Commission from the President and Council of Surat to Mr. Davies, to open trade at Quedah, in Malacca, 25th April 1669.

## CHAP. II.

1668-69. Statements of Governor Gary and the Commissioners from Surat, of the revenues and disbursements of Bombay.

Mr. Gary, on this occasion, delivered over to the Commissioners, a statement, or “ accmpt general of His Majesty’s receipt, revenue, and disbursement, of His Island of Bombaim, from the 22d day of May 1667 (the day Mr. Gary took possession of the government, on the death of Sir Gervase Lucas) “ to the 23d September 1668, the day it was “ transferred to the Honorable East-India Company;” of which the following is an abstract :—

By this statement, Mr. Gary acknowledged to have received, during the time he held the government, for the farms of cocoa-nuts, customs, excise, and tobacco, and the rents of the towns in the Island, the sum of £9,402. 12s. 8½d., which, with the sum of £536. 15s. 1d., recovered from the executor of Sir Gervase Lucas, on the King’s account, and the value of the shipping, houses, cattle, jewels, plate, and ready money, estimated at £1,631. 4s. 0½d., made the whole receipt, during his administration, amount to the sum of £11,570. 11s. 10d.

The disbursements, during the same period, on the King’s account, for pay of the troops, fortifications, repairs of houses, provisions, stable-charges, and contingencies, amounted to the sum of £6,691. 4s. 9d., and there was delivered to the Commissioners, on account of the East-India Company, on the 23d September 1668, shipping, houses, cattle, jewels, plate, and ready money, to the amount of £4,879. 7s. 6d., making

making together the sum of £11,570. 11s. 10d., which Mr. Gary acknowledged to have received.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1668-69.

This account of the transfer of the Island of Bombay, from the Crown to the East-India Company, was communicated by a letter from Mr. Gary to Sir Joseph Williamson, Secretary of State, dated the 5th October 1668, in which Mr. Gary stated, that he had received the King's Warrant for the cession, on the 21st September 1668, with which he readily complied, and, on the 23d September, gave possession of the Island to the East-India Company's Commissioners; and added, "that though this unexpected change had much troubled him," he hoped that Lord Arlington and Sir Joseph Williamson "would make the Governor and Committees of the East-India Company, sensible of his fidelity, and that he was deserving of remuneration."<sup>(2)</sup>

The account which the Presidency of Surat gave to the Court of Directors, of the events and circumstances which had attended the cession of the Island of Bombay to the East-India Company, was, in substance, as follows:—

Mr. Goodier, Mr. Master, and Mr. Cotes, members of the Council at Surat, and Captain Young, appointed Deputy Governor of Bombay, were the Commissioners sent by Sir George

(1)—Account of the Receipts and Disbursements of the Island of Bombay, from the 22d May 1667, to 3d October 1668. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 257.)

(2)—Letter from Mr. Gary to Sir Joseph Williamson, dated Bombay, 5th October 1668. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 258.)



CHAP. II. George Oxinden, to require from Mr. Gary, who had succeeded Sir Gervase Lucas, the transfer of the Island to the Company:—on their arrival, on the 21st September 1668, these Commissioners addressed a letter to Mr. Gary, informing him, that they had to present to him the King's orders, under the Privy Seal, and the Company's commission, for taking possession of the Island:—Mr. Gary fixed the following day for the ceremony:—on the Commissioners landing, the troops were drawn up to receive them with military honors, and then ordered to ground their arms; the King's orders were next read, and Mr. Gary surrendered the Island, in form:—the troops were then invited to enter into the Company's service, with the same rank and pay, but with permission to such of them as might decline it, to return to England:—the officers and soldiers, in general, accepted the proposition, and became the Company's first military establishment at Bombay:—they consisted of two companies, commanded by captains; the first company comprehended two commissioned officers, sixty-six non-commissioned officers and privates, and twenty-eight topasses; the second, three commissioned officers, seventy-three non-commissioned officers and privates, and twenty-six topasses:—the ordnance amounted to twenty-one pieces of cannon, with proportionate stores; but no part of the military were particularly attached to this service, except two gunners. This force, on the first inspection by the Commissioners, was deemed inadequate; for, in their reference

rence to Sir George Oxinden, they required thirty additional pieces of cannon, and three hundred men, to form the garrison.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1668-69

The Commissioners next reported, that measures would be concerted, to ascertain the amount of the customs, encouragement given to manufacturers, and the military employed in husbandry, as soon as the habits of the men would allow of it.

On the trade of the Island, the Commissioners reported, that above five thousand pieces of taffaties were annually made at Chaul and Tannah, and that they would use their endeavours to induce the weavers to settle at Bombay ;—that a mole and dry-dock must be constructed ;—that the Island had been oppressed by the exactions of the Portuguese at Tannah, and, indeed, by their opposition to every plan which could promote the establishment of the Company's power and trade in it ; and therefore recommended, that application should be made to the Crown of Portugal, for an order to the Viceroy, to desist from such exactions, it certainly not being the intention of that Crown, in ceding the Island to the King, to render access to it difficult, or supplies from the Portuguese settlements impracticable. To enable the Commissioners to act, they requested to have a copy of the Treaty of Marriage

VOL. II. 2 I between

(1)—Letter from the Commissioners at Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, 28th September 1668, and 30th October 1668. (Surat Letter-Book, in the Indian Register Office, vol. lviii, page 7.)

CHAP. II. between the King and the Infanta of Portugal, that, guided by  
 1668-69. it, they might know how to decide on any doubtful question; that is, whether the possession of Bombay, only, was ceded, or whether Salsette, and the other Portuguese dependencies on it, were comprehended in the Treaty:—with this information, they hoped to counterbalance, as much as circumstances would allow, the restrictions of the Portuguese;—and recommended, that as timber could be obtained only from the Portuguese settlements, and caulking stuff from Bombay, that exchanges of these articles should be insisted on:—it was farther their intention to endeavour to get access to the port of Penne, which, though it was in Sevagee's country, at this time acknowledged the Mogul as its superior. For the immediate defence of the Island, the Commissioners requested that a large quantity of iron-work of every kind should be sent from England;—that engineers would be required, to plan and direct the fortifications;—and, as disputes must arise, from the habits of the people, accustomed to civil law, that a Judge Advocate might be appointed, to take cognizance, and decide in civil cases.<sup>(1)</sup>

Regulations established by Sir George Oxinden, for the Administration of the Island.

Such is the substance of the information respecting the Island of Bombay, which the Commissioners appointed to take possession of it reported to Sir George Oxinden. On the 5th of January 1668-69, he arrived, in person, from Surat, to take a general view of the settlement, to establish a system for the

(1)—Letter from Bombay to Surat, 6th October 1668, and 8th December 1668.

the civil government of it, and to form a code of military regulations for the garrison:—these regulations are prolix in their divisions, but suited to the new circumstances in which Bombay was placed:—they prescribed the duties of the commanding officer, who was the senior captain; they specified, also, the military duties of the subordinate officers on garrison duty; and enacted strict discipline, under severe penalties;—they defined the duties required of the soldiers, both in garrison and in quarters, and those keeping stations and guards;—they specified the duties of the muster-master, who was to inspect the strength of the corps; and enjoined a general obedience to all orders proceeding from the civil government. It is remarkable, that in these regulations, the neglect or breach of duty, in the inferior officers, and in the soldiers, was declared to be punishable with death; and in the superior officers, with deprivation of rank, only.

These regulations were founded on the powers vested in the Company by their Charter, for levying, embodying, and entertaining a military force for the defence of their Factories, or Settlements; and we shall find their military establishments proceeded upon them, for a long series of years, till King's troops were sent to India, and started the question, how far the Company's troops were competent to hold courts martial, or exercise martial law?<sup>(1)</sup>

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After

(1)—Letter from Mr. Goodier to Sir George Oxinden, 5th January 1668-69.—Laws of War for governing the Company's Militia, 1668-69, (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii. page 91.)

CHAP. II.  
1668-69. After the residence of a month, Sir George Oxinden returned to Surat, leaving the Deputy Governor and his Council to carry into execution the measures which he had devised, and with orders for the sale of lands by proclamation; for completing the fortifications of the castle; letting the tobacco farms and customs, and for establishing, as far as might be practicable, an intercourse with the ports of Sevagee, to obtain timber and chunam (lime) to complete the works.

The Island was next declared to be an asylum to all merchants and manufacturers who might be disposed to place themselves under the English protection:—but this protection could not be given to the weavers, who had come from Chaul to Bombay, till houses could be erected to accommodate them; a street, therefore, was ordered to be built, stretching from the Custom-house to the Fort, the rents of which, it was expected, would soon defray the expences.

The trade of Bombay had been so much exposed to captures by the Malabar pirates, or, in any dispute with Sevagee, by his armed boats, that the Council of Bombay intimated to the Court, it would be necessary to construct three small armed ships, to protect the trade coming to, or going from the Island, and to serve as temporary convoys to the trade to and from the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia.<sup>(1)</sup>

As

(1)—Letters to the President and Council of Surat, 17th and 20th March 1668-69, and 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii. pages 107, 110, 117.)

As a preliminary explanation of the events which occurred on the **COROMANDEL COAST**, in the season 1668-69, it is necessary to state, that the Court had continued under the impression, that Sir Edward Winter was still in possession of **FORT ST. GEORGE**, and that Mr. Foxcroft was detained a prisoner;—it is also necessary to refer to the conduct of the Agent at Masulipatam, who had persevered in his obedience to the Company, though he had not been able to persuade Sir Edward Winter to return to his duty;—and it must be recollected, that a commission had been given to Mr. Clavell, strengthened by an order from the King, and a corresponding order from the Court, on his arrival off Fort St. George, to intimate to Sir Edward Winter the powers with which he was vested, and under these, to require him to surrender the Fort, and to deliver it to the Company's authority.

On the 21st May 1668, the *Rainbow* and *Loyal Merchant* arrived in Madras Roads, and, on their appearance, Mr. Proby and Mr. Locke came on board:—on consultation, it was thought expedient to detain them prisoners, and to require Mr. Proby to inform Sir Edward Winter, by letter, that he had seen the King's commission, and the Company's orders, to surrender the Fort to the Commissioners, who had arrived to take possession of it, in His Majesty's name, and that three of them would come on shore to receive his answer. Alarmed and embarrassed at this demand, Sir

Edward

CHAP. II.  
1668-69.  
Sir Edward Winter, in obedience to the King's Commission, resigns the government of the Fort, and Mr. Foxcroft released, and vested with the Agency.

CHAP. II. Edward Winter required, that, previously to any discussion  
 1668-69. on these orders, Mr. Proby should be set at liberty:—this occasioned delays, demands of personal safety, and protection of property, before he would examine the authority which required him to give up the place. On consultation by the Commissioners, on board, it was agreed to accede to his terms:—they, accordingly, went on shore, and on the 22d August 1668, took possession of the Fort, released Mr. Foxcroft from the imprisonment, in which he had continued from September 1666 to August 1668, and reinstated him as the Company's Agent at Fort St. George.<sup>(1)</sup>

Mr. Foxcroft's report to the Court on this occasion.

Mr. Foxcroft, on his being put in possession of the Fort, acted with a moderation, which must be ascribed rather to a sense of duty, than to his own feelings, after the harsh treatment he had experienced from Sir Edward Winter and his adherents; explaining, that such moderation was necessary to bring back to Madras the native merchants and manufacturers, whom Sir Edward Winter's severities and schemes of private trade had expelled from it. On consultation, Mr. Foxcroft dismissed Mr. Proby from the Company's service, without instituting any prosecution against him, because such a suit might have the effect of alarming those who had been forced into Sir Edward Winter's plans, and induce them to desert their homes and families, or deprive them of the means of subsistence:

(1)—Letter from Mr. Hall, Agent at Masulipatam, to the Court, dated 8th December 1668.

subsistence:—Mr. Foxcroft, on consultation, also, stated to CHAP. II.  
 the Court, the narrow stock with which Mr. Chuseman had 1668-69.  
 come to India, and the large sums which he had amassed, by  
 setting up manufactures; and left it to his superiors to take  
 decided measures against him on his arrival in England, for  
 which he allowed him a passage, along with Smythes, the  
 priest, who had been an active instrument in Sir Edward  
 Winter's projects.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sir Edward Winter, after delivering up the Fort, went to  
 Pullicat, where suspicions were entertained of his connexions  
 with the Dutch;—these, with his former violence, made it expe-  
 dient, on his return to Madras, to oblige him to reside without  
 the Fort, to prevent his again disturbing the tranquillity of the  
 garrison:—subsequently, he went to Masulipatam, at which he  
 intimated to Mr. Foxcroft his resolution to remain, till he  
 should receive advices from England of the reception which  
 Chuseman and Smythes might experience, and, of course,  
 whether he was to be permitted to return, or be made respon-  
 sible for his proceedings.

The investment intended for England, principally Coast  
 cloths, was considerable, and the goods and stock required for  
 Fort St. George, next season, nearly the same as in the pre-  
 ceding years, with the exception of quicksilver and vermillion,  
 for which there was little demand; but to re-establish the  
 Company's

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 12th  
 November 1668.



CHAP. II. Company's influence, a stock would be required of £100,000,  
 1668-69. both to render Madras the seat of their trade on the Coromandel Coast, and to recall the native weavers to live under the English protection.

Mr. Foxcroft farther stated to the Court, that the writers and apprentices which had been appointed, were youths, who, from having received a good education at Christ's Hospital, promised, from their industry and morals, to become useful servants.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Agent at  
 Hughly re-  
 commends a  
 direct trade  
 between Ben-  
 gal and Eng-  
 land.

The circumstances of the Factories in BENGAL, and their subordination to Fort St. George, had occasioned difficulties in executing the commercial orders, partly arising from the stock in the Bay not being equal to the investment of salt-petre, silks, &c., expected from it, and partly from the Agents not being able to obtain credit for £10,000, by drafts on the Court, and, from the time required by the Company's ships to come from the Bay to Masulipatam, to complete their cargoes, the Agent at Hughly suggested, that the investments in Bengal should be sent direct to Europe,—a plan which could not be complied with, unless the Court should furnish enlarged stock and shipping.<sup>(2)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Madras to the Court, 23d and 29th January 1668-69.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Madras to the Court, 13th April 1669.

The Company's affairs at BANTAM, in 1668-69, had been affected by the capture of Maccassar by the Dutch, which had rendered it impracticable for the Agent and Council to carry the Court's order, for extending the trade, into execution ;—for, on the one hand, the King of Bantam, under religious prejudices, considered it to be his duty to go to war with the Christians once in ten years, and had commenced hostilities against the Dutch ;—and, on the other hand, the President and Council of Bantam explained, that those hostilities had prevented their obtaining new privileges for the English trade ; but that they had purchased a large assortment of pepper, though not of the best kind, to fill up whatever tonnage might arrive from England, in the subsequent season.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1668-69.  
State of trade  
at Bantam.

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, 14th November 1668.

## 1669-70.

CHAP. II.  
 1669-70. Company  
 present a  
 memorial to  
 the Council,  
 on the Dutch  
 evasions of  
 the Treaty of  
 Breda.

THE decision of the King and Privy Council, of the 15th July 1668, on the explanations required in the Treaty Marine with Holland, it was mentioned, had been communicated to the States General by Sir William Temple, who had proceeded to Holland as the King's Ambassador; it appears, however, that great difficulties had been thrown in the way of an arrangement by the States General, and by the Pensionary De Witt:—the communications, therefore, from Sir William Temple to the King, were transmitted to the Court of Directors, for their information. After taking the subject into consideration, the Court addressed a memorial, on the 2d July 1669, to Lord Arlington and Mr. Trevor, the Principal Secretaries of State, in which they submitted, that, after an attentive perusal of Sir William Temple's dispatches, they had great reason to doubt the intentions of the Dutch in this negotiation; for, notwithstanding the arguments which had been urged, on behalf of the London East-India Company, the Dutch still adhered to their old system of engrossing the whole commerce of the Indies; and, notwithstanding the explanation which the States General had given, of the manner in which trade was to be carried on,

on, in a town "besieged, blocked up, or invested," yet both De Witt and Van Beuninghen affirmed, that a general article, to that effect, in the treaty, could not be expected, unless it contained restrictions, that it should not prejudice any acquisitions the Dutch had made, or might make, in the Indies; which would leave the dispute as open as before, and afford pretences to the Dutch continually to interrupt the English trade;—therefore that, under all circumstances, the East-India Company could not recommend to His Majesty to accept of any terms, which would deprive the English of the trade to India, and that the only expedient they could devise, was again strongly to press for the confirmation of the articles formerly transmitted by Lord Arlington to Sir William Temple, the greater part of which had been agreed to by the States General, though objected to by De Witt and the Chamber of Amsterdam.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.

The long continued opposition of the Dutch to the progress of the London East-India Company, and to their trade, could not, notwithstanding the interference of the King with the States, be brought to a fair and liberal system, and the Company could not but be shackled, in their proceedings, by the experience of the subterfuges and violence of a rival, whose fixed object it had been to exclude, not only

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the

System of administration at Surat new modelled.

(1)—Memorial of the East-India Company to Lord Arlington and Mr. Secretary Trevor, relative to the negotiations with the Dutch, dated 2d July 1669. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 260.)

CHAP. II. the English, but the maritime powers in general, from a participation in the trade to the East-Indies:—The Court, in 1669-70. this year, however, (though they had not received the returns they expected, from the large stock and tonnage which they had dispatched in the preceding season,) were determined to persevere in encreasing the trade, that they might counterbalance the Dutch in the Eastern markets, and preoccupy them, before the French Company should have an opportunity to establish Factories, or to form connexions with the Native Chiefs or Merchants, sufficient to raise them to become an additional rival.

To give consistency to their Factories and trade, the Court, appear to have had in view the following objects:—the first was, to vest the administration of their affairs in a President and general Council, because, though the great knowledge and experience of Sir George Oxinden was a sufficient security to the Company's interests, it would not be wise, in future, to depend on the talents of an individual; the Court, therefore, appointed Sir George Oxinden to be President at SURAT, with a Council of Eight, viz. Mr. Gerald Aungier, Mr. Matthew Gray, Mr. Thomas Rolt, Mr. Henry Young, Mr. Streynsham Master, Mr. Charles James, Mr. Philip Gifford, and Mr. Alexander Grigsby, five of whom were constantly to reside at Surat, particularly Mr. Aungier, Mr. Gray, and Mr. James. This plan merits particular notice, from being the first example of

of a regular constitution, with checks, in the Company's Foreign dependencies.

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.

The Court, in the second place, recommended the opening trade to Manilla, by an application to the Spanish Governor, for permission to English ships to enter the seas of the farther Indies, under licence of a European Maritime Power:—As the Dutch had wrested the Spice Islands from Spain, while Portugal was annexed to that Crown, it was hoped that, independently of the imports to and exports from them, the Manillas would afford the English an opportunity of extending their trade to those distant seas:—the Court, by this expedient, preferred a licence of this kind to a general freedom of trade, such freedom being liable to interruption by the Dutch, who would not oppose an order of the King of Spain, for the English to trade to the Spanish settlements.

Commercial instructions to Surat, on the Persian and Southern markets.

The Court also countermanded the provision of the cargo for Bantam, and required that the Surat articles intended for it, should be sent to Europe

Alarmed, on hearing of the magnitude of the French exports on three ships that had arrived in India, and that eight more were to be sent this season, the Court gave instructions to the Presidency of Surat, to avoid disputes with them, but not to give encouragement to the establishment of a trade, which might involve the Company in difficult political and commercial discussions.

The Court then took into consideration the intercourse  
with

CHAP. II. with PERSIA, which they ordered should be kept open, and  
 1669-70. desired the opinions of the Presidency on the naval force that would be necessary, to protect the Persian trade, or to compel that power to the observance of treaties; but recommended, that in the employment of this force, care should be taken, not to interfere with the ships of the Indian Powers, in whose dominions the Company had Factories, because, however trivial the subjects of complaint, it might be difficult and expensive to adjust them.

Regulations of the Court, for the marine and military establishments at Bombay.

When the Court of Directors took into consideration the report of the Presidency of Surat, of the events which had attended the taking possession of the Island of BOMBAY, and the appointment of Captain Young to be the Deputy Governor, they came to the following resolutions on this subject:—With respect to the building of vessels for the defence of the Island, they appointed Mr. Warwick Pett to proceed to Bombay, and to construct two vessels, for which equipments and stores would be sent on the ships of the season, explaining, that their reason for appointing Mr. Pett was his practical knowledge of ship-building, in which he could instruct the settlers, to the advantage of the Island.<sup>(1)</sup> They next appointed Captain Smith and Captain Tolderrey, two of the officers commanding the military at Bombay to act as engineers,

(1)—(Note.) It is probable, that this Mr. Warwick Pett was a descendant of Sir Phineas Pett, celebrated for his extraordinary talents in marine architecture, in the reigns of Elizabeth and James I.

Engineers, who were to employ, under them, such persons in the garrison as might be qualified, to assist in constructing and repairing the fortifications, being of opinion, that professional men could not be obtained in England, without large salaries, and that they probably might expose the Company to heavy charges, from the speculations into which men of this description usually lead their employers. The Court also intimated to the Presidency of Surat, that any application to the Crown of Portugal, for redress, would be hopeless, and therefore, that the Deputy Governor and his Council must endeavour to strengthen the Island, so as to prevent obstructions from Tannah and Caranjah, and to retaliate, by exacting customs from the Portuguese, till they could bring them to a reasonable accommodation of trade.

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.

On the subject of the claims of the Portuguese to lands on the Island, the Court ordered, that it should be ascertained, whether the lands belonged to the Crown of Portugal, or to individuals, in 1661, the date of the cession, and that all acquisitions, posterior to that date, must be held to have proceeded from an imperfect right; but, as it would be imprudent to delay strengthening the fort or building the town, the Presidency were authorised to purchase the lands in the immediate vicinity of the fort, provided the expence did not exceed £1,500;—the Deputy Governor was also instructed, for the improvement of the Island, to encourage plantations of pepper, and manufactures of the cloths, which had formerly been brought



CHAP. II. brought from the neighbouring continent, and, if possible, to  
 1669-70. render such cloths a fabric of the Island:—the inhabitants  
 were to be allowed a moderate toleration; but the claims of  
 the Jesuits, though admissible by the Portuguese usages, were  
 not to be held valid in an English settlement.<sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments  
 and stock for  
 Surat.

The equipments for Surat and its dependencies, in this  
 season, amounted to 1500 tons of shipping, and the stock,  
 including goods and money, was estimated at £100,000;—  
 the goods expected in return, were large quantities of Surat  
 cloths, indigo, &c., ordered to be in store for the ships on  
 their arrival:—A ship of three hundred tons was, at the  
 beginning of the season, intended to be sent to Surat, with  
 a stock, to provide goods for the Bantam market; but, after  
 hearing of the seizure of Maccassar by the Dutch, this  
 destination was altered, and the ship, with the goods intended  
 for Bantam, ordered to proceed direct to Surat.<sup>(2)</sup>

Mr. Foxcroft  
 re-appointed  
 Agent at  
 Fort St.  
 George, for  
 one year, and  
 to be succeed-  
 ed by Sir  
 William  
 Langborne.

The Court, in this season, received intelligence, that **FORT  
 ST. GEORGE** had been delivered to the Commissioners by Sir  
 Edward Winter and his Council, in obedience to the King's, and  
 to the Company's orders. Though they condemned the whole  
 of Sir Edward Winter's conduct, while he retained possession of  
 the Fort, and excluded Mr. Foxcroft from the station to which he  
 had

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 2d August 1669,  
 and 17th February 1669-70,

(2)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 2d August  
 1669, and 16th February 1669-70.

had been appointed, their opinions appear to have undergone a material change, on receiving fuller information of the case; and this change was also observable in the King and Privy Council :—whether it proceeded from the information given by Mr. Chuseman and Mr. Smythes, on their arrival in England, or whether it originated in the prudent expedient, of removing not only Sir Edward Winter and his partizans, but Mr. Foxcroft and his adherents, to make way for a new Agent and Council, unconnected with either, it is perhaps unnecessary to enquire; but that this was the resolution of the Court, appears from the appointment of Sir William Langhorne, and six other persons, some of whom were already in the service in India, and others sent from Europe, to act as Commissioners for investigating the whole of this transaction :—These Commissioners were to continue Mr. Foxcroft as Agent, at the head of the Council, for one year, after which he was to be succeeded by Sir William Langhorne :—Sir Edward Winter was allowed to remain at Madras, for a short time, to recover his debts, and then to come to Europe ;—Mr. Foxcroft, the younger, was also to be sent home. These measures were in conformity with an order of the Privy Council, confirming the new appointments, and requiring obedience to the persons, nominated Commissioners, who were to transmit the whole evidence respecting this transaction, for the information of the King and of the Court.

CHAP. II.  
1669-70. In a subsequent period of the season, on a complaint to the Court by Mr. Thomas Winter, founded on letters he had received from his brother, stating the hard usage he had experienced, both in his person and family, the preceding general order was so far altered, that Sir Edward Winter was allowed to dispose of his property, ordered to be treated with respect, and to have a passage to England.

Mr. Jearsey, the Agent at Masulipatam, was ordered to be removed from that station, and Mr. Mohun appointed Chief in his place;—Mr. Powell was to be Chief at Bengal:—these stations, at all times, were to continue subordinate to the Fort, and regular annual returns made of the Company's civil and military servants.

Equipments,  
stock, and  
commercial  
instructions,  
for Fort St.  
George, for  
the season.

The equipments for the Coast, this season, consisted of six ships, with a stock estimated at £150,000, of which £80,000 was to purchase the investment at the Fort, £40,000 to be sent to Bengal, and £30,000 to Masulipatam:—the principal exports consisted of broad-cloth, lead, sheet copper, quicksilver, silver in foreign coin, and, in this year, a very large proportion in gold:—one of the ships was to be sent with a stock of £10,000, in Coast goods and money, to Jambee, to endeavour to obtain pepper, &c., for the Europe market.

The caution was repeated, respecting the French, who were endeavouring to fix Factories, and establish a trade in India, to avoid giving them offence, but, at the same time, not to countenance any measure that might be favourable to their views;

views ; and not to interfere in any disputes between them and the Dutch, but always to remain neuter.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.

The general orders of the Court to the Factory of MASULIPATAM have been, in substance, mentioned, but, in particular, the contract for saltpetre was to be discontinued, as it could be procured of better quality, and cheaper, in Bengal ; and this Agency was to direct its attention to the selection of cloths suited to the Bantam market.

Court's orders to the Agents at Masulipatam, Bengal, and Bantam.

The orders to HUGHLY corresponded with those to the Fort and to Masulipatam :—the Chiefs at Patna and Cossimbuzar were to be of Council, when they were at Hughly, and the Factory at Ballasore was to be kept up.<sup>(2)</sup>

The instructions, in 1669-70, to BANTAM, discover, that the Court, though doubtful of the safety of this Agency, as well as of the returns which might be obtained from it, equipped four ships, with an investment valued at £31,000 ; an amount, which proves that this trade was of great importance, the Court requiring, that as large a quantity as could be procured, both of black and white pepper, and a proportion of ginger and sapan-wood, should form the home investment. Still doubtful of the intentions of the French ships, the Court ordered their own to keep in company, for defence

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against

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 7th December 1669, and 16th February 1669-70.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Chiefs and Factors at Masulipatam and Hughly, 7th December 1669:

CHAP. II. against any violence they might offer ; but the Agent at  
 1669-70. tam was not to detain the shipping longer than their la-  
 could be completed :—they were also to avoid trading to  
 ports resorted to by the Dutch, and to endeavour to for-  
 trade at Japarra and other ports, where pepper might  
 bought, and not to be deterred by the menaces of the Du-  
 but to send home distinct accounts, with vouchers, of any  
 lence which that nation might commit :—the trade with M-  
 cassar was still to be attempted, and application made to  
 King, to allow the English ships entrance into his p-  
 although he might be at war with the Dutch. In this, a-  
 the preceding season, the Agent was to endeavour to pro-  
 information of the practicability of opening a trade  
 JAPAN and with CHINA.<sup>(1)</sup>

Death of Sir  
 George Ox-  
 inden, and  
 provisional  
 appointment  
 of Mr. Gerald  
 Aungier to  
 be President  
 of Surat.

The events which occurred in the Foreign Settlements  
 the Company, during the season 1669-70, discover the extent  
 of the spirited measures of the Presidency of Surat, and  
 Factories depending on it. It will be recollected, that not  
 the equipments and stock sent to the different Settlements  
 on a more extensive scale, but that the orders were, that

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 25th Feb.  
 1669-70.

stock, consisting of goods and of bullion, should be employed to purchase large investments, and that permission, to a specified extent, had been given to take up money on credit;—the Out-stations, also, were to be encreased, wherever profitable markets might be obtained, without regarding, as formerly, any opposition by the Dutch, that the English trade might, if possible, balance that of this rival, and maintain a superiority, or preference, to the French, who, by their equipments and funds, were becoming a new maritime and commercial opponent in the East-India trade.

CHAP. II.  
1669-70,

The accounts from SURAT, during this season, open with the general regrets of that Presidency, and of Bombay, for the death of Sir George Oxinden, on the 14th July 1669, whose probity and talents, they feelingly describe, had enabled them to preserve the Company's rights and commerce, and who, to the esteem of their servants, united the respect of the Dutch and French, as well as of the Native Government and merchants of Surat;—the Council, therefore, vindicated his character from the suspicion which the Court had formerly entertained, as if he had acted, in commercial matters, without their advice, the fact being, that, in no case, he had done so. On consultation, the Council of Surat nominated, provisionally, Mr. Gerald Aungier to be successor to Sir George Oxinden, till the pleasure of the Court should be known; a nomination which was acceptable to the Government of Surat.

The

CHAP. II.  
 1669-70. Measures of President Aungier for disposing of the Company's goods and procuring an investment.

The first measures of Mr. Aungier were directed to the disposal of the English produce and merchandize in the houses, and to make contracts for the sale of the expected by the ships of the season. It does not appear anterior to this period, any other rule had been observed selecting the most favorable periods of the year, and accommodating the sales to the market prices; Mr. Aungier, however, availed himself of a demand which was unexpected, and, on this demand, formed a rivalship among purchasers:—to one merchant, Cojah Meenas, he disposed the whole of the Company's cloth in store, and of that exported by the ships, the interest on the price to commence six months after delivery;—to another merchant, Hodgee, he disposed the whole of the expected copper, vermilion, quicksilver, allum, and tin, and also the tin in store; a contract which far as it regarded the last article, was the more profitable, “it had lain on hand for a considerable time,” as tin from Acheen (probably Malacca tin) had, from its quality, obtained a preference.

This aspect of the sales was necessarily connected with a requisition for an enlargement of stock, proportioned to the extension of the trade, a proposition which Mr. Aungier recommended to the Court, on the authority of Sir C. Oxinden:—on this opinion, money, to a considerable amount, had been borrowed, to purchase investments for the expected arrival of the Company's ships; but it was explained,

stock, so taken up, at interest, must absorb a considerable part of the profits ; if, therefore, it met the judgment of the Court, the President and Council desired that a Double Stock might be sent, to keep up the trade to its present magnitude ; a request which they strengthened, by stating, that the Factor at Carwar had provided a considerable proportion of pepper and cloths, on a stock of £12,000 ; and that Mr. Grigsby, the Agent at Cochin, had opened a trade at Cananore, and obtained a small fort from the Rajah, on the Billiapatam river, to the exclusion of the French :—besides, there appeared to be a general disposition in the Malabar Princes and States, to open their ports, and to sell their goods, without reserve or exclusion ; hence the President and Council inferred, that unless the extension of the trade, which had been begun, should appear to the Natives to be permanent, by large stocks, enabling the Presidency to make large purchases, their confidence in the English would diminish, and the difficulty of providing investments increase.

On the arrival of the Company's ships, one was dispatched to Persia, with stock suited to that market, and to import produce for the Europe investment ; another ship was sent to Carwar, to bring up the pepper and produce in store, and with stock to continue the purchases ; a third, to Cananore, Cochin, and Billiapatam, to bring also the pepper in store at those places, and a fourth was to be laden at Surat, direct for England.

On

CHAP. II.

1669-70.



CHAP. II.      On the reference which the Court had made, for informa-  
 1669-70. tion on the practicability of a trade to Japan and Manilla, the  
 President stated, that himself and Council were as yet unable  
 to collect facts; but that an experiment was making, by  
 Cojah Meenas, who had sent a vessel, partly with Europe  
 produce, to attempt a trade at Manilla, the result of which  
 adventure should be subsequently communicated.

The commercial situation of SURAT, at this juncture,  
 was affected by an unexpected event :—the Mogul had banished  
 the Shroffs and Banians, on account of some religious dispute;  
 this materially injured the Company's trade at that city,  
 because those Shroffs were calling in the money, which it  
 was their practice, on such occasions, to conceal and bury,  
 till better times should enable them to employ it; and because  
 they were the persons who took off the Company's Europe  
 exports, in large quantities, and advanced money to them on  
 interest, when the stock from Europe was not equal to the  
 provision of the investment for the expected shipping: the  
 Council therefore suggested, that should these unfavorable  
 proceedings of the Government continue, it might be for con-  
 sideration of the Court, whether the Presidency should be  
 removed from Surat to Bombay, to which Island produce and  
 manufactures might be brought from Carwar, Billiapatam,  
 &c., of quality better suited to the Company's demands and  
 circuitous exchanges, than to Surat; but that such change of  
 commercial dealings must be gradual, and acted on with  
 much

much caution, lest the alarm it would occasion to the Mogul Government, might produce measures, unfavorable to the existing commercial rights of the Company, in that quarter of their limits. CHAP. II.  
1669-70.

With these explanations, the Presidency proceeded to state the kinds of Europe goods which they expected would find a sale in the Surat market in the ensuing season, *viz.* broad-cloths of close texture, chiefly red and green; as large a proportion of copper as could be procured; tin, in small pigs, but not in blocks; lead and allum, in considerable quantities; vermilion and quicksilver, a small proportion only, as the market did not answer; and some elephants' teeth of good quality.<sup>(1)</sup>

The circumstances which have been alluded to, respecting the restraints improvidently laid on the Shroffs and Banians, connected with the alarm which soon afterwards took place at Surat, of an attack by Sevagee, were explained to proceed from a supposed union between this Chief and Sultan Mauzim, the Emperor's son, who commanded the Mogul army, intended to act against him;—on this occasion the Dutch and French, as well as the English Factories, were put in a state of defence. It was to this alarm that Mr. Aungier refers the uncertainty under which he and his Council were placed, both in making

Difficulty of procuring Indian produce, from the apprehension of another attack by Sevagee.

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the

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th November and 23d December 1669.

CHAP. II. the purchase of their investments for Europe, and in  
 1669-70. the Company's exports, acting, as they naturally must, in  
 sequence of the intelligence of the disturbed state of  
 Mogul armies, and of the rapid progress of Sevagee. They  
 therefore, they continued their requests for Europe; and  
 they prepared the Court for uncertain returns from  
 country, the political state of which was apparently un-  
 dergoing:—to balance this evil, they stated the offers made  
 them by Sevagee, of protection to their trade; offers which  
 they received, but deemed it premature to embrace, and  
 act on.<sup>(1)</sup>

Failure of the  
 project for  
 opening trade  
 at Acheen  
 and Quedah.

This commercial situation of Surat was connected with  
 detail of the failure of the project for establishing a Factory  
 at Acheen, and of the difficulties experienced by the Factory  
 in endeavouring to open a trade at Quedah, the Dutch  
 having opposed them in this quarter; the Presidency, however,  
 intended to send another vessel to Quedah, to endeavour to  
 recover their debts, and to try, once more, the practicability  
 of this trade; and, on her return, this vessel was detained  
 at Acheen, to bring off the Company's stock and effects; and  
 consequently, any attempt for trade at that port having been  
 relinquished.<sup>(2)</sup>

Persian trade  
 on the de-

The connexion between Surat and GOMBRON, or PERSIA, was

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, dated 30th March 1670.

(2)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 30th March 1670.

though still kept open, to maintain the Company's claim for a proportion of customs, was, at this juncture, in a precarious situation. The change of the Shahbunders, or chief officers of the customs, had been frequent; the fulfilment of former grants was uncertain; the interferences of the Vizier had been arbitrary, and the applications for privileges and protection at Ispahan always expensive and temporary:—the small stock, besides, remitted by the Court, or by the Presidency of Surat, to the Factor at Gombroon, had rendered it difficult to comply with the order for Caramania wool and drugs for the Surat or Europe markets; hence, when the ships arrived, those articles were rather to be then purchased, than in readiness:—notwithstanding these circumstances, the trade between Gombroon and Bombay was of such importance, that the Agent in Persia recommended the giving of land, in the Island of Bombay, to the Persian Banians and traders, to encourage them, by having protection from the Company, to bring the trade to that Island:—this might lead to a connexion with Persia, which, in progress of time, would render the trade profitable to the Company.

With respect to Gombroon itself, and the Company's right to a moiety of the customs at that port, (from the example of the Portuguese, who had sent a small armament to enforce the payment of their proportion of the customs at Cong,) the Agent recommended the sending of armed ships, as the only

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.  
cline, and receipt of the Company's customs at Gombroon precarious.

CHAP. II. means which could preserve this right to the Company, or  
 1669-70. acquire for them a proportion of the trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

Report of  
 the Deputy  
 Governor of  
 Bombay on  
 the state of  
 the Island.

The Deputy Governor of BOMBAY, during the season 1669-70, reported to the Court, that the fortifications were improved, that the garrison required a supply of recruits, and accommodation for the soldiers and the families of settlers, who had arrived in the ships from Europe ;—that application had been made by the Siddee of Rajahpore (which he described to be an impregnable fortress, unless attacked by sea) for an asylum at Bombay, in case he should be obliged to abandon it to Sevagee :—this application occasioned considerable embarrassment, as, on the one hand, it might offend Sevagee, and, on the other, the Mogul, to whom the Siddee of Rajahpore owed allegiance ; the Deputy Governor, therefore, submitted, that as Rajahpore had formerly been deemed an object of importance to the Company, because, with a small European garrison, it could hold out against any attack, either of Sevagee or the Mogul, it might be prudent, under the present circumstances, to get possession of it, as it would place the Company's trade and shipping in a better situation than they were at Bombay, or even at Surat.<sup>(2)</sup>

Mr.

(1)—Letters from the Agent at Gombroon to the Court, February 1669-70, and 15th June 1670.

(2)—Letters from Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, 4th August, 6th and 16th October, and 2d November 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii., pages 123, 148, 151, 153.)

Mr. Aungier, at this time, had become doubtful of the prudence of Mr. Young's administration at Bombay, and of the expediency of the projects which he recommended, and therefore recalled him to Surat, and instructed the other Commissioners to take charge of the Island, till he should himself arrive, and promulgate the civil and military regulations sent by the Court; but was of opinion, that it would be dangerous to entertain the proposal of the Siddee of Rajahpore, to protect him at Bombay, which might offend the Mogul, and be followed with disastrous effects to Surat; and therefore recommended to the Council at Bombay to give evasive answers to his applications, and to lay aside the project of obtaining possession of Danda-Rajahpore, though it might afterwards become a subject of consideration. The Deputy Governor, Mr. Young, resigned his office on the 13th November 1669, to Mr. James Addams, and five Commissioners, and embarked with his family for Surat.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.  
The Deputy  
Governor of  
Bombay su-  
perseded.

The disputes between Mr. Young and the Company's servants at Bombay had been so violent, that the President determined to proceed to Bombay, to institute an inquiry into the grounds of the dissention, and to administer the oath, prescribed by the Company to their civil and military servants; but this measure was postponed for a time, by a dispute which had arisen between the Dutch and Portuguese, and attracted

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Commissioners at Bombay, 1st November 1669— Letter from Bombay to Surat, 15th November 1669.

CHAP. II.  
1669-70. attracted the notice of the Governor of Surat, who suspected that the English had been parties in it, and that the scheme of the Europeans was to ruin the trade of that city by seizing on their junks, and withdrawing to Bombay: this suspicion obliged Mr. Aungier to remain at Surat, till he could dispatch the ships for Europe; but he directed one of them not to touch at Bombay, and receive from the Commissioner a full report for the Court, on the state of fortifications, and other &c., and on the re-inforcements required for the garrison. His report stated, that the stock had been employed in profitable investments, but that the expences incurred for building the fort at Bombay, to render it inaccessible to an European enemy, would require a separate fund from that intended for the provision of the investment, as this supply alone would not render the Island a secure residence for the native traders and manufacturers.<sup>(1)</sup>

President Aungier proceeds to Bombay, and establishes Courts of Judicature, and other internal regulations.

President Aungier embarked at Surat, on the 11th of January 1669-70, for Bombay, and appointed Mr. Streynsham Master to act as President during his absence. This appointment was necessary, to reconcile the Governor of Surat to the unusual measure of the absence of the President, at the time he had allowed the Shroffs and Banians to return to the Island and to re-assume their occupations.<sup>(2)</sup>

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th November 1669.

(2)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 23d January 1669.— Commission and Instructions from President Aungier to Mr. M

President Aungier, on his arrival at Bombay, after investigating the accusations against Captain Young, published the Company's regulations for the civil and military administration of the Island, and formed two Courts of Judicature; the inferior court to consist of a Company's civil officer, assisted by native officers, who were to take cognizance of all disputes under the amount of two hundred xeraphins; and the superior court, to consist of the Deputy Governor and Council, to whom appeals were competent from the inferior court, to take cognizance of all civil and criminal cases whatever; and their decisions were to be final, and without appeal, except in cases of the greatest necessity:—these courts were to meet regularly once a week:—he next reduced the military establishment from two to one company, but made provision for the supernumeraries, till this small establishment should be brought into form:—he appointed a supervisor of the fortifications, and an accountant to keep regular books of the expenditure:—the exemption from taxes for five years, recommended by the Court, to encourage the merchants and manufacturers, Governor Aungier, without receding from the principle, modified, by continuing the old customs on the produce of the Island, or cocoa-nuts, and coir used as cordage, and on wine, arrack, opium, and tobacco; but he exempted bullion, and the goods specified in the Court's order, from all customs; and,  
to

take charge of the Company's affairs at Surat, during the absence of the President at Bombay, 11th January 1669-70.

CHAP. II.

1669-70.



**CHAP. II.** **1669-70.** to cover the loss of revenue, imposed a port-duty of one per cent. The result of this survey was, that the amount of the revenues from the lands had been over-rated, by the large proportion of them claimed and retained by the Jesuits; but the amount of the lesser inland customs had been under-rated, because, when put up to sale, they had produced  $\pounds 200$  more in this, than in the preceding year:—with regard to the projected town, the expences incurred in erecting the fort had rendered it a subject for future consideration; and as the claims for rights to lands near the town, had been numerous, he had removed the fishermen to some distance, and intended to build houses on the ground where their huts stood; but it would require time to adjust the foundations of the rights to lands, before houses for the settlers and merchants could be erected.

Mr. Gray appointed Deputy Governor of Bombay.

Having, by these regulations, formed a plan for the administration of Bombay, President Aungier appointed Mr. Matthew Gray, lately returned from Acheen, to be Deputy Governor, with three Members of Council:—Mr. Gray and the three military officers were to constitute a court for administering martial law. Mr. Aungier returned to Surat on the 11th March 1669-70, which he found in great alarm, from a threatened invasion by Sevagee.<sup>(1)</sup>

Fort St. George besieged by the Naig; but

The transactions at FORT ST. GEORGE, during the season 1669-70, were few, and limited in their objects. The experiment made,

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 30th March 1670.

made, under the instructions of the Court, to open a communication between Madras and Acheen, in consequence of the invitation of the Queen, had been tried, but the project had been relinquished, because an annual cargo of pepper for a ship of two hundred and fifty tons could not be procured at this port, and because Coast goods, suited to that market, could not be sold but at a loss;—for similar reasons, the project of a Factory and trade at Quedah had been abandoned.

CHAP: II.  
1669-70.  
siege raised,  
on applica-  
tion to the  
Nabob.

The Fort, during this season, had been besieged, in consequence of the refusal of a present to the Naig commanding in the neighbourhood; but, on an application to the Nabob, this Chief had been ordered to withdraw his troops.

From the number of the shipping which had arrived, both in the last and present season, the stock, amounting to £150,000, had been invested in Coast goods at Madras and subordinate Factories, and the ship intended for Bantam and Jambee, dispatched with the requisite funds, and Coast goods, for those markets.<sup>(1)</sup>

State of trade  
at Madras;

The stock which the Agent and Council in BENGAL had received, had enabled them to provide a full proportion of saltpetre, taffaties, &c., for filling up the Coast and Europe investments; and though considerable purchases of these articles had been effected at Patna and Cossimbuzar, it was necessary

— in Bengal;

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Presidency of Surat, 17th October 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii, page 182); 24th January 1669-70, and 9th July 1670 (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lx, pages 49—101).

CHAP. II. to continue the seat of trade at Hughly, which was better  
1669-70. situated for the speedy dispatch of the Company's shipping.<sup>(1)</sup>

and at Bantam.

The circumstances of BANTAM varied with the public events in this year :—during the war, the Dutch had engrossed the pepper trade, not only at Bantam, but on the West Coast of Sumatra, and had also, by the war at Maccassar, prevented imports between that place and Macao and Manilla; hence, after the exchanges for Europe, Surat, and Coromandel goods had been checked, the decline of trade at Bantam became inevitable.

When accounts reached Bantam of the peace with the Dutch, and of the increased stock intended for that Agency, the trade again had revived, and measures had been adopted for fulfilling the general agreement of the Company with the King of Bantam, to take off the whole of the pepper which his dominions yielded; but the stock which had been received not being sufficient, the Agent had been obliged to take up money at interest, to purchase this pepper, otherwise it must have been sold to the Dutch:—this credit was indispensable, to counteract an opinion, which would have injured the Company's trade, or that the plan of again enlarging the trade was abandoned; the Agent, therefore, desired the Presidency of Surat to send him a full stock, to uphold the Company's credit in the

(1)—General Letter from the Agent and Factors at Ballasore to the Court, 31st December 1669.

the market, and to enable him to encrease the quantity of pepper required for Europe.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.

The Dutch continued the war against the Native Powers; and had subjugated the King of Maccassar, and rendered him, as far as affected trade, their vassal;—they had made large demands on the King of Jambee, and threatened him also with subjugation, at a time when he was at war with the King of Johore;—they were negotiating with the Matteram, or Emperor of Java, and, in fact, would acquire the monopoly of the whole South Sea trade, unless a large stock was remitted to the Agent and Council at Bantam, to bear up against these competitors, who had the advantage of a Double Stock, one part of which they employed in the investment of the present, and the other in that of the subsequent year; and, indeed, without such a stock, it would be impracticable to preserve, even the proportion of the pepper trade which the Company held, more particularly when it should be known to the Court, that the Dutch, in this season (1669-70), expected no less than fifty-two ships from Europe.<sup>(2)</sup>

## 2 N 2

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Presidency of Surat, 30th May 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii, page 133).

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council of Bantam to the Presidency of Surat, 8th September 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lx, page 26).

1670-71.

CHAP. II.

1670-71.

Court's instructions to their Foreign Settlements accommodated to the maritime laws of England.

THE measures which the Court of Directors recommended to be observed by their Foreign Presidencies and Agents in 1670-71, are interesting, both as they were accommodated to the maritime law of the kingdom, and as they calculated to introduce a more regular system of administration and trade at the Company's Settlements.

The Act of Navigation had now become so generally known, and considered to be the basis on which the industry and commerce of the kingdom rested, that the Court was obliged, in the first place, to amend the order they had given for the building two ships at Bombay, originally intended for the defence and trade of that Island, but, incidentally bringing cargoes to Europe; and to direct that these ships should be employed in the country trade only, it being contrary to law, that any but British-built ships should be used for the import of Asiatic produce to England.<sup>(1)</sup>

Commercial instructions to the Presidency of Surat.

The Court next recommended, that much caution should be observed, in all transactions with the French Company's trade, to prevent discussions in India, or in Europe, and prohibited their captains from granting passages to the ships

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 11th August 1671.

of the French Company, as this might become the source of disputes, might give them an opportunity of being acquainted with the Company's commercial interests, and enable them to devise expedients, to counteract the resolutions of the Court, and the measures of their servants abroad, for enlarging the trade. CHAP. II.  
1670-71.

The Court farther directed the Presidency of SURAT to avoid shewing partiality to any of the Country Powers, because this would necessarily expose them to oppressions from the prevailing party:—at the same time, they were to take every measure which they could devise, for conciliating the favor of Sevagee, who, at this time, was understood to be at the head of a powerful army.

As an additional general instruction, the Court ordered that their Presidencies and Agencies should, in future, observe the following plan, in their correspondence with the Court, *viz.* to treat separately of their commercial or other interests, and, in like manner, of those of each Factory or Station, but not (as had been the practice) to blend the whole of these subjects together, in one general description; farther, that *General Letters*, only, would be received as authentic information, from their principal Settlement, and prohibited individuals, in future, to write to the Court, which tended only to excite jealousies and disputes among their servants.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 22d February 1670-71.

CHAP. II.  
1670-71.

Mr. Aungier's provisional appointment, as President, confirmed.

The Court confirmed Mr. Aungier in the rank of President of Surat, and instructed him to relinquish the project of a trade between Surat, Acheen, and Quedah, as they intended to give directions to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, to try what could be done at those ports, by sending small country vessels from the Coromandel Coast, to purchase and collect such produce as they could furnish.<sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments and stock for Surat.

Five ships were this season consigned to Surat and its dependencies, amounting to about two thousand tons:—the cargoes were estimated, in goods and money, at £100,000:—the goods consisted chiefly of broad-cloths, (to be disposed of at such prices, above prime cost, as they would bring,) and of a large proportion of copper, lead, corals, and foreign silver coin, and one valuable chest of gold ducats:—the investment expected in return, was to consist of different kinds of Surat cloths, indigo, and such proportion of goods as might be obtained from the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia.<sup>(2)</sup>

Regulations for settling the Government of Bombay, for increasing the garrison, and erecting a mint.

The Court next took into consideration the information which they had received of the state of their affairs in the ISLAND OF BOMBAY, and expressed their approbation of the conduct of President Aungier, of the Deputy Governor and Council of that Island, and desired, that the plan of government, and civil and military administration, which they had

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 11th August 1670.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 11th August 1670, and 22d February 1670-71.

had established, should be followed up, as much as circumstances would allow; explaining, that care should be taken, that Trial by Jury should be introduced into the Courts of Justice, agreeably to English law, but declined engaging a Judge, versed in the civil law, being apprehensive that such a person might be disposed to promote litigation, and probably might not obey the orders which the President and Council might find it for the interest of the Company to give him; it had, therefore, been resolved to send some persons, who had received education in the law, as civil servants, without making the practice of the law their only object, and if they deserved well, they might be appealed to, as assistants in the Courts of Justice. CHAP. II.  
1670-71.

For the better defence of the Island, Captain Shaxton had been ordered to embark with a company of soldiers, which would make the establishment consist of two companies:—from Captain Shaxton's good character, he was also appointed to be a Factor, that he might combine his military with his civil duties; and if his qualifications should, on trial, recommend him as a fit person, he might afterwards hold the office of Deputy Governor. The Court farther recommended, that a mint should be established at Bombay, for coining gold and silver money, and, subsequently, small copper money; but the impression on such coins must not bear any resemblance to the King's coin, and be such only as would render them current at the places where the Company traded;



CHAP. II. traded ; and, particularly, that they should be of such purity  
 1670-71. as would make them pass among the natives, as precious metals only, which would not only facilitate their reception, but would “ add to the credit and character of the Company.” The Court also approved of the building of the two ships, formerly mentioned, to which two small brigantines might be added, to be armed for the protection of the coasting trade of Malabar.<sup>(1)</sup>

Directions to the Agent at Fort St. George, for his conduct towards the Native Powers.

The measures adopted for the Agency of FORT ST. GEORGE, during the season 1670-71, open with regulations for the internal administration of the Company's affairs in this part of their limits, and with recommending a similar plan for the correspondence, as that prescribed for Surat ; or, that the *General Letter* of the Agent and Council should contain all the information which the Court would admit of being authentic, who prohibited letters from individuals being addressed to them ; and enjoined, that the knowledge of their proceedings, or the record of them, should be known only to the Company's servants, of the rank of Factor. On the subject of the external relations of this seat of their trade, they rejected the project of compelling the Native Chiefs, or States, by retaliation at sea, to make restitution for injuries on shore, as chimerical, if not hazardous, because the interruptions

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 22d February 1670-71.— Letter from the Court to the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, 22d February 1670-71.

tions which might be given to the transit of goods to the Fort would cut off the sources of investments, and because the expence of armed vessels, stationed in the Indian Seas, would exceed any influence which might arise from adopting a scheme, that would render ineffectual the grants which had hitherto been obtained by bribes, or mercantile submission.

CHAP. II.  
1670-71.

The equipments intended for Fort St. George, this season, were five ships, amounting to about seventeen hundred tons; —one of them was to be dispatched with a stock to Jambee (the trade with Acheen being relinquished), three were to proceed to Bengal, and one direct from the Coast to England: —the stock on these ships was estimated at about £155,000, consisting chiefly of gold and silver, (without any additional orders respecting coinage), and of broad-cloths, lead, &c. These vessels were to be dispatched to their destination, as soon as they might arrive. (1)

Equipments  
and stock for  
Fort St.  
George.

This stock, besides being intended to procure a great investment, was sent to counteract the large imports of the Dutch, and the partial assortments of the French, Danes, and Portuguese, in the Europe market, that the balance of trade might be in favor of the English Company. In the purchase of this investment, the sale of the British exports was to be pushed as far as practicable, even with a moderate profit, the amount of which, with the large propor-

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 29th November 1670, and 22d February 1670-71.

CHAP. II  
1670-71. tion of bullion, it was expected, would insure an import of Coast cloths, sufficient to bear down the sales of the Dutch.

The instructions to the Factory at HUGHLY (subordinate to Fort St. George) required, that a large investment of saltpetre, and of silks, taffaties, &c. should be obtained, these being principal articles in the Company's sales.<sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments  
and stock for  
Bantam.

The instructions of the Court to the Agent and Council at BANTAM varied, during the whole of the season 1670-71, and, therefore, must be viewed as experiments, calculated to revive and invigorate this branch of their trade. Two vessels, the Greyhound and Ann, were dispatched, early in the season, direct for that port, with a cargo estimated at £22,500, which consisted chiefly of silver coin. In return, an investment of pepper, sapan-wood, benjamin, &c. was ordered to be ready for the vessels when they arrived.<sup>(2)</sup>

Two vessels  
dispatched  
from England  
to attempt re-  
opening the  
trade to Ja-  
pan.

These directions were repeated in the subsequent orders, and two additional vessels (the Crown and Eagle) were dispatched to Bantam, it appearing to the Court, that the trade might be extended to Cambodia, Formosa, and Japan:—the trade to Manilla was still a subject of negotiation with the Court of Spain;—but the communication by junks, between Japan and Bantam, was to be continued:—though the Agent had not specified the kinds, or colours of the cloths, suited for that trade, the

(1)—Letter from the Council to the Agent and Factors at Hughly, 29th November 1670.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 9th July 1670.

the Court were resolved again to attempt it, and intended to dispatch the Advance frigate, in a subsequent period of the season, on this service; this vessel sailed in December following, with orders, if she should be too late in arriving at Japan, that the Factors, and a person versed in the Malay language, should proceed to Formosa, or Cambodia, and there attempt to fix stations; the goods sent were estimated at £5,300, and varied in quality from those which had hitherto been selected, either for India, or for the Islands, and included a stock of about £2,000 in silver, with a small proportion of broad-cloth, and lead, but consisted chiefly of cases of looking-glasses, wax figures, hardware, &c., suited to a traffic with a people, who were to give their produce by barter, for novelties, rather than for value.<sup>(1)</sup>

At the close of this season, four more vessels were dispatched to Bantam, with a stock of about £26,000, and assurances given, that large equipments and stock would be sent in the subsequent season, for which cargoes of pepper, &c., were required to be provided. As the Court had received information of the "disorderly character of the people" at Cambodia, it was recommended, if such information should be justified by facts, rather to attempt the establishment of a trade at Tonquin.<sup>(2)</sup>

Additional equipments and stock for Bantam.

2 O 2

The

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council of Bantam, 4th October and 24th December 1670.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 18th January 1670-71, and 7th April 1671.

CHAP. II.  
1670-71.

The orders of the Court, in 1670-71, regarding ST. HELENA, are rather connected with the whole of their foreign settlements, than with any one in particular, and consisted of cautions to be observed, in respect to the admission of strangers to the Island. On board one of the ships a number of persons, male and female, had embarked, to colonize the Island, and the captains had been directed to touch at St. Jago, to purchase negroes, who were to be employed in the more laborious part of agriculture, or the cultivation of the soil. (1)

Surat again attacked and pillaged by Sevagee, and the English Factory defended and the Company's property preserved.

The events at the Company's Foreign Settlements, during the season 1670-71, must rather be arranged from their subjects, than from their chronology.

At SURAT, the President and Council stated, that affairs were in a disturbed situation ;—that Bahadar Khan had arrived, with three thousand horse, to defend the place against Sevagee ;—that the English Factory was under the necessity of making large presents to this commander, as the Dutch and French Factories had set the example ; for the Mogul Chiefs uniformly estimated the importance of the trade of

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Governor of St. Helena, 9th December 1670, and 22d February 1670-71.

of distant nations, by the amount of the sums paid to conciliate their favour:—though the markets of Surat had been favourable for the sales of the Company's cloths and Europe produce, this sale had arisen from the contingency of the French and Dutch ships not having arrived, to produce a competition:—the subordinate Factory of Billiapatam had been productive; but the French had established Factories at Durmapatam, in its neighbourhood, at Rajahpore, and at Mergee, near Carwar.

In this situation of the Company's commercial interests at Surat, Sevagee entered the city, on the 3d October 1670, and pillaged it of immense treasure. Mr. Master, one of the Council, was sent with a party of seamen from Swally, to defend the Company's house at Surat:—the French and Dutch Factories, also, stood on their defence; the former, however, compounded with Sevagee, and furnished his troops with the means of carrying the Persian Factory, though defended by a Tartar Prince (styled the King of Cascar) who had returned, by the way of Surat, from a pilgrimage to Mecca. The Dutch, from their supposed force, remained unattacked:—the English Factory made repeated and successful resistance, which produced conferences with Sevagee, in which he endeavoured to persuade the Agent to return and trade at Rajahpore. Though the Company's house held out, some men and goods in their detached warehouses were lost; but the most valuable part of their property had

CHAP. II.  
1670-71.

CHAP. II. had been sent to Swally, or put on board the ships, on the  
1670-71. first report of Sevagee's approach.

Trade precarious from this event, and from the attempts of the French to establish a Factory.

This event having rendered the trade at Surat precarious, the President and Council inferred, that many of the merchants and Banians would resort to Bombay, as soon as they should be satisfied that the fortifications and garrison were sufficiently strong to protect them and their property, and therefore recommended this object to the immediate attention of the Court. <sup>(1)</sup>

As the season advanced apprehensions were felt of another attack by Sevagee's army, which obliged President Aungier again to postpone his visit to Bombay, because the Governor of Surat had intimated to him his jealousy of the intention of the English to draw the trade to Bombay, and because the French, at this time, were projecting the establishment of a Factory at Surat, at which three ships of that nation had arrived, with a pretended stock of £50,000, and also, because the Dutch might take this opportunity to monopolize the Surat trade.

State of trade at the subordinate stations to Surat.

The Factories dependant on Surat were, in this season, in improving circumstances, particularly Carwar and Cananore. The Chief, or Prince of Billiapatam, had offered to the President his friendship and the trade of his country; this subject was, therefore, referred to the Court, as well as the expediency

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 20th November 1670, and Postscript, of the 15th December following.— Letter of 19th December 1670.

expediency of forming commercial connexions with the Chiefs, CHAP. II.  
 or States, along the whole of the Malabar Coast, to counteract 1670-71.  
 the efforts of the Dutch, who, in this season, were sinking  
 £50,000 on fortifications at Cananore.

In obedience to the Court's orders, the Factory at Ahme-  
 dabad had been transferred to Nundrabaud, and specimens  
 of the produce of this town sent home. The following ac-  
 count of the *Quick and Dead Stock* at Surat, made up to the  
 7th January 1670-71, was transmitted to the Court, and affords  
 a distinct view of the Company's affairs.

	Rupees.	
In Dead stock . . . . .	181,519	55½
Desperate debts . . . . .	86,500	0
Good Debts. . . . .	99,262	5
Investments for provisions of goods	262,318	37¾
Goods embaled, ready for England	611,086	16
Goods for sale. . . . .	130,046	9
	1,364,732	51¼ <sup>(1)</sup>

The project of fixing Factories at Acheen and Quedah  
 had failed :—the former had been dissolved ; and one of the  
 Company's ships sent on freight, on account of the Native  
 Merchants, to the latter, but with no goods on the Company's  
 account.<sup>(2)</sup>

The

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 9th January 1670-71.

(2)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 7th April 1671.



CHAP. II.  
 1670-71. Measures taken to strengthen Bombay and increase the garrison.

The administration of BOMBAY, during this season proceeded according to the plan which President Aungier had formed; but the Court's orders, that Mr. Gray, the Deputy Governor, should take his seat in the Council at Surat, had obliged Mr. Aungier to appoint Mr. Gyffard to succeed him at Bombay.<sup>(1)</sup>

The fortifications of Bombay were, at this juncture, on a limited scale:—the bastions and curtains of the Fort, towards the land, had been raised to within nine feet of their intended height; but towards the sea, batteries only were erected, as bastions would be the work of the subsequent year. The contingency of a Mr. Herman Bake's going on an adventure to Persia, which had failed, induced him to offer his services to the President at Surat, as an Engineer, which had been accepted, and he was appointed Engineer and Surveyor General in Bombay:—his surveys would also be directed to ascertain the rights to property, as well as to the works:—subsistence, only, had been allowed him, and his salary left to the discretion of the Court. The military force was very limited, both from the small number of English, and from the inefficiency of the native troops to resist an European enemy, a supply of three hundred recruits, therefore, was required for the garrison; but to prevent discontents from the supercession of officers, those in the service, at the time, ought to

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to Bombay, 6th September 1670.

to be employed. This supply of men was the more urgent, from the permission given to the soldiers, obtained from the King's service, to resign when they pleased, a circumstance which rendered discipline impracticable; recruits, therefore, ought to be engaged for a term of years, that being under martial law, their discipline and services, in case of attack, might be relied on.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sir William Langhorne had arrived at Fort St. George, as Provisional Agent, till the expiration of Mr. Foxcroft's term: in the interval, he had proceeded to Masulipatam, to act as Provisional Superior of that Factory, as Mr. Jearsey, from his disputes with Sir Edward Winter, could not be continued as Agent. Sir William Langhorne reported, that from the quantity of goods shipped for Europe, the warehouses were almost empty; but he had taken measures, to enable the Factory at Masulipatam to provide for the following season:—these measures, and the provision made at the Fort (including the imports from Bengal) would furnish a full investment for the ensuing season:—the investment for Europe, for the season 1670-71, exclusive of thirteen hundred and fifty bales of goods, remaining in the warehouses, ready for the first ship which might arrive from Europe, was as follows:—

CHAP. II.  
1670-71.  
Sir William Langhorne's report on the trade on the Coromandel Coast.

VOL. II.

2 P

Exported

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat and the Deputy Governor at Bombay to the Court, 20th November 1670, 9th and 14th January 1670-71, and 7th April 1671.

— Letter from Bombay to Surat, 20th December 1670

CHAP. II.  
1670-71.

	Pagodas.
Exported from the Fort . . . . .	144,726 9 1
— from Metchlepatam . . . . .	35,967 13 3
— from the Bay. . . . .	85,544 4 1
	<hr/>
Pagodas	266,237 26 5 <sup>(1)</sup>

Pepper trade increased at Bantam, but the Factory embarrassed, from English seamen entering into the service of the Native Powers.

The trade at BANTAM, during the season 1670-71, had assumed a more promising aspect, as the orders of the Court, after the peace with the Dutch, could be fully acted on. By comparing the limited trade between Bantam and England, and between Bantam, the Coast, and Surat, in the preceding season, with the quantity of pepper required to fill up so large a tonnage as ten sail, dispatched this season from Bantam to England, (notwithstanding the continuance of the wars between Jambee and Johore) we discover, that this Agency had made the greatest exertions, for there still remained in the warehouses 3,893 peculs of pepper; therefore the large stock which the Court had consigned to Bantam, was fully employed, and the proportions of it which had come in Surat and Coast goods, had found a ready market. The sale of the cloths had, however, been affected, by the arrival of a Danish ship from Tranquebar, which,

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Factors at Masulipatam to the Court, 14th July 1670.— Letter from Fort St. George to the Presidency of Surat, 11th April 1671.

which, by glutting the market, had, for a time, diminished the demand.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1670-71.

Considerable embarrassments had been felt this season, from the Company's seamen, and some of their inferior servants, having gone on board the ships and junks of the King of Bantam, who had formed the project of establishing a trade in pepper, to such distant ports as Macao, or China, on the one hand, and to Mocha and the Gulf of Persia on the other:—to remedy this evil in future, an oath of fidelity to the Company had been administered to their servants, and a recommendation submitted to the Court, to restrict the commanders of ships consigned to Bantam, from selling anchors, cables, hawsers, or azimuth compasses, to the Native Princes in the Southern Seas, without the consent of the Agent and Council at Bantam.

As an expedient, the Agency of Bantam had, this season, endeavoured to form a trade at Tywan, which, in time, might prove the means of opening a commercial intercourse with Japan, but the result could not, as yet, be known.<sup>(2)</sup>

The uncertainty which hitherto had prevailed, respecting the import and export trade at Bantam, or at the subordinate stations, was this year obviated, by an agreement between the King and Mr. Dacres, the Agent, by which it

Commercial regulations between the King of Bantam and the English Agent.

2 P 2

was

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, 20th December 1670.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court 30th January 1670-71.

**CHAP. II.**  
**1670-71.** was stipulated, that the Company should pay annually, in lieu of all duties, 4,000 rials per annum, and that their ships, vessels, and junks, should have, without any duties imposed on them, a free export and import trade, reserving only to the King the established duties on pepper; and that opium should have a free import, but be sold at the custom-house only, and not in the towns, or at any other place, under the penalty of being forfeited: provided that all military stores, imported by the English, should be offered for sale to the King exclusively.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Copy of Agreement between Agent Dacres and the Sultan of Bantam, 29th March 1671. (Vol. xxvii, No. 2555).

1671-72.

THE measures of the Directors for their trade, in CHAP. II. the season 1671-72, were affected by the preparations of 1671-72. France, Holland, and England, which threatened a war in Europe:—these appearances necessarily obliged the Court to vary their equipments and stock, as they were unable to conjecture, either what were the objects of the war, or of the maritime alliances or oppositions by which their trade might be affected.

Instructions of the Court to Surat, on the probability of a war in Europe, and equipments and stock limited; in expectation of that event.

At the opening of the season, it was intimated to the Presidency of SURAT, that the Court had resolved to extend their trade, by trying exchanges between India and the countries bordering on the China Seas; and with this view, they had taken up sixteen hundred tons of shipping, exclusive of two vessels, which were to proceed, first to Surat, and then to Bantam, to make an experiment of trade with Tonquin, Formosa, and Japan:—the vessel intended for Japan was to be furnished with a stock, estimated at £14,000, and to take in a part of her assortment at Surat, for the place of her ultimate destination.

After the events in Europe assumed that aspect, which impressed the Court with the opinion, that war was probable,

**CHAP. II.**  
**1670-71.** probable, they limited the equipments to Surat to four ships, with a stock, in goods (chiefly cloths) and bullion, estimated at £85,000, and postponed the plan of dispatching a ship from England, direct to Bantam, and thence to the China Seas, till the relations of the European nations should be positively ascertained, or the war become certain, for it would not have been prudent to detach a vessel, with a valuable stock, from the Surat trade, on a speculation liable to so many hazards. On reviewing, also, the information from Surat, of the relative circumstances of the Mogul and of Sevagee, it was resolved, as the most effectual means of conciliating this Chief, to resettle the Factory at Rajahpore.<sup>(1)</sup>

Court's regulations for Bombay.

The Court, on examining the report on the plans for rendering the Island of BOMBAY sufficiently strong to resist any enemy, approved of the appointment of Mr. Gyfford to be Deputy Governor, and of Captain Herman Bake to be Engineer and Surveyor General, and instructed the President and Council of Surat to examine and approve of all plans, before they should be carried into execution :—and to strengthen the garrison, one hundred and fifty soldiers had been embarked, and a proportion would annually be engaged. As it had been found difficult to arrange the

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 23d June 1671, and 15th March 1671-72.

the duties and customs exacted at Tannah and Caranjah, with the Crown of Portugal, it was left to the discretion of the President and Council of Surat, to adjust this business, if possible, by offering concessions, on the part of the Company, and requiring reciprocal concessions from the Viceroy of Goa.

CHAP. II.  
1671-72.

The Company's four regular ships were to be dispatched as a fleet, with orders not to touch at the Cape of Good Hope, and to be on their guard, on approaching St. Helena, to prevent any risk of capture.<sup>(1)</sup>

From the distracted state of the government of PERSIA, at this juncture, and from the probability of a war with the Dutch, the President and Council of Surat were instructed to limit the trade between Surat and that country, to appearances only, that the Company's rights of trade, which had formerly been granted to them, and their moiety of the Customs at Gombroon, might be preserved; but not to engage in any commercial speculation, or expect profit from this trade.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Court, on reviewing the information on the state of their affairs at FORT ST. GEORGE, and particularly of the strength of the garrison, authorised the Agent and Council to engage

Directions  
for increas-  
ing the gar-  
rison at Fort  
St. George.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 15th March 1671-72.— Letter from the Court to the Deputy Governor at Bombay, 15th March 1671-72.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Chief and Factors at Gombroon, 23d June 1671, and 15th March 1671-72.



CHAP. II.  
1671-72. engage from the ships, as many men as would fill up the complement of the troops, which would save the expence of sending recruits from England :—This expedient was the more necessary, from the expiration of the covenants of some of the soldiers, and from the misconduct of others, which required that both of these descriptions of men should return on the ships of this season.

On reviewing the report of the Commissioners, who had investigated the long subsisting disputes between the Agent and Council, Sir Edward Winter, and Mr. Jearsey, the Court decided, that the enquiry had not been properly conducted, and ordered, that what remained of Sir Edward Winter's goods should be sold, and credit given to him for the amount, to be paid on his arrival in England.

Equipments  
and stock for  
Fort St.  
George and  
subordinate  
stations.

The equipments for the Coast, this season, amounted to nearly two thousand tons ; and the stock, consisting of a small proportion of British produce (broad-cloths, lead, and copper) but chiefly of ingots of gold and foreign coins, was estimated at £160,000, of which £133,700 was in gold and coins. Of this large stock, £30,000 was intended for the Factory at Masulipatam, and £40,000 for Bengal, and, in addition to the £14,000 ordered to be sent from Surat to Bantam, £5,000 was, annually, to be provided in Coast commodities, for the trade to Japan.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1) — Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 18th December 1671, and 15th March 1671-72.

The instructions for the subordinate Factory at MASULIPATAM required, that this trade should be extended, and that one-half of the goods sold at this station should be English woollens; but, in providing accommodation for the Factors, on this increased scale of trade, the sum, to be annually expended in buildings, should not exceed six hundred pagodas.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1671-72.

The separate instructions to the Factory at HUGHLY ordered that £5,000 should be annually invested in silk, for the Japan trade; but the principal assortment should be of taffaties and Bengal muslins, for the home sales.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Court, on taking into consideration the report which they had received from BANTAM, during the season 1671-72, decided that this port should become the centre of trade for the exports from Europe, from Surat, and from the Coast; and, as such, enable the Company to prosecute schemes of a circuitous trade to Tonquin, Formosa, and Japan, the equipments and stock were therefore formed on a more enlarged scale, and, for the first time, we discover the intentions of the Court to open an indirect, if it should not be practicable to establish a direct trade to CHINA. Excluded from the Spice Islands by the Dutch, and rivalled and frequently borne down by them, in the pepper trade at Java and Sumatra, it was re-

Equipments and stock for Bantam, and instructions to attempt trade at China, Tonquin, Tywan, and Japan.

VOL. II.

2 Q

solved

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Chief and Factors at Masulipatam, December 1671.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Chief and Factors at Hughly, 28th June and 18th December 1671.

CHAP. II. 1671-72. solved to establish a traffic in the farther Indian Seas, by consigning shipping to Bantam, to the amount of not less than 2,800 tons :—three of the ships were to proceed to Tonquin, Tywan, and Japan, with Europe, Surat, and Coast goods, suited to those markets, and, in return, to obtain Japan produce, for the Indian and Europe markets. In this way, the Court projected to bring China produce into their trade, or into the circuit of their exchanges, and, subsequently, to acquire a share in the China trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

On the basis of these principles, the Court resolved to fix Factories at Tywan and Tonquin, and appointed (but with discretionary powers to the Agent at Bantam) civil servants from England, to be Factors and Writers at those stations ; and, in like manner, Writers and Factors for Japan, who were to be accredited with letters from the King and from the Company, to the Emperor, soliciting his permission to re-establish a trade between his dominions and the English Factories in the East-Indies. The instructions were introduced with references to the former connexion of the English with Japan, as the reason of the Company for again offering to open this trade ; and to obviate the difficulties which had prevented its continuance, the Agents were to declare, that their only view was trade, and, on no occasion, to interfere in matters of religion : and that, in the use of their flag, they were particularly

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 23d June 1671, and 2d February 1671-72.

cularly to explain, that the cross on it was not a badge of their being Catholics, but only the characteristic mark of their nation to distinguish English ships, and ought not to excite any alarm in the Japanese, that the English had any scheme for detaching them from their established belief:—should the Agents be permitted to erect houses of trade, all attempts to fortify, or to land guns, were to be avoided; but, if possible, they were to endeavour to evade the ancient requisition, that the guns of the ships should be landed, and the rudders unhung, during the time of their being in a Japanese port:—the Company's Agents were always to wear dresses of English cloth, with gold and silver lace, that their appearance might convey to the Emperor, and to his officers, impressions of their rank. Three vessels were destined for this commercial speculation, with cargoes chiefly consisting of English broad-cloths, and an assortment of glasses, &c. for presents, and such Indian articles as would sell:—the imports expected were gold, silver, and copper, and cabinets of lacquered work, china jars, &c.; and, on the return of the ships, they were to touch at Bantam, the Coast, and at Surat, for goods to fill up their tonnage, that they might come to England with full cargoes. <sup>(1)</sup>

The orders to the Governor of St. HELENA form only a supplement to the annual directions, *viz.* that the original di-  
 2 Q 2  
 visions

Regulations  
for St. He-  
lena.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 21st September 1671.

CHAP. II. visions and grants of land should be confirmed;—that the  
 1671-72. town should be built on the plan formerly sent, at a distance from the Fort, and the market placed in its vicinity;—that no boat should be suffered to land with more than ten men, whatever flag the ship might carry;—that the crews should not be permitted to enter the Fort, or to make excursions in the Island, or to sleep on shore;—that the honours of the flag should be dispensed with, it not being a Royal garrison, and that all disputes respecting salutes should be avoided, by complying with them, to the extent of seven guns only;—that such inhabitants as should be called on to assist in the defence of the Fort, should be allowed a compensation;—and that provisions should be furnished to the Company's shipping, only, lest the demand might be a stratagem of an enemy, by reducing the stock, to facilitate an attack on the Island. <sup>(1)</sup>

The trade at Surat, for a time, suspended by the Governor, from a dispute between the Dutch and the Natives.

Turning from the domestic proceedings of the Court to the measures which events had rendered it expedient to adopt, at the three principal stations of the Company's trade in India, during the season 1671-72, it must be recollected, that the orders from England could only be carried into execution

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Governor of St. Helena, 23d June 1671, and 15th March 1671-72.

cution in India, as circumstances might render obedience practicable.

CHAP. II.  
1671-72.

The events at Surat, during the season 1671-72, required prudence and firmness in those to whom the Company's interests were entrusted, who were obliged to accommodate their conduct to circumstances, and to the habits or prejudices of the Natives;—for those habits could neither be opposed by European opinions, nor resisted by notions of national dignity:—and the following incident is a memorable example of the application of local knowledge, and temperate manners, in restoring tranquillity, and preserving the English rights at Surat, which an opposite conduct might have endangered or overset.

In July 1671, some Dutch seamen, who had been intoxicated, insulted the attendants of Aga Jaffier, a chief officer in Surat, and after a disorderly conflict, took refuge in the English Factory:—the Governor of Surat, alarmed at what was represented to him to be a combination of the three Christian Nations (English, French, and Dutch), ordered the Moors to discontinue their services to the Europeans, and to put them to death, with impunity, if found with arms: the Company's servants, on this occasion, were, therefore, obliged to keep within their house, and business was at a stand. The President, who was at Swally, received information of this circumstance in his way to Surat, and returned to Swally, where he was met by the Dutch and French "Directores," who had

CHAP. II. had fled from Surat. At a conference, it was agreed that  
 1671-72. the three Nations should assume the appearance of an intention to abandon their Factories at Surat, that they might bring the Governor to terms:—the result was, after communications, by messengers, for above six weeks, that the privileges of the European nations were restored to them, and their Presidents, or “Directores,” invited to return to Surat: but, in the ceremonies on this occasion, the levity of the French, in affecting pomp and power, had not the English and Dutch Presidents manifested a behaviour dictated by common sense, would again have plunged the whole into distress:—the European Factors, however, returned to their houses, on the 19th August 1671, and the English obtained a grant of one year’s customs, in addition to their former privileges; which probably arose from the arrival at Bombay, of the Company’s fleet from Europe:—these ships, with a proportion of Europe goods and stock, were sent to the subordinate Factories of Porcat, Batticolo, and Carwar, under orders to dispose of the goods, and to return to Surat with the produce intended for Europe.

A large French fleet arriving at Surat occasions a depression on the English trade.

This momentary commercial calm was disturbed by the arrival of a French fleet of twelve sail of armed ships, and merchant vessels, commanded by an Admiral, Monsieur De la Haye, and with a stock computed at £130,000:—on this fleet had been embarked about two thousand troops, great part of which died at St. Lawrence,

or

or Madagascar:—the French, with their usual gasconade, published, that another fleet might be expected from Europe: <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> 1671-72. —this excited an immediate alarm in the Governor of Surat, from a jealousy of the French intentions; but the commercial evil to the English trade was, that the French, by extravagant presents and imprudent purchases, lowered the price of the Europe cargoes, and raised that of Indian produce:—this fluctuation the President considered to be rather alarming in appearance, than in fact, because he judged that this variation in prices must, in a short time, terminate in the ruin of the French; an opinion which was soon justified by the conduct of the Natives, who received the French with deference, but had no confidence in a trade, which they held, from the folly of the traders, to be temporary and precarious

The French, with their national arrogance, expected, on this occasion, that the Company's ships at Swally would pay their fleet the honors of the flag, because they bore the flag of a Sovereign, and not that of a commercial Company;—the President, however, with becoming spirit, resisted this pretension, both from a sense of the Company's flag being authorized by the King, and from the distinction between the King's and Company's flags being unintelligible to the Native Governors or Princes.

It was at this juncture, that the Presidency formed a treaty with Sevagee, on the basis of which the Company's Factory at Rajahpore was proposed to be re-established. The An English Agent sent to Sevagee, to solicit payment of the public



CHAP. II.  
 1671-72.   
 Company's  
 losses by his  
 armies.

public instructions to Mr. Ustick, who was sent to negotiate this agreement, were, to stipulate for payment, by Sevagee, of the losses which the Company had sustained from his armies, amounting to 32,000 pagodas ; and the secret orders were, to accept of such a sum as could be procured, in money or in customs : if these conditions should be obtained, he was to stipulate for similar privileges to the English, with those which had been granted by the Mogul, and the other Native Princes, but to avoid, under general excuses, any agreement to furnish naval or military assistance, and to leave that subject open to subsequent arrangement, explaining, that the Company were merchants only, and that military services were incompatible with commerce ; but to promise a full supply of such articles as England afforded, for the maintenance of his power.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was difficult for the Presidency, under such circumstances, to shape their conduct in such a manner as neither to alarm the Mogul, (already beginning to entertain suspicions of Bombay, as an impregnable port) nor to offend Sevagee, because each could have obstructed the plan of acquiring a trade on the Malabar Coast, in opposition to the Dutch.

The

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 7th November 1671. Narrative of the Dispute with the Governor of Surat, July 1671, (vol. xxvii, No. 2561.)  
 — Instructions to Mr. Stephen Ustick to treat with Sevagee, (vol. xxvii, No. 2581.)  
 — Articles between the President and the Shahbunder of Surat, 21st August 1671, (vol. xxvii, No. 2574.)

After the late peace, the Dutch affected friendship, but in this season, they resumed their ancient animosities, for, by leagues with the Country Powers, and by their superior naval force, their designs against the English settlements at Carwar and Billiapatam, became apparent:—cargoes, however, were provided for the Company's shipping, and instructions given to the Captains, from the doubtful appearance of affairs in Europe, to keep together, and resist whatever enemy might assail them:—the investments consisted of a considerable quantity of pepper, and of a small proportion of Lahore indigo.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1671-72.  
Dutch again interfere with the Company's trade.

The exertions of this Presidency were liable to constant interruption, from events affecting the sovereignty of the country to which the trade was extended; a victory by Sevagee over the Mogul army, exposed Surat (then in a defenceless state) to invasion, while the exactions and the rapacity of a new Governor, under the pretext that the President intended to retire from Surat to Bombay, were excessive; for at one time he took possession of the English Factory, but soon quitted it, leaving them in uncertainty, either how to provide investments for Europe, in this, or for the subsequent season.<sup>(2)</sup>

Apprehensions at Surat of another attack from Sevagee.

The events at BOMBAY, during the season 1671-72, related  
VOL. II. 2 R. only Measures at Bombay for

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th January 1671-72.

(2)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 3d February 1671-72, and 6th and 23d April 1672;

CHAP. II.  
 1671-72.  
 defending the  
 Island.

only to the progress of the manufacture of cotton, and to the means employed to bring the inhabitants under a regular subordination :—the Governor and Council reported, that they trusted the fortifications would be completed in the course of another year, and that they had divided the old soldiers among the two companies, that their example might have an effect on the discipline of the recruits, and habituate them to the service of the Island ; but that it would be expedient, from the great mortality among the soldiers, to send an annual supply of fifty men ; and that the principle of seniority must be observed, in adjusting the rank of the officers :—the shipping, however, of the island, as well as of Surat, had been exposed to captures by the Malabar pirates, and therefore it was necessary to build and equip some small armed vessels, for the protection of the trade of the Island.<sup>(1)</sup>

Judging, however, from the circumstance of the President being, a second time, prevented from visiting Bombay, to revise the regulations for its administration, it had become a question, whether it might not be wise to remove the Presidency from Surat to Bombay, leaving a Chief and Council at Surat, to carry on the trade and maintain the privileges ; because the local situation of this city made it dependant, and

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 7th November 1671.  
 — Letter from the Governor and Council of Bombay to the Court, 18th November 1671.

and exposed to constant alarms from Sevagee and the Mogul, and the Company to losses, from the extortions of both.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1671-72.  
Sir William Langhorne assumes the Government of Fort St. George, and Mr. Foxcroft and Sir Edward Winter return to England.

The events at FORT ST. GEORGE and at its dependencies, in the season 1671-72, consisted chiefly in the final adjustment of the disputes, between Sir Edward Winter, Mr. Foxcroft, and Mr. Jearsey, the Agent at Masulipatam, and refer, in general, to the Company's interests and trade. In the whole of the dispute, from its commencement to its becoming a subject of enquiry for Commissioners, the intemperance of Sir Edward Winter, and the imprudence of Mr. Foxcroft and his adherents, rendered it expedient to recall both, and to bring the subject under the cognizance of the Court; each party, however, was permitted to bring home such evidence as he might deem necessary for his vindication. Mr. Foxcroft embarked in January 1671-72, leaving Sir William Langhorne, Agent at Fort St. George, and Sir Edward Winter sailed, at the same time, on another vessel, for England.

In this season, a Cowl, or Phirmaund, was obtained from the King of Golcondah, granting new privileges to the Company, at Fort St. George, of which the Agent and Council were availing themselves, to prevent future disputes about customs, and were of opinion, that though the expences incurred

Phirmaund, conferring additional privileges on the English, obtained from the King of Golcondah.

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th January and 23d February 1671-72, and 6th and 23d April 1672.

CHAP. II. incurred in obtaining this grant, were considerable the ad-  
1671-72. vantages arising from it would fully compensate the charges.

State of trade  
at Fort St.  
George and  
subordinate  
Settlements.

The trade had been successful, as full cargoes had been put on board the shipping, and there remained in the warehouses a considerable store for the next arrivals:—it would be expedient, however, to lower the prices of English cloths, &c., particularly those intended for Bantam, where the market had been glutted, by the imports of the Portuguese, Danes, and French.

The only report, regarding trade in BENGAL, was, that, at Patna, the Agent had made advantageous purchases of saltpetre, which would be in readiness for the ships of the subsequent season.<sup>(1)</sup>

Trade at Ban-  
tam impeded,  
by disputes  
with the  
King, and  
the inter-  
ferences of  
the Dutch,  
Danes, and  
French.

The Company's trade at BANTAM, at the commencement of the season 1671-72, had been obstructed, by the shifting degrees of power between the King and the Chiefs, at the different ports in the Island of Java, and by the commercial interferences of the European nations (the Dutch, French, and Danes) which had lowered the price of Europe produce, and diminished the profits from the exchange of Eastern articles:—these events had obliged the Agent to have recourse to expedients to obtain pepper, the staple export of Bantam, at advanced prices; but it had  
been

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, to the Court, 6th September 1671, and 23d January 1671-72.— Letter from the Agent at Masulipatam to the Court, 9th August 1671.

been procured, in sufficient quantity to meet the orders of the Court, and to fill up the tonnage of the expected fleet. This import would materially affect the profits of the sales in England:—the Agent and Council, in illustration, stated, that the probability of wars between the King of Java and Coxsin, the Chief of Formosa, who controlled the Kings of Jambee, Johore, &c., would have the effect on the trade at those ports, of rendering the price of imports and exports uncertain, and commercial speculation difficult:—it was farther explained, that the quantity of Coast and Surat cloths, brought by the French and Danes, and the non-arrival of those articles, which the Court's letter had estimated at £12,000, would compel this Agency to apply almost their whole stock of money to provide goods for the expected tonnage, leaving sufficient room for the imports expected from Tywan and Japan; circumstances which had diminished their means of providing investments for the large tonnage which the Court proposed for the following season.<sup>(1)</sup>

The imports from Japan and Tywan not being hitherto brought into the trade, the report on this subject could only be expected, in the advices of the following season.<sup>(2)</sup>

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, November and 29th December 1671.

(2)—Letter from Mr. W. Baron to the Court, dated Bantam 4th June 1671.

1672-73.

CHAP. II.  
 1672-73.  
 Measures of  
 the Compa-  
 ny accommo-  
 dated to the  
 war between  
 England and  
 Holland.

IF the Court, in the preceding season, had been obliged to abridge the projected amount of their equipments and shipping, both from the appearance of war between the Maritime Powers in Europe, and from the uncertainty of the alliances, or enemies, which the King might have to support, or to oppose, the events, in 1672-73, removed this uncertainty, and compelled the Directors to accommodate their measures in England, and their instructions to their servants in the Indies, to the existing state of affairs in Europe.

It is necessary, only, to refer to the alliance which the King had formed with Louis XIV., and the declaration of war, by both, against the States General, to discover the source of that caution which the Company were obliged to observe.

The events in the war, affecting the trade to the East-Indies, were, the indecisive, but destructive naval battle of Solebay, in May 1672, and the occupation of five of the Seven Provinces of the States General by the French armies:—the one, had the effect of rendering the arrival or departure of the Company's ships uncertain; and the other,

of

of lowering the pretensions of the States, in any treaty in which the war might terminate. CHAP. II.  
1672-73.

It appears, that, during the war, secret negotiations were carrying on, with the object of conciliation, between the King and the States General, and that the Court were aware Ambassadors were about to proceed to the French camp, to frame, and, if possible, to settle preliminaries of peace.

The Court, therefore, in June 1672, presented a memorial to the King, praying, that the Ambassadors might be instructed to propose, that mutual reparation should be made by the Dutch and English East-India Companies, for any damages done to either, since the last peace, or the breaking out of the existing war, or, at least, from the date of the memorial; and, in case the negotiation should be proceeded in, that the Company might be allowed to represent to the King, what would be indispensable for the better carrying on the trade, in future: but, should it be impracticable to accomplish this, in the treaty then pending, they trusted, that there would be a general article inserted, referring to a treaty, to be subsequently formed, for settling the East-India trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

Court's memorial to the King, praying their affairs might be taken into consideration, in any negotiation with the Dutch.

These circumstances explain the source of the general instructions which the Court framed, for the conduct of their Foreign Settlements; or, that they were to follow the orders which

General instructions to the foreign Settlements, in consequence of the war.

(1)—Memorial of the East-India Company to the King, respecting the negotiations with Holland. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 261.)



CHAP. II. which they had received, for providing the investment, at  
 1672-73. Surat, at Fort St. George, and at their dependencies, previously to the breaking out of the war; but to postpone sending stock or shipping to Bantam, that port being more exposed to interruptions in trade, and to losses in shipping, than their more concentrated stations on the Malabar and Coromandel Coasts.

As pepper could not be obtained from Bantam, and twelve hundred tons of this article were required for the home sales, this supply was, if possible, to be procured through the Factories on the Malabar side of the Peninsula, and on the ships in which this pepper was to be laden, the other articles required for the Europe market were to be sent.

As a second general instruction, the Court intimated, that they intended to dispatch ten sail, or about four thousand tons of shipping:—this fleet was to be divided into three squadrons, under what was then termed an Admiral, Vice Admiral, and Rear Admiral; it was to proceed, in the first instance, to Fort St. George and Masulipatam, and take in such goods as might be ready at those places; then to touch at Porcat, Carwar, Billiapatam, &c., and the Factories along the Malabar Coast, and rendezvous at Bombay; and, lastly, to assemble at Surat, to complete their cargoes:—from being armed, each with from thirty to thirty-six guns, and fully manned, the ships were to sail as a fleet; but not to touch  
 at

at St. Helena, a report having reached England, that this Island had been captured by the Dutch.

CHAP. II.  
1672-73.

The particular orders to President Aungier specified, that the intentions of the Court were to keep open the trade at the different ports subservient to the Presidency of SURAT, for which a stock, estimated at £90,000, had been sent; and though discretionary powers were given to the President, in case of any unforeseen emergency, to remove the Company's Factory to Bombay, this was to be avoided, if possible, till the re-establishment of peace in Europe:—and, in consideration of Mr. Aungier's services, his salary was increased to £300 per annum, with a gratuity of £500, and a proportionate addition allowed to the subordinate servants.

Particular orders to President Aungier, whose salary was augmented.

Under the prospect of peace, the Court desired information of the kinds of goods which would be required in the Persian market, and for Quedah and Siam, should it become advisable again to attempt trade at those ports. <sup>(1)</sup>

The general instructions were repeated by the Court to the Agent and Council of FORT ST. GEORGE, which have been detailed, as transmitted to Surat, the only separate order being, to endeavour to place the Fort in a state of defence against any enemy;—in return for the stock consigned to this branch of the trade, estimated at £87,700, a large proportion of Coast cloths were to be laden on the

Instructions to place Fort St. George in a state of defence.

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shipping,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 5th July, 9th August, and 13th December 1672, 10th January 1672-73, and 28th April 1673.

CHAP. II. shipping, as soon as they should arrive at Madras and  
 1672-73. Masulipatam, for which ports the fleet was, in the first instance, to shape its course, and then to follow the destinations which have been specified.

Commercial orders to Bengal.

The Company's trade in BENGAL was immediately connected with their investments from Fort St. George:—the principal articles expected from Hughly were saltpetre and taffaties, the qualities of which, though good, as silks, had been found deficient, in point of colour, particularly the greens and blacks;—persons, therefore, were sent on this fleet, qualified to improve these articles, by dying the green and black silks; but under an obligation to keep their art secret from the Natives.<sup>(1)</sup>

Political and commercial relations of Bombay and Surat with the Portuguese and the Native Powers.

The political and commercial circumstances of the Presidency of SURAT and the Island of BOMBAY were affected, not only by the war with the Dutch, but by the alliance with France, it being possible only to act on the defensive against the former, and hazardous to co-operate with the latter.

At this time, the project of adjusting the duties at Tan-nah and Caranjah, with the Viceroy of Goa, had failed, and therefore

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 9th August and 13th December 1672.

therefore could only be settled by an application of the King to the Crown of Portugal, requiring the performance of the stipulations in the original Treaty of Cession. On consultation, it was deemed expedient to postpone any treaty with Sevagee, till the result of the war between this Chief and the Mogul should ascertain his submission to, or his independence on that power:—the President and Council of Surat, however, did not reject his offers of privileges of trade, but evaded any treaty, by demanding, as a preliminary, a sum, in compensation for past losses, the payment of which was to become the basis upon which any treaty with him could proceed:—by this delay, an opportunity was afforded to keep up the Company's relations with the Mogul Government, that, at the close of the war between these Native Powers, it might be ascertained, what Factories could be held as safe in the dominions of either.

The naval war between what was, at this time, termed the *Malabar* fleet, and the Siddees, or Mogul fleet, (for both were at sea,) it was expected would, in the course of the year, be decisive; and this uncertainty rendered it indispensable, that some armed vessels should be built and equipped at Bombay, for the protection of the trade, and to maintain the English naval character, the Native Powers and merchants making constant comparisons between it and that of the Dutch, and, recently, of the French, in the Indian Seas: unless, therefore, the English Factories and trade should be protected by

CHAP. II.  
1672-73. a respectable naval force, the confidence of the Native Powers could neither be acquired nor preserved, nor the Company's outward or homeward ships arrive, to pre-occupy the markets, or yield profits to the proprietors, which alone could maintain their credit against such powerful rivals, acting either as allies or as enemies :—Reference to these political circumstances, affecting the safety of the Presidency of Surat, and of Bombay, will explain the sources of the commercial reports from both.

Of the Europe imports, the broad-cloths had sold, but with a small profit;—the sales of the foreign merchandize had rather been attended with a loss;—the allum could not be sold, and ought, for the present, to be withdrawn from the Company's assortments;—the copper and quicksilver being in demand, had sold with considerable profit; but the balance of gain, from the whole sales, would do little more than clear the debt at interest, and would not leave a fund for providing an investment for the subsequent year. As the demand for tin and copper was considerable, though the Dutch (with large quantities of finer spices) had sold copper at reduced rates, a large proportion of both articles ought to be sent on the next fleet; but toys and glasses would not sell.

The homeward fleet from Surat was to consist of four ships, with an investment estimated at £98,000 :—£80,000 more had been borrowed at interest, and the goods intended for Bantam had been sold at prime cost, to enable them to provide

provide for the investment of the next season ; a large stock, therefore, would be requisite to keep up the trade, in any degree of equality with that of the other European nations ; and this stock, it was submitted, ought to be sent chiefly in bullion.<sup>(1)</sup>

Resuming the account of affairs at Surat and Bombay, as detailed at the close of the preceding season, it appears, that the question, whether it would be expedient to remove the Presidency from Surat to Bombay, had been postponed till the contending interests of the European Maritime Powers could be adjusted, or their proportions of the East-India trade settled ; the President and Council of Surat, therefore, informed the Court, that Mr. Aungier had gone to Bombay, in May 1672, where his experience and authority were employed, in putting that Island in a state of defence, against any attack which might be meditated by the Dutch, or any other enemy ; that he had strengthened the fortifications, and, by strict discipline, prepared the troops for action ;—that the inhabitants were formed into a militia, to act with the garrison ;—that the fortifications, as originally designed by Captain Smith, were upon too narrow a scale for the defence of the Island ;—that the revenue from customs could not be estimated at more than 20,000 xeraphins per annum ;—that

the

CHAP. II.  
1672-73

Measures of President Aungier and the Deputy Governor, for putting Bombay into a state of defence, under the plan of transferring to it, the Seat of Government.

(1)—Letters from the Deputy President and Council at Surat, (the President being at Bombay), 22d October and 10th December 1672, 10th and 17th January and 25th February 1672-73, and 4th April 1673.

CHAP. II. the project of establishing a mint, from the necessity of send-  
 1672-73. ing the bullion to Surat, could not be carried into effect, how-  
 ever obvious its importance might be to the Company's trade ;  
 —that, if this measure could be effected, four distinct species of  
 money must be coined, *viz.* gold, to be called Carolinas ; silver,  
 or Anglinas ; copper, or Copperoons ; and tin, or Tinnies.<sup>(1)</sup>

In aid of Mr. Aungier's opinion, Captain Shaxton, who commanded the Company's forces at Bombay, represented, that though every exertion had been made to encrease the garrison, by filling up the two European companies with natives, that each might consist of one hundred and thirty men, and though a militia, or train bands, had been embodied at the town of Bombay, and at the different stations, to the number of nearly fifteen hundred men, one half carrying fire-arms, and the other lances, and though this force would be sufficient to resist any of the Country Powers, or States, yet it would be inadequate to defend the Island against an European enemy :—To render this garrison efficient, therefore, five hundred soldiers, with proper officers, must be sent from England, and, from casualties, an annual supply of one hundred recruits ;—with this force, he could not only be in a capacity to defend the Island, but to act offensively against the invaders of any of the Company's Factories, admitting, at the same time, the immense charges which had been incurred,

(1)—Letters from President Aungier and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 14th June and 7th October 1672.

incurred, in building the fort, but that it was not more than half completed, and would require additional stock, for two years, to finish it.<sup>(1)</sup> CHAP. II.  
1672-73.

The Presidency of Surat suggested, in this season, the expediency of erecting courts of law, and establishing a police at Bombay; measures which, though expensive, they trusted would add to the confidence which the Natives were beginning to feel, that the English would protect them, and, in the event of peace, would render the Island a considerable commercial resort.

If these preparations promised a vigorous defence, in the event of any attack, it was found, on the appearance of a Dutch fleet, in February 1672-73, under Rickloff Van Goens, the Dutch Governor General of India, that the greatest alarm was created, the inhabitants having fled to the Portuguese Settlements for safety. The Dutch fleet hovered, for some time, between Bombay and Surat; and, in this crisis, the the Governor had applied for the assistance of five hundred Rajpoots; but before they could arrive, the enemy disappeared, probably on discovering the number of the militia and garrison, and that an attack would be vigorously resisted.<sup>(2)</sup> Appearance  
of a Dutch  
fleet off Bom-  
bay.

At FORT ST. GEORGE, in 1672-73, the investment was greater than could have been expected, during hostilities with the Dutch. French Fac-  
tories esta-  
blished at  
Trincomalé  
and at St.  
Thomé.

The

(1)—Letter from Captain Shaxton to the Court, 3d January 1672-73.

(2)—Letters from President Aungier and the Council of Bombay to the Court, 6th and 11th January, and 18th and 28th March 1672-73.



CHAP. II.  
1672-73. The unnatural alliance, between England and France, to depress the Dutch in Europe, had induced the French to send Monsieur De la Haye to the East-Indies, with a considerable armament. On its first appearance, it lowered the power, and pretensions of the Dutch, to exclusive trade, but, in the sequel, by introducing the French to a participation of trade, formed a dangerous rival to the English company:—De la Haye first attempted to establish the French at Trincomalé, in the Island of Ceylon, from which the Dutch force was unable to remove them;—From Trincomalé they sailed to the Coromandel Coast, and unexpectedly landed three hundred men, and some guns, at St. Thomé, which they took by storm; in July 1672, and resisted the numerous forces of the Natives, which could not expel them. Sir William Langhorne's conduct at Fort St. George, on this occasion, discovered great prudence and foresight:—as allies of the King, he could not oppose the French, but he considered their settlement in the vicinity of the Fort (should they retain possession of it) as leading to consequences that would embarrass trade, and, in any future war with France, place two garrisons in a distant country, in the immediate vicinity of each other, under circumstances which must be destructive, either to the one, or to the other. This event is the more memorable, from its being the first appearance of the French on the Coromandel Coast,—on which, towards the middle of the subsequent century, the wars  
arose

arose, which ultimately led to the acquisition of the British territorial power in Hindostan.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1672-73.

The relative circumstances in BENGAL, with those of the Coast, and of Surat, during the season 1672-73, were affected by the arrival of the French fleet in the Indian Seas, to participate in the trade in the Ganges, and by a dispute between the Dutch and the Nabob of Dacca, which exposed the English to contingencies, that prevented the full provision of the Bengal investment:—the apprehension of this evil (though three of the Company's ships had arrived in the Bay,) obliged the Agent to fill them up with such goods as he had in store, and to dispatch them to the Coast, to complete their cargoes at Madras.<sup>(2)</sup>

Investment in Bengal limited, from disputes between the Dutch and the Nabob of Dacca.

The Agent and Council at BANTAM, during the season 1672-73, were obliged to adopt temporary commercial expedients:—of the ships dispatched to Tywan, two vessels had been lost, and the success of a third was uncertain:—some of the Company's ships had been taken in the Straits of Banca by the Dutch, and the sales at Bantam obstructed:—several French ships had also arrived, laden with cloths, which, in colours and patterns, were more marketable than those which the Presidency of Surat had sent for the Bantam sales:—the

Trade at Bantam depressed by the war with the Dutch, but a Factory established at Tonquin.

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result

(1)—Letter from Fort St. George to the Court, 16th December 1672.— Letter from Sir William Langhorne, Agent at Fort St. George, to the Court, 1st January 1672-73.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Factors at Hughly to the President and Council at Surat, 23d August 1672.

CHAP. II.  
1672-73. result of these events was, that expectations were rather to be entertained, of the revival of trade at Bantam, when the Dutch war should terminate, than of profitable sales or purchases, while it continued; and, indeed, when it is considered, that the principal seat of the Dutch power was at Batavia, and that the English were at war with that nation, it could not be expected, that the Agency at Bantam, or the Factories at Jambee, Tywan, or even the trade to Japan, could succeed, in opposition to a rival, so superior in fleets, and in territorial power.<sup>(1)</sup>

These accounts of the state of trade at Bantam, afford a view of the commercial relations between the Dutch and the Native Powers; and the instructions which the Agent and Council gave to Mr. Gyfford, who had been sent to open a trade at Tonquin, evince, that under the most discouraging circumstances, efforts were made to extend the commerce of the Company, by every practicable expedient. Mr. Gyfford was directed, on his arrival in the river of Tonquin, to receive, with all deference, the officers of the King and Prince;—to limit his requests to permission to trade;—to give presents to the amount of £600 per annum, only, the Dutch (notwithstanding their large commerce)

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, 25th July 1672.  
— Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Presidency of Surat, 22d September and 9th October 1672.— Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 20th March 1672-73.

commerce) not having exceeded £900;—to ask permission to have a Factory and Agents;—to offer to the King a preference in the purchase of all commodities, and liberty to sell to others what he should not select;—to request leave (still with discretionary powers, to act according to circumstances) to purchase silk at Tonquin, proper for the Japan market, and to buy the manufactures of Tonquin, and musk, for England, and gold, to be sent to the Coast of Coromandel;—and to dispose of such quantities of English manufactures, and of pepper, as might be practicable.<sup>(1)</sup>

The report of Mr. Gyfford, on his reaching Tonquin, shews the difficulty of complying with the terms, though he might with the spirit of his instructions:—he stated, that the government of the King was arbitrary and absolute;—that though he paid the sums for which he contracted, he required the goods, of which he had a selection, to be given him at such price as his Mandarins would allow;—that the power of the Prince was equally absolute, and his payments to be made only when he should succeed to the throne;—that the powers of his officers, and of the Mandarins, were unlimited, provided they met the views of the King, and therefore were arbitrary and vexatious to the trader;—that the Natives were avaricious, jealous, and vindictive;—hence, judging from the

CHAP. II.  
1672-73.  
Mr. Gyfford's  
report on the  
trade at Ton-  
quin.

2 T 2

practice

(1)—Instructions and directions from the Agent and Council at Bantam to Mr. William Gyfford, for attempting the settlement of Trade at Tonquin, 25th May 1672.

CHAP. II.  
1672-73. practice of the Dutch, (who, for a long time, had traded at the place) the imports of such goods as the King might require, must be complied with, and the sales consist of such articles, as were in common demand;—that, therefore, a considerable stock would be required for a participation in the trade, the profits from which were uncertain;—that the temptation to the Company to continue this speculation, was the prospect of obtaining raw-silk, which would find a sale at Japan, and bring silver, gold, and other articles in return, and thus extend the circuit of exchanges for Europe produce, at Bantam, the Coast, and Surat; but that the sale of English cloth was uncertain, from the dress of the different ranks at Tonquin being fixed, and from the arbitrary power, from the King to the Mandarin, being such as to render it hazardous to expose goods, which might tempt avarice, without producing profit;—on the whole, that the establishment of trade at Tonquin, was rather to be considered as an expedient for facilitating the intercourse with Japan, than, in itself, a means of procuring imports for Europe, or sales of European produce.

The Factors at Tonquin justified these observations, for they explained, that silk, velvet, musk, and lacquered-work (considered to be superior to that of Japan) were to be obtained at that port, and then specified the Europe, Surat, Coast, and Bantam produce, *viz.* English cloth, lead, warlike stores, saltpetre,

saltpetre, Surat and Coast cloths, and pepper, which would find a sale at Tonquin, and, in return, bring articles to form part of the assortments for the Company's Factories in India, or for their sales in Europe.<sup>(1)</sup> CHAP. II.  
1672-73.

(1)—Letter from the Factors at Tonquin to the Court, 7th December 1672.

## 1673-74.

CHAP. II.  
 1673-74. Events of the war in Europe, and appearances of negotiation at Cologne.

THE proceedings of the Court of Directors, in the year 1673-74, were, at the commencement, necessarily influenced by the state of the war, and towards the close of the season, by the Treaty of Westminster, between the King and the States General. After referring to the indecisive naval actions of the fleets, commanded by the Duke of York and Prince Rupert, to the progress of the French armies, in reducing Maestricht, and to the first appearances of negotiation at Cologne, the Court adverted to the opposite views of the German Princes, regarding France and the States General:—In the Southern Circles, the Sovereigns and Princes favoured the projects of France, while, in the Northern Circles, they were disposed rather to support, than to depress the States General.

At this juncture, information was received, that the Island of St. Helena had been captured by the Dutch, and retaken, on the 4th May 1673, by Captain Munden; but, notwithstanding this recapture, the Directors considered the occupation of the Island, by the English, to be temporary and precarious.<sup>(1)</sup>

Under

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 11th, 23d, and 25th August 1673.

Under these circumstances, the Court expressed their apprehensions to the Presidency of Surat, for the safety of <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> 1673-74. Bombay, as intelligence had been received from Holland, that the Dutch were equipping a large armament, the object of which, it was conjectured, was to invade that Island.

These events induced the Court to abridge the equipments and stock, intended for Surat, more particularly, after receiving intelligence of the state of the markets at that port, and at its dependencies, which were so overstocked, that neither British produce, nor foreign merchandize, could find a profitable sale:—hence, only a small proportion of Surat cloths, with a quantity of Lahore indigo, were ordered for the investment of the following year, that the trade might continue on a limited scale, till the restoration of peace.<sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments and stock to Surat diminished.

A short time, however, had only elapsed, when these measures of precaution, and of abridged trade, became unnecessary, from the restoration of peace, between England and the States General, by the Treaty of Westminster, concluded on the 17th of February 1673-74; the conditions of which, in so far as regarded the English East-India trade and possessions, were specified in the Introduction to this Chapter.

Treaty of Westminster, between England and Holland, and its effects on the Company's equipments.

The Court, in consequence of this Treaty, instead of narrowing

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 29th September 1673.



CHAP. II. rowing their equipments, dispatched a ship to Surat, with a  
 1673-74. cargo estimated at £10,000 in money, and £8,000 in goods, and, subsequently, consigned three ships more to that Presidency, to the amount of fifteen hundred tons, with directions to enlarge the investment, which had been ordered prior to the war, because they could now carry on the trade at their different Factories, without apprehensions of interruption from the Dutch, passports having been mutually given, by both nations, for the protection of shipping. On this occasion, the Court recommended to the Presidency of Surat, rather to solicit temporary protection from the Native Governors, than to incur heavy charges, and uncertain results, by seeking Phirmaunds from the Eastern Sovereigns.<sup>(1)</sup>

At the close of the season three additional ships were dispatched to Surat with cargoes, in goods and money, estimated at £82,000.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Govern-  
 ment of Bom-  
 bay prohibit-  
 ed from en-  
 tering into  
 any treaty  
 with the Por-  
 tuguese.

The instructions, in 1673-74, to BOMBAY, specified, that the regulations which had been sent home for approbation, did not appear to be of that description which the Court could authorize, and therefore they required, that rules, better accommodated to local circumstances, might be framed, to which they could assent:—in the mean time, any new attempts to negotiate with the Viceroy of Goa, were prohibited, because the  
 Company,

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 13th March 1673-74, and 3d April 1674.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 3d April 1674.

Company, though authorized by their Charter to form treaties with the Native Princes or States, were not empowered to enter into engagements with the officers of the European Maritime powers, having settlements or trade in the East-Indies, as such agreements might lead to questions between their respective Sovereigns, with whose political relations it would be unwise for the Company to interfere, particularly as such treaties might lead to Conventions for mutual support, against the Native Powers, which would be hazardous in themselves, and productive of commercial embarrassments in the sale or purchase of goods :—the Court, therefore, ordered the Bombay Government to take all its directions from the Presidency of Surat ; to confine itself to the encouragement of arts and trade among the settlers ; and, as recruits had been embarked, to attend to their discipline, and always to place the Island in a state of defence, notwithstanding the present return of peace.

CHAP. II.

1673-74.

An interruption had taken place in the trade to PERSIA, probably on account of the war in Europe, as well as of the political embarrassments in that kingdom ; the Court, on peace being restored, resolved, as a letter had been obtained from His Majesty to the King of Persia, and a collection of former Phirmaunds had been made by the Agent, that translations should be sent home, for their information ; and that a new Phirmaund, if possible, should be solicited, for confirmation of privileges, but would not come to any positive

Measures for  
reviving the  
Persian trade.

CHAP. II.  
1673-74. resolution, respecting the trade, till an answer should be received from the King of Persia to the King's letter, though they considered the thousand tomands which had been recovered in the preceding season, as the Company's share of the customs at Gombroon, to be much below the expected amount:—to these general orders were subjoined directions, that Carmania wool, and other Persian goods, should be more strictly inspected, before they were shipped, as many of the bales had arrived in England in a damaged state, which depreciated their value in the market.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Agent at Fort St. George to attempt conciliatory measures with the Native Powers.

The same intelligence which had been transmitted to Surat, respecting the state of affairs in Europe, was forwarded to the Agent and Council of FORT ST. GEORGE, with instructions to put the place in the best practicable state of defence, to try every possible conciliatory expedient with the Native Powers, and to give greater attention in assorting the Coast cloths, in the small investment which could be collected, in a state of war, at Madras and Masulipatam, but not to provide any articles for the trade with Japan, which, for the present, was suspended.<sup>(2)</sup>

After the peace between the English and Dutch had been signed, orders were given to keep on the best terms possible  
with

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Gombroon, 8th May, 7th July, and 7th April 1674.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 7th July, 29th September, 1st November, and 24th December 1673.

with the Natives, both in the vicinity of Fort St. George and in Bengal, as it would be hazardous and expensive to solicit new Phirmaunds from the King of Golcondah, or the Mogal, experience having shewn, that, even when such grants were obtained, the oppressions of the Nabobs, or Naigs, were seldom diminished. CHAP. II.  
1673-74.

Three ships, amounting to thirteen hundred and fifty tons, with cargoes estimated at £87,000, were to be dispatched, this season, for Coast and Bay :—the cargoes consisted chiefly of money, with a very small quantity of goods, (broad-cloths, &c.) in compliance with the opinion of the Agent and Council :—the investment for Europe was ordered to consist chiefly of Coast cloths, of the denominations frequently specified, and of ten thousand pieces of taffaties, and three hundred tons of saltpetre from Bengal :—the value of £10,000 in goods, was to be forwarded to Bantam, to enable that Agency to resume its trade ;—and a new set of regulations was transmitted for the management of the warehouses at Fort St. George, and the subsistence of the Factors and Writers at a public table.<sup>(1)</sup> Equipments  
and stock for  
Fort St.  
George.

From HUGHLY being subordinate to the Fort, and receiving from thence the detail of the measures which the Court had adopted, both during the war, and after peace had placed trade on better ground, local directions only appear, viz. to Commercial  
instructions  
to the Agent  
in Bengal.

2 U 2

select

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 13th March 1673-74, and 3d April 1674.

CHAP. II. select finer taffaties, of a green and black colour ;—to keep  
 1673-74. the saltpetre men and weavers employed, and always to have  
 a quantity of these commodities ready for the shipping on  
 their arrival, for which purpose, authority was given to  
 the Factory to draw on the Court to the amount of £20,000  
 this season ; but, under no circumstances, to detain the  
 ships beyond the period when their passage round the Cape  
 could be secure, this being essential for the Company's sales,  
 in which any deficiency of the goods expected for the home  
 market had the worst effect. <sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments,  
 stock, and  
 commercial  
 instructions  
 to Bantam.

The instructions to the Agent and Council at BANTAM, in 1673-74, are introduced with a similar narrative of the state of affairs in Europe, as had been sent to Surat and Fort St. George, but with the additional information, that the force sent out by the Dutch against the French, might probably be directed against Bantam, and the commercial Agencies at Tywan, Cambodia, and Japan, rather than against the Company's Settlements on the continent of India; a conjecture which the capture of three of their ships, last season, fully justified :—this misfortune the Court attributed to the misconduct of the Agent at Bantam, who had detained the ships, particularly the vessel intended for Tywan, after the monsoon had set in, which had obliged the Court to dispatch a small vessel to Bantam, with a cargo of £1,200, under orders

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Hughly, 7th July and 31st October 1673, and 13th and 16th March 1673-74.

orders to return direct to England with pepper, and with <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> instructions to the Agents always to have a considerable <sup>1673-74.</sup> quantity of this article in readiness to meet the large equipment and stock to be consigned to them, as soon as the peace with the Dutch should be ratified. <sup>(1)</sup>

When this event took place, in February 1673-74, the destination of the small ship was changed, and the Company's ship *Eagle*, with a stock estimated at £11,000, was consigned to Bantam, with information that seventeen hundred and sixty tons of shipping would be dispatched in the course of the season, and a stock estimated at £30,000; the Agency therefore, were to provide a large proportion of pepper, and of benjamin, sugar, and ginger:—one of the ships was to proceed to Jambee, and the whole were to sail for Europe without delay.

The restoration of peace again gave the Company an opportunity to attempt trade at Tywan, Formosa, and Japan, and as it was also the wish of the Court to obtain a proportion of the trade in the finer spices, they desired the Agent to transmit the fullest information on those subjects, that they might proceed in framing instructions for the subsequent season, when it was intended to send out near three thousand tons of shipping to Bantam. <sup>(2)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 2d. August and 2d October 1673.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 13th March 1673-74, and 3d April, and 1st and 6th May 1674.

CHAP. II.  
 1673-74. St. Helena granted by Charter to the East-India Company.

The event of the capture of the Island of ST. HELENA by the Dutch, and the re-capture of it, this season, by Captain (afterwards Sir Richard) Munden, gave rise to a new question, respecting the rights of the Crown and of the Company; or whether the Island of St. Helena (which had been granted to the Company by the King's Charter, dated 3d April 1661) reverted to them as a right, or whether, from having been recovered by the King's fleet, without the aid of the Company, it again became the property of the Crown, to be disposed of according to the King's pleasure:—to obviate this difficulty, His Majesty, by a Charter, dated 16th December 1673, regranted the Island to the London East-India Company, *in perpetuity*, “to be held of the King, his heirs, and “successors, as of the manor of East Greenwich, in free “and common soccage,” reserving only to the King, the allegiance of the inhabitants.

By this Charter, the King granted to the Company all the ordnance, ammunition, and stores, remaining on the Island, and authorized them to transport to it settlers and recruits, and to send stores and provisions, duty free; to make laws for the government of the Island, and to punish offenders; to appoint and dismiss governors and officers; empowered the Governor of St. Helena to exercise martial law on the Island, and to repel invaders and unlicensed persons; and declared, that the natives and settlers  
 of

of the Island of St. Helena were to be deemed natural-born subjects of England. <sup>(1)</sup> CHAP. II.  
1673-74.

The Court, on receiving this grant, appointed Captain Field to be Governor, with a salary and allowance of £100 per annum; and Captain Beale to be Deputy Governor, with a salary of £50 per annum; and to have under them a storekeeper, artificers, &c.; they were to re-occupy and settle the Island, with one hundred persons (including their families), and had powers to repair and enlarge the fortifications:—the garrison was to consist of two companies, under the command of the Governor and Deputy Governor:—the lands belonging to the old proprietors were to be restored to them; and twenty acres, and two cows, allotted to each of the new settlers, with an allowance of provisions for nine months free, and afterwards at specified rates:—three boats were to be built, and given to the inhabitants, for fishing, that they might add to their means of subsistence; and a market was to be established for provisions.<sup>(2)</sup>

Appoint-  
ments and  
salaries of  
officers, and  
Court's regu-  
lations for St.  
Helena, on  
receiving this  
Charter.

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Connecting the accounts of the situation of the Presidency of SURAT and its dependencies, with the events which occurred Another Eng-  
lish Agent  
sent to nego-  
tiate a treaty  
with Sevagee.

(1)—Letters Patent, granting the Island of St. Helena to the London East-India Company, 16th December 1673. (Printed Collection of Charters, page 96).

(2)—Commission and Instructions to the Governor and Council of St. Helena, 19th December 1678.



CHAP. II. <sup>1673-74.</sup> curred in the Peninsula of India, during the season 1673-74, we discover, that this Presidency was divided in opinion respecting the ultimate success of Sevagee, or of the Mogul, and therefore, unable to decide to which it ought to pay its principal attention. The vicinity of Sevagee's dominions, and his daily encreasing force, seem to have made the strongest impression on their proceedings, both because the stations subjected to his authority furnished the principal articles for the investment, and because it was within the reach of his armies to obstruct the sales and purchases effected at the ports on the Malabar Coast; or, in fact, that he could encourage, or annihilate, the commerce at them.

In this situation, the Presidency decided, that they were more exposed to his incursions, than they could be confident of the protection which the Mogul would afford them; and therefore, in May 1673, Mr. Nichols was sent as an envoy to Sevagee, to require reparation for the losses the Company had experienced at Rajahpore, and a compensation for the recent pillage of the Factory at Hubely, by a part of his army.

Without entering into the detail of his journey, we find that this Envoy was first introduced to Sambagee, the son of Sevagee, and next was admitted into the presence of Sevagee himself:—the negotiation terminated, on the part of this Chief, with promises of protection to the English trade, without giving any security, either for the redress asked, or the protection promised; the Envoy had, therefore,

fore, only to report progress on his return to the Presidency.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1673-74.

Under these political difficulties regarding the Mogul, Sevagee, and the inferior Chiefs who had power over their Factories on the Malabar Coast, the President and Council entered into a comparison of the amount of tonnage and stock which the Court of Directors had sent out, and expected to be filled, and the amount of purchases required for the investments for Europe, with the means within their reach, even in the time of peace. After forming an estimate of the charges of Bombay, they concluded, that as the prices of goods had advanced, during the war, and as obstructions in the markets were daily multiplying, by opposition from the Dutch, an investment for sixteen hundred, instead of four thousand tons, would be all they could collect in this season;—that the stock of £90,000, sent to them by the Court (large as it might arithmetically appear), was unequal to their orders, and that the attempt to invest it, would terminate in disappointment:—besides, considering the arrears they had to liquidate, and the daily charges of Bombay, there would not remain a sum to purchase investments for this large tonnage, or to meet the Company's instructions to make provision for the subsequent year:—under such difficulties, the Council at Surat had referred the whole subject to the judgement of President Aungier, at

The Court's orders for provision of a large investment at Surat impracticable, from the low state of funds.

VOL. II.

2 X

this

(1)—Surat Consultations, 24th May 1672.— Mr. Nichols's Report of his negotiation with Sevagee Rajah, in May and June 1673. (Vol. xxix, 1673, No. 2729).

CHAP. II. this time arranging the Company's interests at Bombay,<sup>(1)</sup>  
 1673-74. and transmitted to him an account of the actual Quick Stock of the Company, made up to August 1673, amounting to £88,228, and an account of their debts (exclusive of interest at nine per cent.) amounting to £86,234, leaving only a balance of stock of £1,994. From this state of their affairs they inferred, that with such means, and with the engagements into which they had entered, to obtain goods for Europe, with all that could be collected at their Factories from Carwar to Surat, and the country ships exposed, in their passage to Surat, to interruption by the Dutch fleet, that it would be possible only to obtain an investment to fill up fifteen hundred tons, and that, even this, must be obtained, by giving advanced prices to the Malabar Rajahs for pepper, which, supposing it could be procured, would not be ready at the time the ships must be dispatched to Europe.<sup>(2)</sup>

President Aungier's answer discovers equal prudence and perseverance, for promoting the Company's commercial interests:—he proposed, first, the liberating a vessel from Rajahpore, which had been detained at Bombay, to make an impression on Sevagee and the merchants at that port, of the honour and justice of the Company's proceedings; and, on this concession, to rest the hope of obtaining from Rajahpore,  
 pepper

(1)—Letter from the Council at Surat to President Aungier at Bombay, 6th and 7th August 1673.

(2)—Letter from the Council at Surat to the President at Bombay, 11th August 1673.

pepper and cloth for the investment expected by the Court, with such additional quantities of other goods, as could be brought from Carwar, Batticolo, &c. :—he next recommended to the Council at Surat, to make the greatest exertion their means could allow, to meet the expectation of the Court, admitting, at the same time, the obstacles from the opposition of the Dutch, and their influence over all the ports to which the Company's ships resorted ;—he conceded also, that however plausible the instructions of the Court might be, that plausibility was done away, by the deficiency in the amount of stock, and by the power of the enemies (European and Native) with which their servants had to contend.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the progress of this season, appearances, rather than events, in the wars between Sevagee and the Mogul, continued to render political, as well as commercial transactions, as difficult to devise as to execute ; for it was at this juncture, that Sevagee was endeavouring, partly by promises, and partly by threats, to bring over the Kings of Visiapore and Golcondah to his interest :—this situation of the Native Powers obstructed the purchases at Carwar, and by the menacing station his army had taken near Surat, exposed that city to contributions, to compensate for the losses he had sustained by the irregular invasions of the Siddee's fleet, of different towns on his part of the Coast ; hence there was a strong pro-

Measures of President Aungier for defence of Bombay, if attacked by the fleets of the Mogul or of Sevagee.

2 X 2

bability,

(1)—Letter from President Aungier at Bombay to the Deputy and Council at Surat, 21st August 1673.

CHAP. II. bability, that he might again attack Surat, where, though he  
 1673-74. might respect the Company's house and flag, there was no  
 security for the goods inland :—President Aungier, therefore,  
 considered it to be necessary, as an attack might be made on  
 Surat, to remove the Company's goods, for safety, to Swally,  
 and to station the Hunter (Company's frigate) off Surat, to  
 protect the servants of the Factory.

The anxieties, both of the Presidency of Surat, and the  
 Council of Bombay, were increased, by the Siddee's fleet  
 blocking up the river of Caranjah, and projecting a small for-  
 tification on the Island, situated at the mouth of that river :  
 measures which, if persevered in, would cut off the supplies  
 of provisions brought from the continent to the Island of  
 Bombay ;—it became, therefore, a subject for consultation,  
 whether opposition should be made to the Siddee ; reasoning,  
 on the one hand, that such opposition might give occasion to  
 the expulsion of the English from Surat, and their other  
 settlements, and trade in the Mogul's dominions ; and, on the  
 other, by submitting to him, to run the hazard of losing  
 Bombay. It was, at last, resolved to temporise, and to en-  
 deavour, by petitions and by presents to the Siddee, to re-  
 move his fleet and avoid a quarrel. Such an event the Dutch  
 would readily turn to their own advantage, and, by their aid,  
 the Island of Bombay might be lost, and the Company's Settle-  
 ment at Surat, perhaps ruined.<sup>(1)</sup>

This

(1)—Letters from President Aungier and Council at Bombay to the Presidency of  
 Surat, 23d October 1673. (Surat Consultations, 25th October 1673.)

This prudent conduct had the best effect:—the Siddee's fleet, unable to make any impression on Sevagee's country, retired, and the Native Merchants began to consider, that piracy might be the Siddee's ultimate object, and, therefore, withdrew the assistance they had given him. These events enabled the Presidency to raise money, to the extent of 30,000 rupees, required to place the garrison of Bombay in a state of defence, against any attack from the Dutch, under Van Goens.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1673-74.

This interesting report of President Aungier is summed up with a general recapitulation of the funds necessary to preserve the Company's Dead Stock, and of the money required for carrying on the purchase, and sales for investments. Two great causes, in his opinion, obstructed the progress of trade, and increased the expence of the establishment; first, the almost general wars in India, occasioned by the rivalship of Sevagee and Aurungzebe, and the decline of the power of the Kings of Visiapore and Golcondah, and of the lesser States on the Malabar Coast; and next, the necessary and unavoidable charges incurred in securing Bombay, which, when made over to the Company, was almost a desert island, but which had been made a centre for their trade, protected by

State of the  
Company's  
funds at Su-  
rat.

(1)—Letter from the Council at Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, 31st October 1673.— Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 14th and 18th November 1673.— Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Council of Bombay, 22d and 29th November 1673.

CHAP. II.  
1673-74. by strong fortifications, and having a harbour and docks for the reception of their shipping :—the first of these causes, the President considered to be destructive of all commercial proceedings, and wholly without his control; the second, he held to be a necessary consequence of obtaining a secure and independent station for trade. Under such embarrassments and charges, he stated to the Court, that their debts in India amounted to £100,000, exclusive of the rapid accumulation of them by the payment of high interest; and concluded, under an existing war, and with those pressures, that to support their credit, and again enter the market with effect, a stock of £250,000, or at least £200,000, would be required, chiefly in bullion, for the season 1675. To illustrate this opinion, Mr. Aungier enumerated the failure in the sales of Europe produce and merchandize, from the markets for those articles being obstructed by the wars, from the price of Indian produce being raised by the influx of Europe produce, through the Dutch and French, and by their demands having raised the prices of the articles, which formerly constituted the principal part of the Surat investment.<sup>(1)</sup>

Under all these circumstances, however, this able officer of the Company collected an investment for Europe, from the  
 Presidency

(1)—Letter from President Aungier and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 15th December 1673.

Presidency of Surat, amounting, for this season, to the sum of **£104,000.**<sup>(1)</sup> CHAP. II.  
1673-74.

The subsequent events in this season were, first, the alarms of the Presidency of an attack on Bombay or Surat, by the Dutch fleet, under Van Goens; for they reasoned, that should he succeed in capturing St. Thomé from the French, his force would next be brought against Bombay;—secondly, the arrival of four large Dutch ships, laden with spices, which had given them a commanding hold on the trade of Surat; and, lastly, the revival of the Portuguese commerce, and the oppressive proceedings of the Viceroy of Goa, which would endanger the continuance of the English trade; and concluded with a request to the Court, for instructions regarding the conduct he should observe towards those European maritime allies or enemies.<sup>(2)</sup>

Apprehension of an attack on Bombay, by the Dutch fleet.

The separate information from BOMBAY, during the season 1673-74, consisted of what would, in modern times, be termed a statistical account of the Island, specifying the division of it into the districts of Bombay and Mahim, with an account of its inhabitants, European and Native;—the extent and magnitude of the fortifications, upon which one hundred pieces of cannon had already been mounted;—the strength.

State of the trade and garrison of Bombay.

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 12th January 1673-74.

(2)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 16th and 20th March 1673-74, and 1st April 1674.



CHAP. II. strength of the garrison, consisting of two companies, of  
 1673-74. two hundred men each, of which the greatest proportion were  
 topasses, and one hundred more of this force employed in the  
 marine, and of three companies of militia. The report pro-  
 ceeded to consider (in the event of peace) the practicability  
 of rendering Bombay a seat of trade, equal to Surat, without  
 interfering with the purchases or sales at that Presidency:—  
 It was taken as a principle, that branches of trade might be  
 opened between Bombay, and the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia,  
 and between this Island and the ports of Sevagee, and those in  
 the Decan; but this speculation affords only the result, that  
 however comprehensive the views of President Aungier might  
 be, taking the whole of the preceding details into consider-  
 ation, the prospect of an enlarged commerce from Bombay  
 was precarious, if not doubtful.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Dutch  
 attack the  
 Company's  
 homeward-  
 bound  
 ships on the  
 Coromandel  
 Coast, and  
 besiege the  
 French settle-  
 ment of St.  
 Thomé.

The Company's affairs at FORT ST. GEORGE, at the close  
 of the preceding season, were disturbed, by the circumstance  
 of St. Thomé being in possession of the French, at this time,  
 indeed, the unnatural ally of the English, against the Dutch,  
 but, in a prospective view, the dangerous neighbour, and  
 probable enemy of the English Settlement. The events of  
 this season (1673-74), at Fort St. George, are rather to be  
 viewed as the result of the improvident relation with France,  
 than

(1)—Account of the Island of Bombay, by President Aungier and the Council, 15th  
 December 1673.— Letter from the Council of Bombay to the Court, 19th January  
 1673-74.

than as a part of the Dutch opposition to the English interests, CHAP. II.  
it being obvious, that whether the French should continue 1673-74.  
in, or be dislodged from St. Thomé, a strong hold in the  
neighbourhood of Madras, in possession of an European rival,  
would be the source of great danger ; and it is memorable, at  
this early period, that Sir William Langhorne, the Governor  
of Fort St. George, should describe the French to be a more  
dangerous neighbour than the Dutch, and that they were in-  
triguing in the extreme with the Native Chiefs. Matters, at  
Fort St. George, were in this situation, when the Dutch  
besieged the French in St. Thomé, and their fleet on this  
service, consisting of fourteen sail, met the Company's  
homeward-bound ships, consisting of ten sail, off Pettipolee,  
on the 22d August 1673 ; and after a running engagement, took  
two of the ships and sunk one ; the remainder retired to  
Madras, and after being repaired, sailed with an investment  
for Europe, estimated at 156,000 pagodas.<sup>(1)</sup>

As the Dutch forces and fleet made no impression on St.  
Thomé, their influence with the King of Golcondah was  
affected by their want of success in this enterprize ; but, till  
the close of this season, a kind of neutrality was observed, with  
respect to Madras.

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Presidency of Surat, 2d and 10th September 1673.— Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 20th September 1673.— Letter from Sir William Langhorne to the Court, 12th September 1673.

CHAP. II.  
 1673-74. State of af-  
 fairs at Ma-  
 sulipatam  
 and in Ben-  
 gal.

The advices from the subordinate Factory of MASULIPATAM, consisted, in this year, only of details of the oppression which they were experiencing from the Governor, and of his acting, in some degree, independent of the King of Golcondah, in consequence of a dispute about the succession to that kingdom; an event which was noticed in the abridgement of Aurungzebe's reign, in a preceding part of this Chapter, as one of the causes of the subjugation of Golcondah to the Mogul power.<sup>(1)</sup>

It does not appear, that any event of consequence occurred at the Company's Factories in BENGAL, from which the ships were dispatched for Madras, to form part of the Europe fleet of this year.

Trade at Bantam suspended, by the superior naval force of the Dutch.

The events at BANTAM, in 1673-74, furnish only the sequel of the disasters experienced from the Dutch war in the preceding year; or that numerous captures had been made by the Dutch, of the ships and small vessels connected with the English trade at that port, and that the influx of Europe produce by the Danes and Dutch, had rendered the exchange of them for pepper, almost impossible, and raised this article to an exorbitant price.<sup>(2)</sup>

Unsuccessful result of the project for opening a trade with Tywan.

The projected trade to Tywan, in Formosa, for which the ship Experiment had been dispatched from Bantam, was found, on trial, to be impracticable, and the information on which

(1)—Letter from the Factory at Masulipatam to the Court, 25th August 1673.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Presidency of Surat, 22d September 1673.

which this speculation had proceeded to be fallacious. On the Experiment's arrival at Tywan, the captain discovered that the sugar and hides, which were the principal articles that would admit of profitable exchanges at Japan, were engrossed by the King, exclusively, and that the returns, by his junks, from Japan, which brought silver, copper, &c., were the funds with which he paid his army; the Company's ship was therefore obliged, after losing the monsoon, to take in such Tywan goods as she could procure, and to return to Bantam, and on her voyage (being ignorant of the breaking out of the war) fell in with eight sail of Dutch ships, in the Straits of Banca, and was captured, on the 9th December 1672, and Captain Limbrey, and his crew, carried prisoners to Batavia.<sup>(1)</sup>

The other vessel, the Return, which, with the Experiment, had been sent from England, to open a trade at Tywan, and at Japan, after touching at Bantam, and getting produce and instructions, proceeded to Tywan, where, on consultation, it was found advisable that the Experiment's goods should be shipped in the Return, and that the former should be sent to Bantam, as has been detailed, and the latter to proceed for Japan:—the Return reached the port of Nagasaki, on the 29th June 1673; but her commander also was ignorant of the existing war between Holland and England:—Mr. Delboe, the chief factor on board, intimated to the Governor of the

Mr. Delboe's report on the attempt to renew the trade with Japan.

2 Y 2

port,

(1)—Letter from Captain Limbrey to the President at Bombay, dated Batavia, 16th September 1673, (vol. xxix, No. 2768.)

CHAP. II.  
1673-74. port, that he had come to renew the ancient trade between Japan and England, which had been interrupted for forty-nine years, and was answered, that, in the first place, he must deliver up his guns and ammunition, till the Emperor's pleasure could be known :—after complying with this hazardous condition, and undergoing the strictest examination, respecting the causes of the interruption of the trade, (or the civil wars in England, and two successive wars with the Dutch,) he was, at last, informed, that no trade would be allowed by the Emperor, to a people so nearly allied to the Portuguese, as the King of England had been married to a Princess of that country; and though it was explained, that this circumstance did not alter the character of the English nation, who were Protestants, as well as the Dutch, this explanation was doubted, from so trifling a circumstance as the English flag having the St. George's Cross on it, which was considered as resembling the Portuguese flag :—after, therefore, being permitted to remain at Nagasaki, but not to trade, till the monsoon changed, and the wind became favorable for his departure, though several Dutch ships had arrived with intelligence of the war, the guns and ammunition were re-delivered, with an exactness which could not have been expected; and the ship, attended by the Japanese boats out of the harbour, allowed to depart, on the 28th August 1673, under assurances, that the Dutch ships should not be permitted to follow her for two months

months, that she might have time to reach Bantam unmolested by an enemy.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.

1673-74.

Mr. Delboe, and the Factors and officers, on getting to sea, held a consultation, respecting the place to which they should proceed:—the difficulties which had been experienced at Tywan in Formosa, had rendered that speculation unprofitable;—the prohibition, by the Spaniards, of trade to Manilla, made it unsafe to attempt that port;—the return to Bantam, from the Dutch naval power, and the uncertainty, even there, of the safety of the ship and cargo, rendered this destination hazardous;—the voyage to Surat, through the Straits of Malacca, and along the coast of India, equally so;—it was therefore resolved, to make for the port of Macao, at which, from the amity between the King and the Portuguese, it was hoped, at least, the ship and cargo would be safe, and the prospect of finding a market for part of their goods not improbable. This ship reached Macao on the 13th September 1673, and though, by the Portuguese intrigues with the Governor, a Factory was not allowed to be established, the vessel was careened, and the goods landed, but under such restrictions, that trade could only be attempted through the Portuguese; and, from not having silver on board (the only medium which the Chinese would accept), the sales of goods were

Mr. Delboe suggests establishing a Factory at Macao, to introduce the sale of English goods into China.

(1)—Mr. Delboe's narrative of the attempts to open a trade in the Empire of Japan, June to August 1673, (vol. xxx. No. 2829.)

CHAP. II. were partial, and the purchases inconsiderable. This incident, 1673-74. however, was the basis of an important speculation, suggested by Mr. Delboe and the Factors, that the Governor of Bombay should endeavour to negotiate with the Viceroy of Goa, for permission for the English to have a Factory, and liberty of trade, at Macao, because a considerable quantity of the Company's goods might be disposed of to the Chinese, and Chinese produce obtained in return, - which might find a profitable sale, both in India and in Europe ; and, probably, to this incident may be traced the origin of the China trade of the East-India Company.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Consultations held on board the Return, 1st September 1673, (vol. xxix, No. 2758.)— Letter from Mr. Delboe to the Governor of Bombay, dated Macao, 2d December 1673, (vol. xxx. No. 2829.)

## 1674-75.

THE proceedings of the Court of Directors, in the season 1674-75, were influenced by the indirect attacks of the Private Traders, or Interlopers, by the political and commercial difficulties in the Peninsula of India, and by the military defence of Bombay, on which President Aungier had made his report.

From the period at which the Council of State (during the Interregnum) had decided, that the trade between England and the East-Indies could only proceed on a Joint Stock, with exclusive privileges, and, in a greater degree, from the Restoration of the Company's Charter by King Charles II., the interference of the Private Traders, or Interlopers, as individuals, or as associations, had disappeared; and the transfer of the Island of Bombay to the Company, by the Crown, had satisfied them, that any direct attack on the Company's privileges would be discouraged:—this impression, if it had checked, had not altogether extinguished their projects, and they were watching any incident which might again give plausibility to their speculations.

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.  
Statement of the Company's exports of bullion, and general view of their trade published, to counteract the schemes of the Interlopers.

It



CHAP. II.  
1674-75.

It had been the practice of the Company to export, annually, under the licence of the Crown, considerable quantities of bullion and of foreign coins, as stock, for purchasing investments:—this practice, the Interlopers represented to be prejudicial to the interest of the Kingdom, and injurious to commercial credit. The Court, aware that these assertions might, in the first instance, prejudice the public, and subsequently the Government, against them, as a body, with exclusive privileges, and again bring up questions and opinions, that might facilitate the projects of their domestic opponents, adopted the decided measure of placing before the Government, a statement of facts, regarding their exports of bullion and foreign coins, that they might prove, by the large sums which the Company's trade paid to the revenue, and the outlets which it afforded to the staples and merchandize of the Kingdom, that, instead of being prejudicial to the general commerce of the Kingdom, or, in any degree, detrimental to commercial credit, it had eminently contributed to the support of both.

The following statement of the Company's affairs, at this juncture, will afford an interesting view of the value of the East-India trade, on a Joint Stock, to the navigation and commerce of the Kingdom.

“ A particular of all bullion (gold, silver, and pieces of  
“ eight) shipt out by the Company, since the year 1667-68,  
“ to this present year, 1674.

“ In

	£.	s.	d.	CHAP. II. 1674-75.
“ In the year 1667-68 . . . . .	128,605	17	5	
1668-69 . . . . .	162,394	9	10	
1669-70 . . . . .	187,458	3	8	
1670-71 . . . . .	186,149	10	11	
1671-72 . . . . .	186,420	8	3	
1672-73 . . . . .	131,300	5	11	
1673-74 . . . . .	182,983	0	6	

“ In lieu whereof, and of several sorts of manufactures  
 “ sent out by the Comp<sup>a</sup>, there had been paid unto His  
 “ Ma<sup>ty</sup> for custom, yearly (*communibus annis*) the sum of  
 “ about £35,000 per annum.

“ And for encreasing the navigation and strength of  
 “ this kingdom, there hath been built, within that time, and  
 “ are now in building, twenty-four sail of ships, from three  
 “ hundred and fifty, to six hundred tons burden, and they  
 “ have paid for freight and wages, yearly, to the amount of  
 “ £100,000 per annum.

“ And have furnished His Majesty’s kingdoms of Eng-  
 “ land, Scotland, and Ireland, with all sorts of East-India  
 “ commodities (excepting cinnamon, cloves, nutts, and  
 “ mace), which, had they not done, would have cost the  
 “ kingdom farr greater rates to have been supplied from other  
 “ nations.

“ And, besides which, there is exported East-India  
 “ goods to other countries (by moderate estimate) double the  
 VOL. II. 2 Z “ value

CHAP. II. “ value of what they have so exported in bullion, which is a  
 1674-75. “ very great encrease to the stock of this kingdom, and the  
 “ proceed of a greater part thereof is, from time to time,  
 “ returned in gold and silver.

“ And as for the permissions granted to others to send  
 “ on their ships, the Company not finding it convenient for  
 “ themselves to trade in diamonds, bezoar stones, amber-  
 “ greese, musk, pearles, and other fine goods, they have  
 “ given leave to others to trade therein, paying onely a small  
 “ acknowledgem<sup>t</sup> to the Comp<sup>a</sup> for freight, to the end that  
 “ trade might not onely be preserved, but encreased, to the  
 “ kingdom’s advantage: by which, also, this kingdom is not  
 “ onely furnished with those commodities, but there is also  
 “ sent out from hence, of those fine goods, to a very great  
 “ value, unto other countries, for encreasing the stock of this  
 “ kingdom.” (1)

This statement suppressed the latent opposition to the Company’s trade, and accounts for the large equipments and stock which, in this year, were provided for the prosecution of their commerce.

Instructions  
 to Surat and  
 Fort St.  
 George, for  
 their conduct  
 towards the  
 Native Powers  
 the Dutch,  
 and the Por-  
 tuguese.

As the political and commercial embarrassments in the Peninsula of India, on which the able report of President Aungier had been made, and the military establishment, which now began to assume a more regular form, both at  
 Bombay

(1)—Memorial relative to bullion exported by the East-India Company, 1674. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 264.)

Bombay and at Fort St. George, were subjects which, from being new, were not fully intelligible to the Court, we discover indecision, and timidity, in the resolutions on which they formed their instructions to their Foreign Presidencies; for, instead of prescribing measures for regulating the political conduct of the Presidency of SURAT with the Mogul, or with Sevagee, they founded the instructions on a commercial caution, little suited to the difficulties which their servants had to encounter.

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.

In President Aungier's report, he had stated, that, by taking part with the Mogul, he might provoke Sevagee to expel the Company from their Factories on the Malabar part of his dominions, or the Mogul to withdraw those Phirmaunds, or grants, which had been purchased at so great an expence:—the Court were uninformed of the history of the Asiatic Sovereigns, or Chiefs, on whose favour their Presidencies and Factories depended, and the Government not less so, from being habituated to European politics, inapplicable to the Indies, and therefore often framed instructions, which their servants could neither observe, nor apply to the situations in which they were placed.

The orders of the Court to the Presidency of Surat and the Agency of Fort St. George, directed them to make concessions to the Mogul, that the Company's privileges and trade at Surat might be preserved, and to form a convention with Sevagee, on the basis of recovering their losses by

CHAP. II. his invasion of Surat, and at the Factories on the coasts of  
 1674-75. his dominions:—these general orders, however natural to cautious men, anxious to preserve their trade, could be of no use to their servants, who could only act according as circumstances, in the general war on the West of India, or on the Coromandel Coast, prescribed:—when these might occur, it would be in vain that their servants refused compliance with the demands of the Native Powers, by stating the orders of the Court to remain neuter, when, in fact, they had neither force nor means to become parties in the Indian wars, and could not enter into any engagements to afford assistance to the Mogul or to Sevagee;—the difficulty, therefore, still remained, because excuses would not be listened to, or understood, by the contending sovereigns, who could alone balance the favours they conferred, by the services of those whom they protected.

The same indecision in the Court, is observable in the instructions given to their servants, for their conduct towards the Portuguese, for they ordered the President and Council of Surat, and the Governor of Bombay, notwithstanding the slender military force on the Island, to maintain the pass between Tannah and Caranjah, and Bombay, forgetting that this was the immediate source of dispute with that nation.

Equipments  
and stock for  
Surat en-  
creased to pay  
off debts.

The equipments for this season, for the Presidency of Surat, consisted of five ships, or two thousand one hundred tons:—four of these ships were to proceed to the Factories on the  
 the

the Malabar Coast, to take in the goods provided at the Out-stations, and to complete their lading at Surat and Bombay; and one was to be dispatched, with a suitable assortment of Europe and Surat goods, to Bantam. The stock on those vessels was estimated at £189,000, chiefly in bullion, with a proportion of broad-cloths, lead, tin, and quicksilver, under a general order to dispose of the goods, at such prices as they would bring in the market, and to apply the proceeds to the discharge of the debts at interest, and the balance (whatever it might be), to the provision of an investment for the subsequent season; in particular, to dispose of the cochineal at a low price, to prevent this article being brought from India, by the traders to the Persian Gulf:—in return, the investment was to consist of Surat piece goods, for which, however, a lower price must be paid, as these articles had not so ready a sale in England as the Coromandel cloths; that a less quantity of Lahore indigo should be sent than formerly, because the importations from the West-Indies, of this article, had lowered the demand for that of Lahore;—and that a less quantity of lac would be required, because the demand for that article had decreased, from the new practice of using wafers, instead of wax, for sealing letters.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Court, on the subject of the fortifications and strength of the garrison at BOMBAY, which had, for several years,

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.

Seamen not to be allowed to settle as colonists at Bombay.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 5th March 1674r75.

CHAP. II. years, been under their notice, were influenced by the event of  
 1674-75. the return of peace with the Dutch, but do not appear to have estimated the danger to which the Island was exposed, in case of any attack by the Mogul's fleets, or those of Seva-gee. In a former season they had recommended, that supernumeraries from any of the Company's ships, who might be disposed to engage in the military service at Bombay, might be encouraged; but, in this season, they ordered, that the Governor should not encourage the settlement of any Europeans on the Island, but such as might be sent from England, under covenants; assigning as a reason, that enlisting men from their ships weakened the crews, and might stand in the way of the colonists and their families receiving that encouragement, which it was their intention to offer to those who might be disposed to proceed direct from England to Bombay.<sup>(1)</sup>

Court's measures for the Persian trade.

Though the Court were disposed, in this season, to revive and encrease the trade to PERSIA, they were without the knowledge of facts, on which they could frame positive instructions; and were apprehensive, that the sending of armed vessels into the Gulf, might lead to hostilities with the Mogul's subjects, which would endanger the trade at the ports of that Empire, and afford an opportunity to the Dutch to get an exclusive possession of the Persian trade;—adopting, therefore,

a

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 5th March 1674-75.

a middle course, they recommended, that the ships intended for the Persian Gulf should be fitted equally for war and for trade, to give the appearance of force and of commerce, and that the Agent at Gombroon should provide as much Caramania wool, (which was in great demand,) as his funds would allow, and recover the moiety of the customs, till such time as a better knowledge of the relative circumstances of Persia and India should enable the Court to determine, whether it would be preferable to place the Persian trade on a more enlarged scale, by means of negotiation, or by an encrease of naval force.<sup>(1)</sup>

As the Court had not received intelligence, in this season, of the removal of the French from St. Thomé, and could not but be apprehensive of the measures which the Dutch might adopt, supposing them to be possessed of that place, for distressing, if not laying siege to FORT ST. GEORGE, they sent strict orders to the Agent and Council to direct their chief attention to the improvement of the fortifications, and the discipline of the garrison, that they might be always in a situation to resist an European enemy. If St. Thomé should remain with the French, and a war in Europe take place between France and England, (of which the French commander

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.

Fortifications at Fort St. George to be strengthened, on account of the war between the French and Dutch.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 5th March 1674-75.— Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors in Persia, 5th March 1674-75.



CHAP. II.  
1674-75. commander would receive earlier intelligence than the Company's Agent) it was probable, they would immediately attack Fort St. George, and might take it by surprise :—if the Dutch got possession of it, and a war took place between England and Holland, from the superiority of the Dutch naval and military power in the East-Indies, Madras might be lost.

To provide against either of these contingencies, and as an encouragement to the military officers, for vigilance, an additional allowance was granted to them, proportionate to their rank :—and to prevent disputes respecting the orders of the Agent and Council to the garrison, it was required, that all questions, respecting the defence of the place, should be decided by a majority of votes; and that the minority should not sign such orders, but enter the reasons of their dissent, on the books, and transmit them to the Court.

Increased equipments and stock for Fort St. George and Bengal.

The equipments of this season, for Fort St. George, amounted to five ships, or two thousand four hundred tons ;—the stock, principally in bullion, was estimated at £202,000, of which £100,000 was to be invested in Coast goods, at Madras, and £35,000 at Masulipatam, and the remaining £65,000 was to be remitted to the Factories in Bengal :—of the £100,000 ordered to be invested at Madras, £12,000 was to be expended in purchasing Coast goods for Bantam. In return for this large stock, the Court expected a considerable investment of Coast cloths, for the home sales; but, greater

greater care, than formerly, must be observed, in selecting these cloths, both in their fineness and breadths. <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> (1) <sub>1674-75.</sub>

From the large stock remitted to BENGAL, a proportionate investment was expected in silks and saltpetre, that country affording those articles of a superior kind, and, therefore, they were not to be purchased, in future, on the Coromandel Coast, on the Company's account.

The Factors in Bengal were authorised, besides the £65,000 of stock, to take up £20,000 at interest; and such proportion of this large sum as might remain, after purchasing silks and taffaties of a finer quality, (the black and green silks to be under the inspection of the English dyers) and six hundred tons of the best saltpetre, was to be invested in white sugar, cotton-yarn, turmeric, and bee's-wax, to fill up any spare tonnage in the ships, when they came round from Masulipatam to Hughly, to take in their cargoes. (2)

It might have been expected, that the Court, after the full information which they had received of the commercial circumstances of the Agency of BANTRAM; of the subordinate stations of Jambee, Tonquin, and Tywan; of the ineffectual attempt to open an intercourse with Japan, and of the experi-

Equipments and stock for Bantam increased, to renew the attempt of trade at Japan

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3 A

relinquishing

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 17th August and 22d December 1674.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Hughly, 27th August and 23d December 1674.

CHAP. II. relinquishing the project of a Factory' at Japan, and have  
 1674-75. addressed the King for his good offices with Portugal, to  
 obtain a reception for their ships at Macao:—in defiance,  
 however, of all difficulties, the Court resolved to persevere in  
 their efforts to open the trade with Japan, and, for this  
 purpose, instructed the Agent at Bantam, to endeavour to  
 persuade the King of Tywan to interpose his good offices  
 with the Emperor, by explaining, that the Portuguese  
 were subjected to the King of Castile, at the time when they  
 interfered with the religious observances of Japan, but now  
 they were governed by their lawful sovereign;—and that  
 the English intended to fix a principal seat of their trade at  
 Tywan, at which they would encourage the introduction of  
 Japan produce, (gold, silver, and copper), and give in ex-  
 change, English goods, and Coast and Surat cloths.

The equipments for BANTAM, in this season, amounted  
 to two thousand five hundred tons, and the stock, in bullion  
 and goods, was stimated at £65,000, exclusive of £20,000  
 in goods, to be forwarded from Surat and Fort St. George.<sup>(1)</sup>

Additional  
 regulations  
 for St. Hele-  
 na.

ST. HELENA, also, in this season, became a subject of  
 attention to the Court. Though the number of the colonists,  
 to whom lands had been allotted, was considerable, they were  
 not, as yet, equal to the defence of the Island; the Governor,  
 therefore, was instructed to give encouragement to such  
 landmen,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council of Bantam, 23d October  
 and 18th December 1674, and 9th February, and 5th and 22d March 1674-75.

landmen, or seamen, as offered to become settlers, on their agreeing to assist in its defence, which, it was hoped, would enable him to reduce the garrison from seventy-five to fifty men :—he was also to encourage fishing, and always to have in store dried provisions, to prevent scarcity: and though civility and assistance were to be shewn to such ships as might touch at the Island, the crews were not to be permitted to land, to whatever nation they might belong.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.

1674-75.

The Foreign transactions at the Presidency of SURAT, and in the Island of BOMBAY, during the season 1674-75, open with the deliberations and proceedings of the President and Council, to meet the difficulties, which they were experiencing from Aurungzebe, and from Sevagee, not only at Surat, but on the coast opposite to Bombay, and in the countries in the vicinity of those ports on the Malabar Coast, at which the Company's trade had, hitherto, been carried on. From having neither force nor authority to take a decided part in favor of any of those Princes, nor specific instructions to direct their commercial relations with them, it remained, on the one hand, to negotiate with Sevagee, for liberty and privileges of trade,

Mr. Henry Oxinden sent as Envoy to Sevagee, and a treaty concluded between this Chief and the Company.

3 A 2

and

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Governor and Council of St. Helena, 18th December 1674.

CHAP. II. and on the other, it was hazardous to form connexions with  
 1674-75. him, which might awaken the suspicions, or expose them to  
 the resentment of Aurungzebe. The state of affairs, at  
 this juncture, from the power of Sevagee, required that  
 an Envoy should be sent to that Chief, and Mr. Henry  
 Oxinden was selected for this service:—his instructions, in  
 substance, were, to endeavour to settle the payment of the  
 damages sustained by the English, at Rajahpore, which, by a  
 convention, had been admitted by Sevagee; to obtain per-  
 mission to trade at the ports in his dominions; and that the  
 Company's Agents might be allowed to make inland purchases  
 and sales in the countries between those ports and the Decan,  
 particularly at the ports opposite to Bombay.

Mr. Oxinden proceeded from Bombay to Rairee, and  
 delivered the presents to the minister, or Peishwah; Morah  
 Pundit; and to the other ministers of Sevagee. Being intro-  
 duced to Sevagee, and to his son, Sambagee, and having made  
 known the Company's requests, he was permitted to attend  
 the coronation of Sevagee, which exhibited all the Eastern  
 magnificence:—this event ascertains the period when the  
 sovereignty of the Hindoos, or Mahrattas, was established,  
 and refers to the Asiatic customs, which must be observed, in  
 soliciting, or receiving, the protection of an Eastern Sovereign.

By the prudent management of Mr. Oxinden, a grant was  
 obtained from Sevagee, on the 12th June 1674, conferring  
 privileges of trade on the Company; with an explanation,  
 that

that if their money should be of sufficient fineness, there could be no difficulty in its passing current in the Hindoo dominions, without being the subject of a separate article in the grant.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.

This treaty with Sevagee was approved of by President Aungier and his Council, and transmitted to the Court, accompanied with an explanation of the measures which he proposed to adopt, for extending the trade.

The war between the Moguls and Patans continued to disturb the northern frontier provinces of the empire, and (as noticed in the abstract of his reign) Aurungzebe had proceeded, in person, to repel, rather than to subdue, that powerful people.

The trade with PERSIA having this year failed, on account of a number of vessels belonging to Surat having been lost, President Aungier attempted to revive the English interests in that kingdom, by sending Mr. Henry Oxinden as Envoy, and to act as second to the Agent at Gombroon.<sup>(2)</sup>

Mr. Oxinden sent to Persia.

Though the accounts of the peace in Europe had reached Surat, in the course of the season, the sales of the Company's exports was heavy, from the influx of similar articles by the other European traders, and the purchase of Surat goods, at the prices

Trade at Surat impeded, by the competitions of the Europeans and the inland wars.

(1)—Instructions from the President and Council at Bombay to Mr. Henry Oxinden, to negotiate with Sevagee Rajah, 11th May 1674.— Mr. Oxinden's Narrative of his Negotiations with Sevagee, 13th May to 13th June 1674, (vol. xxxi. No. 2879)

(2)—Letter from President Aungier and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 20th August 1674.

CHAP. II.  
1674-75. prices specified, had become difficult, from the low state of the funds of the Presidency; and, therefore, they anxiously looked forward to the stock of the subsequent season, and explained, that it would be difficult to find a cargo for Bantam, or sales at that port, as the King had opened a trade with Surat, on his own account.<sup>(1)</sup>

On a general view of the Company's debts, amounting, in November 1674, to the sum of £135,000, the Presidency intimated to the Deputy Governor of Bombay, that he must not only suspend the investment ordered for Bantam, but, in a great measure, the provision of an investment for Europe, till he should receive supplies to revive the Company's credit.<sup>(2)</sup>

Notwithstanding these circumstances, trade was, at this time, extended, by re-establishing a Factory at Rajahpore, at which considerable sales and purchases might be anticipated; <sup>(3)</sup> but this, and other projects for enlarging the sales of Europe goods, and providing investments, during the remainder of the year, had been obstructed, by reports of negotiations between Sevagee and the Mogul, and by the predatory incursions of the Mahratta horse, which had approached Surat, and subsequently plundered the Company's  
Factory

(1)—Letter from the Deputy President and Council at Surat, 12th October 1674.

(2)—Letter from the Deputy President and Council at Surat to Bombay, 4th November 1674.

(3)—General Letter from the Government at Bombay to the Court, 12th November 1674.

Factory at Dungum. In this situation of affairs, the Com-  
 pany's credit had been stretched to its utmost limit, to provide  
 an investment, and to pay interest, and, therefore, they repeated  
 the request for a larger stock, to enable them to make provision  
 for the tonnage expected from Europe.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
 1674-75.

In the Island of BOMBAY, during this season, the enlarge-  
 ment of the fortifications had been postponed, from the want  
 of money to defray the charges, and from the detection and  
 punishment of a dangerous mutiny, in Captain Shaxton's com-  
 pany of infantry. This officer, it will be recollected, had  
 been appointed by the Court, under the strongest recommen-  
 dations, to take charge of the military defence of the Island,  
 and, in the event of the President's absence, to act as Deputy  
 Governor ; but he and his subalterns had encouraged disorderly  
 proceedings among the soldiers, who resolved to lay down their  
 arms, unless their demand for a month's pay, (which they  
 affirmed had been promised to them by the Court), should be  
 paid, and unless their discharge (as their term of three years  
 had expired) should be granted to them. On discovering this  
 mutiny, President Aungier acted with equal prudence and  
 firmness : prudence, in consenting to grant the demands ; and  
 firmness, in bringing the principal ringleaders to trial before a  
 court

Measures of  
 President  
 Aungier for  
 improving  
 the revenues  
 of Bombay.

(1)—General Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court, 20th March 1674-75.— General Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 9th and 11th January 1674-75, and 25th March 1675.



CHAP. II. court martial, preferably to trial by civil law. Three of the  
 1674-75. ringleaders were condemned to death, of whom one, a Corporal Fake, was shot, on the 21st October 1674: the other two were pardoned by the President, at the request of the Council and Officers:—Captain Shaxton was next brought to trial, and found guilty on some of the charges, and sent to England, that the whole of the circumstances regarding him, might be under the knowledge and judgement of the Court and of His Majesty. This event, looking at the Company's Charter, which authorized them to levy, entertain, and discipline forces, furnishes the first example of their exercising martial law.<sup>(1)</sup>

This state of affairs induced President Aungier to continue at Bombay till the arrival of the ships of the following season, conceiving that, in this interval, his presence might contribute to the restoration of order:—meantime, he discharged the Portuguese soldiers, as the recruits arrived, and gave the command to Captain Langford, an officer of character in the King's and Company's service.

President Aungier's attention was next directed to improve the revenues of the Island, by the establishment of a mint, by farming the customs, and by taking measures for the  
 introduction

(1)—Letter from President Aungier and Council at Bombay to the Deputy President, &c. at Surat, 20th August and 23d October 1674.— General Letter from Surat to the Court, 16th December 1674.

introduction of excise duties, to which the inhabitants had been accustomed, under the Portuguese government.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.

As the exemption from the payment of customs for five years (or the period which had elapsed, since the Island was granted by the King to the Company) expired at the close of this season, Mr. Aungier and his Council framed regulations, with the following object, *viz.*—the carrying the amount of the revenue to the Company's account, and applying one per cent. to defray the charges of the fortifications: under this regulation, all goods, whether imported or exported, were to be entered at the Custom-house of Bombay or Mahim, and the following rates were fixed for the principal imports and exports:—all goods imported, including corn, grain, and timber, to pay two and half per cent., and one per cent. towards the fortifications, with the exception of Indian tobacco and Indian iron, which were to pay eight per cent. custom, and one per cent. towards the fortifications:—all goods exported, to pay three and a half per cent.; with the exception of the produce of the Island (cocoa-nuts, salt, fish, &c.) which was to pay eight per cent. custom, and one per cent. towards the fortifications:—gold, silver, jewels, pearls, bezoar stones, musk, amber, and coins of copper and tin, to be free of all customs, either on import or export.<sup>(2)</sup>

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The

(1)—Letter from the President and Council at Bombay to the Court, 18th January 1674-75.

(2)—Rules and Regulations for the Custom-House at Bombay, established by President Aungier, 25th March 1675. (Vol. xxxi, No. 2939.)

## CHAP. II.

1674-75. Dutch take St. Thomé from the French, and deliver it to the King of Golcondah.

The principal events at FORT ST. GEORGE, during this season (1674-75), were, the surrender of St. Thomé by the French to the Dutch, on the 26th August, on condition that the garrison should be transported to Europe; the place was to be ceded by the Dutch to the King of Golcondah, and the Agent and Council expressed the hope, that St. Thomé would be demolished, to prevent its being again occupied by any European power.

In this state of affairs at Fort St. George, offers were made to the Agent and Council, by the Nabobs of Madura and Tanjore, to cede to the Company the ports of Negapatam and Tutacorin, on condition of giving assistance against the Dutch; but these offers were declined, as the goods to be obtained at those ports, would not compensate for the hazard and expences which might be incurred by this connexion.

The commercial events were,—the arrival of the Company's ships and treasure, and the issuing orders to Bengal, to expedite the lading of the saltpetre, silks, &c.<sup>(1)</sup>

Critical situation of Fort St. George.

It would appear, that if the accounts of peace in Europe had not arrived, it was the intention of the Dutch commander, as soon as St. Thomé should be reduced, to have attacked or besieged FORT ST. GEORGE :—though the garrison and fortifications

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Presidency of Surat, 20th May 1674.— General Letters from the Agent and Council of Fort St. George to the Court, 23d September, 1st October, and 1st December 1674, and 14th January 1674-75.

cations were sufficiently strong to have made a vigorous resistance, yet, estimating the strength of the French forces at <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> 1674-75. thirteen hundred Europeans and eight hundred natives, the Dutch at four thousand Europeans, and the King of Golcondah's troops, acting in that quarter, at twelve thousand horse and foot, there was every reason to apprehend an attack on the garrison, amounting only to two hundred and fifty men, exclusive of Peons; the Agent and Council, therefore, submitted to the Court, the necessity of augmenting this force, to enable them to resist either European or Native enemies:—considering, besides, the difficulties which, during the war, they had experienced, and the caution and reserve required towards the French, though allies, yet dangerous neighbours, and the equal caution towards the Dutch, who, notwithstanding the restoration of peace in Europe, were enemies in India; and supported by a superior force by land, and sea, the Fort ought to be strengthened, and the garrison rendered effective.

From the whole of the French and Dutch transactions, this season, it appeared, that though alternately allies to the English, both were real enemies; and that the Portuguese, during the wars of the European Maritime States, having been relieved from the oppressions of the Dutch, were making exertions to re-establish their maritime and commercial intercourse with the natives:—the burden thus fell on the English, who, with heavy charges, had to hold out against their Euro-

CHAP. II. 1674-75. pean rivals, the French, Dutch, Portuguese, and Danes : reinforcements, therefore, for the garrison, and additional stock, in goods and in money, would be requisite, to give the Company a respectable rank in the trade of the Coast, and to render that trade productive in Europe. The Agent and Council, therefore, submitted, that applications should be made by the Company to the King, to form some fixed system, or regulation, by which the respective rights and privileges of the Maritime Powers in Europe, trading to the East-Indies, might be ascertained.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Agent and Council complained, that neither the Agents and Factors in BENGAL, nor in MASULIPATAM, had conformed to the orders of the Court, which had placed them in subordination to the Agent of Fort St. George.<sup>(2)</sup>

Project of the King of Bantam to form an independent trade to the Peninsula of India.

A commercial difficulty occurred at BANTAM in this season, which could not have been anticipated; or a project of the King, to establish an independent trade for the encrease of his revenues :—with this view, he had equipped ships, and sent them with produce to the Coast of India, and even into the Gulf of Persia. These vessels were navigated by seamen who had deserted the Company's service, and managed by some of their inferior civil servants, who expected to amass fortunes.

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 20th November 1674.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, dated 1st December 1674, and 14th January 1674-75.

fortunes. The ships brought Surat and Coast goods to the Bantam market, thirty per cent. cheaper than the Company could import them ; which had raised the price of Bantam produce, and rendered the provision of an investment expensive and difficult.<sup>(1)</sup>

No measures appear to have been adopted this season, for following up the orders of the Court, to open a trade to **TONQUIN, TYWAN, OF MACAO.**

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Presidency of Surat, 1st August 1674. — Anonymous Letter from Bantam to the Court, 23d February 1674-75.

## 1675-76.

CHAP. II.  
 1675-76. New plan of  
 administration  
 formed for  
 Surat and  
 Bombay.

FOR several years, the measures devised by the Court of Directors, and those which their Foreign Presidencies found practicable, have been discovered to be at variance. This opposition could only be explained by the different circumstances in which each was placed :—to remedy these evils, the Court, this season, directed its attention to the formation of a more regular system of administration at SURAT and at BOMBAY, by fixing the rank of their servants on the principle of *Seniority*, as the rule of succession to offices of trust, and next, by connecting the civil and military service in such a manner, as to place the chief authority in the former, but to render the duties of the latter subservient to the preservation of the settlements, and promotion of trade.

With the view of preventing disputes about succession, the Court framed the following regulations :—“ For the  
 “ advancement of our Apprentices, we direct that, after they  
 “ have served the first five yeares, they shall have £10 per  
 “ annum, for the two last yeares ; and having served those  
 “ two yeares, to be entertayned, one yeare longer, as Wri-  
 “ ters, and have Writers’ sallary ; and having served that  
 “ yeare, to enter into y<sup>e</sup> degree of Factors, which otherwise  
 “ would

“ would have been ten yeares. And knowing, that a dis-  
 “ tinction of titles is, in many respects, necessary, we do  
 “ order, that when the Apprentices have served their times,  
 “ they be stiled *Writers*; and when the Writers have served  
 “ their times, they be stiled *Factors*; and Factors, having  
 “ served their times, to be stiled *Merchants*; and Merchants,  
 “ having served their times, to be stiled *Senior Merchants*.”

CHAP. II.

1675-76.

With the object of connecting the civil and military service, and vesting the authority in the former, it was ordered, that though Captain Langford, who had been chief military officer at Bombay, had been admitted to a seat in the Council, this, in the case of a vacancy, was not to be founded on as a precedent; and that the civil servants were to apply themselves to acquire a knowledge of military discipline, that, in the event, either of any sudden attack, or of being found better qualified for military, than for civil duties, they might receive commissions, and have the pay of military officers, till the pleasure of the Court should be known. <sup>(1)</sup>

The shipping taken up for this Presidency amounted to five sail, or two thousand three hundred and fifty tons, and the stock, in goods and money, was estimated at £96,500: —this sum was, in the first instance, to be applied to discharge the debts at interest, which had been contracted for the investment of the preceding year; the residue,  
 under

Equipments,  
 stock, and  
 commercial  
 instructions  
 to Surat and  
 Bombay.

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 12th July 1675, and 8th March 1675-76.



CHAP. II.  
1675-76. under frugal management, to be applied to the investment of this season. In the purchase and selection of goods, the coarser Surat cloths, (as they did not sell in England) were to be omitted, and a less quantity, but of a finer kind, purchased:—as ginger had become a substitute for pepper, and the sale of pepper, either in Italy, Turkey, or the North of Europe, on account of the wars in Poland, had failed, and the price had fallen to seven-pence per pound in England, the highest price to be given in the Indies, was fixed at two-pence half-penny, or at most, at three-pence per pound, for, unless the profits on the whole investment should compensate for a larger price, and produce, at the sales in England, thirty per cent., the Indian trade would become unproductive; particularly, when it was considered, that, from the rivalship of the French, Dutch, &c. English staples and merchandize did not sell in the Indies, with the same advantage as when the market was without these competitors.

Under the commercial pressure at Surat, it became, more than formerly, expedient to raise the revenue in the Island of BOMBAY, to an amount which would defray the charges; the Court, therefore, approved of the regulation, for levying three and a half per cent. customs on imports and exports, with the exception of raw materials for manufactures, which ought to be subject to little or no duty: and though they sanctioned the duty of eight per cent. and one per

per cent. for the fortifications, on the general produce of the Island exported, they referred it to the consideration of Pre-<sup>CHAP. II.</sup> 1675-76. sident Aungier, and the Council of Surat, to report (as this duty might press on trade) whether it might not be preferable to levy a moderate tax on provisions of all kinds:—The Court, before coming to any positive resolutions on this subject, desired, also, that a report might be sent, on the method by which the Dutch levied the duties of customs at Batavia, it having been productive, and equal to the maintenance of that great establishment. <sup>(1)</sup>

The Court next took into their consideration, the report which they had received on the trade to PERSIA, which, in substance, was,—that unless this trade could be protected by armed ships, neither the privileges which had formerly been acquired, could be acted on, nor the moiety of the customs at Gombroon recovered; and, therefore, ordered, that two of the ships, which had been consigned to Surat, and sufficiently armed for service in the Gulf of Persia, and on which broad-cloths, tin, &c. had been sent, to facilitate exchanges at Gombroon, should proceed to that port, to which directions had been given to provide Persian silks, Caramania wool, &c. and to enforce the payment of the customs. <sup>(2)</sup>

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3 C

A similar

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 12th July 1675, and 8th March 1675-76.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 8th March 1675-76.— Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Gombroon, 16th September 1675, and 11th March 1675-76.

CHAP. II.  
 1675-76.  
 Similar in-  
 structions to  
 Fort St.  
 George.

A similar system for the administration of the Com-  
 pany's affairs (varying only according to local circumstances)  
 was transmitted to the Agent and Council at FORT ST.  
 GEORGE.

After specifying the ranks of the civil servants, it was explained, that the Writers and Apprentices, appointed this season, were not intended to supersede any of the servants in actual employment:—that promotion was, in general, to proceed by seniority; but the stations at which their civil servants were to be fixed, were left to the discretion of the Agent and Council, as they might discover them to be qualified.

To prevent the recurrence of disputes for succession, it was ordered, that on the death or removal of Sir William Langhorne, Mr. Streynsham Master should succeed to be Agent at Fort St. George; and, in the mean time, to qualify him for this rank, he was to be stationed at Masulipatam, at which he was to act as Agent and Supervisor:—he was next to proceed to Bengal, and, under a special commission, empowered to introduce the new system of administration at Hughly, and its dependencies, and to establish the subordination of both, to the Agent and Council of Fort St. George:—on his return he was to act as second at the Fort, till Sir William Langhorne's term should expire; the general object of the Court, in this arrangement, being to settle a system of Government, on such a basis as would enable them,

them, in their future instructions, to issue positive and precise orders.

CHAP. II.  
1675-76.

The equipments consigned to Fort St. George, this season, consisted of five ships, or two thousand one hundred and forty tons, and the stock, in bullion and goods, was estimated at £235,000, of which the appropriations were,—£15,000 in goods, and £105,000 in bullion, for Fort St. George; £30,000 in bullion, and £23,000 in goods, for Masulipatam; and £67,000 in bullion, for the Bay of Bengal:—it was farther required, that the Europe goods sent to Madras should be disposed of, at such rates, as would have the effect of diminishing the price of Coast goods intended for Surat or for Europe, and that a preference should be given to the cloths obtained at Masulipatam, which were in request at the home sales; but the small proportion of Coast cloths intended for Bantam, should be of the kinds in demand at that port. <sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments  
and stock for  
the Coroman-  
del Coast and  
Bengal.

The orders to BENGAL, in 1675-76, were in substance:—that the Factors were to form a collection of the Phirmaunds under which they had enjoyed privileges of trade;—that they were to establish the same gradations of rank among their servants, as at Fort St. George and Surat; and that they were to draw on the Court for £20,000, in addition to

3 C 2

the

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 17th August, and 24th December 1675.— Commission and Instructions to Mr. Streynsham Master, 16th December 1675.

CHAP. II. the stock allotted to them, for the purpose of completing the  
 1675-76. investment of this season, and to provide and have in store, goods for the next year.<sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments and stock for Bantam, and instructions to extend the trade to Tonquin and Tywan, and, if possible, to Japan.

On comparing the orders to BANTAM in 1674-75, with the instructions in 1675-76, it appears, (notwithstanding the information from this Agency, from Fort St. George and from Surat,) that the Court continued to consider Bantam, next to Surat, to be the most profitable seat of their trade:—this opinion may be inferred from the shipping and stock, consigned to this station, the former amounting to 2,450 tons, and the latter estimated at £58,000;—with this tonnage and stock, the Court intended to push a commercial speculation in the southern quarter of their limits, for they appointed Agents and Councils for Tywan and Tonquin, and, catching at some slight advances made by the King of Formosa, ordered negotiations to be opened with this Chief, with the object of again making an experiment for trade at Japan:—in this project, the Court were rather influenced by the profits which they expected from exchanges of Japan gold, silver, and copper, for Coast and Surat produce, than by the facts and circumstances so ably detailed to them, in the report of Mr. Delboe.

The trade which the King of Bantam had opened, on his  
 own

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Hughly, 24th December 1675.

own account with the Coast, Surat, and the Gulf of Persia, <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> the Court ordered to be discouraged, by every possible expedient ; 1675-76. in particular, by prohibiting English subjects from navigating his ships, and their civil servants from assisting in the management of this traffic, which could only tend to cripple the exertions of the Company, in receiving those returns which they had reason to expect, from the large tonnage and stock consigned to this Agency. On the subject of the investment, it was required that it might consist chiefly in pepper and ginger, of which articles, a sufficient quantity was to be kept in store for the fleet of the following year ; or three thousand tons of pepper, and fifteen hundred jars of ginger.

The rank of the civil servants at Bantam, was placed on the same principle of seniority, as at the other settlements ;— a report was annually to be made on all transactions at this Agency, and subordinate stations, and transmitted to the Court, to enable them to judge of the instructions required, for this branch of their foreign trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

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The foreign events, affecting SURAT, in 1674-75, or the treaty with Sevagee, and the absence of Aurungzebe and his armies, Trade at Surat depressed, from the wars of Sevagee, and the opposition of the Dutch.

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 6th November 1675, 29th February 1675-76, and 10th May 1676.

CHAP. II.  
1675-76. armies, in the war against the Patans, it might have been expected, would have enabled President Aungier to extend the Company's trade; but circumstances rendered it impracticable to realize his well-concerted plans:—Sevagee still continued in the field, and was threatening Surat, and the Mogul armies had not returned, to protect that city, or the district in which it was situated; the countries, also, in the vicinity of the ports, on the Malabar Coast, at which the Company had Factories, were, at the same time, exposed to devastations, by the detachments of Sevagee's army, employed in overawing the petty Chiefs, and though the Rajahs, or Chiefs of the districts, near Carnapoly and Porcat, had offered to furnish several hundred tons of pepper for the Company's investment, it was on condition of a force being sent to support them against the violence of the Dutch.

Under circumstances so unfavourable to trade, it was with much difficulty, notwithstanding the large stock sent from Europe, that the President and Council of Surat could provide cargoes for the four ships which had arrived from England;—the proportion of pepper and cloths, expected from Carwar, could not be received, because the neighbouring districts had been laid waste by a body of Sevagee's troops:—the Factors at Calicut had been obstructed in the purchase of those articles by the Dutch; and the rainy season had prevented the arrival of the caravans, which brought the indigo, and other goods, from Agra: causes which had obliged the President  
and

and Council to fill up the tonnage with such articles as they could draw from Ahmedabad and Cambaya, or purchase from the Dutch, at advanced prices. This unfavourable state of the Indian market was also rendered worse, by competitions in the sale of Europe produce, occasioned by the arrival of three ships of the French Company, and four Dutch ships, the cargoes of which had brought the prices lower than prime cost.

On reviewing these circumstances, President Aungier, and the Council of Surat, framed a report on the state of the Company's trade, in the countries, and at the ports, more immediately under their administration, which, in substance, stated;—that it was impossible not to divide the Company's stock into small portions, because the goods were to be collected from various points;—that it was not less impossible to derive profit, to the amount expected by the Court, from the sale of Europe goods;—that it was with the greatest difficulty, money could be borrowed, from the convulsed state of the country having almost ruined the trade of the native merchants; and, therefore, that commerce had declined, from causes which could not be controlled by the Directors at home, or by their servants abroad:—to obviate these evils, there appeared to be one practicable remedy, only; or the reducing the tonnage, or exports and imports, for a few years, till the goods in the warehouses, both at Surat and in England, could be sold off: this would have the effect of reviving demands for Europe goods,

CHAP. II.

1675-76.

President  
Aungier's re-  
port on the  
trade at Surat  
and its depen-  
dencies.



CHAP. II.  
1675-76. goods, and of lowering the prices of Indian produce, and would bring back the trade to the principle of quick exchanges, upon which all commercial profits must rest:—this opinion was illustrated, by a comparison of the rates of purchases, at Surat, on the Coromandel Coast, and at Bantam:—at Surat, the Dutch, French, Danes, Armenians, and Arabians, participated in the trade; on the Coromandel Coast, and at Bantam, though the weight of the Dutch influence, and the amount of their funds, gave them a preponderance, the Company, particularly on the Coromandel Coast, had a less divided share in the market.

From these causes, the investment, this season, was less considerable than the Court might have expected; but the utmost exertions would be used, at Surat and at its dependencies, to provide a fuller investment for the subsequent year.<sup>(1)</sup>

Report on the civil and military administration required for Bombay.

The unsettled state of the government in the Island of BOMBAY had, for almost three years, obliged President Aungier to reside on that Island, and to leave the management of the Company's interests at Surat, to the Council. On his return to Surat, in September 1675, the instructions which he framed, and left with the Deputy Governor and his Council, afford a distinct view of the situation of affairs at Bombay. After the President had suppressed the mutiny, and introduced

(1)—Letters from the President and Council at Surat to the Court, 10th and 26th October, 17th November, and 6th December 1675, and 17th and 26th January, and 2d February 1675-76.

duced regularity into the administration, he placed before the Court an account of the inhabitants of the Island, consisting of the following classes;—the English garrison and settlers; the Portuguese, who had remained after the cession; and a mixed assemblage of Hindoo, Mahomedan, and Parsee inhabitants:—he next took a view of the great object of the Company, or the rendering Bombay an emporium of trade, and recommended, that the regulations which had been established for the garrison and for the English settlers, should be the general rule of the government; but, as it would be difficult to reduce the mixed classes of the other inhabitants under these regulations, it would be proper to form them into something like the English incorporations, and to direct them to elect five persons, who were to become their representatives, to hear and prepare their different claims for the consideration of the Governor and Council; and these persons to be responsible for all tumults, or disorderly conduct, of the classes of inhabitants whom they represented:—by this expedient, President Aungier trusted, that a general confidence would be created in the Company's government. With the object of encouraging the trade of the Island, he recommended that forbearance and moderation should be observed, in levying the duties of customs, rents, licences, &c., but calculated, that the revenue would amount to 107,000 xeraphins per annum:—he, also, recommended, that while the most firm conduct was required, in resisting the obstructions of

CHAP. II.  
1675-76.

CHAP. II. 1675-76. the Portuguese, at Tannah and Caranjah, and in keeping at a distance the fleets of the Siddee and of Sevegee, the strictest discipline should be observed in the garrison, to prevent any disputes between them and the inhabitants. Captain Longford having died in this season, President Aungier proposed, that one of the companies of infantry should be denominated the Governor's, and the other the Deputy Governor's companies, and the command of them given to lieutenants, for the purpose of saving the pay of two captains:—and submitted, the necessity of giving up the practice of sending serjeants from England, because it cut off the prospect of promotion to the corporals, and well-behaved privates.<sup>(1)</sup>

Measures for  
reviving the  
Persian trade.

It had been a subject of discussion between the Court and the Presidency of Surat, for several years, whether the trade with PERSIA could be most effectually revived, by the employment of force, or by treaty; and, in the transactions of the Court this season, we found that two of the ships consigned to Surat had been armed for service in the Persian Gulf, and had taken in goods suited to that market;—the Presidency, therefore, took into consideration the expediency of adopting

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Governor and Council at Bombay, 15th and 28th June 1675.— Letter from the Governor and Council at Bombay to the President and Council at Surat, 4th June 1675.— Instructions from President Aungier to the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, 28th September 1675. (Vol. xxxi, No. 2958).— Letters from the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 26th November 1675, and 8th January 1675-76.

adopting either forcible or pacific measures; and reported to the Court, that the propriety of hostilities rested on the kind of warfare which was practicable, and on that warfare being in the name of the King, not in that of the Company;—that hostilities could consist only in the blockade of the Persian ports, particularly Gombroon, the Company not being provided with any military force to make an impression on shore;—that, even this limited warfare, must be proceeded in with caution, to avoid giving offence to the Mogul and to his subjects, or advantage being taken of it by the Portuguese, who were uniformly obstructing the English trade, or by the Dutch, who would prosecute the trade to Gombroon, and endeavour to engross it;—that the other expedient, of treaty, might be attempted, upon the principle of recovering the moiety of the customs at Gombroon, or by proposing to the King of Persia, either that he should allow three thousand tomands, or £9,000 sterling, per annum, in lieu thereof; (in which case, the Company's ships were to be subjected, as well as others, to the port duties;) or that the customs on all goods belonging to, or freighted by the English, should be wholly appropriated to the Company:—the Presidency having these views, recommended to the Court the attempt at negotiation, rather than hostilities; and preferred the first alternative, or the annual receipt of three thousand tomands, which would be a certain sum in peace or war, to the appropriation of the customs, which,

CHAP. II. though much more advantageous to the Company in peace,  
1675-76. would, in time of war, be unproductive. <sup>(1)</sup>

Investment at  
Fort St.  
George, this  
season, con-  
siderable.

The Agent and Council at FORT ST. GEORGE acknowledged the receipt of the large stock of above £200,000, by the ships of the season, and stated their intentions to apply the sums, as apportioned by the Court, to the different branches of the investment, at the Fort, at Masulipatam, and at Bengal; but in the application of this stock at Fort St. George, an unforeseen difficulty had arisen, from the actual situation of the Government of Golcondah, the King of which had placed his whole confidence in two Bramins, who paid him large sums:—the Agent and Council had been soliciting a Phirmaund for extending their privileges, but had not been able to bring over these Bramins to their views, and therefore rather preferred adhering to the old Cowl, which they possessed, than persevering in this request, because the Dutch, at this time, in return for having expelled the French from St. Thomé, were negotiating to have Pullicat ceded to them, with the same privileges as the English enjoyed at Madras.

The trade, in this season, had been farther embarrassed, by the rebellion of the Polygars, which had prevented the merchants

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 17th January 1675-76.— Letter from the Agent and Factors at Gombroon to the President and Council of Surat, 22d November 1675.

chants from purchasing cloths, and other produce, in the inland provinces :—an investment, however, had been made, to the extent which the Court had required, chiefly in long-cloths, and the ships had been dispatched to Bengal, to complete their cargoes. <sup>(1)</sup>

The Company's affairs at BANTAM, in this season, were thrown into considerable confusion, by the disputes between Mr. Dacres, the Agent, and his Council, on the subject of promotion ; the only information, therefore, which the Court received, was, that the cargoes of three ships, which had been consigned to Bantam, one from the Coast, one from Surat, and one from Bengal, must wait for a market, which would retard the provision of an investment, and oblige the Agent to borrow money at an exorbitant interest, the King being the only lender, and requiring two per cent. per month :—the Agent, however, intimated, that the trade at Tywan was assuming a more promising aspect ; but that, though skins, and other articles, fitted for the Japan market, might be procured at that port, and yield a profit of nearly sixty per cent., yet that the communication with Japan, by Tywan vessels, was difficult, and a direct trade impracticable ; on which account, it was intended to dissolve the Factory at  
Tonquin,

CHAP. II.  
1675-76.

Agency of  
Bantam re-  
commend  
a trade with  
Amoy, in  
China.

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 16th July to 3d October 1675.

CHAP. II. Tonquin, as it would be preferable to form a Settlement at  
1675-76. AMOY, on the coast of China, opposite to Formosa. <sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Presidency at Surat, 11th August 1675.— Letter from part of the Council at Bantam to the Court, 10th January 1675-76.— Letter from the Factors at Tywan, in Formosa, to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 22d December 1675.

## 1676-77.

THE information which reached the Court of Directors, on the state of the war between the Mogul and Sevagee, and on the difficulties under which the trade had been placed, induced them to recede from the large scale of commerce, which they had adopted for several years, and to revert to the ancient system, of accommodating their commercial speculations to the prices at which the purchases for the investment could be effected abroad, and to the prices, which their imports brought at the home sales:—in this way, they hoped to clear their warehouses at Surat, and in England, and to improve their general credit.

CHAP. II.  
 1676-77.  
 Equipment and stock to Surat limited, from the convulsed state of the countries in its vicinity.

On this contracted plan, they ordered the President and Council of SURAT to purchase the most marketable goods only;—to reduce the number of their servants, particularly at the stations of Carnapoly and Carwar, and always to employ the smallest possible number of soldiers, as guards to their houses of trade; though the precarious circumstances in the countries in which these houses were situated, rendered a small guard indispensable.

The



CHAP. II. The equipments and stock for the season 1676-77, consisted of three ships, or fourteen hundred and eighty tons, and the estimated stock at £97,000 only, of which the proportion in goods was £69,500, and in bullion £27,500.<sup>(1)</sup>

Charter obtained from the King, for establishing a mint at Bombay.

The measures adopted for the Government of BOMBAY, during this season, were:—that the charges were to be abridged, as their amount had exceeded even that of the improved revenues;—that the aggressions of the Portuguese, at Tannah and Caranjah, having been represented to the King in Council, letters from His Majesty, on the basis of the resolutions of the Privy Council, had been transmitted to the Prince Royal of Portugal, and to the Viceroy of Goa, requiring forbearance from exactions of this description; and the Presidency of Surat were authorized, by such means as they could employ, to resist the payment of them:—the King's authority had also been granted to the Company, by His Letters Patent, dated 5th October 1676, (28th of Charles II.), to establish a mint at Bombay, at which they were empowered to coin “rupees, pice, and budgrooks,” which were to pass current, not only on the Island, but in all the dependencies of the Company in the East-Indies. Forty additional recruits had been embarked on the ships of the season, to render the garrison efficient.<sup>(2)</sup>

After

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 28th June and 25th August 1676, and 7th March 1676-77.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 7th March 1676-77.

After considering the reasons for war, or negotiation, with PERSIA, detailed in the Surat report of last season, the Court preferred the expedient of negotiation to hostilities; and explained, that, under treaty, they would be satisfied with obtaining one thousand tomands per annum, as the moiety of the customs at Gombroon; and, should the Portuguese continue to refuse passes to the native junks going to that port, the Presidency of Surat were to refuse their passes to native vessels going to the Portuguese port of Cong, in the Persian Gulf, a resolution which the Presidency were to intimate to the Governor of Surat.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1676-77.  
Orders for entering into negotiations with Persia, for recovering the arrears of customs.

The instructions to the Agency of FORT ST. GEORGE proceeded, in this season, on the same limited scale of trade, which had been adopted for Surat; considerable difficulty, however, was experienced, in framing instructions, from the want of information, or any report from the Commissioners sent to examine the state of the Company's affairs at Masulipatam and in Bengal, and from not being possessed of the result of the applications which had been made to the

Commercial instructions, equipments, and stock, for Fort St. George.

VOL. II.

3 E

King

1676-77.— (Copy). Letter from King Charles to the Viceroy of Goa, 10th March 1676-77.— Report of the Lords of Trade on the Petition of the East-India Company, relative to Bombay, 23d February 1676-77.— Letters Patent granted to the East-India Company, for establishing a Mint at Bombay, 5th October 1676, (erroneously printed 1677.)—(Printed Collection of Charters, page 108.)

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 7th March 1676-77.— Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Gombroon, 7th March 1676-77. Minute of Council, 12th February 1676-77.

CHAP. II. King of Golcondah, when he was at Masulipatam, to grant  
1676-77. to the Company a new Phirmaund, for explaining and enlarging their privileges of trade. Another difficulty had arisen from the information which had reached the Court, that the Agent and Council had encouraged a Private Trade, carried on in the name of the King of Bantam, which had not only injured the trade at that port, but affected the prices at the home sales, and was positively prohibited in future. A third difficulty had arisen, from the heavy charges which had been incurred on the fortifications;—it was therefore ordered, in future, that all plans of this kind, accompanied with estimates, should be sent home, for the consideration of the Court, and no new buildings erected, without orders from England.

With respect to the garrison of Fort St. George, it was the Court's intentions, that it should wholly consist of English, and, for this purpose, twenty recruits were to be embarked on the ships of this season; the allowances to each man to be at the rate of twenty-one shillings per month, in full, for provisions and necessaries of every kind;—and, though they had formerly ordered the civil servants to be trained to the use of arms, they now prohibited the removal of any person, from a civil to a military situation.

The shipping of this season, consigned to Fort St. George, amounted only to three sail, or sixteen hundred tons, and the  
- stock

stock was estimated at £176,600, consisting of broad-cloths, and other Europe produce; but chiefly of bullion:—of this stock, the proportion intended for the Fort and Masulipatam, was £11,800 in goods, and £92,500 in bullion; and that for Bengal of £17,300 in goods, and £55,000 in bullion:—though a considerable part of the investment expected in return, was to be Coromandel goods, the large amount of stock sent to Bengal proves, that a valuable assortment was anticipated from that quarter.<sup>(1)</sup>

The separate instructions, during this season, to the Agent at HUGHLY, to whom so large a stock had been consigned, with permission to take up £20,000 at interest, were, in substance, to obtain saltpetre of the best kind, and large quantities of taffaties and silk, provided the colours should be more perfect than those imported by the ships of the preceding season.<sup>(2)</sup>

Though the amount of the tonnage and stock had been reduced for Surat and Fort St. George, the trade to BANTAM was, in this season, to be continued on the former large scale, notwithstanding the unfavourable accounts received of the conduct of this Agency:—the shipping consisted of eight sail, or three thousand one hundred and eighty tons, to be dispatched at three successive periods; and though the total

3 E 2

amount

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 28th June, 4th August, and 15th December 1676.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Hughly, 18th December 1676.

CHAP. II.  
1676-77.

Orders for extending the Company's trade in Bengal.

Equipments and stock for Bantam continued on a large scale.

CHAP. II.  
1676-77. amount of stock does not appear in the letters of the Court, as in preceding years, it must have been proportionate to the purchase of pepper, ginger, and other produce, to fill up so large a tonnage :—probably this tonnage was so great, from the accounts received of the favorable state of trade at Tywan, and the prospect of exchanges at Amoy, for which a part of it was intended. The Court continued to regret the exclusion from the Japan trade, but considered the Factory at Tywan to be the only inlet to it, and therefore directed, that every opportunity should be taken, to get access to Japan, because the gold, copper, &c., from that Empire, would facilitate the whole circuit of their exchanges from Bantam to Surat.

Instructions  
given to ex-  
tend the trade  
to China.

A small vessel was to be dispatched to AMOY, which was ordered to be placed under the charge of one of the most prudent and intelligent of their servants, to endeavour to open a trade with China, and to purchase flowered damasks and white satins, but no taffaties, and to collect such information as might enable the Court to judge of the expediency of settling a Factory at that port :—as teas were beginning to be known in Europe, the Agent at Bantam was again ordered to send, annually, on the Company's account, tea of the best sort, to the value of one hundred dollars.<sup>(1)</sup>

The instructions of the Court to the Governor of ST.

HELENA,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bombay, 19th October and 15th November 1676, 7th February 1676-77, and 30th March 1677.

HELENA, in 1676-77, relate only to the encouragement to be afforded to the cultivators of the Island, and to observe the strictest discipline, to prevent surprize by an enemy.

In this year, the interesting incident occurred, of the King having required, that the celebrated Dr. Edmund Halley, then a student at Oxford, should be allowed a passage to St. Helena, on one of the Company's ships, with permission to reside for two years; the Court, therefore, ordered that he should receive, not only accommodation in the Governor or Deputy Governor's house, but every assistance from the naval commanders, that he might be enabled to complete his observations, for perfecting the knowledge of astronomy, and of the useful arts dependent on it.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1676-77.  
The celebrated Halley, on the King's recommendation, accommodated with a passage to St. Helena, for the purpose of making astronomical observations.

The foreign advices from the Presidency of SURAT, during the season 1676-77, though they communicated events of great political importance, were discouraging to the Company's trade. The conquests of Sevagee had continued in the country bordering on Surat, and had not been resisted by the Mogul, whose attention, at this time, was fixed on the war against the Patans. Sevagee had taken the castle of Pindolee, within three days march of Surat, and was in a situation to menace

Surat again menaced by Sevagee.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Governor of the Island of St. Helena, 27th October 1676.

CHAP. II.  
1676-77. menace that city, from which he had demanded a contribution of nine lacks of rupees, and the quarter part of the revenue, declaring, that unless payment should be made, he would plunder and destroy the town:—the Governor could only endeavour to put the castle in a state of defence, and the President and Council were apprehensive, that the Company's stores might be lost:—the sudden coming on of the rainy season prevented these calamities, but the dread of them materially checked all commercial proceedings.

Trade at Su-  
rat lowered,  
by the depre-  
ciation of  
bullion;

Another event, equally prejudicial to trade, and destructive of the value of the Company's export of bullion, was the failure of the resources of the Mogul:—by his wars in the Decan, and against the Patans, Aurungzebe had exhausted his treasury, and all expedients had failed, by which money, for the payment of his troops, could be raised:—this obliged him to open the secret treasures of the great Acbar, hitherto deemed sacred:—the quantity of gold and silver found in this deposit, if it served to pay the army, lowered the price of the precious metals so considerably, that the bullion received from Europe could not be disposed of, but at a great loss; nor could any price be obtained for Europe articles, which therefore, were sold under prime cost.—President Aungier, in this emergency, recommended, that tin, coral, red-lead, different kinds of cloth, naval stores, and iron, might not be sent from Europe, till he could inform the Court, that the price for those articles had recovered its level.

A third

A third event, though of an inferior kind, had been pre-  
 judicial to trade :—the petty Rajahs, or Chiefs, on the Malabar  
 Coast, particularly those at Carwar and Calicut, had, from their  
 necessities, levied contributions from the different Factories; and  
 as the Agents, or the Presidency, could only remonstrate and  
 protest against this conduct, these feeble means, (from never  
 having been followed up by hostilities, as had been the prac-  
 tice with the Dutch), were disregarded, and the Natives had  
 gradually lost all respect for the English nation.

CHAP. II.

1676-77.

—and from  
the revolts of  
the petty Ra-  
jahs on the  
Malabar  
Coast.

In this situation, the Presidency submitted to the con-  
 sideration of the Court, that two frigates should be employed  
 on the Malabar Coast, to enforce the observation of treaties  
 and grants, but under assurances, that they should not act,  
 except by order of the President. On consultation, it was also  
 agreed, to withdraw the Factory from Rajahpore, because it had  
 been exposed to extortions by Sevagee, though he had sent Sam-  
 bagee, his son, to it, with promises of redress and protection :  
 —these outrages of the Native Chiefs, it was apprehended,  
 had been instigated by the Dutch, who continued to prosecute  
 their scheme of engrossing the whole of the pepper trade.

The trade, in the last place, had been depressed, by  
 the loss of the sums which had formerly been drawn from  
 the freight of the Company's ships, during the interval be-  
 tween their landing the Europe cargo, and taking in their  
 investment, this source of gain having been engrossed by the  
 country vessels, belonging to private merchants; and to  
 ascertain



CHAP. II. ascertain the amount, President Aungier recommended that  
 1676-77. a Notary might be appointed, to keep a register of Private-trade.

Several of the most valuable servants of the Presidency, particularly Mr. Gray, the Deputy President, (who was to have succeeded Mr. Aungier,) and Mr. Gyfford, the Deputy Governor of Bombay, died this season; and the President himself, worn out with fatigue, solicited permission to return to England, as soon as a person, properly qualified, should be appointed to succeed him.<sup>(1)</sup>

Additional  
 civil and mi-  
 litary ar-  
 rangements  
 adopted for  
 Bombay.

The measures, in this season, regarding the administration of BOMBAY were,—that the duties had been farmed, as the most profitable expedient, and that excise taxes on provisions had been established, on the same principle as practised by the Dutch at Batavia; by which the amount of the revenues had been increased, and this system was to be followed up, as far as the circumstances of the Island would permit:—that the works on the fortifications had been limited to perfecting the sea-bastions and hornworks, which would have occupied the attention of Mr. Bake, the Engineer, for years; but his sudden death, and the difficulty of finding a person qualified to succeed him, had checked this undertaking:—that the charges for the infantry had been brought as low as practicable; and as the German recruits had behaved

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 22d September 1676, and 22d January and 18th February 1676-77.

behaved with sobriety and regularity, it was recommended to the Court, that a proportion of them, being Protestants, should annually be embarked. The fatigue of marching infantry, in a hot climate, having cut off numbers, it was resolved to raise a small troop of horse, and to give the command of it to Captain Keigwin, the former Governor of St. Helena:—it was also in contemplation, to establish a militia, for the better defence of the Island; but it would require time, and much prudence, to reconcile the inhabitants to this institution.<sup>(1)</sup> In the course of the season, however, this expedient had been tried, and six hundred men embodied, the charges of which would be defrayed by about one hundred of the principal land-owners on the Island.<sup>(2)</sup>

Two armed ships had been sent to protect the trade in the Persian Gulf, and at the port of GOMBRON; it being explained to the King of Persia, that the Company's right to the customs had been granted for their former services at Ormus, and that the charges of those ships must be paid, in addition to the amount of customs then due, otherwise the protection of the port, by the English, would be withdrawn:—any refusal of this demand, on the part of the King of Persia, would be considered as equivalent to a declaration of hostilities.<sup>(3)</sup>

VOL. II.

3 F

The

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 22d and 23d January 1676-77.

(2)—Letters from the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 24th January and 19th March 1676-77.

(3)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 22d September 1676.

CHAP. II.  
 1676-77. Affairs at  
 Madras em-  
 barrased, by  
 the conquest  
 of Gingee,  
 &c. by Se-  
 vagee.

The events affecting the trade at FORT ST. GEORGE, during the season 1676-77, were political, rather than commercial. The wars in Visiapore and Golcondah, between Sevagee and the Mogul, had continued:—Sevagee had made an unexpected irruption into the Carnatic, and got possession of Gingee and of Vellore: these conquests were, at first, considered to be temporary, only, and made for the purpose of levying tribute, or plunder; but, in fact, they were intended to be permanent, and to become a part of his dominions, with the force of which (having established a Hindoo Rajah in Tanjore) he hoped to keep in check the conquests of Aurungzebe in the Decan;—the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, therefore, found it expedient to apply for the good offices of Sevagee, and to strengthen the Fort and garrison, that it might be in a situation to resist any attack which might be made on it, by any of the contending powers who might become predominant.

These political events, fortunately coincided with the narrower scale of equipments and trade which the Company had adopted, and explain the measures of the Agent and Council, in appropriating the stock, and employing the shipping which had come from England, to carry the views of the Court into effect, to obtain a Phirmaund for trade in Bengal, and to purchase the articles for the investment, chiefly at Masulipattam:—it was, however, found necessary, to send one of the ships from the Coast to Bantam, it being impossible, from  
 the

the convulsed state of the provinces in the vicinity of the Fort, to fill up the tonnage with Coast goods.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1676-77.

The dissensions between the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, and the Agent at Masulipatam, had involved the Factory at HUGHLY, and its subordinate branches, in difficulties, which obstructed the Company's trade to and from Bengal;—and as the Court had appointed Mr. Streynsham Master, and other commissioners, to proceed to Bengal, as supervisors, their report forms authentic information of this branch of the trade. After detailing the irregularities which had prevailed at Hughly, Mr. Master stated to the Court, that he had new modelled the consultations, and assigned particular duties to the Agent, to each of the Members of the Council, and to the subordinate Factors; and that regular records were to be made of the whole of the proceedings, to be sent first to Fort St. George, and subsequently to England, and, with them, translations of all Phirmaunds and grants for trade.<sup>(2)</sup>

Mr. Streynsham Master's report on the trade of Bengal.

The project of the Court, in sending a considerable fleet and stock to BANTAM, and their resolution to continue the trade, in this part of their limits, on a large scale, was upset, by one of those unforeseen events, which, at

Agent White, and the greater part of the Company's servants at Bantam, massacred by the Javanese.

3 F 2

times,

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 17th February 1676-77, and 19th June 1677.

(2)—Consultations at Cossimbuzar, for establishing Regulations in the Bay of Bengal, November 1676. (Vol. xxxii, No. 3048).

CHAP. II. times, occur in remote countries, governed by chiefs acting  
1676-77. without a regular system of government or laws:—Mr. White, the Company's Agent, his Second, and the principal servants of the Agency, having gone up the river of Bantam, in April 1677, in their prows, were attacked by a number of Javanese assassins, who had concealed themselves in the water, and suddenly sprung upon each prow, as it advanced, and stabbed the English gentlemen, one after another, with their lances:—the Factory, thus, with the few which escaped, was left in a situation which rendered it impracticable to discharge their duties, or to convey to the Court an account of the actual state of their affairs. The Sultan, and his sons, either were ignorant of this attack, or affected to be so, but, promised that punishment should be inflicted on the aggressors, promises with which the survivors were obliged to be satisfied, and to report their situation to the Agency of Fort St. George, and to the Court.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from Bantam, 11th May 1677, with an account of the murder of Agent White, &c. (Vol. xxxiii, No. 3075.)

## 1677-78.

As the pacific relations between England and the Maritime Powers in Europe, in the season 1677-78, continued to be uninterrupted, the measures adopted by the East-India Company arose entirely from the information which they had received, on the political and commercial circumstances of their Foreign Settlements and trade.

Taking, in the first place, into consideration, the reports from the Presidency of SURAT, and the stations on the Malabar Coast subordinate to it, on the violence and duplicity of the Native Powers, the Court recommended temporizing expedients to their servants, as the rule of their proceedings with the Mogul, with Sevagee, and with the petty Rajahs, to induce them to comply with the conditions in the Phirmaunds, which the Company had purchased, or in the grants which they had acquired; and to endeavour, by their conduct, to impress the Natives with an opinion of the probity of the English, in all commercial dealings; but, at the same time, they gave to President Aungier and his Council, discretionary powers, to employ armed vessels, to enforce the observation of treaties and grants:—in this way, the Court shifted from themselves, the responsibility of commencing hostilities, that they

CHAP. II,  
1677-78.  
Discretionary powers given to President Aungier, to employ force, if necessary, in his transactions with the Native Powers;

CHAP. II. they might be able, in any questions which might arise between  
 1677-78. the King and the Company, to refer such hostilities to the errors of their servants.

The same cautious policy was adopted in the instructions to President Aungier and the Council of Surat, for their conduct with the Native Powers, both in respect to rights and trade;—they were to continue the Factories on the Malabar Coast, but only to station at them a small military guard, that this force might not excite jealousy in the Native Princes, or alarm in their European rivals;—they were to avoid fixing Factories in inland stations, because this would be chargeable, and only to send one or more of their servants to them, in the capacity of merchants, either to purchase cloths on the Surat side of India, or indigo, &c., at Agra, and the interior provinces:—Mr. Rolt, who had been Chief at Gombroon, was appointed to succeed Mr. Aungier, on his resignation, or departure for Europe.

Equipments  
and stock for  
Surat.

A similar scale of equipments and stock for Surat, under these instructions, was adopted, as in the preceding year:—the equipments consisted of three ships, or fourteen hundred and sixty tons, and the stock was estimated at £125,000, of which £70,800 was in bullion, and £54,400 in goods. This circumstance discovers, that though the former exports of British produce and merchandize had been discouraging, the Court had resolved to extend, as much as might be in their power, the sales of both.

The

The measures for the administration and defence of BOMBAY, consisted of the appointment of a Judge for the Island ; CHAP. II. 1677-78.  
 —ordering a troop of horse to be embodied, (the pay of the captain not to exceed £120 per annum);—directing that encouragement should be given to the diamond merchants to settle at Bombay, and protection to the weavers;—and intimating, that a supply of recruits were to be embarked on the ships of the season, without specifying whether they were Germans or English, though the former had been recommended by the Presidency of Surat :—such of the soldiers whose conduct had been regular, and whose term of seven years had expired, were to be promoted to small civil trusts.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Court, in this season, had not been able to come to any resolution, either to support the English claims to the customs of Gombroon, or to obtain new privileges of trade in PERSIA, by employing armed ships to threaten hostilities, if the customs should not be regularly paid, or the trade obstructed ; the hope was only expressed, that one thousand tomands of customs might be recovered, and farther sums solicited, to defray charges :—in the event of the Agent's death, his successor was prohibited from going to Ispahan, and was to employ temporizing measures only :—the factors were blamed, for being too late in shipping the Caramania wool to Surat, by which

Directions to the Agents in Persia to preserve the Company's privileges by negotiation.

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat and the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay, 15th March 1677-78.



CHAP. II. which neglect, on the arrival of their ships, the Court were  
 1677-78. without an article which was in demand in the market, and  
 the price, besides, fell, when two years' supply arrived at the  
 same time. <sup>(1)</sup>

A Phir-  
 maund, for  
 coining ru-  
 pees at Fort  
 St. George,  
 to be ob-  
 tained from  
 the King of  
 Golcondah.

It does not appear, that the reports which the Court had received, in this season, of the state of their affairs at FORT ST. GEORGE, MASULIPATAM, or BENGAL, had the effect of inducing them to relax in their determination, in 1677-78, to prosecute the trade on a larger scale than in the preceding year:—this resolution proceeded from the importance of Fort St. George, as a place of security for their property and servants:—the commanders of the ships consigned to the Coromandel Coast, were ordered to take in as many large stones at Johanna, as they could stow, to be used for the building of the Fort, that it might be placed in a sufficient state of defence against any enemy; and the Court trusted that some person, among their servants, might be found qualified to act as Engineer, because the sending an officer of this description, from Europe, would be chargeable:—a supply of Writers, and civil servants, had been appointed, who, at the end of seven years, were to obtain the rank of Factors;—a survey of all houses at Madras was to be instituted, both in the Portuguese and in the Black Towns, that a more adequate revenue might be raised;—and recruits and arms had been embarked to  
 strengthen

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors in Persia, 19th July 1677.—  
 Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 15th March 1677-78.

strengthen the garrison. At Masulipatam, the Court re-  
 quired fuller information, before they could accede to the  
 plan of removing this Factory to Madapollam, afraid that  
 such a measure would offend the Governor, and might  
 obstruct the investments, or give an undue advantage to  
 European commercial rivals;—houses at Madapollam and  
 Verasheroon, however, might be rented, that the expediency  
 of erecting Factories at either, might be known.

CHAP. II.  
 1677-78.

As advantages had arisen from coining pagodas, the  
 Court recommended that application should be made to the  
 King of Golcondah, for permission to coin rupees and pice at  
 Fort St. George. <sup>(1)</sup>

The shipping consigned to Fort St. George and its de-  
 pendencies, for this season (1677-78), were four sail, or two  
 thousand one hundred and twenty tons, and the stock was  
 estimated, in goods and bullion, at about £227,000, of  
 which £30,000 was to be sent to Masulipatam, and  
 £100,000 to the Bay of Bengal:—a cargo of goods was  
 also to be provided at Fort St. George, fitted for Bantam, to  
 the value of from £10,000 to £12,000;—this last order  
 was explained as proceeding from an opinion, that commer-  
 cial advantages would result from the exchanges of Coast  
 goods, in making provision of Bantam produce, for the Europe  
 market.

Equipments  
 and stock for  
 the Coroman-  
 del Coast and  
 Bengal.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 7th Sep-  
 tember and 12th December 1677.

CHAP. II.  
1677-78. As the stock for BENGAL was large, and the goods obtained at Dacca and Malda had yielded profit, the Factors were empowered to borrow 80,000 or 100,000 rupees, and to draw on the Court for this amount, to be invested at those stations, in raw-silks and floretta yarn.

From the event of the Danes having obtained commercial privileges, and the falling off of the Dutch trade in Bengal, the Court recommended to the Agent to solicit a Phirmaund for additional privileges, founding his application on those given to the Danes; and, in the event of success, additional encouragements were to be held out to their naval officers, and to young seamen, to acquire a knowledge of the navigation of the Ganges, it being of importance to avoid the risks and charges of bringing the goods, by boats, up and down the river:—saltpetre being an article of which the Company always wished to have the largest possible quantity, it was ordered, that any surplus of it, which might remain, after lading the ships, should be sent to Fort St. George, to remain in store.<sup>(1)</sup>

Commercial orders to the Agent at Bantam, to relinquish the trade to Japan, to fix a Factory at Canton, and to extend the trade at Tywan and Tonquin.

The orders to the Agent and Council at BANTAM, for the season 1677-78, assume two distinct characters.

The first corresponds with the enlarged scale upon which the Court had proposed, in the preceding season, to carry on the trade, both at Bantam itself, and at Tywan, Tonquin, and

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Bengal, 12th December 1677

and Amoy, stations which promised a large sale of British produce, and corresponding returns, that would give new vigor to the Company's settlements on the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts, and bring new Eastern articles into the Europe market. CHAP. II.  
1677-78

The shipping originally intended for Bantam were seven sail, or three thousand one hundred and fifty tons; but as the stock in goods, and the amount in money, in each separate ship, had different denominations, and were to be applied, according to circumstances, in the new markets at which trade was to be attempted, it is practicable only to infer, that the stock must have been proportionate to the tonnage.

The instructions, for this more extended trade, were,—that applications should be made to the King of Bantam, (letters having been addressed to him by the Company,) to request the enlargement of privileges in his dominions, and an abatement in the price of pepper; this application proceeded on the principle that, as the whole profits on the exports went to the King of Bantam, and as, on the re-export of pepper from England, the drawback on the customs had been disallowed, it was impossible to continue the large exports of this article from Bantam, unless a diminution of price could be effected: if this request should be refused by the King of Bantam, pepper must be procured at those ports in India, at which it could be got at more reasonable rates.

CHAP. II.

1677-78.

The Court, under these circumstances, despaired of an intercourse with Japan, which, for so many years, had been a favourite project, and resolved to attempt a trade with the countries bordering on CHINA, or with the ports of that Empire; part of the shipping, therefore, taken up on freight, was consigned to Tonquin, Tywan, Siam, and Amoy:—any surplus of stock and goods which might remain, was to be sent to Surat, to purchase goods for the Southern markets, and to Fort St. George, to purchase Coast goods and saltpetre, for Europe.

Though aware of the difficulties of trade at Amoy and Chinchew, on the same coast, the Court continued of opinion, that, by prudent management, it might be practicable to establish a Factory at the former, connected with the Factory at Tonquin; another experiment, therefore, was to be tried for a trade at Siam, and if a Factory could be established at Amoy, or any other port on the coast of China, the Factory at Tywan was to be subordinate to it.

It was in this season, that the first mention is made of the intentions of the Court to establish a Factory at CANTON, and the order repeated, that teas, of the best kind, to the amount of a hundred dollars, annually, should be purchased; it being hoped, the sale of British produce might be extended in this Empire, and silks, and, in general, China goods, enter into the Company's assortments, because considerable profit was expected from this trade, at the home sales. The attempt to obtain

obtain an order from the Spanish Government to trade to Manilla, the Court informed all their Agencies had been unsuccessful.<sup>(1)</sup>

The second aspect of the Court's instructions to Bantam arose out of the information which they had received of the massacre of Agent White, and their other servants. An application had been made to His Majesty, to address letters to the King of Bantam, (to accompany those from the Court,) requiring that justice might be done on the murderers:—to prevent the recurrence of such a calamity, a guard of twelve soldiers, at fourteen shillings each, per month, with a corporal, at forty shillings per month, was embarked, to protect the Factory from robbers and a present of one hundred and fifty barrels of gunpowder made to the King of Bantam, in return for the present of pepper which he had sent to His Majesty.<sup>(2)</sup> The orders were repeated, to improve the connexion with the Kings of Bantam and Jambee, and to request that the price of pepper might be lowered, for the reasons already detailed; this spirit of enterprize in the Southern trade was, however, depressed, at the close of the season, for the Court ordered goods for fourteen or fifteen hundred tons, only, (a quantity scarcely more than one-half of the preceding season)

CHAP. II.  
1677-78

King's letters to the King of Bantam, requiring the punishment of the murderers of Agent White and the Company's servants.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 5th October 1677.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 19th December 1677; inclosing Letter from King Charles II. to the King of Bantam, 31st December 1677, and Letter from the East-India Company to the King of Bantam, 20th December 1677.

CHAP. II. season) to be provided for the investment of the subsequent  
1677-78. year.<sup>(1)</sup>

Garrison of  
St. Helena  
formed into  
two compa-  
nies.

The Governor of ST. HELENA was ordered to form the garrison into two companies, and to continue his exertions for training the inhabitants to arms, for the defence of the Island; the alienation of lands was prohibited, unless after seven years possession.<sup>(2)</sup>

Death of Pre-  
sident Aun-  
gier, and suc-  
cession of  
Mr. Rolt to  
the Presiden-  
cy.

The summary of foreign events, under the administration of the Presidency of SURAT, for the season 1677-78, furnishes scarcely any commercial information, and only one great political event. In so far as regarded the European opponents of the Company, the President stated, that there had not been any arrivals of French ships, the credit of that people having declined;—that the Dutch shipping and trade, either from Europe, or from the Eastward, though considerable, had not materially affected the sales or purchases;—that difficulties still continued, in providing the investments along the Malabar Coast (Carwar, Calicut, &c.) and that the provision of the cargoes ordered from Surat for Bantam and the Eastward, had been injured, by the arrival of the King of  
Bantam's

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 23d January, and 15th March 1677-78.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Governor of St. Helena, 15th March 1677-78.

Bantam's ships with produce at Surat, and carrying thence goods, to rival the Company's sales at Bantam;—that the trade between Surat and the Gulf of Persia had rather worn a better aspect, the imports and exports, to and from Gombroon, having turned out more profitable than in the preceding season; and that the purchases at Ahmedabad, Broach, &c., had been provided with less interruption than usual. CHAP. II.  
1677-78.

The conquests of Sevagee, in this season, had been chiefly in the Carnatic, which had diverted his army from Surat; but his generals continued at Rairee, in such force, as to lead to an opinion that his power would soon extend from Surat to Cape Comorin.

These dispatches expressed the regrets of the Presidency for the death of Mr. Aungier, on the 30th June 1677, the loss of whose talents and integrity the remaining Members of Council at Surat (two only) considered to be a public calamity; for to him they ascribed, amid a succession of difficulties, the merit of having preserved the English trade for the last sixteen years. The administration of the Presidency devolved on Mr. Rolt, the Agent at Gombroon, agreeably to the Court's appointment, and the Government of Bombay on Mr. Henry Oxinden.<sup>(1)</sup>

The:

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, March to 31st August, 31st December 1667, 19th January, 6th February, 18th March 1677-78, and 3d April 1678.



CHAP. II.  
 1677-78. Mr. Henry Oxinden's report on the state of Bombay, and the effect of the wars of Aurungzebe on that Island.

The report of Mr. Oxinden on the internal circumstances of the Island of BOMBAY, stated, that the revenues from customs amounted to 30,000 xeraphins, and the duty on tobacco to 20,000 xeraphins per annum; that though the inhabitants were numerous, (consisting of Gentoos, Mahomedans, and indeed the outcasts of all sects, who had sought protection,) they were of the poorer classes, to whom every indulgence had been shewn, in the hope of inducing the more wealthy Native merchants and manufacturers to place themselves under the English government: but the prospect of the Island ultimately becoming a seat of trade, was remote, from the opposite coasts being exposed to the armies of Sevagee, and from the Mogul armies being employed in the Patan wars and those in the Decan, and unable to stop his progress; that the Portuguese at Tannah and Caranjah, continued to obstruct the entrance of provisions, and created every obstacle to the trade of the Island;—the political and commercial importance of Bombay, therefore, was distant, and the difficulties of bringing it beyond its present narrow influence daily increasing; for the progress of Sevagee in the countries immediately connected with it, and his alliances with Visiapore and Golcondah, had enabled him almost to command the Decan towards the Carnatic, and all the countries between it and Surat:—His success, connected with the revolt of Aurungzebe's sons and relatives, was calculated, on the one hand, to prevent the Mogul from making good the privileges of trade which

which he had given to the Company; and, on the other, the grants from Sevagee himself, for liberty of trade on the Malabar Coast, from which the greatest part of the Company's assortments had been furnished, were precarious and uncertain. CHAP. II.  
1677-78.

Under such circumstances, the Deputy Governor of Bombay, and Mr. Gary, the Chief Justice, recommended, that a supply of at least one hundred and fifty recruits should be annually embarked, to render the English garrison equal to the defence of the Island, as no dependence could be placed on the Portuguese, or militia, the only ostensible force it possessed:—the fort, however, had been completed, except the eastern bastion, which was in a state of forwardness.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Court do not appear to have received, in this season, any advices on the political situation of the Agency of FORT ST. GEORGE, or of BENGAL and MASULIPATAM, at least any, on which instructions could be founded.

In like manner, the information respecting BANTAM, during this season (1677-78) was almost as defective as that from the Coromandel Coast:—it only appears, that the Agent who had succeeded Mr. White, and his Council, were at variance, and that the trade, both at Bantam and at its dependencies, was at stand.<sup>(2)</sup>

Trade suspended at Bantam, from disputes between the Agent and Council:—

(1)—Letter from the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay to the Court, 15th January 1677-78.— Letter from Mr. Henry Gary, Chief Justice of Bombay, to the Court, January and February 1677-78.

(2)—Letter from the Council at Bantam to the Court, 30th January 1677-78.

CHAP. II.      The success of the speculation at AMOY, and on the Coast  
 1677-78. of CHINA, was obstructed by a political event, which probably  
 —And at Amoy, from the conquest of that place by the King of Formosa. was the true cause of its failure; for though a considerable assortment had been collected at Tywan, a kind of revolution had taken place, as Coxsin, the Tartar Chief, not having resources to pay his army, had seized on Amoy:—this place appears to have been, for some time, a dependency on this chief, who had stiled himself King of Formosa:—his possessions in the vicinity of Amoy, however, had been conquered by the Chinese, hence trade, between Amoy and the interior, was impracticable:—the factors, therefore, could only collect a part of the investment for two ships;—one was dispatched to complete her cargo at Tywan, with copper and some gold; another was sent to Surat, with copper, at this time in great demand for the coinage at Bombay, and thence to return with such goods as, from experience, had been found suited for Amoy, if affairs at that port, in the subsequent season, should render it practicable to renew the trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Factory at Amoy, in China, to the Presidency of Surat, 2d November 1677. (Vol. xxxiii. No. 3081.)

1678-79.

THE resolutions upon which the Court founded their instructions to their Foreign Settlements, in the season 1678-79, were partly drawn from the political relations of England, with the Maritime Powers in Europe, (detailed in a preceding part of this Chapter,) and partly from the disappointment the Company had experienced in the returns for the large stock which had been sent to Surat, a considerable proportion of which had been required for the fortifications at Bombay, that this Island might not be endangered by any attack of European, or of Indian enemies.

CHAP. II.  
1678-79.  
Instructions to the foreign Settlements suspended, till the result of the conferences at Nimeguen.

The instructions to SURAT, drawn from the relative circumstances of the European powers, went to one point only, or to postpone large investments, till authentic information should reach them, that the Treaty of Nimeguen had been ratified, and, in the mean time, to order the homeward-bound ships to observe the same precautions, as during an actual war.

The resolutions, regarding Surat and Bombay, appear have arisen from a review of the Company's affairs at Surat, during the sixteen years of Sir George Oxinden's, and of President Aungier's administrations.

Presidency of Surat reduced to an Agency, and the Salaries of the civil servants diminished.

3 H 2

On

CHAP. II.  
1678-79. On a retrospect of these Annals, it will be found, that, on the first transfer of Bombay, by the Crown, to the Company, the equipments and stock had been augmented, and the trade placed on a large scale, and that the proceedings of Mr. Aungier, and the Council of Surat, had annually received the approbation of the Court ;—that it had been specifically enjoined, that Bombay should be made a seat of government and of trade, impregnable against any attacks of the Native Powers or States, and, by its fortifications, put in a situation, to resist any European enemy. On the same retrospect it will be found, that the wars between the Mogul and Sevagee, during the whole of this period, had continued, and though the Surat trade, by the exertions of President Aungier and his Council, had been preserved, both at its seat, and, in general, in its dependencies on the Malabar Coast, yet that both had been exposed to frequent interruptions, and to heavy losses ; and that these interruptions and losses, whether occasioned by the wars between the Maritime Powers in Europe, or those between the Native Powers, had rendered the charges for fortifying Bombay unavoidable, and the investments frequently precarious, by the sales of Europe produce being uncertain, and the prices of Indian articles fluctuating.

These facts do not appear, however, to have had their full weight on the resolutions of the Court in this season, because the returns from the large stock had not, as yet, been received,  
and

and were distant, and could not be brought into the balance of profit on the Company's books;—it was, therefore, resolved, CHAP. II.  
1678-79. that an economical system should be adopted, both for the establishment at Surat and at Bombay, that, by savings, the Company might be re-imbursed for any disappointment of gain on their large stock, and for the heavy charges incurred in forming the civil and military establishments at Bombay.

It was resolved by the Court, though the title of *President* should be continued to Mr. Rolt, with the same allowances which Mr. Aungier had enjoyed, that, on his death or departure for Europe, his successor should have the title of *Agent* only, at the reduced salary of £300 per annum; the second in Council, £80 per annum; and the other members, and subordinate civil servants, proportionally diminished allowances; and by this plan, it was expected, that a considerable saving might be made, applicable to the discharge of debts.

The same system was prescribed for the stations dependent on Surat; the Factories at Carwar and Rajahpore were to be withdrawn, and a Native Agent left, with powers to collect goods, and to recover debts:—Agents, however, were to remain at Calicut and Carnapoly; a resolution which, on comparing the opinion of the Court in the preceding seasons, appears the more extraordinary, because the pepper brought from these ports was found, at the Company's sales, to be of inferior quality, and because the purchase and transit of it to  
the

CHAP. II. the warehouses, was exposed to obstructions and exactions,  
1678-79. by Sevagee's officers.

Limited  
equipments  
and stock for  
Surat.

These measures of the Court account for the diminished equipments and stock of this season :—the equipments consisted of three ships, or fourteen hundred and eighty tons, and the stock was estimated at £136,000, of which £34,400, only, was in goods, and £101,600 in bullion. The appropriation of this stock corresponded with the abridged system of trade :—the Europe goods were ordered to be sold at prime cost, rather than remain in store, and the proceeds to be applied to pay off the debt at interest ; the bullion, only, was to be applied to purchase such an investment, as would be productive at the home sales. <sup>(1)</sup>

Civil and  
military esta-  
blishment at  
Bombay re-  
duced.

If these orders for reducing the rank and allowances of the President and Council of Surat and its dependencies, appear improvident and capricious, the orders given for reducing the rank and allowances to the Deputy Governor of BOMBAY can only be accounted for, by the difficulty which a commercial body had to encounter, in passing from trade, their original and habitual object, to the management of a small territory, the revenues of which, they considered, might be sufficient to counterbalance the charges of maintaining and preserving it. It was, however, resolved, that the salary of the Deputy Governor should be decreased to £120 per annum ;—that the military establishment

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 5th and 9th August 1678, and 28th February 1678-79.

establishment should be reduced to two lieutenants, two ensigns, four serjeants, four corporals, and one hundred and eighty privates, and that no extra-allowance should be paid to the thirty soldiers, who had been detached to defend the Company's house at Surat, at the crisis when it was threatened by Sevagee's army, but the same pay given to them, as if they had remained on garrison duty, at Bombay ;—that the troop of horse should be disbanded, and Captain Keigwin, who commanded it, dismissed the Company's service; and that the militia, which had been embodied for the defence of the Island, should be discharged.

CHAP. II.  
1678-79.

As the fortifications had been the source of the heaviest expence, they were to be continued in their present state, without any farther improvements; and two gunners, and four matrosses, only, allowed for the batteries :—all the armed ships were to be sold, except one small frigate, and a few boats, to defend the fishery.

From these retrenchments in the civil and military establishments at Bombay, it was expected that a considerable saving would be made, to be brought into the Company's cash; and it was determined, that the whole charges, civil and military, of the Island, should be limited to 71,900 rupees, annually :—these regulations were obviously calculated to discourage, if not to break the spirit of their military servants, and to make Bombay an easy acquisition to any European or Indian invader; and yet the Court summed up their orders,  
by



CHAP. II. by requiring the Governor, by strict discipline, to have the  
1678-79. garrison always prepared for a vigorous defence of the Island, and by improving the revenues and trade, to raise funds sufficient to defray the charges of the whole establishment. <sup>(1)</sup>

Similar orders for Persia.

The same narrow expedients were ordered for PERSIA :— the Agent at Gombroon was required, in the unhealthy season, instead of going to Ispahan, to proceed no further than Shiras ; —the Europe goods were to be sold, at whatever price they would bring ; but the greatest possible quantity of Caramania wool was to be procured, and whatever balance of money might remain, was to be remitted to Surat. <sup>(2)</sup>

Plan of retrenchment for Fort St. George, and its dependencies, postponed.

In the instructions of the Court to FORT ST. GEORGE, for this season 1678-79, we do not discover either the dissatisfaction which they had expressed, on reviewing the state of their affairs at Surat and Bombay, or that similar reductions of rank and allowances were ordered at the Fort itself, or its dependencies, of Masulipatam, or Hughly. On comparing the want of information in the preceding season, regarding this part of the Company's possessions and trade, or the destination of the equipments and appropriation of the stock sent out, and the regulations for the administration of the Government at the Fort and its dependencies, we discover, that the Court were disposed

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 28th February 1678-79.— Letter from the Court to the Deputy Governor of Bombay, 28th February 1678-79.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 28th February 1678-79.

disposed to temporize with the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, and to postpone any reduction of their number or allowances. CHAP. II.  
1678-79.

The equipments for Fort St. George, this season, consisted of three ships, or fifteen hundred and eighty-five tons, and the stock was estimated at £209,950, of which £35,000, in bullion, was for Masulipatam, and £6,500 in goods, and £100,000 in bullion, for Bengal: but no sum was appropriated, as usual, for an investment of Coast goods for Bantam; in return, the goods were to be provided, agreeably to lists sent. No alteration was made in the situation of the civil or military servants, except that soldiers, having served seven years, were to be allowed ten fanams per month, additional, as an inducement to continue in the service. <sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments  
and stock for  
the Coast of  
Coromandel  
and Bengal;

The Factors in BENGAL, during this season, were instructed not to dispose of Europe goods by barter, but to sell the small quantity of this year's imports, and the remains of former years, for ready money only:—the large stock of money, in hand, it was expected, would enable them to purchase turmeric, and a sufficient quantity of saltpetre, of which five hundred tons ought to be annually in store at the Fort, ready for the shipping. <sup>(2)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, 3d January 1678-79.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Chief and Factors in the Bay of Bengal, 3d January 1678-79.

CHAP. II. 1678-79. The Company, in the season 1678-79, seem to have given up BANTAM, as a favourite seat of their trade; for though this Agency was allowed to continue its commercial speculations at TYWAN and AMOY, and again to attempt trade at TONQUIN and SIAM, their efforts were to be guided by circumstances, by the amount of the sales of Europe produce, and by the quantity of goods which might be obtained at those ports. The equipment consisted of two ships, or eleven hundred and fifty tons, and the stock was estimated at £48,000, in goods and bullion:—of this stock, thirty thousand dollars, in bullion, and the value of twenty thousand, in goods, were to be sent to Amoy and Tywan; fifty thousand dollars, in bullion, and twenty thousand, in goods, to Tonquin; and twenty thousand dollars, in bullion, and fifteen thousand, in goods, to Siam. From the disturbed state of the government at Tywan and Amoy, on account of the wars between the Tartars and Chinese, the Agents were ordered rather to hire houses for the accommodation of trade, than to build Factories:—another experiment might be made, of trade to Siam and Tonquin, to ascertain whether Europe goods would sell, or investments be procured, that would yield a profit; but, in this speculation, the Agent and Council were vested with discretionary powers to withdraw that trade, according to circumstances.

Trade to be attempted at Canton, in consequence

The Viceroy of CANTON having, by letters, offered the English at Bantam admission to trade, the Court ordered that

a respectful

a respectful answer should be given, and information requested, what protection would be granted to an English ship, if sent to Canton, and what privileges of trade would be given, if the Company should send a Factor or Agent to that port.

CHAP. II.  
1678-79.  
of a proposal  
of the Vice-  
roy.

The Agent was also instructed, in the event of a war between the Dutch and the King of Bantam, to avoid interferences, and to rest this conduct on the liberty of trade granted to the Dutch and English East-India Companies, by the treaty between England and the States General, in 1674.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Court's orders to ST. HELENA, during this season, were repeated, to promote the cultivation of the Island, as a colony, and to grant permission to the soldiers, whose terms had expired, to return to England.<sup>(2)</sup>

The information from SURAT and the subordinate Factories, in 1678-79, consisted chiefly of a detail of the difficulties of trade, from the convulsed situation of the provinces in which the investments had formerly been collected, and from the perpetual alarms in which the manufacturers and merchants

Trade at Surat depressed by the irregular wars and the reduction of rank.

3 I 2

were

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 6th November 1678, and 7th May 1679.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Island of St. Helena, 8th November 1678, and 16th May 1679.

CHAP. II.  
1678-79. were kept, by the predatory incursions, rather than by regular wars, between Sevagee and the Mogul. In former years, Phirmaunds and grants of privileges of trade, at least, yielded a partial return for the expences; but they had become, at this time, of less importance, from the Princes and States, who had given them, being engaged in constant warfare, which had made trade difficult, and purchases expensive and precarious.

The President and Council of Surat, therefore, stated, that from the heavy charges on goods, from bad debts, which (from the existing political anarchy) could not be recovered, and from the expences of the fortifications and garrison of Bombay, as an English Settlement, a thousand tons of shipping would be fully sufficient for the investment of the subsequent year; that two thousand five hundred pieces of broad-cloths, and twenty chests of coral, would supply the market, and that the stock for the investment must be, chiefly, in bullion.

The situation of the subordinate Settlements was as discouraging as that of Surat:—the Factory at Rajahpore, from its being much exposed to the depredations of Sevagee's troops, had been withdrawn, but the Factory of Carwar, from being more remote from his influence, was continued:—similar consequences were apprehended from the Mogul Government being occupied in suppressing revolts in different provinces, and not stationing armies in the countries from  
which

which the investments had hitherto been drawn, or even a detachment to protect Surat;—hence the stores of Europe goods, and the produce provided for investments, had been removed to Swally, that they might be more easily put on board the ships:—Struggling, thus, for the Company's interest, the Agent and Council of Surat complained of the hardship of the reduction of their rank as a Presidency, after it had, for so many years, and under so many dangers, been held up, as the principal seat of the Company's government and trade in the East-Indies. <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> (1) 1678-79

The information from BOMBAY was not less alarming:—the weavers were so poor, that, without some advances, manufactures could not proceed:—the diamond merchants could not be persuaded to settle at Bombay, while Sevagee occupied the countries on the neighbouring continent:—deaths among the soldiery were frequent, and few arrivals of recruits to fill up the vacancies:—the garrison was disheartened at the reduction of rank; and the Portuguese continued to obstruct the passes at Tannah and Caranjah. (2)

Difficulty of trade at Bombay and in Persia.

The trade to PERSIA, in this year, was equally unpromising, it being impracticable, from a scarcity in the country, and

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 24th September, 19th October, and 7th December 1678, 21st January and 17th February 1678-79, and 5th April 1679.

(2)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat, and the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 21st January 1678-79.

CHAP. II. and from the exactions of the Government, to find purchasers  
 1678-79. for the woollens and tin; or to procure goods, particularly  
 Caramania wool, of the quality ordered, and at the seasons  
 expected;—it would, therefore, require much discretion to  
 obtain payment of the thousand tomands of customs, or, in-  
 deed, a smaller sum, unless a force should be employed, to  
 bring the Persians to respect the English, and fulfil their  
 commercial obligations with them. <sup>(1)</sup>

The Agency  
 of Fort St.  
 George agree  
 not to attempt  
 soliciting a  
 general Phir-  
 maund.

Though the Court, in 1678-79, (as in the preceding sea-  
 son,) were without any direct communication from FORT ST.  
 GEORGE, the correspondence between it, and Hughly, and  
 Surat, furnishes sufficient facts, to afford a general estimate  
 of the trade on the Coromandel Coast:—the investment at  
 the Fort consisted chiefly of re-exports from Bengal, and  
 of some Coromandel goods, and, on the whole, was greater  
 than (in the terms used in the letter) “it had been in any  
 “ period of the Company’s commerce, and greater than, un-  
 “ der all circumstances, could have been expected,” though  
 there remains no specification, either of the goods, or of their  
 estimated value:—It appears, however, that considerable dif-  
 ferences of opinion had arisen, both at Fort St. George and  
 at Hughly, on the prudence of applying for a General Phir-  
 maund from the Mogul, so repeatedly recommended by the  
 Court, or resting on a Nishân, or grant for privileges of  
 trade

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 21st January 1678-79.

trade, in the provinces bordering on the Ganges, but to leave Surat out of view, as being possessed of a particular Phirmaund. This exception of Surat was evidently intended to keep the privileges solicited for Bengal, &c. distinct from those actually possessed at Surat, lest this should lead to discussions, which might abridge, rather than improve, the Company's privileges on the West of India :—it was therefore decided, that it would be more wise to take a Nishân for privileges in Bengal, Bahar, and Orixâ, than to hazard an application for a General Phirmaund, though the advantages from such a Phirmaund, it was allowed, would be great, and would soon compensate for the expences of procuring it, even should they amount to forty thousand rupees :—the Nishân was, accordingly, obtained, in September 1678, and it was the opinion of the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, and of the Agent at Bengal, that, under it, the Company's trade ought to proceed. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP II.  
1678-79

The only information which reached the Court, respecting BANTAM and its dependencies, in the season 1678-79, was, (after much negotiation with the King of Tonquin, respecting the amount of the presents which he required,) that

(1)—Letter from the Agent at Bengal to the Presidency of Surat, 9th December 1678.— Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Agent at Bengal, 24th February 1678-79.— Copy of Nishân, or Order for Permission to trade at Bengal, 12th September 1678. (Vol. xxxiii, No. 3124.)



CHAP. II. that ground for building a Factory had been obtained, but not  
1678-79. with such privileges or protection as had been solicited; and  
no information was given of the produce which could either  
be sold or purchased. <sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Factors at Tonquin to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 4th  
October 1678.

1679-80.

THE Restoration of Peace on the continent of Europe, CHAP. II.  
 in 1679-80, having removed the necessity of those precautions, 1679-80.  
 which the Court had ordered to be observed by their home- Court alarm-  
 ward-bound ships, it might have been expected, that the ed at a new  
 contracted system, upon which the equipments and stock of class of Eng-  
 the preceding year had been formed, would have been relin- lish Interlo-  
 quished, lest the public should complain of the East-India pers fitting  
 trade not being carried on with those advantages, which the out ships for  
 Joint Stock of the Company had promised:—the Court, How- the East-Ind-  
 ever, adhered to the same limited system, as in the last dies, at Cadiz.

It was, therefore, resolved, to continue the reduced  
 establishment at SURAT, which was, henceforward, to have,  
 instead of the rank of a *Presidency*, that of an *Agency*;  
 —the Agent was to have only £300 per annum; and a pro-  
 portionate diminution was to take place in the salaries of the

CHAP. II. Members of Council, so that the junior Member should only  
1679-80. have £40 per annum.

Those variations, however, in the amount of equipments and stock, intended for the different Agencies, occurred, towards the close of this season, which either must have arisen from doubts being, at this time, entertained of the permanency of peace between England and the Maritime Powers of Europe, trading to the East-Indies, or from the irresolution of particular Directors, leaning to a limited trade, and the more public spirit of other Directors, favouring a more extended commerce:—In this season, also, the Private-Traders re-appeared, none of whom had interfered with the Company's exclusive privileges, by fitting out vessels from England, since the restoration of the Company's Charter by the King, in 1661:—These Interlopers were directed by a Captain Alley, whose project was, to equip a large ship at Cadiz, to carry out Europe commodities, and to return with Eastern produce, to be disposed of in foreign European markets.

Alarmed at the consequences of this intrusion, the Company applied to the King, and obtained a letter, founded on an Order of Council, directed to their principal Agents at Surat, authorizing them to refuse protection, and commercial assistance, to Interlopers of this description; and the Court sent commissions, to the same effect, to the Chiefs of their different settlements.

It

It will immediately appear, however, from the different amounts of equipments and stock consigned to Surat, and to Fort St. George, that the Court had received information of the views of these Interlopers being directed, chiefly to the trade on the Coromandel Coast, and the Bay of Bengal.

The equipments for SURAT and BOMBAY, in this season, consisted of three ships, or sixteen hundred tons, and the stock was estimated at £123,000, of which the large proportion of £99,600 was in bullion:—the investment expected was to be of the usual articles, sent from the West Coast of India, and from the Gulf of Persia, with the exception only of a small quantity of Surat goods, of a finer kind, amounting to £2,000, which was ordered to be purchased at Surat, and sent to Bantam.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the directions of the Court, for the administration of BOMBAY, in this season, we discover a doubt of the practicability of carrying the orders of the preceding year into execution; but, at the same time, an adherence to the plan of retrenchment:—these orders had specified, that the rank of the military officers of the garrison should be lowered, and that the militia should be disembodied:—afraid, on reflection, that if this plan should be adopted, the Island might be left defenceless, the Court now directed, that two companies of auxiliary forces should be raised, composed of the principal

3 K 2

inhabitants

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 14th July and 29th September 1679, and 19th March 1679-80.

CHAP. II.  
1679-80.

Equipments  
and stock for  
Surat.

Orders for  
continuing  
the retrench-  
ments at  
Bombay, and  
for increasing  
the revenues.

CHAP. II.  
1679-80. inhabitants, each to be commanded by a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign; the pay of these officers not to exceed a thousand xeraphins per annum. By this measure, a superior rank was conferred on the officers commanding auxiliary companies, to that held by the officers of the regular garrison, who were to be lieutenants only. Thirty recruits were to be embarked on the ships of the season, which, with the like number serving as a guard to the Factory of Surat, it was considered would form an English corps, equal to the defence of the fort.

With the view of providing a sum equal to the civil and military charges of the Government, the Court required, that all houses should be valued, and a proportionate tax imposed on each; the uncultivated land surveyed, and let out on rent; and the marshy grounds drained, and rendered fit for agriculture.<sup>(1)</sup>

Conditional orders for relinquishing the trade at Gombroon.

On the basis of the information which had been received, respecting the trade with PERSIA, the Court recommended, that the broad-cloths and tin should be sold, at such prices as they would bring, and that the proceeds should be applied to the purchase of Caramania wool, of better quality than what had been received last season; and, unless the trade at Gombroon

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 19th March 1679-80.— Letter from the Court to the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay, 19th March 1679-80.

broon should be more advantageous than it had proved for several years, it was to be relinquished.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1679-80.

In the resolutions of the Court, respecting the Settlements on the COROMANDEL COAST, we discover, that they intended to introduce, in some degree, the same plan of retrenchment, which had been adopted at Surat and Bombay, and their dependencies; and yet it appears a kind of contradiction to their own measures, that they should, in this season (1679-80), have enlarged the scale of their equipments and stock, and have required, from their civil servants, new efforts to extend and improve the trade, and the utmost exertions, from their military servants, to keep the place in the best state of defence:—we can easily account for the former, by the necessity of bearing down the Interlopers in the market; but can only account for the latter, by the project of deriving from the savings, a sum, to be carried to the Company's cash:—to this narrow plan we must refer the orders for reducing each of the companies, composing the garrison, to sixty men; for so fully satisfied were the Court, of the danger incurred by this hazardous experiment, that they explained to the Agent and Council, that the Fort was to be considered only as a place of security to their property and servants, and that it would be a cheaper expedient, to purchase grants from the Native Princes and

Military establishment at Fort St. George to be diminished.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 19th March 1679-80.

CHAP. II.  
1679-80. and States, for the protection of trade, than to incur the heavy charges of enlarging the fortifications, or adding to the number of the troops, which, at best, with the appearance of a military force, might give umbrage to those Native Powers, whose armies the garrison could not resist.

Equipments  
and stock for  
the Coast and  
Bengal.

The equipments for the Coromandel Coast, in 1679-80, consisted of four sail, or two thousand one hundred and eighty tons, and the stock was estimated at £268,700, in goods and bullion, being a larger amount than had, in any former period, been sent, in one season, for the Company's trade at Fort St. George, or at its dependencies of Masulipatam, and in Bengal.

This large sum was chiefly in bullion, with a very moderate proportion in goods:—of this stock, £100,000 was to be invested at the Fort, £60,000 at Masulipatam and Madapollam, and £110,000 sent to the Factories at the Bay of Bengal. It does not, however, appear, that any part of this large stock was intended to keep open the trade between the Coromandel Coast and Bantam; on the contrary, the Court allowed their servants to engage in this trade, on their own private account, though, in the orders of the preceding years, this practice had been strictly forbidden.

The investment expected from the Coast was enumerated in a list, similar to those which had been sent in former seasons, with injunctions to purchase, at as low prices as might be possible, and to take greater care, in making up the packages,

packages, that the goods might not be cut or damaged:—as <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> the cloths which had been provided at Masulipatam had answered at the sales at home, that Factory was ordered to receive farther encouragement, which was also extended to the new station at Madapollam. <sup>1679-80.</sup> (1).

The instructions of the Court, in this season, to BENGAL, approved of Mr. Vincent's exertions, in obtaining the Nishân from the Prince, referred to last season; authorized the establishment of a Factory at Ballasore; and recommended the observance of the regulations, for keeping the books, consultations, &c.; and that all accounts should be signed by the Chief and Second in Council. (2)

The equipments for BANTAM, in 1679-80, consisted of three ships, or sixteen hundred tons, with a stock of £69,000, consisting of bullion, with a small proportion of broad-cloth:—the instructions required, that a good understanding should be cultivated with the King of Bantam, between whom, and the Dutch, a war was apprehended, in which the Agents were not to interfere, but, to rest on the articles of the late peace between England and the States General, and to avoid any

Orders to the Agent at Bantam, to improve the trade at Amoy, but to lessen the expences at Siam, Tonquin, and Tywan.

(1)—Letter from the King to [the Company's Agents and Councils on the Coast of Coromandel and Bay of Bengal, 2d December 1679.— Commission from the Company to their Agents and Councils at the Coast of Coromandel and Bay of Bengal, 3d December 1679.— Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, 3d and 31st December 1679.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Hughly, 3d and 31st December 1679.



ANNALS OF THE HONORABLE

II. any disputes that might revive the animosities between the  
30. Companies of the two nations:—the like conciliatory conduct  
was recommended to be observed with the King of Jambee,  
to draw, if possible, a proportion of the pepper from Che-  
ribon:—directions were also given, to establish a trade at  
AMOX, from its being a port belonging to a great Empire, in  
which English cloths, and other produce, might find a sale,  
and from which a communication might perhaps be opened  
with Japan; but the Factories at TYWAN, TONQUIN, and SIAM,  
were to be kept open on a limited scale, though the produce  
of those places had not sold in England, but with loss: one  
servant, only, was, therefore, to be left at each, to recover  
debts, and wind up the Company's concerns.<sup>(1)</sup>

14-  
St. In the season 1679-80, the Court took a review of  
their affairs at the Island of ST. HELENA, and established a  
code of regulations for the future management of the Island.  
The substance of these regulations was, that twenty acres of  
land, and two cows, should be allotted to each English family,  
and ten acres, and one cow, to each unmarried settler;—that  
the soldiers should be admitted, when their term of service  
expired, to these proportions of land, and that, in common  
with the other settlers, military service should be required of  
them, in guarding the Island; that is, that every proprietor  
of twenty acres of land should furnish a man, to be regularly  
trained

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 26th November  
1679, 4th February and 19th March 1679-80, and 14th April 1680.

trained, and in his turn to do garrison duty;—that, in the event of the death of a settler, his land and stock should descend to his family, one half to be rented by the widow, for her life, the other to go to his heirs, provided that, within two years, they became resident on the Island;—that under this arrangement, the force, or garrison, should be made up of the settlers, rather than of soldiers from England; it being, however, always understood, that one half of the land should remain the exclusive property of the Company:—the Governor was strictly ordered, should any of the Interlopers touch at the Island, to refuse them supplies, refreshment, or assistance of any kind.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1679-80.

The orders for reducing the establishments, both civil and military, at SURAT and BOMBAY, reached those places at a crisis, when the convulsed state of the Indian Continent, from the wars, between Sevagee and the Mogul, rendered it hazardous to attempt the carrying them into execution. On perusing the advices from Surat, for the season 1679-80, which intimated the death of several of the most experienced company's servants, and the difficulties under which the dependencies

Court's orders for reducing the establishment at Surat found impracticable.

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dependencies

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Governor and Council of St. Helena, 24th March 1679-80, and 14th April 1680.

CHAP. II.  
1679-80

dencies were placed, it is evident, that much exertion must have been used to provide investments to load the three last ships which had arrived, and were dispatched for Europe with full cargoes.

Bombay endangered, from Sevagee, and the Mogul Admiral, or Siddee, having respectively occupied the Islands of Henery and Kenery.

The orders for reducing the Factory at Rajahpore, and bringing off the servants, had been opposed, by a prohibition of Sevagee:—the dissolving the Factory at Carwar was, in like manner, impracticable this season, because it might offend that Chief, and because the collecting of the Company's debts must be a previous step. What rendered the situation, both of Surat and Bombay, at this crisis, peculiarly embarrassing, was, the occupation, in October 1679, of the Island of Kendry, or Kenery, situated at the mouth of the harbour of Bombay, by the troops of Sevagee:—this unforeseen occurrence could not be prevented, because the Deputy Governor could only employ armed boats, to oblige the invader's troops to withdraw:—he was, therefore, compelled, from the want of force, to admit the right of Sevagee to occupy this Island, on his granting permission to the Company's Factors at Rajahpore, to return to Surat.

This event was followed by one equally menacing, or the seizure of the Island of Hendry, or Henery, by the Sidde or Mogul Admiral, who assigned, among other reasons for this measure, that the Mogul had been offended at the treaty made by the English with Sevagee.

**BOMBAY**

BOMBAY, by these events, was exposed to become a conquest to the one or the other of the great Indian Powers, and yet, under such circumstances, the positive order of the Court, to reduce the troop of horse, and the equally positive order, for retrenchment, were carried into effect, under an explanation, that unless a reinforcement, of at least two hundred English soldiers, with a proper officer to command them, should arrive (a duty for which Captain Keigwin, who was about to return to England, was qualified), and unless a proper marine force should be established, to keep in check the fleets of Sevagee, and of the Siddee, it was natural to anticipate the loss of the Island ;—nor were the stores at Surat, or Swally, less exposed, by obeying the order to withdraw the guard, and to bring it from Bombay, when danger was apprehended ; for the reports of Sevagee's intention of committing any violence or depredation, were immediately followed by the execution of them :—it was, therefore, obvious, that however expedient, in a commercial view, the reduction of the military establishment at Bombay, might be, from the charges of maintaining it, such reduction would be dangerous, and could not be attempted, consistently with the duty of their servants to preserve the place, and the trade of the Company.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1679-80.  
Difficulty of executing the Court's orders for reducing the military establishment at Bombay.

3 L 2.

On

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 18th November 1679, 24th January 1679-80, and 8th April 1680.

CHAP. II.  
1679-80. On comparing the letter of the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay, to the President at Surat, with his general letters to the Court during the season 1679-80, it appears, that however hard the condition to which the Company's servants, civil and military, were reduced, by the diminution of their numbers, rank, and allowances, they had complied with the orders of the Court, except in the allowances for table-money, the civil charges of the court of justice, and the military charges of the soldiers and marines; and to account for this deviation from their instructions, they furnished the Court with an estimate of the lowest possible scale to which the charges could be brought, even in a time of peace, explaining, that this estimate could not apply to existing circumstances, or to the constant alarm in which they were kept for the safety of the Island; and concluded, that they held it to be inconsistent with the trust reposed in them, to come under any obligations, not to exceed the amount which had been specified, when such excess, on consultation, should appear unavoidable; nor could they promise, that the revenues would improve, while the Island was so imminently exposed to the Native Powers, nor would it be prudent to discontinue the fortifications, because the workmen, who had received wages under this head, having no other subsistence, would necessarily leave the Island, and the cultivation of the land, of course, cease.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, and to the Court, 7th and 31st December 1679.

The Court do not appear to have received any informa-  
tion, in this season, of the state of their affairs at FORT ST. <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> 1679-80.  
GEORGE, in BENGAL, or at BANTAM.

## 1680-81.

CHAP. II. THE domestic Annals of the East-India Company, for 1680-81. the season 1680-81, varied only from those of the preceding year in a few particulars, the Court assigning, as a reason for this similarity, that affairs, in Europe, continued to have the same aspects.

Court's instructions to Surat, on intelligence of a large fleet fitting in the Baltic for the East-Indies.

An alarm, at this time, had been excited, by an equipment in the Baltic, of a squadron of six armed ships, of from sixteen to forty-four guns, accompanied with victuallers, intended to proceed to the Indian Seas, to make prizes of the country ships, between Surat, Mocha, and the Gulf of Persia. As this fleet might probably carry the colours of some of the European Maritime Powers, the Presidency of SURAT were directed to notify this circumstance to the principal Indian Sovereigns, and, to prevent misunderstanding, to disavow any connexion between this fleet and the East-India Company.

Equipments and stock for Surat.

The Company's equipments for Surat and its dependencies, for this season, consisted of three ships, or fifteen hundred tons, with a stock, in goods and silver only, (no gold being this year sent, on account of its low rate in India) estimated at £155,000. The orders for the investment, except in one

or

or two articles, were similar to those of the preceding year ;— CHAP. II.  
1680-81.  
 the purchase of diamonds, which had hitherto been regarded as the private-trade of the Company's servants, was, in future, to be considered as a branch of the investment, and £20,000 of the stock was to be allotted to this speculation, provided diamonds, of different descriptions, could be purchased, at rates which would yield a mercantile profit ; if this could not be effected, this sum was to be laid out in the purchase of additional quantities of calicoes :—a proportion, also, of pepper, turmeric, &c., was to be kept in store, ready to be put on board the Europe ships, to prevent dead freight.

The instructions of the preceding season, respecting Carwar and Rajahpore, were to be acted on, but, with discretionary powers to the Presidency, to accommodate them to the circumstances in which those Factories might be placed, with respect to Sevagee, that their estate might be preserved, and their debts recovered. In the event of the President's coming to Europe, as he had desired, Mr. Child was to succeed, but with the rank of *Agent* only. <sup>(1)</sup>

The Court, on considering the occupation of the small Islands of Henery and Kenery by Sevagee's fleet, and that of the Siddee, resolved, that if those places could not be recovered by negotiation, (in the sequel, however, they were relinquished)

Directions not to employ force, to expel Sevagee and the Siddee from Henery and Kenery.

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 16th July and 15th August 1680, 15th March 1680-81, 22d and 25th April 1681.



CHAP. II.  
1680-81.

quished) no attempts were to be made to recover them by force: the Deputy Governor of BOMBAY, was, however, censured, for not calling upon the Company's ships to assist in preventing the enemy from getting possession of them, as, by charter-party, the captains were bound to promote the Company's interest, by arms, as well as by trade;—on every future occasion, therefore, it was ordered, that such service should be required of them; but, it was explained, that like the Dutch, the Governor of Bombay ought to avoid interferences in all wars between the great Indian Powers, the Company having no adequate force for such a service, and that their ships and soldiers were to act only in insular situations.

Captain Keigwin, and seventy soldiers, sent as a re-inforcement for Bombay.

For the greater security of the Island of Bombay, the Court, this season, engaged Captain Keigwin, with the rank of Captain Lieutenant, and to be third in Council (no military officer being to rise above that rank) to proceed to Bombay, and to have the pay of six shillings per day, but no allowance for diet and lodging:—he was to bring with him a reinforcement of seventy English soldiers, eighteen pieces of small ordnance, and a proportion of ammunition, and to command the whole of the military force and militia; but, to balance this additional charge, on the death, or coming away of either of the Lieutenants, no successor was to be appointed; and, in the event of peace, a number of the Portuguese soldiers were to be discharged, proportioned to the re-inforcement now embarked, and the garrison reduced to a fixed establishment:

—a Mr. Smith was also sent, as Assay-master, to conduct the Mint, at a salary of £60 per annum. <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> <sup>1680-81.</sup> <sup>(1)</sup>

As the trade to PERSIA continued to be unproductive, the Court, this season, ordered the Agent at Gombroon to endeavour, by every possible means, to reduce the charges, and to dispatch to Surat, such goods as he might be able to procure in proper time to meet the ships intended for Europe. <sup>(2)</sup>

A new plan of administration, for the Government of FORT ST. GEORGE and its dependencies, was transmitted in this season (1680-81) with the preliminary explanation, that it was calculated for the larger scale of trade which the Court intended to introduce in that quarter of their limits. The Agent, hitherto, had been appointed by the Company, and the Council filled up by removals of the Chiefs, from subordinate Factories:—this practice had occasioned frequent irregularities and animosities, and it had also been found, that the persons who, in one season, appeared to have had the fullest confidence of the Court, had, in the next, been the objects, either of their suspicion, or of their condemnation; and an example occurred, in the present season, in the case of Mr. Streynsham Master, who was dismissed the Company's service, and Mr. Job Charnock, who had

New plan of administration for Fort St. George, of which Mr. Gyfford was appointed Agent.

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(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, and the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, 15th March 1680-81.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 15th March 1680-81.

CHAP. II. kept in check the measures of this Agent and Council, by  
 1680 -81. correspondence with the Court, restored to his situation, the Court declaring to the Government of Fort St. George, “ that they would rather dismiss the whole of their other “ Agents, than that Mr. Charnock should not be the Chief “ of Cossimbuzar.”

On this occasion, Mr. William Gyfford was appointed to be Agent and Governor of Fort St. George, and a Council, consisting of five members, who were to be responsible to the Court, only ; the succession, in the event of death, or removal, to be regular in those five, till the pleasure of the Court should be known :—the Agents, or Factors, at Masulipatam, and at the different stations in Bengal, were to remain fixed in their situations, unless, upon evidence of misbehaviour, supercessions should be deemed necessary by the Governor and Council at Madras, the reasons for which were to be entered on the consultations, and reported in their general letters ; but no new appointment to a seat in the Council (except in case of death) was allowed, without the approbation of the Court, and, even in this case, to be provisionally, only, till such approbation should be signified. These changes proceeded from the frequent disobedience to orders, and from the indecorous letters addressed to the Court by their servants abroad.

On reviewing the commission to Mr. Gyfford, and the instructions under which he was to act, it appears, that he  
 was

was appointed Agent, Governor, and Commander-in-Chief, at Fort St. George and its dependencies, and that the objects of the Court were, first, to do away all dealings in private trade, by their servants, in any of the articles in the Company's investments, of which lists would annually be sent; next, to establish a strict obedience to orders, either regarding trade or the internal administration of Madras and its dependencies, in particular, to prevent building houses of any kind, except in such places as were under the Company's immediate command; and, lastly, to encrease the revenues of Madras, by lowering the customs, and imposing a duty on articles of consumption:—if any discontent should appear, it was to be explained, that those who lived under the English protection must contribute to the charges, by which that protection was maintained.

The equipments for Fort St. George, in the season 1680-81, consisted of five ships, or two thousand six hundred and ninety tons, and the stock was estimated at £373,000, chiefly in bullion:—£150,000 of this amount, in money and goods, was to be appropriated to the Factories in BENGAL; £70,000, to MASULIPATAM; £60,000, to be invested in diamonds; and the remainder, or near £100,000, was to remain at the Fort, to provide the investment for the subsequent year.

If the Company's orders for cloths, silks, &c., could not be fulfilled, a discretionary power, for this season only, was

3 M 2

given

CHAP. II.  
1680-81.

Equipment  
and stock for  
Fort St.  
George and  
Bengal.

CHAP. II. 1680-81. given to the Agent, to compleat the lading with such additional quantities of other goods as would vend in England, though not included in the lists sent :—the Company's servants were prohibited, (till after the Company's ships should be dispatched for Europe) to trade in any articles in their lists, because a quantity of raw-silk from Bengal, last year, had been sent, through illicit interferences, which had depressed the prices at the sales :—the trade in diamonds was, exclusively, to be on the Company's account :—the diamonds were to be purchased at Madras only, as bringing them from Golcondah was hazardous, and as Madras ought to be the principal mart in India, for this article :—this part of the trade was to be carried on under the following regulations :—three per cent. freight was to be allowed for diamonds imported, one-half to the owners, and one-half to the commanders ; and five per cent. commission, on the purchase, one-half to the President, or Agent, making such purchase, and the other half to the respective Councils :—if the profit on the diamonds sold in England, should exceed £60 per cent. (including interest and insurance) such excess was to be equally divided, one moiety to belong to the Company, and the other to the President, Agent, and Councils, by whom the diamonds had been obtained, in equal proportions, but not to be paid till their return to England. <sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Governor and Council at Fort St. George ; Commission to Mr. William Gyfford to be Agent and Governor at Fort St. George ; and Regulations about the Diamond Trade ; 5th January 1680-81.

EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

The BENGAL Agents, this season, were ordered to transmit copies of all journals and consultations; to obtain full quantities of silks and taffaties; to send equal proportions of stock to Dacca and Malda; to make Ballasore a buying, as well as a shipping Factory, with a stock of £20,000, and not to interrupt the silk investments, by their private trade; to pay particular attention to the packing and sorting of goods; to dispatch the ships early for Europe; and whatever Phirmaunds, Nishâns, or Perwannahs, they might hereafter procure, were to be in the name of the London East-India Company, only. <sup>CH</sup> 168

The same regular plan, as ordered for the government and trade of Fort St. George, was, this season, transmitted to BANTAM and its dependencies. Mr. Bowyer, with six Members of Council, were vested with the administration, and their salaries specified:—an allowance was fixed for the Factors at Amoy, Tonquin, &c. and regularity in keeping accounts and journals to be observed; copies of which were to be annually transmitted to England. New of a trati Bant

The equipments for Bantam consisted of three ships, with a stock estimated at £68,000, of which fifty thousand dollars were to be sent to Amoy, and fifty thousand to Tonquin; the remainder to be invested in pepper and ginger, at Bantam. The Factories at Siam and Jambée were again ordered to be dissolved; but, notwithstanding the direction for withdrawing the Equ stoci com instr for l and nate

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Hughly, 5th January 1680-81.

CHAP. II. the Factory at Tonquin, in the preceding year, another experi-  
 1680-81. ment was to be made, to obtain silks, and a Mr. Blundel, a  
 person particularly skilful in this article, sent from England, to  
 examine whether that trade could be turned to more advantage,  
 than it hitherto had been, or, by any expedient, connected  
 with that of Japan:—the Factory at Amoy was supplied with  
 goods and stock, to purchase silks, musk, &c., and if possi-  
 ble, to extend from that port the sale of English produce.

It does not appear, that, as yet, teas were in any  
 estimation, not being mentioned in the orders of this season;  
 or that the Court had any farther idea of the CHINA  
 trade, than that, through so extensive an Empire, the sale  
 of English produce might be augmented, and silks pro-  
 cured; but they repeated, that, in return to the invitation  
 of the Viceroy of Canton, the Agent was to inform him,  
 that as soon as the wars in China should be over, the Eng-  
 lish would readily make an experiment of trading to that  
 port.<sup>(1)</sup>

More fa-  
 vourable  
 prospects of  
 trade, from

The foreign Annals of the Company, beginning with  
 those of SURAT, in the season 1680-81, open with the im-  
 portant

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 25th August  
 1680, and 5th January 1680-81.— Letters from the Court to the Factors at Amoy and  
 Tonquin, 25th August 1680.

portant information of the death of Sevagee, whose talents and intrepidity had so long opposed the Mogul Government and the armies of Aurungzebe. By the wars of these two great Chiefs, the Peninsula of India had been divided for a long series of years, and trade obstructed, as the predominance of the one or of the other appeared probable:—this had been severely felt, not only at Surat, but at all the Factories on the Malabar Coast, and each, in its turn, had been kept in uncertainty and alarm, sometimes forming, but more frequently withdrawing, Factories and Stations, and often in danger of losing those rights and privileges, which had been so expensively purchased, and often, also, in danger of being plundered, and excluded from the East-India commerce.

The first impression on the Presidency of Surat, from Sevagee's death, was, that his successor, Sambagee Rajah, would, from his character, be more steady in his politics, and better disposed towards the trade of the Company, and therefore they regretted, that the orders of the Court, for withdrawing the Factory from Carwar (for which one of the lately arrived Company's ships had been dispatched) would narrow the means of obtaining pepper, and other Malabar goods, and prevent the enlarged tonnage, sent this season, from being filled. Agreeably to the orders of their employers, and to prevent this consequence, expedients had been tried, and hopes held out, notwithstanding the arrival of a large  
French

CHAP. II:  
1680-81.  
the death of  
Sevagee and  
the accession  
of Sambagee.



CHAP. II. **French ship, with broad-cloth, and other goods fitted for the**  
 1680-81. **market, that the ships might be fully laden.**

Order of Aurungzebe to augment the customs at Surat from two to three and a half per cent.

This prospect, however, was obstructed, by an order from Aurungzebe to impose a heavy contribution on all his subjects, and, among others, on the European Factories at Surat:—on compliance being refused, as being contrary to grants and privileges, an order arrived to re-establish the ancient duty of three and a half per cent. customs, instead of two per cent.:—this order obliged the Presidency to offer, in conjunction with the French and Dutch, a present to the Governor, of thirty thousand rupees, provided, by his interest, the former rate of two per cent. customs should be allowed to continue. <sup>(1)</sup>

It does not appear, from the subsequent dispatches, that a grant to this effect, was obtained, the rebellion of Sultan Acbar, the third son of Aurungzebe, supported by the Rajpoots, having prevented all negotiation.

The investment for Europe considerable.

The large investment which had been put on board the Company's ships for Europe, amounting, in cloths and pepper, to 9,73,000 rupees, the Presidency explained to have been obtained, partly from their having received a small quantity of cloth, and other Europe commodities, only, by which means they had disposed of the articles remaining in store, to much greater advantage than could have been anticipated, but chiefly

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 18th October 1680.

chiefly from the large quantity of bullion, which had enabled them not only to discharge the debt at interest, but to have funds, to the amount of nearly £30,000, to begin the investment for the subsequent season:—if, however, the tonnage which the Court proposed should arrive, they would be obliged to take up money at interest, but the stock in hand would furnish funds to the Factors at Carwar, Calicut, and Dungum, to provide pepper, cassia-lignum, and cloth, agreeably to the Court's orders.

CHAP. II.  
1680-81.

The Presidency next explained, that though they would endeavour to carry the Court's orders, respecting the trade in diamonds, into effect, they must complain, that this was taking from them the only remaining means, by which they could trade, on their private account.

To the letters of the President and Council were sub-joined a list of Europe goods required for the next season; or two thousand five hundred pieces of broad-cloths, twenty chests of coral, and three of cochineal. <sup>(1)</sup>

The internal circumstances of the Island of BOMBAY, this season, were more favourable, than, from the alarming events in the preceding year, could have been anticipated; for though the Islands of Henery and Kenery had been occupied by the forces of Sevagee, and of the Mogul, and a humiliating truce, or treaty, concluded by the Deputy Governor

Trade and  
revenue of  
Bombay im-  
proving.

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and

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 24th January 1680-81, and 11th April 1681.

CHAP. II. and Council, acquiescing in those Chiefs' retaining these  
1680-81. stations, the trade had neither decreased, nor the number of  
inhabitants in Bombay been diminished; for the revenues,  
which had been farmed, produced more than in former sea-  
sons, and the garrison had been reinforced by the guard from  
Surat; and the arrival of twenty-eight recruits. <sup>(1)</sup>

Phirmaund  
obtained from  
the King of  
Persia, for  
payment of  
part of the  
arrears of  
customs at  
Gombroon.

In PERSIA, the sales and purchases at Gombroon had  
been depressed, although Mr. Pettit, the Agent, had ob-  
tained a Phirmaund from the King of Persia, for the pay-  
ment of a thousand tomands, or above £3,000 sterling, as  
the moiety of customs, for the preceding season; and he was  
in expectation of receiving another thousand tomands, as  
the moiety for the current year. <sup>(2)</sup>

The accounts of the proceedings of the Government of  
FORT ST. GEORGE, on the new constitution which had been  
promulgated, did not reach England this season, and the  
commercial measures adopted for providing the investment  
at the Fort, and at the Factories in BENGAL, are the only facts  
detailed in the Company's records. <sup>(3)</sup>

It does not appear, that any communication was received,  
this season, from BANTAM.

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 24th January 1680-81, and  
11th April 1681.

(2)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 24th January 1680-81, and  
11th April 1681.

(3)—Letter from the Agency of Fort St. George to the Factories in Bengal, 12th  
August 1680.

## 1681-82.

IN 1681-82, the measures recommended for the trade of SURAT (now again allowed to resume the rank of a *Presidency*) exhibited aspects, which mark the shifting state of the Company's domestic affairs.

At the opening of the season, six small vessels, from one hundred and thirty, to three hundred tons, were proposed to be dispatched, for what the Court termed the China trade, that is, to proceed to Tonquin and Amoy, and having obtained from the Factors there, such produce, silks, velvets, &c., as they had provided, to return to Surat, and complete their cargoes with pepper, cardamoms, cassia-lignum, &c., and thence to be dispatched for Europe. As the season advanced, information was received, that the Tartars had driven the Chinese from Amoy, that the Company's Factory had been destroyed, and their servants had escaped to Tonquin and Bantam; this speculation was, therefore, suspended, and the vessels ordered to be filled up, from the Company's warehouses at Surat, and to proceed for Europe.

This event did not damp the commercial enterprizes of the Company, for the equipments consigned to Surat consisted of six ships, carrying about two thousand five hundred tons,

CHAP. II.

1681-82.

Surat restored to the rank of a Presidency.

Equipment and stock for Surat.

CHAP. II. with a stock, estimated at £178,000 in bullion and goods,  
 1681-82. £20,000 of which was appropriated to the purchase of dia-  
 monds, and the remainder to be invested in Surat cloths,  
 and the produce of the dependencies of that Presidency.

Mr. John  
 Child ap-  
 pointed Pre-  
 sident of Su-  
 rat, with par-  
 ticular in-  
 structions to  
 promote the  
 sale of Eng-  
 lish manufac-  
 tures in India.

To conduct this new and enlarged scale of trade, Mr. John Child, brother to Sir Josiah Child, the Governor of the East-India Company, was appointed President of Surat, with a Council of eight:—the Second in Council was to have the immediate charge of the Persian trade, and one of the other Members (at the discretion of the President,) to be Deputy Governor of Bombay:—the new President and his Council were to re-establish the Factory at Carwar, and to obtain information, in what ports or countries it might be practicable to attempt the opening of trade, particularly the sale of English staples or broad-cloths, it having become a favourite object, with the King and with the Parliament, to encourage the home manufactures; and to second this public measure, the Court held it to be their duty to extend the trade, as far as possible, to all the countries within their limits, that they might obviate a prejudice, which was beginning to prevail in England, that they had not fulfilled the intentions of the King, in granting them exclusive privileges, or that they ought not, for the public good, to prevent private merchants from sending ships and stock to ports, and to countries, in which the British trade had not, hitherto, been introduced.

The

The application of the large stock of the preceding year, to discharge the debt at interest, and the carrying the balance of £30,000 to the account of the investment for the subsequent year, was approved of; but, in future, it was ordered, that money should not be taken up in India, at a higher interest than six per cent. <sup>(1)</sup>

On comparing the instructions to Surat, regarding the Island of BOMBAY, with the orders to the Deputy Governor, we find, that the Court approved of the measures which had been adopted, for averting the dangers with which the Island had been threatened, by the occupation of the Islands of Henery and Kenery, by the forces of Sevagee and the Siddee; and though they admitted, in so difficult a case, that it might be often hazardous to carry the instructions for retrenchment into effect, or to raise a sum in the Island, equal to the charges, yet they limited the expences to 72,000 xera-phins per annum, and appointed Captain Keigwin to be Captain Lieutenant, and to command the garrison, with the pay of six shillings per day; but revoked the order for his having a seat in Council. <sup>(2)</sup>

Orders for limiting the civil and military charges of Bombay to a fixed sum.

A new plan of trade with PERSIA was next projected, or to connect the trade of the two Gulfs, with that of Surat :—and

with

Plan for reviving the Persian trade, and connecting it with the trade to Mocha.

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 10th February 1681-82, and 6th April 1682.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay, 31st January 1681-82.

CHAP. II. this view, the *Dragon*, a small vessel of one hundred and  
 1681-82. eighty tons, carrying eighteen guns, was equipped:—this  
 ship was to proceed from England, early in the season, and  
 to touch first at the Island of Socotora, to purchase aloes,  
 which were to be put on board country vessels, and sent  
 to Mocha, at which the supercargo, after he had disposed of  
 the English produce, was to purchase coffee and olibanum;  
 these ships were then to proceed to Gombroon, in the Gulf of  
 Persia, to meet the *Dragon*, and to receive instructions,  
 which were to be sent over-land.

The *Dragon* was not to remain at Gombroon, more than  
 one day, but proceed, up the Gulf, to Bussorah, and make the  
 like attempt to dispose of the English goods, and of the coffee  
 and olibanum procured at Mocha:—from Bussorah she was to  
 return to Gombroon, with the money arising from the disposal  
 of her cargo, and there to take in such Persian goods as had  
 been provided by the Factors, and thence to sail to Surat,  
 to be filled up with gruff goods from the warehouses, or  
 godowns, and to accompany the regular ships to Europe.  
 Mr. John Gibbs was appointed Agent at Persia, to superin-  
 tend this trade, with a Council of four, who were to  
 succeed by seniority, in the event of death or removal. This  
 is the first instance which occurs of a speculation, to con-  
 nect the trade in the Gulfs of Arabia and Persia, with what,  
 in after times, became the Factories or stations subordinate  
 to the Presidency of Surat, or Bombay, and thus to encrease  
 the

the circuit of exchanges between Arabia, Persia, the West Coast of India, and England.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1681-82.

The resolutions of the Court, upon which their instructions to the Agent and Council at FORT ST. GEORGE, for the season 1681-82, were founded, proceeded upon the alarm given by the Interlopers, Privateers, or Private-Traders (terms indiscriminately used) to obstruct the Company's exclusive privileges, under the specious pretext of extending the English trade to the East-Indies; that is, to commence an undefined open trade, in opposition to that on a Joint Stock, with exclusive privileges. This attack roused the attention of the Court, and induced them to call upon the Proprietors, to pay into the Company's treasury, at specified times, within the season, the full amount of their subscriptions, by two instalments, to prove to the Nation, that they were employing their utmost means, to carry on the trade to the East-Indies, on the largest possible scale:—by this spirited effort, the Court trusted that they should be able to upset the plans of the Interlopers, and to bear down the stock, equipments, and illegal projects, of individuals. The Company's Agents were, also, to seize on these illicit traders, and to offer to the parties (the master and purser excepted) the payment of their full wages, and

Directions to the Agent at Fort St. George, for counteracting the schemes of the Interlopers.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 20th May 1681.— Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Persia, 20th May and 12th August 1681, and 6th February 1681-82.



CHAP. II.  
1681-82. and an exemption from all consequences, if they would deliver up the ships and cargoes; the Agents, in every part of India, were to be indemnified from all the consequences of seizing on Interlopers and their effects: but any of the Company's servants, who might encourage them, or second their views, were to be seized, and sent to England.

That the Company might not leave this important concern entirely to the fidelity or exertions of their servants, in India, they instituted a prosecution against the Interlopers, in England, by seizing, in the river Thames, the ships belonging to Crisp and Pitt, two Interlopers, and having them prosecuted by the Attorney General, and condemned:—that no doubt might remain of the Company's right, under their exclusive privileges, to take such coercive measures, both at home and abroad, they obtained from the King, additional powers, vesting them with authority for these proceedings.

Having unfolded the principles upon which the Court acted, we have to advert to the amount of the tonnage and stock, exceeding in quantity and value (upon the basis of the subscription of the Proprietors which had been called in) the equipment of any former season, and to explain, from the commercial orders for the appropriation of both, the instructions to establish new Factories, at such ports, as it was conjectured the Interlopers might visit; and, farther to strengthen this resolution, discretionary powers were given,  
“ to

“ to spare no money in presents to the Native Powers,” to prevent the Interlopers from obtaining protection.

CHAP. II.  
1681-82.

The equipments for the season 1681-82, to Fort St. George, alone, consisted of six ships, or three thousand eight hundred tons, with a stock in goods and bullion, estimated at £530,000:—£60,000 was to be appropriated to the purchase of diamonds; £150,000 to remain at the Fort, for the cloth investments; £90,000 for Masulipatam and Madapolam, and £230,000 for the Bay of Bengal. It was explained, that this very large stock was intended to counteract the Dutch, who were now imitating the English, for instead of sending, as formerly, all their goods to their grand depôt at Batavia, thence to be shipped for Europe, they had ordered their ships to proceed direct to Holland, from the ports at which the cargoes were procured:—for this purpose they had, in this season, fitted out no less than twenty sail:—from subsequent information, it was discovered that the Dutch intended to establish their exclusive monopoly rather by force of arms, (three thousand troops being embarked in this fleet) than by the weight of their stock, reported to be about £140,000, which the Court were of opinion, could not commercially preponderate against the very large stock of the Company, sent to Fort St. George, and its dependencies.

Large equipments and stock to Fort St. George and Bengal.

A Factory was ordered to be established at Porto Novo, to which place it was apprehended the Interlopers might resort, and every expedient which the Agent and Council

CHAP. II. could devise, "both there and elsewhere," was to be em-  
 1681-82. ployed, to obstruct their progress, and ruin their enterprize.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the course of this season, information was also obtained, that the Interlopers were fitting out two additional ships, under Captains Dorell and Pitt, against whose schemes all the positive orders above recited, were repeated, and obedience to them enjoined, under pain of the King's displeasure, and dismissal from the Company's service.<sup>(2)</sup>

Another change of system occurred in this season, which is important, rather from the events to which it subsequently gave rise, than from its immediate effects.

Bengal constituted a distinct Agency from Fort St. George, and Mr. Hedges, one of the Directors, appointed Agent at Hughly, and Governor of the Company's Settlements in Bengal.

The trade to BENGAL, both in its origin and progress, had, hitherto, been subservient to that of the Coromandel Coast, and under the control of the Agent and Council at Fort St. George: this control, however, had been irregularly exercised, probably from the circumstance of the Agent at Hughly, and not unfrequently at the lesser Factories, having an eventual title to succession, sometimes to the Government, and, often, to a seat in the Council of Fort St. George; it frequently occurred, also, that this control was evaded, by the expectation of succeeding to the Government of the Fort, at which an opportunity would be given to justify proceedings

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 20th May 22d July, 18th and 30th November, and 30th December 1681.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 8th and 15th February, and 10th March 1681-82.

ceedings, improper in themselves, and sometimes the foundation of blame by the Court. These removals of Agents and Factors, managing the Company's interests on the Coast, or in Bengal, had produced irregularities; the last, and most striking instance of which was the dismissal of Mr. Master, at Fort St. George, and the confirmation of Mr. Job Charnock, as Chief of Cossimbuzar:—it was, therefore, determined, on taking into consideration the evils resulting from the dependency of the Bengal Factories on the Fort, to constitute the Agency at Hughly, a distinct and separate Factory from Fort St George; but that, in an affair of such importance, they might act with certain knowledge, the Court appointed Mr. Hedges, a Member of their Committees (or what, in modern times, would be termed a Director of the East-India Company) with special powers to be Agent, and Governor of their affairs in the Bay of Bengal, and of the Factories subordinate to it, or Cossimbuzar, Patna, Ballasore, Malda, and Dacca; and directed that the stock of £230,000, appropriated for Bengal, should be distributed as follows; £140,000 to be sent to Cossimbuzar, £14,500 to Patna, £32,000 to Ballasore, £15,000 to Malda, £16,500 to Dacca, and £12,000 to remain at Hughly. After specifying the silks, cloths, and other articles, expected from each of those Factories, to form the investment of the season, the Court repeated the orders against the Interlopers, already detailed, and directed, that a corporal, of approved

CHAP. II. fidelity and courage, with twenty soldiers, should proceed  
 1681-82. from the Fort, to be a guard to the Agent's person and the  
 Factory at Hughly, and to act against the Interlopers. Such  
 was the foundation of the Company's government in Bengal,  
 or what became, in the sequel, the centre of commerce, and  
 the seat of Government in British India.<sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments  
 and stock for  
 Bantam, and  
 instructions  
 to resettle the  
 Factory at  
 Amoy, and  
 to extend the  
 trade to Can-  
 ton.

The Court's orders, during the season 1681-82, to BAN-  
 TAM, varied, as the information they received of events,  
 rendered the resolutions of the preceding year more or  
 less practicable in their execution:—at the opening of the  
 season, they fitted out four small vessels, and afterwards  
 a fifth, carrying in the whole, eight hundred and ninety tons,  
 with a stock estimated at £32,000, of which £20,000 was  
 for Tonquin, and £12,000 for Amoy, to connect the trade  
 from this port with Bantam, and, of course, with the im-  
 ports from Surat and the Coast, and the sales at Tonquin  
 and Amoy. At the beginning of this season, the Factories  
 at Siam and Tywan were intended to be withdrawn; but, to-  
 wards the close of the year, information having been received,  
 that the Tartars had been expelled from Amoy, (though it was  
 uncertain whether they might not repossess themselves of that  
 port,)

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at the Bay of Bengal, 20th  
 May, and 18th and 30th November 1681, and 4th January and 10th March 1681-82.—  
 Commission and Instructions to William Hedges, Esq. to be Agent and Governor at the  
 Bay of Bengal, 14th November 1681.

port,) the Agents were to act according to circumstances, that is, as the Chinese or Tartars, might occupy Amoy, but, in either case, they were to endeavour to retain the freedom of commerce at this port; and, if this trade should be found impracticable, an attempt was to be made to open a communication with Macao and Canton, to become an outlet for the sale of English produce, and a more promising situation for obtaining silks. Discretionary powers of withdrawing this Factory were to be exercised, till assurances could be had from the Viceroy of Canton, that he would protect the shipping, the servants, and the property of the Company:—offers, however, were to be made to him, and presents, on a moderate scale, sent, with requests for grants or privileges of trade, and assurances, in the event of such grants being conferred, that ships of larger size, and with richer cargoes, would annually resort to that port. Under these commercial instructions for extending the Company's trade, the Agents at Bantam were to purchase large quantities of pepper, ginger, &c., and copper, silks, and damasks of various colours, at Tonquin, to be disposed of, partly on the Coast and at Surat, and the remainder sent to Europe in the larger ships, of which the kintlege was to be filled up with pepper:—of this article a thousand tons were always to be kept in store, and purchased, if possible, by truck, or barter, for Europe commodities; or, if that could not be effected at Bantam, the Agent might take

CHAP. II.  
1681-82.

CHAP. II. take up money, to the amount of £20,000, provided the  
1681-82. interest did not exceed nine per cent. <sup>(1)</sup>

Judicial re-  
gulations for  
St. Helena.

Having, in the preceding seasons, at the close of the instructions of the Court to their Foreign Settlements, sketched out, separately, the orders to the Governor of the Island of ST. HELENA, not annually, but as they assumed new aspects, we discover, at the close of this year, that, after censuring the Governor for the reception he had given to the Interlopers, a new plan of administration, was established, of which the following is the substance :—the Governor to be the sole judge of the Island, and to hold regular courts of justice, once in three months ;—the Sheriffs to be nominated by the Governor, by selecting the most respectable inhabitants, with power to summon juries, which juries were to decide, according to the laws of England, in civil and criminal cases :—capital punishments were to be inflicted, according to their verdict, for the crimes of murder, mutiny, or treason (defined to be “ any plot, “ or scheme to deliver up the Island to foreigners ”); all other wrongs or crimes, such as theft, injuries to person or property, and giving false evidence, were to be punished, on conviction, by fine, imprisonment, pillory, or whipping ;—the Governor and Council, however, were always to have the power of suspending, mitigating, or pardoning such crimes or offences :—

Subordinate

(1)—Letters of the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 20th May and 12th and 19th August 1681, and 18th February 1681-82.— Letters of the Court to the Factors at Tonquin and Amoy, 12th August 1681.

Subordinate directions were added, regarding the administration, and what may be termed the police of the Island :—the former required, that should the Interlopers touch at the Island, a duty of twenty shillings per ton should be levied on them ; and, should vessels trading to Madagascar, and other places (not interfering with the Company's trade) touch at the Island, a duty of two shillings and six-pence, per ton, was to be levied, besides being subject, in common with the ships of all nations (the Company's ships not excepted) to an anchorage duty of five shillings per vessel :—the latter, or the police, empowered the Governor or Sheriffs to levy fines, and inflict corporal punishment, on persons offering insults to the Governor, officers, or magistrates, and authorized them, should the parties remain refractory, to send them to England. <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> 1681-82. <sup>(1)</sup>

The occurrences at SURAT, in the season 1681-82, consisted only of the means employed to carry the Court's orders into execution, and of the commercial obstructions, in the sales and investments, experienced from the arrival of shipping from France, with a stock of £50,000.

Increase of investments at Surat attributed to its restoration to the rank of a Presidency.

After

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Governor of the Island of St. Helena, 20th May 1681, and 14th March 1681-82.— Laws and Regulations for the better governing the Island of St. Helena, 10th March 1681-82.



**CHAP. II.**  
**1681-82.** After noticing that Mr. Child had been established, agreeably to the Court's orders, this President and his Council informed the Court, that the investment accumulated from the subordinate Factories, of cloths, pepper, cardamoms, and cassia-lignum, had enabled them to load the Company's three ships, and that they estimated the cargoes at 10,63,932 rupees;—that the purchase of diamonds, to the extent of £20,000, (as at first ordered) had been attempted, through the private merchants, but when they were informed, that the Company had included that article in their trade, these merchants had ceased to deal in them; the purchases, therefore, could not be effected on the advantageous terms expected, because the number of European and Native competitors in the market, at Golcondah, had raised the prices:—the Factory at Rajahpore had been withdrawn, but that at Carwar continued for another year:—the debt at interest had been cleared off, by the stock sent, and by the proceeds of the sales; and about £30,000 remained to commence the investment of the subsequent year.<sup>(1)</sup>

Embarrassed state of Bombay from Saumbagee continuing the plans of Sevagee.

The administration of the Island of BOMBAY, the Presidency of Surat represented (there being no direct communication from the Deputy Governor and Council) had been the most difficult, as well as the most embarrassing part of their duty, on account of the occupation of the barren rocks of Henery and Kenery, by the troops of Sevagee and of the Mogul; the obstructions

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 27th October 1681, 23d January 1681-82, and 25th March and 10th April 1682.

obstructions to trade by the Portuguese; and, above all, the CHAP. II. general impression that Sambagee Rajah, the successor of 1681-82. Sevagee, was following up the plans of his father, and adding, on every limit of his dominions, to his extensive Empire.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Court do not appear to have received any direct or collateral communications from PERSIA, during this year, 1681-82.

From the want of communications, in this season, from the Agent and Council of FORT ST. GEORGE, the Court remained unacquainted with the effect of the new plan of rendering Bengal a distinct Agency from the Fort, or of the measures adopted at that station:—it appears, only, that the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, still considered Bengal to be under their control, and that the irregularities, for the correction of which the Court had devised this new system, continued to prevail.<sup>(2)</sup>

The events at BANTAM, in the season 1681-82, disclose the following circumstances:—that the King of Bantam had sent ships, navigated chiefly by Europeans, on commercial speculations to the Coast and to Surat, and that he had projected dispatching a ship to England, with Ambassadors to the King and Company, though he had kept secret the nature of their

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instructions ;

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 23d January 1681-82.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Agent and Council at Bengal, 17th November 1681.

Intelligence from Fort St George and Bengal defective this season.

King of Bantam sends an embassy to England.

CHAP. II. instructions ; but, not being able to obtain a complement of  
1681-82. European seamen, he had embarked the Ambassadors, and a  
suite of twenty-five persons, on the Company's ship London,  
with a letter of recommendation to the Court, and a present  
of fifty bahars of white pepper. Though the Agent had pur-  
chased and shipped cargoes of pepper, benjamin, ginger, &c.,  
the circumstances of the English dependencies on Bantam,  
during this season, were uncertain, and no intelligence had  
been received by the Court, relative to the China trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, 19th August 1681.

— Letter from the Pangran, or Chief Minister, at Bantam, to the Court, 22d October 1681.

**EAST-INDIA COMPANY.**

**1682-83.**

THE domestic Annals of the East-India Company, for the year 1682-83, disclose the first attempt made in England, to form a New, or Second East-India stock, and it is not improbable, that the orders of the King and Council, against Interlopers, or individual merchants, who had attempted to violate the Company's exclusive privileges, had given rise to the speculation of participating in the trade, by forming a similar joint stock. This project was favoured, by a jealousy which had long subsisted, between the Levant and the East-India Companies, the source of which forms an interesting fact in commercial history.

The ancient transit of Indian produce, to Europe, was to the extremities of the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia:—from the extremity of the former, or Bussorah, they passed by caravans, through the Turkish dominions, to the Mediterranean; and, from the extremity of the latter, at Suez, to the same sea; and thus furnished proportions of the cargoes which the Levant, or Turkey Company, brought to England from the ports in the Mediterranean, or from the maritime republics of Venice and Genoa. When the East-India Company opened a direct trade, between the coasts of India

CHAP. II. England, the profits of the Levant Company, upon those ar-  
 1682-83. ticles, were reduced ; and after the Interlopers had been, by  
 law, at home, and by the privileges of the Company abroad,  
 and still more, by the extension of stock and shipping, disap-  
 pointed in their scheme of participation, the project, in this  
 year, assumed the aspect of a new Subscription for a Joint  
 Stock, upon which was to be founded the establishment of a  
 rival Association to the London East-India Company. This  
 scheme was held to be of such public consequence, that it  
 came under the consideration of the King and Privy Council,  
 in April 1682, who rejected it, and continued that protection  
 which they had afforded to the exclusive privileges of the  
 London East-India Company.

Instructions  
 to Surat, to  
 re-establish  
 the Factory  
 at Rajahpore,  
 and to form  
 an alliance  
 with Samba-  
 gee.

This event the Court considered to be of so much im-  
 portance, that they sent overland dispatches to SURAT, to be  
 communicated to all their settlements, and ordered that they  
 should dispose of English produce at low rates, on the princi-  
 ple of vending quantities, rather than obtaining large profits ;  
 —the friendship of Sambagee Rajah was, therefore, ordered to  
 be cultivated, by re-establishing the Factory at Rajahpore ;—  
 fine goods, particularly such as were ornamented with gold  
 and silver, formerly disposed of at the Persian market, and,  
 in general, all new commodities, which they might conceive  
 would add to the assortments at the home sales, were to be  
 introduced into the investments.

A new practice, probably a refinement in policy, was  
 this

EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

this year introduced, for the Court, instead of specifying the quantity of tonnage, or the amount of stock, as in the preceding seasons, described both to be larger than had hitherto been sent, and, by a subsequent dispatch to Persia, added, that the stock for the whole of their Settlements in India, would amount, in this season, to above *One Million Sterling*:—this concealment was evidently intended to raise the expectations of the King, of the Council, and of the public, that the Company were prosecuting the East-India trade to the utmost extent. <sup>(1)</sup>

It does not appear, that any particular instructions were sent this season to the Government of BOMBAY.

If the trade with PERSIA, for a series of years, had been on the decline, from the superior naval means of the Dutch and Portuguese, and from the hesitation of the Company to attempt any thing but negotiation, the Court, in this season (1682-83) intimated to their Agent at Gombroon, their determination to adopt more spirited measures, and to equip a maritime force, to second respectful applications to the King of Persia for redress of past grievances, and for the renewal of grants and treaties. On this occasion, a letter, or remonstrance, was addressed to the King of Persia, in which the Court stated their claims on his justice, which was proverbially

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 1st and 26th May, 28th August, and 6th and 15th September 1682.

CHAP. II. bially held in Europe to be unalterable; that, contrary to  
 1682-83 this justice, his ministers, or officers, at the ports at which the  
 English Factories, were settled, or to which their ships  
 resorted, had obstructed their trade, in direct violation of  
 solemn treaties between the two countries; that, though;  
 with respectful deference, they prayed for relief, yet pos-  
 sessing a naval power, which was unrivalled, if such relief  
 should be withheld by his ministers and officers, they trusted  
 that so great and so just a Prince would, instead of considering  
 that naval force, which they employed for their protection, as  
 disrespectful to his dignity, would view it only as a necessary  
 expedient, for restoring the amicable relations between Persia  
 and England.

Plan of com-  
 bining the  
 Persian and  
 Mocha trade,  
 and bartering  
 English cloth  
 for Persian  
 silks.

While the Court adopted these vigorous measures to  
 recover their proportion of the customs, and the debts due to  
 the Company in Persia, which they calculated to amount to  
 £1,000,000 sterling, they resolved, at the same time, to send  
 a larger stock, to give new vigour to the circuitous trade,  
 which, in the preceding season, they had opened, or to  
 equip large ships, to proceed directly from England to Mocha,  
 thence to go round and touch at Gombroon, then to proceed  
 to Bussorah, and return to Gombroon, and lastly, to rendez-  
 vous at Surat, and there to complete their cargoes, and thence  
 proceed for Europe:—discretionary powers were also secretly  
 given, that if the sales of cargoes could be completed at  
 Mocha,

Mocha, Bussorah, or Gombroon, one or more of the ships were to return direct for England. To promote this speculation, and anticipating hostilities, the practice of selling English goods, for ready money, only, was abandoned, and liberty given to dispose of them by barter, at such prices as they would bring, to clear the Company's warehouses, and to purchase the largest possible quantity of Persian produce, for the Europe market. CHAP. II.  
1682-83.

The specification of Persian goods comprehended silks of every description and pattern, large quantities of red and black Caramania wool, and a quantity of rhubarb and drugs:—if redress should be obtained, fresh supplies would be sent to this market; but if hostilities were unavoidable, the goods remaining in the warehouses would be less an object to the Persians, as the chief part of the property being embarked, redress of grievances should be the only condition, on which trade could be re-established.

Subsidiary to this project, was the commercial speculation of enlarging the circuit of exchanges to the most distant English dependencies: It had hitherto been the practice to refine the sugars obtained in India into loaves, which, when exported to Persia, had found a ready sale; the Court, on discovering that the Barbadoes sugar was of a richer quality than that of Bengal, resolved to send out a ship with two hundred tons of sugar, to be refined in Persia, and sold there, from which speculation they expected to draw considerable profit,



CHAP. II. profit, and to render an acceptable service to the government,  
1682-83. by increasing the demands for West-India produce, by the  
sales of sugars in the countries within the Company's  
limits.<sup>(1)</sup>

Court recom-  
mend esta-  
blishing a  
Bank at Ma-  
dras, and  
forming a  
station in the  
Gingee  
Country.

The Court, in this season, approved of the administration of their political and commercial interests by the Agent and Council of FORT ST. GEORGE, because the cargoes which had arrived in Europe had produced the expected profits at the sales ; the former instructions were therefore continued, with little variation :—the practice of specifying the amount of tonnage, or stock, sent to this station, was avoided, by describing both to be very large ; they approved of instituting a Bank to receive money, for a limited time, to the amount of £100,000, bearing interest, not exceeding six per cent., and calculated, that this sum would furnish a fund, not only for purchasing goods at the cheapest rates, but become a stock, which would enable the Agency and its dependencies, to counterbalance the influence of the Dutch Company, the stock and equipments of which, from the best information, they described to be inferior in value, and amount to those of the London Company :—the Court, in the next place, recapitulated the accounts given to Surat, of the intrigues of the Levant Company and of the Interlopers, to raise a rival Association

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent at Gombroon, 26th May, 5th July, 28th August, and 6th September 1682.

EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

sociation for Indian trade, and the determination of the King and Council to resist this project : and recommended the support of the Factory at Porto Novo, and the establishment of a Factory in the Gingee Country, that, by the magnitude of their purchases, they might, (though with a loss) counteract the schemes of the Interlopers ; and repeated the orders to obstruct their proceedings, and went so far as to enjoin, that if any of the Company's servants should intermarry with the families of the Interlopers, they should be dismissed from their employments, and sent home:—If the Danes were disposed to relinquish Tranquebar, the Agent was empowered to purchase it, at a reasonable rate, for the Company.

The garrison of Madras was this year strengthened with thirty recruits, both for the defence of the Fort, and to furnish a guard to any of the Factories which might be established.<sup>(1)</sup>

The dispatches of the Court, this season, to the Agent and Council at the BAY OF BENGAL, being the first (agreeably to the system explained in the preceding year) addressed to them as an independent Agency, discover, that the Court began to consider this trade as affording the most valuable part of their imports, for besides equipping vessels direct for the

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 1st and 26th May, 5th July, 28th August, 20th September, 4th and 27th October 1682. and 2d April 1683.

CHAP. II.  
1682-83. Ganges, of which one was to carry thirty guns, and another was of so large a size as seven hundred tons, a list was transmitted of the goods to be purchased at each of the Factories under this Agency, *viz.* silks, taffaties, saltpetre, &c., and, for the first time, twenty duffers of opium:—To strengthen the means of this Agency, they allowed it to take up (at what they termed a Bank) to the amount of £200,000, and calculated that the remains of the stock and credit of the last year, would amount to £350,000:—The more effectually to promote this trade, the Court engaged to send in the ships of the ensuing season, a stock of £600,000, principally in bullion, that, with this accumulation of credit and stock, the Agents at Hughly, and at the subordinate stations, might have a Double Stock (which, for so many years, had been recommended as essentially requisite) that is, funds to provide the goods ordered at the proper seasons, and at the cheapest rates, and have goods in store sufficient for the subsequent year:—to prevent dead freight, rice was to be sent to the Fort, to fill up the tonnage, which would enable the Agent to dispatch such of the ships as arrived early in the season, that they might reach England in the month of March, in time for the Company's spring sales.

Attempts to  
be made to  
cultivate flax  
in Bengal.

A new speculation was started this season, at Madras and in Bengal, or the erecting a manufactory for sail-cloth and linens:—it was supposed, that in the country round these Settlements

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lements they might raise flax, fitted for these manufactures, at this time supplied by Holland and Flanders. This plan, if it answered, would encourage industry and navigation, and add to the English resources:—if, however, the heat of the climate should be so great, as to prevent the cultivation of flax, the Court, as a substitute, ordered that one or two hundred bales of linen yarn should be sent home, to be manufactured in England, because this import would have the double advantage of depressing the manufactures of rival nations, and of encouraging the linen trade of England;—the Company, thus, would have the merit of forming a new article of British merchandize, and would encourage industry and navigation, in opposition to rival maritime powers in Europe, and give useful employment to English subjects.

These spirited speculations, towards the close of this season, were checked, by a series of those untoward events, to which commercial enterprizes are subjected, *viz.* the unexpected failure in the monied interest in London, which hitherto had furnished the Company with bullion for their exports; the capture of Bantam by the Dutch; and the loss of one of their outward-bound ships (the *Johanna*) with a cargo of £70,000 in bullion:—these events occasioned a run on the Company's treasury, and produced the resolution, for maintaining their credit, that the money arising from the March Sale, 1683, should be wholly appropriated to the discharge of their debts; that

CHAP. II. no bullion should be sent to India, till those debts should be  
 1682-83. liquidated ; and that no dividend should be made to the pro-  
 prietors, till these ends were effected. <sup>(1)</sup>

The Bantam  
 Ambassadors  
 graciously re-  
 ceived by the  
 King.

The opinions of the Court conveyed this season to BANTAM, and its former commercial dependencies, assume such shifting and uncertain aspects, as to render the Annals of this year, matter rather of opinion, than of commercial instruction :— After repeating the prohibition imposed on the Private Adventurers and the opposition of the Levant Company, the Court expressed their disapprobation of the conduct of their Agents at Bantam ; but intimated, that the equipments for the season, for all parts of India, amounted to thirty sail, and that the war between the Dutch and the King of Bantam, from the probable loss of that Factory, had induced the Directors to place the China trade under the control of the Presidency of Surat and Bombay ; the Agent and Council at Bantam were, therefore, desired to inform the King, that the most gracious reception had been given to his Envoys, by his Majesty, and by the Company, and that a present had been sent, of five hundred barrels of gunpowder, from His Majesty, to the King of Bantam, and stipulations entered into, with his Envoys, for a more regular trade. The Court, at the same time, considered the mismanagement of the Agent and Council at Bantam to have been such,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bengal, 1st and 26th May, 5th July, 28th August, 6th and 20th September, 27th October, and 15th November 1682, and 2d April 1682.

EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

such, as to induce them to confine their orders, this season, to the providing of pepper for the ships sent to China and Tonquin, and if exchanges at both should fail, then the trade to Bantam was to consist of the sales of English produce, and returns in pepper.

As the trade at Amoy had been lost, a vessel had been equipped for CANTON, with a letter to the Viceroy, offering to establish a Factory at that port :—the Agent at Tonquin was to forward the sales of English produce, and to procure silks, copper, &c.; and though the Agency at Siam had been directed, in the preceding season, to be withdrawn, a last effort was to be made at that place, to push the sales of English cloths, &c. in exchange for silks and Japan produce, suited to the Surat and Europe markets, and thus, if practicable, to render Bantam, and its dependencies, the centre of trade in the Farther Indies. <sup>(1)</sup>

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The principal events affecting the Company's trade and Factories, communicated, by the first dispatches of this season, from SURAT, were, that Bantam had been taken by the Dutch,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 1st May, 15th July, 20th September, and 2d October 1682.— Letter to the Agent and Factors in China, 11th and 20th December 1682.— Letter to the Agent and Factors at Siam, 20th December 1682.— Letter to the Agent and Factors at Tonquin, 20th September 1682.

CHAP. II.  
 1682-83.  
 wars between  
 Aurungzebe  
 and Samba-  
 gee, and by the  
 Mogul's order  
 to encrease  
 the customs  
 at Surat.

Dutch, on the 30th August 1682, but without any explanation of the effects which this event had on the Company's trade and shipping at that port;—and that Aurungzebe was equipping a fleet, and assembling a large army, to act against his son, Sultan Acbar, who had revolted, and united with Sambagee Rajah. These circumstances materially affected the inland trade, and induced the President and Council to send the greatest part of the Company's goods to Swally, to prevent their falling into the hands of either of these rival powers, should the country round Surat become the theatre of war:—French and Dutch vessels, of large size, and with rich cargoes of Europe goods and bullion, had arrived, which had depressed both the sales and purchases; and the Portuguese at Goa, notwithstanding assurances that they would not receive or encourage Interlopers, had admitted one of their ships to trade at this port, where she had disposed of a rich cargo, and taken in goods for Europe:—the Portuguese had also adjusted their proportion of customs with the King of Persia, and obstructed the Company's trade and shipping in that Gulf:—the Company's ships had, however, successively arrived at Surat, and gone down to bring up goods from Carwar, Batticool, and Onore; and, it was hoped, they would be filled up and dispatched early for Europe. <sup>(1)</sup>

In

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 13th and 18th November, 9th December 1682, and 16th January 1682-83.

In illustration, at the close of the season, the President and Council reported,—that they had again withdrawn the Factory from Rajahpore, but endeavoured to keep open the communications with Sambagee, who was desirous the Company might once more resort to this port;—that they had rather enlarged the trade at Carwar, to keep open the means of obtaining pepper, cardamoms, benjamin, &c. because the Factors had explained, that though, hitherto, they had depended on the Banians, who had gone inland, for the purchase of pepper and cloth, at a great expence, yet, on a fair calculation, this method had far exceeded the charges which would be incurred, by sending some of their own servants, on whose fidelity they could rely, to conduct this business;—that though the French had built a house at Tellicherry, the Factors had kept up the trade at that port, without entering into discussions with them respecting the right to it;—that the trade at Surat, in this season, had been materially injured, by the conduct of Mr. Boucher and Mr. Petit, two of the Company's servants, who had encouraged the Interlopers, and had published, that they were employed by a New Company, the plan of which was to trade on a larger capital, and to pay customs, without reserve; this insidious scheme had materially affected the opinion of the Governor of Surat in their favour, and against the Company, and obliged the President to employ a Native, at the expence of four hundred rupees per annum, to attend on the Mogul's court, as a kind of

CHAP. II.  
1682-83.



CHAP. II.  
1682-83. of Agent or Envoy, to convey information to him, and, from time to time, to solicit protection;—that an order of the Mogul had arrived, directing the Custom of three and a half per cent. at Surat, to be levied on money, as well as on goods, which the President and Council would, by every means of negotiation, endeavour to avert, as it would bear down the Company, more than it would the Dutch or French, the former bringing no money, in consequence of their possessing the Spice trade, and the latter purchasing the goods which the Company rejected, at any price, and yet importing very little bullion;—that the speculation of a trade to Mocha, Bussorah, Gombroon, thence to Surat, and home, would not only be unprofitable, but probably attended with considerable loss;—that the trade in diamonds, (the price of which continued rather to increase in India) would, also, ultimately, prove a losing concern, if the sales of them in England were at so low a rate as the Court had described; and yet, notwithstanding these embarrassing circumstances, the Presidency had dispatched six ships for England, at the end of this season, the cargoes of which were invoiced at 14,33,000 rupees. <sup>(1)</sup>

Report on the  
state of the Is-  
land of Bom-  
bay.

In 1682-83, the revenue of BOMBAY had increased, being, this season, calculated to exceed the two preceding years, by  
4,700

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th January 1682-83, and 10th April 1683:— Letters from the Agent at Carwar to the Court, 10th December 1682, and 8th January 1682-83.

4,700 xeraphins : it was, however, doubtful, whether it would yield this amount at the next sale, or farming, in March 1682-83. CHAP. II.  
 1683, because Sambagee continued in possession of the Island of Kenery, and had ten or twelve armed gallivats, which interrupted the trade ; and because the Mogul fleet, resorting to Bombay, had exposed the garrison to attacks and danger. These Powers, from the situation of Bombay, relatively to their dominions, had kept the Island in a constant alarm, the Hunter galley being the only armed ship left to protect the trade and settlement.

The connexion between the Government of Bombay, Sambagee, and the Mogul, by these events, had become most embarrassing and precarious :—with the former, it was expedient to temporize, on account of his power extending over those commercial stations on the Malabar Coast, from which the principal part of the investments of pepper and cardamoms were drawn, and over several of the stations under the Presidency of Fort St. George, &c., particularly Porto Novo ; while the power of the latter commanded the provinces in which the principal portions of the Surat investment were collected. These alarms were encreased, by the Siddee's fleet and troops being too strong to be resisted by the soldiers of the garrison, now reduced to less than one hundred Europeans, who were daily murmuring at the price of provisions, which their pay could not afford ; a reference

CHAP. II. was, therefore, made to the Court, for instructions and aid,  
1682-83. under these circumstances.<sup>(1)</sup>

Difficulty of  
procuring  
payment of  
Customs at  
Gombroon,  
and the  
Court's plan  
of combining  
the Persian  
and Mocha  
trade imprac-  
ticable.

The Company's trade, and their right to the customs at GOMBROON, in this season, experienced new difficulty, from the economical plan recommended by the Court, being inconsistent with the orders, that an application should be made to the King of Persia for redress, and for protection of trade : —to obviate this difficulty, the Agent and Factors at Gombroon stated, that the appearance of a small Portuguese force, in the preceding year, had induced the Shahbunder to make payment of customs, to the amount of nine thousand tomands, and to give them a facility of trade ; and that the annual arrival of two large Dutch ships had impressed the Shahbunder with an opinion of their power and wealth, and facilitated their trade ; but that the arrival of the Dragon, a small ship, sent out on a speculation of trade to Mocha, Bussorah, and Gombroon, instead of raising the English character, tended to depress it, and to do away the only means which could be effectually used, to ensure an opinion of the power and wealth of the Company, or to enforce the observance of grants and treaties :—hence, the project of sending the Dragon could not have been founded upon a knowledge of facts, for Mocha was supplied by Armenian merchants, with Europe cloth from Surat ; Bussorah, by cloth from  
Aleppo,

(1)—Letters from the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay to the Court, 22d September 1682, and 8th January 1682-83.

Aleppo, and Gombroon, and by French and Dutch ships ;—it was, therefore, obvious, that Mocha coffee, and silks from Busorah, could more profitably become a part of a Europe cargo, obtained by purchase, than be exchanged for English goods ; that Caramania wool, silks, velvets, and other Persian goods from Ispahan, as well as the payment of customs at Gombroon, could only be secured, by two or more of the Company's largest ships, properly armed, annually resorting to the Gulf, to protect the trade ; because the Persian merchants would, from the ships being manned by Europeans, load their goods on board of them, and pay a large freight, from an idea of security, as they had done to the Dutch, who had often drawn a profit of fifty or sixty per cent., and, in a voyage to Bengal, had cleared between fifty and sixty thousand rupees. These facts and circumstances the Agent at Gombroon recommended to the consideration of the Court, as the only basis on which the acquisition, or re-establishment of the trade to Persia, could rest.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Company's records do not furnish any information, from FORT ST. GEORGE, notwithstanding the instructions which had been given in the last season ; but whether this was owing to the change of system, or rendering the Agency of BENGAL independent and distinct from that of Madras, or to the miscarriage of the dispatches, is uncertain ;

Trade in Bengal precarious, from the Mogul's orders to increase the custom from two to three and a half per cent.

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(1)—Letters from the Agent and Factors at Gombroon, 16th May and 9th December 1682.

CHAP. II.  
1682-83.

CHAP. II. —it appears, however, that Mr. Hedges, the Director, had  
 1682-83. arrived at Hughly, and intimated his commission, and the new  
 plan of commercial administration, with which he was intrust-  
 ed; and that he had found both Hughly, and the subordinate  
 Factories, disturbed, by an order which had come from the  
 Mogul, for levying three and a half per cent. customs:—the  
 Agents at Ballasore, Cossimbuzar, &c., were struggling to be  
 exempted from this tax, and making such purchases as would  
 meet the Company's orders. The progress of Mr. Hedges's  
 measures must be collected from the events of the subsequent  
 season. <sup>(1)</sup>

Bantam taken  
 by the Dutch,  
 as allies of the  
 young King,  
 the old King  
 expelled, and  
 the English  
 Factory  
 obliged to re-  
 tire to Bata-  
 via.

The revolution which had taken place at BANTAM, in Au-  
 gust 1682, accounts for the deficiency of intelligence from that  
 ancient seat of the Company's trade. By a letter from a Mr.  
 Hodges, formerly of the Bantam Council, dated at Tonquin,  
 it appears that the Dutch had drawn the young King into a  
 rebellion against his father, who, with their aid, had been dri-  
 ven, not only from Bantam, but from his other sea-ports; and  
 that when the Dutch became masters of Bantam, the young  
 King had taken possession of the Company's house; hence all  
 that remained to the Agent and Council was, after making in-  
 ventories of the goods in the warehouses, to proceed to Batavia,  
 where an offer was made to them by the Dutch Governor, of  
 shipping to take the Company's property from Bantam, and  
 to

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Hughly, and the Agents at the subordi-  
 nate Factories in Bengal, 27th May, 14th and 18th July, and 2d September 1682.

to bring it to Batavia:—this offer Mr. Hodges rejected, because it would preclude the reparation which the Court might seek from the Dutch in Europe, might expose their property to embezzlement, and would finally exclude them from a port, the trade of which had so long been their right, under a grant of the legal Sovereign, and recognised to them, as such, in all the treaties between England and the States General. CHAP. II.  
1682-83.

To add to these misfortunes and calamities, Mr. Hodges gave a most unfavorable report on the trade at TONQUIN and SIAM, not only from the obstruction to sales, and from the prices of goods being raised, but from the arbitrary exactions of the Chiefs at those ports, instigated by the French, and Portuguese, who had avowed their project of getting possession of these markets.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Company, thus, after a trade to Bantam for eighty years, experienced the accumulated loss of principal and interest, expended on their Dead Stock at that port and its dependencies, the amount of which can only be conjectured from a retrospect of the whole of their proceedings, in the prices paid for grants, the expences for buildings, and the charges of preserving, in their corporate capacity, this seat of their government and trade, under successive encouragements from the King, by his Letters Patent, and by his letters to the King of Bantam.

(1)—Letter from Mr. Hodges, at Tonquin, to Mr. Cholmley, dated 27th December 1682.

## 1683-84.

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CHAP. II.  
 1683-84. Court's instructions to their Foreign Settlements influenced by the capture of Bantam, and the bankruptcies of several great houses in London.

WHEN information reached England, that Bantam had been captured by the Dutch, the Court determined to abridge the equipments of the season 1683-84; but not having received precise intelligence, respecting the consequences of this outrage, the instructions to their Foreign Settlements were necessarily varied, in the course of the season.

It could not, for some time, be discovered, whether the States General had authorized this proceeding, or whether it originated with the Governor General of Batavia, as an expedient to find resources for maintaining that establishment, and funds for the Dutch trade; but a sudden and considerable fall in the Dutch stocks led to the conjecture, that Bantam had been besieged and taken, in consequence of orders from the Dutch Companies; the effect was precisely the reverse of what they expected, for, from the alarm taken by the Maritime Powers engaged in the East-India trade, many of whose subjects were proprietors of Dutch East-India stock, unexpected demands were made on the Dutch Companies, which still farther depressed the value of their stock; and as a considerable proportion of the money drawn from them,

them, was vested in the stock of the London East-India Company, its price, of course, was proportionably raised. CHAP. II.  
1683-84.

An event, however, totally unconnected with Indian affairs, occurred at this time, or a great number of bankruptcies in London, which materially affected all commercial enterprises, and deprived the London Company of the advantages which they anticipated, from the rise of their own stock, and the depression of that of the Dutch.

Under these circumstances, the Court resolved to employ the shipping intended for Bantam, to make an experiment of trade to China. The management of this experiment was given to the Presidency of SURAT, who were instructed to provide goods to a large amount, to be forwarded, with a proportion of Europe produce, to ports in China;—and to leave sufficient funds for this speculation, the diamond trade was to be suspended, unless a surplus of former stock, of from £10,000 to £20,000, could be spared, and applied to this purpose, and, even in this case, unless the diamonds (without including rubies and sapphires) could be purchased ten per cent. cheaper than in the preceding season, this part of the investment was to be omitted. Towards the close of the year it was resolved to lay open the diamond trade, but this determination was to be kept secret, till the Company's purchases could be effected.<sup>(1)</sup>

In

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 4th May 1683.



CHAP. II.  
 1683-84. **Limited equipments and stock for Surat.** In this situation of their affairs the Court resolved to dispatch two ships for Surat, at the opening, and two, towards the close of the season 1683-84.<sup>(1)</sup>

A farther tonnage, however, was ordered, from the following event :—on receiving information that the Dutch funds were so low, that their imports were expected to be inconsiderable, orders were given to increase the investment in cloths, indigo, and pepper, which it was hoped might be done at reasonable rates, because the war between France and England had rendered the interference of the French Company, in the Surat market, less probable than on former occasions.

Court authorized by Charter, to erect Courts of Judicature, and establish Admiralty Jurisdiction in India.

The King, by Letters Patent, dated 9th August 1683, authorized the Company to exercise Admiralty Jurisdiction in the countries within their limits :—the object of this grant was to enable them to seize and condemn the ships of the Interlopers : for this purpose, the President was appointed Judge Advocate, *pro tempore*, to take cognizance of all naval cases ; these powers were given to the President and Council of Surat, to resist encroachments on the Company's privileges, at the time when the ships and cargoes of the Interlopers had been detained in England, and prosecutions instituted against the owners and commanders.<sup>(2)</sup>

This

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 25th May 1683.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 31st May, 20th July, 14th August, 6th September, 16th November, and 12th December 1683, and 7th April 1684.— Letters Patent, granting the Company's authority to exercise Admiralty Jurisdiction, &c., dated 9th August 1683. (Printed Collection of Charters, page 116.)

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This authority to the President and Council of Surat was, however, temporary only, that they might be enabled to seize the goods of the Interlopers, and allow the parties to recover, by suits in Chancery, in England; for, by a commission from the King, dated 6th February 1683-84, and from the Court, dated 7th April 1684, Dr. John St. John was appointed Judge of the Court of Admiralty to be erected in the East-Indies, and to have cognizance of all admiralty cases within the Company's limits. This Court was to be held at Bombay, as being a possession acquired by the Crown, and, by it, vested in the Company, in full property:—it was to consist of the Judge, and two Merchants, Company's servants:—the Judge was to have a salary of £200 per annum, and allowances at the Company's table;—he was to take cognizance of, and to try, examine, and decide on all cases regarding the Interlopers, or private merchants, who might attempt, contrary to the King's orders, and in violation of the Company's exclusive privileges, to trade, or establish Factories, in the countries within their limits:—all the processes were to be in English, and not in Latin, and a table of fees was to be framed, to prevent arbitrary charges on the King's subjects, or the Natives of India.<sup>(1)</sup>

The capture of Bantam by the Dutch, led to the declaration of the Court, that, in future, they would consider

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BOMBAY

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 7th April 1684.— Commission from the King to Dr. St. John, to be Judge of the Admiralty Court in India, 6th February 1683-84.— Commission from the East-India Company to Dr. St. John, 7th April 1684.

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CHAP. II. BOMBAY as an independent English settlement, and the seat of  
 1683-84. the power and trade of the English nation in the East-Indies,  
 a resolution which was incompatible with the retrenchments,  
 civil and military, ordered in the two last seasons.

Court's direc-  
 tions for en-  
 creasing the  
 revenues of  
 Bombay.

The revolution at Bantam had induced His Majesty and the Court to send out a naval and military force, the object of which was to oblige the Native Powers to conform to subsisting treaties, and to assist in the restoration of the King of Bantam, who had been dethroned by his son, instigated by the Dutch :—when this service should be effected, the soldiers embarked for that purpose, were to proceed to Bombay, and to form the third company, on the military establishment of that Island. Forty recruits, also, were sent, to complete the two established companies, and the fortifications were ordered to be strengthened ; and to add to the effective force of the garrison, two companies of Rajpoots, of one hundred men each, were to be embodied, and the men selected from the countries not subject to the Mogul, to Sambagee, or to the Portuguese, to be commanded by officers of their own cast, to use their own arms, and to have a weekly pay, half in rice and half in money, and when on duty, to be blended with the regular English troops.

To defray the charges of this enlarged establishment (taking the Dutch at Batavia as an example, and proceeding on the practice at St. Helena) a duty of half a dollar was ordered to be levied on all ships anchoring in the harbour, (the  
 Company's

Company's ships not excepted) a duty on all fishing boats, of one rupee each, per annum, whether those of the Island or those of the Portuguese at Tannah, to counteract their exactions; and one rupee per annum, on each shopkeeper on the Island:—an exception, however, was made of the ships and boats of the subjects of the Mogul and of Sambagee, to prevent disputes with these powers.

With these sources of revenue, the Deputy Governor and Council were to endeavour to liquidate the debts incurred on the Dead Stock, estimated at so large a sum as £300,000, that the revenues and debts might balance each other.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Court, in 1683-84, adopted the plan for the trade to PERSIA, so frequently recommended by the Agents at Gombroon, and approved of by the Presidency of Surat, or sending a respectable naval force into the Persian Gulf, first to recover, at Gombroon, the arrears of Customs, (stated to amount to one hundred and fifty thousand tomands, or £450,000 sterling,) and next, by this appearance of force, to bring the Court of Persia to fulfil the subsisting treaties between England and that Crown. The advice of the Etta-man Doulut, or Minister of Persia, favoured this project:—this officer being offended at the insults offered by the Portuguese, had requested the appearance of a respectable English force in the Persian Gulf, to resist them, an incident which, it

Two fleets, under the command of Sir John Wetwang, and Sir Thomas Grantham, sent to India, for recovering the Persian and Bantam trades.

3 S 2

was

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay, and to the Presidency of Surat, 15th August and 16th November 1683, and 7th April 1684.

CHAP. II. was considered, might restore amity and commerce between  
1683-84. the English and Persians.

The armament, for this purpose, coincided with the obligations under which the King and Company were placed, to restore the old King of Bantam, and the Company's trade at that port, and was divided into two squadrons; one, to be under the command of Sir John Wetwang, with instructions to act against Bantam, and the other, under Sir Thomas Grantham, intended for the Persian Gulf. These fleets, in the first instance, were to co-operate for the relief of Bantam, where Sir John Wetwang was to act as Admiral, and Sir Thomas Grantham as Vice Admiral; but, after this service should be effected, Sir Thomas Grantham was to proceed to the Persian Gulf, under orders to demand the payment of the arrears of customs from the King of Persia, that is, to receive thirty thousand tomands, in full satisfaction for the debts due to the Company, and to insist on a Phirmaund for the moiety of the customs, agreeably to the ancient treaty, when the English expelled the Portuguese from the Island of Ormus, and restored Gombroon, and the other Persian ports, to a trade with the coasts of India. As a separate instruction, the goods at Ispahan were to be disposed of, and those at Gombroon, if not sold, placed in safety, whatever might be the issue of this enterprize.

In the progress of the season, an arrangement took place,  
between

between the Dutch and English, in Europe, by which it was agreed, that Bantam should be restored to the old King, on certain conditions. CHAP. II.  
1683-84.

The subsequent instructions to Sir Thomas Grantham were, that the military, as well as naval force he commanded, should be employed in maintaining the Company's Factories along the Coasts of India, and at Surat and Bombay; that he was then to proceed to the Gulf of Persia, and to make prizes of Persian ships and property, till sufficient compensation should be given for the arrears of customs, and the other losses which the English had sustained;—as soon as prizes, equivalent to the amount of the debt, should be made, he was to notify to the Shahbunder of Gombroon, that he was ready to restore them, on condition that the King of Persia would enter into an obligation to secure to the Company the regular payment of their moiety of customs:—he was next to employ the force he commanded, to seize the Persian ships navigating to the Mogul dominions, or to those of any Prince or Power in amity with the Company, but to retain only the goods of Persian subjects found on board; and having effected those services, he was to negotiate terms for restoring the treaties between England and Persia, as the King and the Court desired, that this trade might not only be recovered, but established upon a solid basis;—till this could be effected, the amount of the prizes (allowing for the shares of  
the

CHAP. II. the captors) was to be carried to the treasury at Surat, for the  
 1683-84. use of the Company. <sup>(1)</sup>

Fort St.  
 George con-  
 stituted a  
 Presidency,  
 and Mr. Gyf-  
 ford appoint-  
 ed President.

The instructions of the Court to FORT ST. GEORGE, in 1683-84, discover, that, notwithstanding the disaster at Bantam, a resolution had been taken, to prosecute the trade between the Coromandel Coast and what they termed “ the Southern Seas ; ” but this measure was affected by a succession of shifting projects, and was receded from, as information arrived from the countries to which the trade was to be directed.

The general orders to the Fort were, that the works should be extended and completed, but that the inhabitants should be subjected to taxes, in return for the protection they enjoyed ;—that the expences of the courts of law should be paid from the fees of court ;—and that, if possible, a right to a Factory at Porto Novo should be obtained, because this might become a market for the Interlopers.

In this season, the Court constituted the Agency of Fort St. George a *Presidency*, and recalled Mr. Hedges, who had formerly been one of the Directors. It will be recollected, that Mr. Hedges had been appointed Agent, with discretionary powers, to reform abuses in all the Factories in Bengal, and to  
 manage

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, and to the Agent and Council at Gombroon, 31st May, 16th September, and 16th November 1683-84, and 7th April 1684.— Commissions and Instructions to Sir Thomas Grantham, 27th July and 21st December 1683.

manage them as a separate Agency. Having failed in these duties, Mr. Gyfford was appointed President at Madras, and to proceed also to Bengal. During his absence from the Fort, Mr. Bigrig was to act as Agent at Fort St. George :—Mr. Gyfford was to be attended to the Bay by a company of soldiers, and to take with him arms and accoutrements for an additional company, to be formed of the seamen, to give the appearance of strength, as well as of dignity, to his mission and transactions :—these soldiers, when affairs should be settled, were to return to the Fort, and the seamen (forming an additional company) to be employed in such lesser vessels or ships, as Mr. Gyfford, or his Council, might think requisite, for protecting the trade, at such Factories on the Coast as he might establish, or to assist the projected expedition from England, under Sir John Wetwang, for the recovery of the Company's Factory and trade at Bantam.

It has been stated, that the Court had resolved to recover, by force, the Factory at Bantam, and the losses incurred in the wars between the old and young King and the Dutch, but an agreement, in Europe, between England and the States General, for the restoration of the English rights at Bantam, suspended this project ; the destination of this armament was, therefore, changed for ACHEEN, where, by presents and negotiation, a grant was to be obtained of one of the old Portuguese forts at the mouth of the river, where an Agent was to be fixed, and the forts strengthened, under the protection of which,

CHAP. II.  
1683-84.

Commercial instructions for Fort St. George and subordinate stations.



**CHAP. II.**  
**1683-84.** which, a town, like Madras, was to be erected, the rents of which might, in time, defray the charges, and an Engineer employed, at £5 per month, for this service:—the lesser vessels of this fleet, with a small stock of goods, were to attempt the formation of Factories at Pegu, Siam, Maccassar, and Johore, and, if possible, one small vessel, with a cargo of Coast goods and skins, was to make another experiment for a trade with Japan; and letters were addressed by the Company to the Emperor of Japan, and the Governor of Nagasaki, praying permission to trade at that port.

The Presidency of Fort St George were farther informed, that the ships of some of the Interlopers had been detained in England, and prosecutions instituted against them; that every expedient abroad, however, must be tried, to obstruct their trade, within the Company's limits;—in particular, that pepper, purchased from the Portuguese, or from Native ships, was to be warehoused at the Fort, to be ready for the Company's regular ships; and that an investment, in diamonds, (from the vicinity of Golcondah to the Fort,) was to be attempted, on the Company's account, to the extent of £20,000 or £30,000.<sup>(1)</sup>

Mr. Hedges,  
 Agent in  
 Bengal, dis-  
 missed, and  
 Mr. Gyfford  
 appointed  
 President of  
 Fort St.  
 George and  
 Bengal.

As Mr. Hedges had been appointed by the Court to be Agent, with a Council, at BENGAL, independently of any subordination to Fort St. George, it is material to look at the proceedings

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 31st May, 20th July, 14th August, 5th September, 19th and 31st October, and 21st December 1683, and 29th February 1683-84.

proceedings of this supervisor, and at the effect of his measures on the sales and exports from Madras, as well as on the general interests of both settlements. CHAP. II.  
1683-84.

It might have been expected, that Mr. Hedges, from his former rank, would have been fully acquainted with the opinions of the Court, that an undue influence had been exercised by the Government of Madras, over the Agency in Bengal, to favour the Private Trade of the Members; or that the Agents in Bengal, independently of this control, had taken advantage of the Company's stock, and employed it to promote their particular speculations; and, therefore, that he would have executed the trust reposed in him, or examined the sources of those evils, and acted on public grounds; but, it appears, that, instead of fulfilling the expectations entertained of his prudence and exertions, he had considered himself as the only person entrusted with the confidence of the Court, and, in the application of this power, had involved their affairs; for, by intercepting and opening letters, from the Members of Council to Sir Josiah Child, the Governor, or Chairman of the East-India Company, he not only lost the confidence of the Court, but, the opportunity of controlling their servants abroad, and, therefore, he was dismissed from the service. This circumstance induced the Court to recede from the plan of rendering Bengal independent of Fort St. George, and to appoint Mr Gyfford, the Agent at the Fort,

CHAP. II. to be Agent at Bengal, with the title of President over both  
1683-84. Settlements.

Measures for  
protecting  
the Coroman-  
del and Ben-  
gal trade.

This change of system is explained, by the impression of the Court, that the Dutch conquest of Bantam, instead of promoting the power or influence of a rival European Company, would enable the English Agents on the Coromandel Coast, and in the Bay of Bengal, to acquire a superiority, of influence and of trade, in both of those countries; conceiving that the Dutch power and commerce, would, in future, be confined to the Spice Islands, and their stock and equipments for the Peninsula of India, diminished, which would afford the English an opportunity of larger sales of Europe goods, and an unrivalled purchase in Indian produce. It was with these objects, that a large vessel, the Charles the Second, mounting seventy-two guns, under Sir Thomas Grantham, was directed to cruize along the Coast of Coromandel and Bay of Bengal, to seize on the Interlopers of every description, and to second the efforts of the Court at home, for suppressing a class of freebooters, acting equally against the exclusive privileges of the Company, and the interest of the nation.

Stock for  
Bengal, and  
instructions  
to obtain a  
fortified sta-  
tion at the  
mouth of the  
Ganges.

Besides the stock sent to Bengal this season, bullion, estimated at £100,000, was ordered to be appropriated to this branch of the trade:—of such consequence, indeed, had the trade to Bengal now become, that a military force was to be employed against the Interlopers, and, if possible, to get possession

possession of an Island in the mouth of the Ganges, which was to be fortified, and constituted a seat of the Company's trade in that part of India. If such station could be had, by Phirmaund, thirty thousand rupees might be expended in procuring it; but though the force to be employed against the Interlopers might be able to take possession of an Island, it would be dangerous to employ it in this way, because this act might offend the Mogul, and expose to hazard the Company's privileges and trade at Surat, and the other ports acknowledging obedience to him;—the measure was, therefore, left to the discretion of President Gyfford and his Council who were to consider the Bengal trade as the principal object in view.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1683-84.

The loss of BANTAM, and the junction of the Dutch with the young King, in his attack on his father, has been stated to have been a subject of negotiation between the King and the States General, and to have led His Majesty and the Court to equip a fleet, and embark a military force, under Sir Thomas Grantham:—on this occasion, the Court requested that the officers commanding the ships might be allowed to act under the King's, as well as under the Company's commission, in the countries within their limits; and that the squadron commanded by this officer, after re-establishing the trade in

Court's order to Sir Thomas Grantham, to recover the trade at Bantam.

3 T 2

the

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Bengal, 30th May, 5th September, and 21st December 1683, and 5th March 1683-84.

CHAP. II. the Gulf of Persia, should co-operate with a fleet of six or  
1683-84. seven sail, under Sir John Wetwang, who was to command, in the service of relieving the old King of Bantam, and re-establishing the English trade at that port.

Sir Thomas Grantham sailed for his original destination, under the instructions which have been detailed, as addressed to the Presidencies of Surat and of Fort St. George; but after the King's and the Company's commissions had been given to Sir John Wetwang, and the other Captains of his fleet, the explanation took place with the Dutch Government, and orders were sent to the Governor of Batavia, to re-deliver Bantam to the English:—the original object of the Court, therefore, was abandoned, and this officer did not proceed to India; but the ships, intended to be under his command, were dispatched, under Captain Nicholson, first to ascertain that the orders for the re-delivery of Bantam had been carried into execution, and next, to unite with Sir Thomas Grantham's squadron, in the extirpation of the Interlopers, and to second the plan of establishing Factories at Acheen, Siam, &c.:—Captain Nicholson was, subsequently, to touch at the Company's Settlements on the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts, and at Surat, and to take in investments for Europe. These views of the Court were directed, rather to give vigor to the trade within their limits, than to any fixed object; the ultimate orders being, that the commanders were neither to be intimidated by the Dutch, nor to afford them any reasonable

reasonable grounds for complaints, or commencing a war in the East.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1683-84.

It having been found, that the inhabitants of the Island of ST. HELENA, who, at this time, did not exceed five hundred in number, could not afford to be subjected to the expences of courts of justice, it was ordered, that the administration of the Island should return to the former system, to which the inhabitants had been habituated;—that no farther alienations of land should be made, but ground leased out for a term of twenty-one years, and then to revert to the Company; and that, to promote industry among the planters, military service, or garrison duty, might be commuted, on paying a duty of forty shillings each per annum, to cover the charges of a supply of soldiers, embarked to complete the garrison company; this expence was to be defrayed by a tax on internal produce, and by a duty on imports.<sup>(2)</sup>

Regulations  
for St. He-  
lena.

The commercial and political events, communicated during this season (1683-84) by the Presidency of SURAT, were;—

Trade de-  
pressed, by  
the wars of  
the Mogul

that,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, and the late Agent and Council at Bantam, then at Batavia, 6th June, 20th and 27th July, 1st August, and 23d October 1683.— King's and Company's Commissions to Sir John Wetwang and Sir Thomas Grantham, 1st August, 19th October, and 21st December 1683.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Governor of the Island of St. Helena, 1st and 15th August, and 9th October 1683.

CHAP. II. that, from the wars in the inland provinces, and on the coasts  
 1683-84 of the Peninsula, between the Mogul and Sambagee Rajah, who had been joined by Sultan Akbar, one of the sons of  
 and Sambagee, the want of sufficient stock, and the interferences of the French and Interlopers. Aurungzebe, the interruptions to the merchants, conveying goods to Surat, and to the subordinate Factories on the Malabar Coast, had been frequent;—that investments, to the extent of the Court's orders, could not be effected;—that money continued scarce, from the non-arrival of the Company's ships and stock;—that, on hearing of the loss of Bantam, every exertion had been made at Surat, Calicut, and Carwar, to procure a quantity of pepper, to fill up from one thousand, to fourteen hundred tons;—that cloths had risen in price, not so much from the actual interferences of the French ships, as from the reports which they had published, of their expectations of a large fleet and stock in the course of the year;—and that, though they had been hitherto much oppressed by the Portuguese, that nation having offended Sambagee Rajah, Chaul, and even Goa, had been invested by his armies, and, therefore, their means of injuring the Company's trade, and their connexions with the Native Powers, had diminished.

An unexpected event had, this season, occurred, which, more than any other, embarrassed the trade;—several ships of the Interlopers had arrived, and been assisted in their projects by Messrs Bowcher and Petit, two of the Company's servants, and Members of Council, who, for this conduct, had

had been dismissed the service, and, in revenge, had reported to the Native Governors and Princes, that the King of England had withdrawn his protection from the Company, and transferred it to them, as a new commercial Association :—this insidious report had lessened the confidence of the Natives, with whom the Company had, hitherto, transacted, while the quantity of goods brought by these illicit traders had affected the sale of English produce, and raised the price of Indian articles ; if effectual measures, therefore, were not taken, to prevent this interference, the Company's trade, and their Settlements, must be ruined. These observations applied, with equal force, to the interferences of the Interlopers in Bengal, and on the Coast of Coromandel. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1683-84.

From subsequent information, it appears, that Sambagee Rajah, having obtained possession of Caranjah from the Portuguese, the Presidency of Surat established a Factory at Telli-cherry, conceiving that one thousand candy of pepper and cardamoms, might be obtained at this port, superior in quality to those of Calicut. As diamonds had been purchased ten per cent. cheaper than in the preceding year, an assortment, estimated at £10,000, had been obtained, and, at the close of this season, three ships were dispatched from Surat to England, with an investment estimated at 10,22,000 rupees. <sup>(2)</sup>

Presidency of  
Surat esta-  
blish a Fac-  
tory at Telli-  
cherry.

While

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th and 23d April, 30th November, and 14th December 1683.

(2)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 25th January 1683-84.—  
Letter from the Agent at Calicut to the Presidency of Surat, 4th May 1683.



CHAP. II.  
 1683 - 84. Captain Keigwin seizes the Deputy Governor of Bombay, and takes possession of the Island in the name of the King.

While the Company's affairs at Surat were under these political and commercial restraints, and Sambagee's forces were besieging Caranjah, a revolt took place in the Island of BOMBAY, the source of which, and its first appearances, threatened the whole of the Company's Settlements, with ruin, and particularly endangered the English interests on the West Coast of India.

Captain Richard Keigwin, who commanded the Company's garrison at Bombay, assisted by Ensign Thornburn and others, on the 27th December 1683, seized on Mr. Ward, the Deputy Governor, and such Members of Council as adhered to him, assembled the troops and militia, annulled the authority of the Company, by proclamation, and declared the Island to be immediately under the King's protection :—the garrison, consisting of one hundred and fifty English soldiers, and two hundred topasses, and the inhabitants of the Island, elected Captain Keigwin to be Governor, and appointed officers to the different companies, with suitable rank, and civil officers, store-keepers, harbour-masters, &c. declaring, however, that the Company might, if their servants would acknowledge the King's Government, as proclaimed, and did not interfere with the administration of it, proceed in their trade, without molestation. Keigwin took possession of the Company's ship *Return*, and the *Hunter* frigate, and landed the treasure, amounting to between fifty and sixty thousand rupees, intended for the investment at Carwar, which he lodged

lodged in the Fort, and published a declaration, that it should be employed only for the defence of the King's Island and Government. CHAP. II.  
1683-84.

Unexpected as this event was, the measures, which for several years had been adopted, of abridging the charges of Bombay, and particularly the military expences, will explain the sources of it:—the officers, both in their rank and pay, had been placed lower than they had formerly been, and the militia had been so much reduced, that not only discipline had been relaxed, but the authority of the officers, over the men, at an end:—discontents, of course, bordering on disobedience, could not be easily repressed, and an incident, only, was wanting, to kindle this discontent into a revolt. Captain Keigwin applied for subsistence-money, there being no Company's table, as formerly:—after much altercation, between him and the Deputy Governor, he was allowed money, to the extent of twenty-five rupees per month; but, in case the Court should disapprove of this allowance, it was to be refunded.

The first measure taken, after the revolt, was a proclamation, by Captain Keigwin, requiring the inhabitants to take the oaths of allegiance to the King, and to renounce their obedience to the Company:—with this proclamation the whole of the garrison, militia, and inhabitants, readily complied; the troops, from an expectation of relief from the grievances of which they had complained, and the inhabitants, from the usual expectations held out to *Mobs*, of relief from taxes. To such a height did this frenzy proceed,

Measures of Keigwin, on assuming the government of Bombay.

**CHAP. II.**  
**1683-84.** that, in the sequel, we shall find the crews of the Company's ships sent, first with Commissioners, and next accompanying President Child to Bombay, to prevail on Captain Keigwin, and his adherents, to return to their duty, instead of being disposed to act offensively against the revolters, caught the prejudices by which they were instigated, and could not be intrusted in the most necessary services, which the Commissioners, and afterwards the President and his Council, thought might be effectual for the restoration of order and legal authority.

Captain Keigwin, and his associates, then addressed letters to His Majesty, and to the Duke of York, expressive of their determination to maintain the Island for the King, till his pleasure should be known, and enumerated the causes which had imposed upon them the necessity of revolt, or to prevent the Island being seized by Sambagee, who was in possession of Caranjah, or by the Siddee, or Admiral of the Mogul, who, with a numerous naval force, lay near it, each having in view to expel equally the King's or the Company's forces from a station, of which both, for a number of years, had been jealous, and each afraid that the other might anticipate him in acquiring.

Captain Keigwin, and the conspirators, next represented to the Court of Committees, that the selfish schemes of Sir Josiah Child, in England, and of his brother, Mr. John Child, the President of Surat, of whom Mr. Ward, the Deputy Governor

vernor of Bombay, was an instrument only, had been the real source of their conduct; adding, that both the garrison and inhabitants were determined to preserve the place in its allegiance, till the King's pleasure should be conveyed to them.

When the President and Council of Surat were informed of this unexpected and dangerous revolt, they appointed three Commissioners (Mr. Zinzan, Mr. Day, and Mr. Gosfright) to proceed with three of the Company's ships to Bombay, and endeavour, by promises of pardon and redress of grievances, to persuade the revolters to return to their duty to the Company. After fruitless conferences for a month, in which every expedient was tried, on the part of the Commissioners, and refused, on the part of Captain Keigwin and his adherents, they were satisfied, that persuasions and threats were equally unavailing.

On the 31st January 1683-84, President Child arrived off Bombay, with three more of the Company's ships, the three which came with the Commissioners having been, at different times in this month, dispatched to England, with the Company's investments. The Commissioners remained on board a country vessel, while President Child held conferences with Captain Keigwin, and repeated promises of pardon and redress of grievances:—this offer, also, was unavailing, for the animosity of Captain Keigwin, and his adherents, was directed against the President and his brother, Sir Josiah Child, to whose in-

CHAP. II.  
1683-84.

Measures of  
President  
Child, on re-  
ceiving intel-  
ligence of the  
revolt at  
Bombay.

CHAP. II. fluence they ascribed, not only the sufferings which had driven  
 1683-84. them to the measures which they had taken, but all the evils of which they, and the greater part of the inhabitants of the Island, complained.

After consultations, which continued till the month of March 1683-84, and after duly reflecting on not having any military force which could reduce the Island to obedience, and that the crews of the ships so far favoured the revolters, that they would not act offensively against them, it was determined, to dispatch the three Company's ships, with their cargoes, estimated at above one million of rupees, to England, and to station two confidential persons at the Island of Kenery, and two at the Portuguese settlement at Vissavah, by permission of the Siddee, and of the Portuguese Governor, to employ boats, whenever ships might appear in the offing, to direct the captains not to go into Bombay harbour, but to proceed directly to Swally. Under these circumstances, the President and his Council returned to Surat, leaving the Island of Bombay in the possession of the revolters.

The recovery of Bombay impeded by the Interlopers.

Besides the want of force, military or naval, another not less strong motive, rendered this conduct of the President and his Council indispensable :—the Interlopers had, for years, been encreasing, and, in the present season, had been more numerous than in any former year; strong apprehensions, therefore, were entertained, either that the revolters had  
 been

instigated by the Agents of the Interlopers, or that, could force have been employed, a connection, between Captain Keigwin and these Adventurers, would be formed (for they had frequently reported, that a new East-India Company had been instituted in England, in whose employ they were), and that the latter would assist the insurgents, and get possession of the Island. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.

1683-84.

The commercial intercourse with PERSIA, at the period when the Company's trade at Surat and Bombay was unhinged by this revolt, must, in a great measure, be considered as a disconnected subject. It may be recollected, that the Court had formed a project, and equipped a vessel to carry into execution a series of exchanges from England to Mocha, thence to Gombroon and Bussorah, (at which places it was expected that English produce could be disposed of) and to collect, at those ports, coffee, silks, and Persian goods, the principal part of the tonnage to be filled up at Gombroon, from which the ship was to return to Surat, and then proceed to Europe, with the Company's regular fleet.

Declining  
state of the  
trade in Per-  
sia.

The

(1)—Letters, Papers, Commissions, Instructions, &c. from the Presidency of Surat, relative to the Island of Bombay; Report of Commissioners, &c. 30th November 29th and 30th December 1683, and 1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 14th, and 30th January 1683-84.— Account of the Revolt at Bombay, January, February, and March 1683-84.— Address from the Revolters, and Captain Keigwin's Letters to His Majesty, and to His Royal Highness the Duke of York, 28th January and 23d February 1683-84.— Correspondence between President Child and the Revolters, in the month of February 1683-84. (Indian Register Office.)

**CHAP. II.**  
 1683-84. The Agents at Ispahan and Gombroon reported, that the basis of this project, or the sale of English produce at Mocha, Bussorah, &c., had failed, or was impracticable, and that the plan, of course, could not be realized;—farther, they stated, that the orders for Persian goods at Ispahan and Gombroon, could not be complied with, for the exports could not be disposed of, to purchase an investment of silks, Caramania wool, &c., to make part of the homeward cargo; but, if proper Agents, with a sufficient stock, should be employed at Ispahan, these articles might be procured, for the ships of the following season, under the risks of interruption of privileges, and the uncertainty of their being renewed.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Presidency of Fort St. George endeavour to procure an investment, and obstruct the Interlopers.

The events at the Presidency of FORT ST. GEORGE, this season, were few, and regarded only the provision of their investments for Europe, and the plan which they had adopted, for obstructing the trade and projects of the Interlopers. On the first of these subjects, after expressing their disappointment, that sufficient tonnage had not arrived, they specified the amount of the investment, on board the two ships which they had dispatched for Europe, *viz.* 2,53,500 pagodas;—on the second, that by an application to the King of Golcondah and his officers, they had excluded the Interlopers from Porto Novo, and trusted that Alley, the principal of them, would not be

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Factors in Persia, 30th May, 21st September, and 17th December 1683, and 11th January 1683-84.

be received on the Coromandel Coast, but, that they suspected he had proceeded for Bengal; that the Interlopers had offered to the King of Golcondah's ministers, according to their report, fifty thousand pagodas, but these officers, expecting the same sum, if a Phirmaund should be granted to the Company, the President had been obliged to evade this demand; but submitted to the Court, that should a Phirmaund be obtained, for excluding the Interlopers from the King of Golcondah's dominions, a considerable expence must be incurred, the payment of which was preferable to the constant uncertainty and state of alarm, in which the Company's trade was kept, by the arbitrary exactions of officers, stimulated by the appearances of these Private Traders. In so far, however, the Company's rights had been extended, that Factories were, this season, established at Cuddalore, and Conimere, in the Gingee country. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1683-84.

No particular accounts of the state of the trade or Settlements, in the BAY OF BENGAL, appear on the Company's records, during this season.

Among the events of the preceding year, the revolution at BANTAM was detailed, by which the old King had been expelled, and made prisoner by his son, instigated to rebellion by the Dutch:—in this season, the son, also, had been dethroned, and the government and trade of the port and its dependencies

The Company's servants, at their late Agency at Bantam, obliged to retire to Surat, and the trade to Siam, Tonquin, &c. lost.

(1)—Letters from the President and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 14th June and 11th October 1683.



CHAP. II. dependencies assumed by the Dutch. This event had deranged  
 1683-84. all the plans of the Company for opening the Southern trade, of which Bantam was to be the seat, or having Agents at Siam, Tonquin, Tywan, and for a time at Amoy, and opening a trade with Japan, and afterwards with Canton.

The Dutch, after being in possession of Bantam, allowed the English Agent and his Council to retire to Batavia, to collect the remains of their property, and to wind up their trade; but, in a short time, signified, that it would be expedient, those Agents and their ships should leave Batavia, and retire to Surat, compliance with which, in the course of this season, became unavoidable:—such part of the English manufactures, as remained in their possession, and which were not vendible at Tywan or Batavia, were sent to Fort St. George and Surat.

The late Agent of Bantam, and his Council, left Batavia on the 23d August, and arrived at Surat the 3d November 1683, with money and goods, amounting to thirty-nine thousand pieces of eight, which sum was charged to the Surat account, and the debts of the Factories, formerly subordinate to Bantam (or Siam, Tonquin, Tywan, and Jambee) in like manner, amounting to one hundred and seventy-six thousand pieces of eight.

The seat of the Company's trade, in this part of India, from these events, being lost, the difficulties of continuing commerce or connexions at Siam, Tywan, and the other dependencies on Bantam, followed as necessary consequences:

—and,

—and, to these evils, the conduct of the Portuguese, at Macao, must be added; for, by bribing the Viceroy of CANTON with £10,000, they had excluded all other nations from the trade at that port, and thus interrupted, and, for the time, wholly prevented the Company's servants and shipping from obtaining any portion of the CHINA trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.

1683-84.

(1)—Letters from the late Agent and Council at Bantam to the Presidencies of Surat and Fort St. George, dated at Batavia, from April to August 1683.— Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, dated in November and December 1683.

## 1684-85.

CHAP. II.      At the commencement of the season 1684-85, the Court  
 1684-85. appear to have proceeded on the same plan of obstructing (with  
 Court's plans to check the Interlopers, and lessen the charge of Bombay. the support of the Crown) the Interlopers in Europe, and of abridging the charges at BOMBAY, civil and military.

The Interlopers had, hitherto, clandestinely equipped ships, and taken in cargoes from England, and had proceeded direct to the East-Indies, and, on their arrival, by similar arts, had eluded the restraints which the Presidencies and Agencies had endeavoured to impose on them : in this season, however, they had recourse to an expedient, which, in the sequel, will be found to have been the source of remonstrances, as well as treaties, between the Maritime Powers. The ships, instead of taking in their cargoes at a British port, went to Ostend, and took in Europe produce, on British capital, and thence proceeded to India :—the Court, on discovering this project, applied to the King, who ordered a man of war to intercept them, but two of their vessels escaped ; instructions were, therefore, sent to the Company's Agents, to seize their ships and goods.

The plan of abridging the charges of the officers intrusted with the defence and protection of Bombay, was, unhappily, carried to the extreme of ordering the half allowance, paid  
 for

for diet to Captain Keigwin, to be refunded (a circumstance which, but for its consequences, would not have been noticed), and this parsimonious measure produced the discontents, and probably the revolt of the garrison, detailed among the foreign events of the preceding season.

CHAP. II.  
1684-85.

The Court, from the constant alarm in which the Presidency of SURAT had been kept, by the wars between Sambagee and the Mogul, resolved, that one half of their fleet should take in the investment at Bombay, instead of Surat, and instructed the President to temporize with both of these powers; with the one, by an application for permission to re-establish the Factory at Rajahpore; and with the other, by presents to the Governor of Surat, to prevent his taking any alarm, from the removal of part of the Company's goods and shipping from that port.<sup>(1)</sup>

Commercial instructions for Bombay.

These orders had been given previously to the Court's receiving intelligence of the revolt at Bombay; but, as soon as the advices of this event arrived, and information, that Captain Keigwin had addressed letters and remonstrances to the King and Duke of York, and attempted to explain away a public crime, by the necessity of preserving the Island in its allegiance to the King, and to save it from becoming a conquest to Sevagee, or the Mogul, the Court appointed a *Committee of Secrecy*, with powers to make application to His Majesty, and

A Secret Committee of Directors appointed, to report to the King on the revolt at Bombay.

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to

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 18th April and 2d July 1684.

CHAP. II. to concert such measures, as might be advisable for the reco-  
1684-85. very of the place.

The Secret Committee stated, in a report to the King, dated the 15th August 1684, that, from the period when their Charter and privileges had been renewed, their officers and soldiers had enjoyed encouragements, superior to those which the Dutch granted to their troops;—that the pay and allowances of an English soldier were greater than those of an inferior Dutch officer;—that their President and Governor, so far from cruel and oppressive conduct towards the garrison, had, on all occasions, manifested every indulgence, compatible with the duty of rendering the revenues equal to the charges of the establishment;—that since the Island had been transferred to the Company, they had expended the large sum of £300,000, on fortifications and improvements, had constructed an excellent harbour, to become the resort of the English trade, and, in the preceding season, had embarked seventy soldiers to St. Helena, and two complete companies to Fort St. George;—that they had authorized the President to engage five companies of Native troops, to serve at Bombay, and that the source of the rebellion could be traced to Mr. Petit and Mr. Boucher, two of the Company's civil servants, who had been dismissed, for encouraging the Interlopers, of whom they now had become the leaders, and had made application to the Mogul, to obtain privileges for a Factory at Surat, similar to that of the Company;—that  
these

these proceedings tended to seduce the Company's garrison, who had become instruments in the interloping projects, as appeared in the reasons assigned by the revolters for their conduct; and thus the evil (in their own language) "had outrun the remedy;" for they had revived the question, (contrary to the prerogative of His Majesty) whether a grant from the Crown, without the authority of the Legislature, could give exclusive privileges to the East-India Company?—and, that the revolt had been, also, encouraged, by the Company's not having power (as appeared in the former cases of Sir Edward Winter, at Fort St. George, and at Bombay and St. Helena) to seize, and bring to trial, their servants, for disobedience and insubordination. The Secret Committee, therefore, prayed His Majesty, that the rights and powers of the Company might be clearly defined;—that a Commission might be issued, under the Great Seal, for restoring the Island of Bombay to them; and a pardon offered to the revolters, with the exception of the four principals, Captain Keigwin, Ensign Thornburn (who had been the chief ringleader), Captain Adderton, and Lieutenant Fletcher; and that His Majesty would issue a proclamation, ordering all Interlopers to leave India, under severe penalties. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1684-85

This

(1)—Report from the Secret Committee of the East-India Company to King Charles II., 15th August 1684.

CHAP. II.  
 1684-85. King's orders to Captain, Keigwin, to deliver Bombay to the Company; and commission to Sir John Child, to offer a general pardon to the revolters, except the four ringleaders.

This request, as far as regarded the reduction of the Island of Bombay to the Company's obedience, was immediately granted, and an order issued, under the Sign Manual, to Captain Keigwin and his associates, to deliver up the Island to the Presidency of Surat, or to such persons as the Company might appoint to receive it:—a Commission, under the Great Seal, dated the 25th August 1684, was also directed to President Child, to the Members of the Councils at Surat and Bombay, and to the commanders of the Company's ships, empowering them to receive the Island from Keigwin and his associates, and to offer a general pardon to all (except the four ringleaders) who should, within twenty-four hours after notice, return to their duty.

Court's instructions for reducing the Island.

President Child was appointed, under these commissions, Captain General and Admiral of the Company's sea and land forces; Sir Thomas Grantham, Vice Admiral; and the senior commander of the Company's ships, Rear Admiral; with orders to assemble the fleet, and such forces as they could muster at Surat, (the men having been instructed in the use of small arms during the voyage,) and to proceed to Bombay, where they were to intimate the King's commands to Keigwin, and require him to surrender the Island:—in the event of his refusal, he, and all who might adhere to him, were to be proclaimed rebels and traitors:—a Council of War was then to be assembled, to concert measures for acting offensively, and to offer rewards for apprehending the principal mutineers, that is,  
 four

four thousand rupees for seizing Captain Keigwin, four thousand for Ensign Thornburn, two thousand for Captain Adderton, and two thousand for Lieutenant Fletcher, and eight thousand rupees to be distributed, according to rank, to such persons as might signalize themselves in the service, with assurances to those who might be wounded, of a suitable provision by the Company, or, in the event of their being killed, of an allowance to their families. CHAP. II.  
1684-85.

The instructions, given by the Secret Committee to the President and Council of Surat, in substance were, to try every expedient to induce the revolters to surrender, and to employ force only, on their obstinately refusing to deliver up the place, still, however, keeping to His Majesty's orders, of excepting the principal mutineers; but, in the event of a general pardon having been granted, before the arrival of those orders, the four ringleaders were to be strictly watched, and, in case of any farther attempts by them, they were to be brought to trial for their first act of rebellion, and if found guilty, to be executed, that an example might be made, to prevent future revolts:—in the event of their resisting, till the orders arrived, they were to be tried, as rebels and traitors.

For the better preservation of the Island, in obedience to the King and to the Company, the seat of the Company's Government was to be removed from Surat to Bombay, where the President and Council were to reside, and a force of three English companies to be maintained, with such number of  
native



CHAP. II. native troops and militia, as the President might deem it  
1684-85. expedient to employ.

Captain Tyrrel, of the Navy, sent out, to receive the Island from the revolters, and re-deliver it to the Company.

The Court, by a subsequent application to the King, obtained an order for Captain Tyrrel, with His Majesty's ship Phoenix, to accompany the fleet, and to command, under the President, in the reduction of the revolters. If Captain Keigwin should refuse to deliver up the Island to President Child, or to any of the Company's officers, Captain Tyrrel, who commanded the King's ship, was authorized to accept of the surrender, and to re-deliver it to the Company:—this service being performed, he was to continue, in India, with the Phoenix, at the Company's expence, for one season, and to be employed, under the directions of the President and Council, in capturing the vessels of Interlopers, and to receive half of the Company's moiety of such seizures, for his encouragement in the service.<sup>(1)</sup>

Commercial instructions to Surat.

The commercial information to the Presidency of SURAT was, that the tonnage and stock would be considerable, and include one large vessel, similar to that commanded by Sir Thomas Grantham; and, if we may judge from the orders for cloths,

(1)—Order, under the Sign Manual, to Captain Keigwin, to deliver the Island of Bombay to the Company, 23d August 1684.— Commission from the King to the President and Council of Surat and Bombay, for taking possession of the Island of Bombay, 25th August 1684.— Instructions from the Secret Committee of the East-India Company to the Commissioners, 25th August 1684.— Letter from the Secret Committee to the Presidency of Surat, 26th September 1684.— Commission to Captain Tyrrel, of His Majesty's ship Phoenix, 23d October 1684.

cloths, and other Surat goods, including the Persian articles, CHAP. II.  
 the stock must have been very considerable, from which such 1684-85.  
 a return could be expected.

The only variation in the commercial instructions of this season, was, that if the French house at Tellicherry could not be rented, so as to remove them from that settlement, an English house was to be built, on which six guns were to be mounted, and a detachment of ten or twelve soldiers stationed for its protection, it being of importance to cultivate the friendship of the Rajah, and to shew the Company's intention of enlarging the trade in his Country. <sup>(1)</sup>

To preserve a proportion of the trade to PERSIA, the — to Persia ;  
 Court, in this season, ordered that two of the Council at Gombroon should constantly reside at Ispahan, to attend to such events as affected the Company's privileges of trade, and to sell off their remains ; but it was explained, that those articles which could be disposed of, by barter, might be sold at prime cost, and that tin, lead, &c., which would sell in India, should be re-shipped, either for Surat, or for Fort St. George :—the Shahbunder was to be informed, that the Company were ready to send ships of force, and an adequate stock, provided the Persian goods should be embarked on English bottoms only, and that the customs, agreeably to treaty, should be regularly paid ; meantime the Agents were to provide the greatest possi-

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 3d, 15th, 24th October, and 26th November 1684, and 7th January 1684-85.

CHAP II.  
1684-85.

ble quantity of red Caramania wool, at Gombroon and Ispahan, and to apply to the Governor of Caramania (to whom they were to make a present) for a preference in the purchase of this article :—copies of all dispatches were to be sent to the President at Surat, to enable the Court to make suitable provision, for both branches of the Western trade. <sup>(1)</sup>

— and to Fort St. George, in consequence of the decision of the Court of King's Bench, in favor of the Company, against the Interlopers.

The measures which the Court prescribed, for managing the Settlement and trade at FORT ST GEORGE, during this season, though few, are of considerable importance.

For a series of years, by applications to the Crown, and of late years, by its active co-operation, the Interlopers, or Private-Traders, had been obstructed in their equipments, and an order had been given to the revenue officers, and (on some occasions) to the King's ships, to seize the vessels employed in this illicit traffic, as being contrary to the Company's rights, and the public interests.

A case, in this season, came before the Court of King's Bench :—the Company prosecuted a Mr. Sands, who defended himself, on the ground that his attempt to trade to India, was not contrary to the laws of the realm. This case was solemnly determined by the Judges, on the 31st January 1684-85, “ that the Crown had a right to grant exclusive privileges, and that such right had been repeatedly acquiesced in by Parliament :”

—The

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council in Persia, 2d July and 30th September 1684 and 5th January 1684-85.

—The Court, therefore, informed the President of Fort St. George, that the Company considered this decision to have fully ascertained the extent of their Charter, and their exclusive privileges, and that they trusted it would completely eradicate an evil, against which they had struggled, for so many years; that, besides, the trade of the Interlopers, in this season, had been followed by heavy losses, rather than by gain to themselves; three of their vessels had arrived, while the litigation was pending, two of them almost with dead freight, and one with a cargo, estimated at £36,000, the sales of which had been unproductive.

On this decision, the Court informed the Presidency, that five ships were to be dispatched to Coast and Bay, two of which carried bullion, estimated at £140,000.

The resolutions of the Court, in this season, regarding Fort St. George and its dependencies, are, also, of considerable interest, both as they related to the Coromandel Coast, and to the Southern trade;—they directed the Fort to be improved; a wall to be built round the town of Madras; encouragement to be given to the native merchants to resort to it, as a principal seat of trade; the expence of the fortifications to be defrayed by a tax on the inhabitants, and by an anchorage duty of one dollar, and a barrel of gunpowder, from all vessels, except fishing boats;—and to strengthen the garrison, such of the inhabitants as kept horses, were to be formed into a troop of cavalry, and arms given to them, under proper

CHAP. II. officers;—certain lands, round Madras and St. Thomé, were  
 1684-85. to be purchased, more effectually to supply the place with provisions, and, if possible, a Phirmaund procured for the coinage of rupees at the Fort;—a discretionary order, also, was added, to obtain a Fort in the Gingee country, if it could be done, without exciting jealousy in Sambagee;—the former dependencies on Bantam, or the Agencies at Tonquin and Tywan (now subject to the Tartars), were to be subordinate to Fort St. George, and as all hopes of recovering Bantam, as a place of trade, were given up, an attempt was to be made to open a trade at Acheen, and to occupy an island near it, as a Company's Settlement, to be fortified, and rendered a centre for the Southern trade;—another experiment was also to be made, to fix a Factory at Amoy.<sup>(1)</sup>

Instructions to the Bengal Agents, to procure a station which might be fortified.

Similar instructions were sent, this season, to the Agent and Council at HUGHLY, as applicable to the Company's interests in BENGAL, with the addition, that the Court empowered the Agent to solicit from the Nabob, or from the Mogul, some station in the province of Bengal, which might be fortified, and circumjacent lands rented, that this station, like Bombay or Fort St. George, might become a seat of trade; because, without such place of safety, a trade, which  
 promised

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 2d July, 30th September, 24th October, and 26th November 1684, 13th and 18th February, 11th and 16th March 1684-85.

promised so much, must be limited:—the Agents in Bengal <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> were censured, for not having been sufficiently careful in the 1684-85. package of silks, cloths, &c. and for not having procured cloths from Benares, which would have been a new article in the Company's sales. The irregularity of the Factors, in not transmitting a diary of their proceedings, and a statement of their accounts, formed a particular subject of censure; and positive orders, were given, founded upon the decision of the Court of King's Bench, to obstruct, by every possible means, the proceedings of the Interlopers in India;—With the object of connecting the exchanges between India and Persia, three hundred tons of Bengal sugar were to be annually exported to that kingdom

These dispatches close with announcing the death of King Charles II., on the 6th February 1684-85, and the accession <sup>Death of King Charles II.</sup> of King James II.:—This event would have necessarily formed a part of the advices from the Court to their Foreign Settlements, but it becomes more interesting, from the circumstance of the new Sovereign, when Duke of York, having been one of the Adventurers in the East-India stock, and the opinion of the Court, that his continuing his interest in their concern, would procure them the same protection which they had received from his Royal Predecessor.<sup>(1)</sup>

Though

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Bengal, 18th April, 2d July, 3d October, and 26th November 1684, 13th February and 16th March 1684-85.

CHAP. II.  
 1684-85. Courts project of making Acheen the centre of the southern trade.

Though the Court, from the loss of BANTAM, had, as yet, been able only to form the project of rendering ACHEEN the centre of trade in the Southern Indies, and though they had, on the presumption of its being established, rendered it subordinate to Fort St. George, and directed the vessels which might be sent to that Presidency, either to proceed, under their instructions, to Tywan, or to Tonquin, and to take in pepper, as a part of their assortment, they, in this season, addressed a letter to the Governor of Tywan, (now acknowledging the Chinese Tartars) to be forwarded on a vessel hired at Madras, and to carry a cargo, estimated at about £5,000, with offers, in the event of trade being granted, to consign a large Company's ship to that port, in the ensuing season; if trade should be refused, their servants were to leave the place, and to bring off their remains to Fort St. George:—in like manner, the trade was to be continued at TONQUIN; but, under doubts of its practicability, a commercial speculation was to be tried on the coast of CHINA.<sup>(1)</sup>

The embarrassment which the loss of Bantam had occasioned, and the uncertainty of being able to fix a seat of trade at Acheen, or, in its vicinity, did not damp the enterprizes of the Company to open trade, or form establishments, in the Chinese Seas; for, in this season, they fitted out a ship (the Adventure)

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Chief and Factors at Tywan, 2d July and 1st October 1684; and to the Chief and Factors at Tonquin, 2d July and 26th September 1684.

Adventure) on board of which three Factors were embarked, with orders to proceed through the Straits of Bally, and to attempt a trade at the Island of Mindanao; and letters were addressed to its Chief, requesting permission to build a fort and house of trade:—should this request be refused, they were to proceed to the Islands of Ceram, Celebes, Ternate &c., and to endeavour to dispose of their cargoes, for spices, and other produce; but if these markets, also, should not be open, they were to attempt a trade in China produce, silks, tutenag, &c., at the Nankeen and Lampacoa Islands, and thence to return to Fort St. George, and there receive the instructions of the Presidency, for their future proceedings.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP II.  
1684-85.

The orders to the Governor of ST. HELENA directed, that salt-works should be established, a person, acquainted with the management of them in France, having been appointed to superintend this manufacture. The importance of having a station for the outward and homeward ships, appears, also, in this season, to have occupied the Court's attention, as they projected the establishment of a station at the Island of Tristan d'Acunha.<sup>(2)</sup>

Additional  
orders for St.  
Helena.

From

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Factors proceeding to attempt a trade at Mindanao, &c. 19th November 1684.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Governor of the Island of St. Helena, 5th April and 26th November 1684.



CHAP. II.  
 1684-85.  
 Connexion  
 between the  
 revoltors at  
 Bombay and  
 the Interlo-  
 pers at Surat.

From the circumstances under which SURAT and BOMBAY were described to be placed, at the close of the preceding season, the sequel becomes interesting :—

It appears, that the President had returned to Surat, on the 7th March 1683-84, and, with his Council, employed every expedient to induce the revoltors at Bombay, to return to their duty; and had been so fortunate as to retake the Company's ship Return, sent by the revoltors to Mr. Petit, the chief of the Interlopers at Surat, a proof, that the opinion which the Presidency had formed respecting the connexion, between the Interlopers and the revoltors, was well founded.

Captain Keigwin sends an Agent to negotiate a treaty with Sambagee.

Captain Keigwin, in this crisis, sent Captain Gary to Sambagee Rajah, and succeeded in negotiating a treaty for a free trade in his dominions; for he procured an order for the payment of twelve thousand pagodas, due to the Company. This service he represented, in a letter to King Charles II., the Company had neglected, or perhaps could not have effected; and added, that the garrison of Bombay consisted of five hundred and five men, in full allegiance to His Majesty; that the Island was supported by its own revenue; and that none of the Company's money, seized on the ship Return, had, hitherto, been made use of.

These

These events embarrassed trade, as the Natives could not distinguish between those who had usurped power, and those who really were the representatives of the English nation, or the Company; an evil which necessarily arose, from seeing the subjects of the same country, assuming the distinctions of King's and Company's servants, unintelligible to those, who could only judge from appearances and from power. CHAP. II.  
1684-85.

In this situation, President Child, and his Council, made every exertion to prepare an investment of Surat goods, pepper, cardamoms, and indigo, for the Company's ships, and to dispatch them for Europe, that the home sales might be as little injured as possible, by the convulsed state of this seat of their trade, and its dependencies:—a Factory was established at Tellicherry, under instructions to avoid offending the French, who had a house of trade at that port; because the arbitrary proceedings of the Dutch, in monopolizing the whole of the pepper trade, and the depression of the Portuguese Settlements, from their war with Sambagee, required conciliatory measures with the French, to induce them to transfer their house at Tellicherry to the Company. <sup>(1)</sup>

VOL. II.

3 Z

Affairs

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th, 16th, and 26th April and 1st May, and to the Secret Committee, 26th September 1684.— Captain Keigwin's Letter to the King, 15th September 1684.

CHAP. II.  
 1684-85.  
 Arrival of  
 Dr. St. John,  
 Sir Thomas  
 Grantham,  
 and the fleet,  
 at Surat.

Affairs were in this situation, when Dr. St. John arrived at Surat, as Judge Advocate, under the commission from His Majesty, on the 15th September 1684:—His commission was published, and the Court erected, in the King's name, at Surat, on the 17th September 1684; and, to give it greater authority to overawe the revolvers at Bombay, they were informed, that their case would come under the cognizance of a King's Judge, and be tried in a more summary manner, (whatever might be the result of the revolt), than if their conduct should become matter of judicial investigation and decision in England. <sup>(1)</sup>

Dr. St. John's  
 report on the  
 state of the  
 Company's  
 affairs.

On this occasion, Dr. St. John drew up a very able report, which he addressed to the King and Council, on the general state of the Company's affairs, and the particular causes of the revolt at Bombay. On the first of these subjects, he represented, that the aggressions of the Portuguese and Dutch had been so great, and so long continued, that it was impossible the English trade could continue in India, for three years, unless His Majesty should adopt effectual measures for restraining their proceedings, and protecting his rights, and those of his subjects, in the East-Indies:—on the second, or the revolt at Bombay, after an attentive examination of the conduct of President Child, who had maintained a steady loyalty to his King and Country, during the  
 twenty-

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th September 1684.

twenty-five years he had been in India, and an uninterrupted probity and activity in his administration of the Company's affairs, he stated, that the rebellion at Bombay had arisen from the depredations and crimes of the Interlopers, with whom Captain Keigwin was intimately connected, whom he termed the "*Oliver and Protector of the Island of Bombay,*" and who, though he used the King's name and authority in his proceedings, had, on a full examination of all the facts, been influenced solely by predatory and rebellious motives;—Dr. St. John, therefore, gave it as his advice to the King and Council, to appoint President Child, to be the King's Lord Admiral in India, with full powers to seize and bring to justice the Interlopers of every description; and concluded with repeating, that unless the Portuguese and Dutch should be prevented from carrying into execution their fixed project of expelling the English from their trade and Factories, and unless the Interlopers, in England, as well as in India, should be suppressed, the trade, between England and the East-Indies, could not continue for three years. <sup>(1)</sup>

In the domestic Annals of the preceding season, it appeared that the Company had fitted out a large ship, the Charles the Second, carrying between sixty and seventy guns, under

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the

(1)—Letters from Dr. St. John, Judge at Surat, to His Majesty and the Privy Council, dated Surat, 20th September 1684; and his official Report on the Revolt at Bombay, dated Surat, 23d September 1684: (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, Nos. 272, 273).

CHAP. II. the command of Sir Thomas Grantham, who was also invested  
 1684-85. with a King's commission, and to have a vote in the Council at Surat, while at that port;—the object of this equipment was, to recover, if possible, the English Factory at Bantam; or, if that should be found impracticable, to proceed to the Gulf of Persia, and there, by the appearance of force, to endeavour to re-establish the Company's rights at Gombroon, &c.

Surrender of the Island of Bombay to Sir Thomas Grantham, and re-delivery to the Presidency of Surat.

The proceedings of Sir Thomas Grantham, in these services, will be afterwards noticed:—it is here necessary, only, to mention, that the Court were ignorant of the revolt of Bombay, at the time of his leaving England; and that his exertions, at that Island, resulted from consultations with President Child and Dr. St. John, after his arrival at Surat, on the 16th October 1684.

In all the reports on the revolt, the President and Council ascribed it to the instigations of the Interlopers, and to the restless disposition of the soldiery. The first subject of deliberation, after Sir Thomas Grantham's arrival, was, whether they should employ force or persuasion, to induce the commander of the interloping ship, *Bristol*, to deliver up that vessel and cargo to Sir Thomas Grantham:—as the commander refused, Sir Thomas did not think himself authorized, either by his commission, or his instructions from the Company, to employ force:—Disappointed in this expedient, it was next, on consultation, resolved, that he should proceed

to

to Bombay, where he arrived on the 10th November 1684; <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> and, with promptitude and spirit, landed, without any at- <sub>1684-85.</sub> tendants, and demanded a conference with Captain Keigwin, the result of which was, that Keigwin agreed to deliver up the Fort to him, as a King's officer, on the 12th November, on condition of a free pardon to himself, and to his adherents. Some difficulties arose, on the following day, with the garrison, one of the soldiers of which, had he not been prevented by Lieutenant Fletcher, one of the ringleaders in the mutiny, would have shot Sir Thomas Grantham:—for a few days, therefore, the revolters were, again, possessed of the Island. In this interval, Mr. Zinzan, who had been appointed by the President to be Deputy Governor of the Island, arrived, with Mr. English and Dr. St. John, as Commissioners from Surat, and the Island was formally surrendered, on the 19th November 1684, by Captain Keigwin, to Sir Thomas Grantham, as bearing a King's commission, and, by him, immediately transferred, in the King's name, to Dr. St. John, as the King's Judge, by whom it was delivered to Mr. Zinzan, as the Company's Governor, till the arrival of the President.

The money which Keigwin had taken out of the ship Return, was delivered to Sir Thomas Grantham, without having been embezzled; but the revenues of the Island had been expended, the amount of which was to become the subject of a subsequent investigation. The new Deputy Governor, Mr. Zinzan, by advice of Dr. St. John, ratified the general pardon which.

CHAP. II. which had been promised by Sir Thomas Grantham, and  
 1684-85. Captain Keigwin went on board the Charles the Second,  
 under his protection, with the intention of proceeding to  
 England, where he arrived in July 1685.

As a recompence to those officers who had remained faithful to the Company, it was deemed expedient to form the two companies of infantry at Bombay, into three, and to give commissions to officers, on whose fidelity the Deputy Governor could depend.

Able mea-  
 sures of Pre-  
 sident Child  
 to procure an  
 investment.

During these transactions, the President remained at Surat, occupied in providing the investments for the Company's shipping and for Sir Thomas Grantham's ship, and making every possible effort to dispatch them with full cargoes, which he accomplished with much difficulty, the Dutch having harassed the trade at Carwar, and along the Malabar Coast, and the Portuguese, during the whole of the revolt, having conducted themselves in an unfriendly manner. <sup>(1)</sup>

The ships dispatched, for Europe, from Surat direct, and indirectly for Gombroon and other ports, amounted to thirteen sail, including the Charles the Second, Sir Thomas Grantham's ship, on which was sent a very large cargo of pepper, estimated

(1)—Letters and Papers from the Presidency of Surat to the Company, relative to Bombay; and Sir Thomas Grantham's Letters on the same subject, 23d and 30th October, 2d, 12th, and 29th November, 8th and 9th December 1684, 6th and 13th January 1684-85.—Original Letter from Sir Thomas Grantham to His Majesty, notifying his arrival in England, with Captain Keigwin, as Prisoner, 24th July 1685. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, part ii, No. 20.)

estimated at 4,35,700 rupees; that the freight might reward an officer, whose loyalty and fidelity to the Company, the Presidency and Dr. St. John, in their letters to the King, and to the Duke of York, acknowledged in the strongest and most honorable terms.

CHAP. II.  
1684-85

Bombay, at the close of this report, is represented, in point of allegiance, to be rather of a doubtful description, from so many officers remaining on that establishment, who had been concerned in the revolt, and who, from their having received pardon, were again becoming insolent, and creating apprehensions in the Presidency of Surat, of a new mutiny:—under such circumstances, the President could only temporize, till fresh instructions, and additional force, should arrive, to enable him to bring the whole under his obedience, or under a defined and regular subordination. <sup>(1)</sup>

Unsettled  
state of Bom-  
bay at this  
period.

The events affecting the Company's affairs in PERSIA, during the period of the convulsions at Bombay, and the embarrassments at Surat, were of the most unfavorable kind. Previously to the arrival of Sir Thomas Grantham, off Gombroon, the Dutch, with a considerable fleet, had blockaded that port, in consequence of a dispute with the Ettaman Doulut, or chief Minister, about their silk contract, and had stopped

Effort of Sir  
Thomas  
Grantham, to  
obtain satis-  
faction for  
losses in Per-  
sia, ineffec-  
tual.

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 31st January, 16th and 23d February 1684-85.— Letter from the Deputy Governor of Bombay to the Court, 5th February 1684-85.— Letters from Dr. St. John to His Majesty and to the Duke of York, in favour of Sir Thomas Grantiam, dated Bombay, 27th January and 5th February 1684-85. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, Nos. 274, 275.)



**CHAP. II.** stopped the Mogul vessels going to Gombroon, and taken from  
 1684-85. them whatever they deemed to be Persian property:—from  
 this interruption of trade, no part of the Company's customs  
 could, this year, be recovered.

On Sir Thomas Grantham's arrival off Gombroon (and, it will be recollected, he was sent there with a ship of great force, to obtain, either by treaty or by hostilities, the fulfilment, by the Court of Persia, of its engagement with the Company) he found, that the large Dutch fleet off the port, and the Persian troops, would prevent him from trying the expedient of menaces; and, therefore, he took on board such goods as he could obtain on freight, and set sail for Surat, where he arrived, and was serviceable in the reduction of Bombay, as detailed, and was thence dispatched for Europe.

Towards the close of the season, a small quantity of silks and Caramania wool was purchased, and put on board one of the Company's ships, and forwarded to England, with the opinion of the Agency at Gombroon, that the project of sending West-India sugar to the Persian market, from the quantity brought from Bengal, and, in a refined state, from Muscat, would be a hazardous and unproductive speculation.<sup>(1)</sup>

Obstructions  
to the trade  
on the Mala-  
bar Coast.

The trade on the Malabar Coast, during this season, was interrupted, by one of those untoward events, which strongly  
 mark

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Factors at Gombroon to the Court, 28th May 1684, and 30th March 1685.— Letter from Sir Thomas Grantham to the Company, dated Gombroon, 10th September 1684.

mark the necessity of attention to the rights, as well as to the prejudices of the Natives :—two small vessels belonging to the Company (the Mexico Merchant and China Merchant) having gone from Surat to Carwar, to bring off the pepper, &c., collected at that Factory, the crew of one of them stole a cow, and killed it, offending, thus, the rights and religious opinions of the Hindoos; being resisted, they fired at, and killed two native children of rank; the irritated Natives stopped the carriages conveying the Company's pepper to the Factory, and the Factors (notwithstanding their expressions of sorrow, and offers of reparation) were in danger of being seized, and the Company's house destroyed, the orders for which were alone suspended by the presence of the Company's shipping, and by the expectation of a general battle between Sambagee and the Mogul, which would decide, whether the country was to belong to the Mogul, or remain to the Hindoos.<sup>(1)</sup>

The events at FORT ST. GEORGE, during the confusions at Bombay, were fortunately favorable to the Company's trade and privileges. This Presidency continued on the most friendly terms with the Subahdar, which facilitated the sale of the Europe goods, and the purchase of the investments, and enabled President Gyfford to go to BENGAL, to establish the

Trade on the  
Coromandel  
Coast more  
favorable.

(1)—Letter from the Factors at Carwar to Surat, 15th September 1684.

CHAP. II. new method of keeping of the Company's accounts, and  
 1684-85. to restore a regular line of trade, between Hughly, and  
 the subordinate Factories of Daeca, Cossimbuzar, and Bal-  
 lasore; as abuses in both, he reported, had arisen, from the  
 innovations of Agent Hedges.

During Mr. Gyfford's absence from Madras, the Fac-  
 tory at Acheen had been confirmed, and the quantity of the  
 pepper expected to be procured at it, was considerable;—  
 a project was formed, for fixing Factories in the King of  
 Pegu's dominions, and at Bamoo, on the coast of China; ex-  
 exertions were, also, made to obtain a lease of the town of  
 Vizagapatam, and permission to coin rupees in the mint at the  
 Fort. The revenue of Madras had increased, by levying an  
 additional tax of one and a half per cent., but the Council  
 were afraid, (after the example of Agent Masters) to extend  
 the duty beyond this limit.

President  
 Gyfford's re-  
 gulations for  
 extending  
 and improv-  
 ing the trade  
 to Bengal.

In Bengal, the following regulations were introduced  
 by Mr. Gyfford:—by one, distinct entries of purchases and  
 sales were to be made in the Company's books, and gene-  
 ral entries of the whole, in the books at Hughly; one copy  
 to remain, and another to be sent to the Fort, and thence  
 transmitted to England:—by another, instead of having  
 one great broker, or merchant, the Native Merchants were  
 to be formed into a Company, on a Joint Stock, consisting  
 of greater or lesser shares, the members of which were to  
 elect

elect a chief, or principal, among themselves, with power to transact with the Agents at Ballasore, and at the other Factories, and to purchase goods for the Company's investment; he and the members of this Association were to be liable for all failures in contracts, and for all bad debts. It was expected from this arrangement, that goods would always be ready, in store, to meet the ships on their arrival, because the parties furnishing them, would be interested in selecting them of the best quality, and at the most reasonable prices:—this plan, however specious and practicable, according to European ideas, (and, on that account, originating in the Court,) was immediately counteracted, by an incident at Cossimbuzar, where the Phousdar, notwithstanding the weavers, or Picars, were indebted to the Company, a lack and a half of rupees, ordered the Agent, Mr. Charnock, to pay them forty-three thousand rupees more, and to remit their debt to the Company:—this order being refused, the case was laid before the Nabob, and bribes and presents given:—the dispute ended in a complaint to the Emperor, aggravated by every circumstance which could be invented to excite his anger against the English. The Dutch took advantage of this accident, and, by presents to the Phousdar and Nabob, obstructed the English trade for this season, at Cossimbuzar, Dacca, Ballasore, and Hughly; the Company's ships were, therefore, obliged to proceed to Madras, with what goods were in store, to have their lading filled up at that Presidency.

CHAP. II.  
1684-85.

**CHAP. II.**  
**1684-85.** President Gyfford left Mr. Beard, Chief at Hughly, re-  
 turned to the Fort, completed the lading of the ships with  
 Coast goods, and dispatched them for Europe.<sup>(1)</sup>

Failure of the  
 plan for re-  
 settling the  
 Company's  
 Agency at  
 Bantam.

By the resolutions of the Court, in the preceding season, Sir Thomas Grantham was to proceed to BANTAM, with others of the Company's ships, and with Mr. English, one of the former Council at that port; we have, therefore, to trace Sir Thomas Grantham's progress, previously to his appearance at Surat.

On Sir Thomas Grantham's arrival, (nearly at the same time with Mr. English) on the coast of Java, in May 1684, he took possession of Hippin's Island, in the Streights of Sunda, on which he left an officer and twelve men. From the best information he could collect from an officer of the young King of Bantam, who came on board, he learned, that Bantam was garrisoned by five hundred European, and one hundred native troops, and that there were, though badly manned, twelve sail of Dutch ships in Batavia Roads;—that the Governor General was under apprehensions of the arrival of a great English fleet, with troops, to recover possession of Bantam, and to reinstate the old King on the throne, and had such fleet  
 and

(1)—Letter from the President and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 9th October 1684. — Letters from President Gyfford and Council at Hughly, to the Chief and Council at Ballasore, 4th September, 2d, 19th, and 31st December 1684, and 13th January 1684-85.— Letter from the President and Council at Fort St. George to the Agent and Council at Hughly, 5th March 1684-85.

and force arrived, the place was not in a situation to have made any formidable resistance :—this impression, however, had the effect to procure for Sir Thomas Grantham and Mr. English, an ostensibly favorable reception, who found means to purchase, and get on board, a very valuable assortment of cassia, without the knowledge of the Governor of Batavia. Sir Thomas Grantham, after having signified to the young King's officers, the abhorrence in which the King of England held his unnatural proceedings towards his father, and having found, that the late servants at Bantam had left Batavia, with the Company's property, set sail for the Malabar Coast, and arrived at Carwar, on the 24th September, and at Surat, on the 24th October 1684. His proceedings, subsequently to this period, have been detailed in the Surat and Bombay transactions of the season.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1684-85.

It could not be expected, under such unfavourable circumstances, that the Company's plan of supporting the Settlements, which had formerly been dependencies on Bantam, could succeed :—the only account which has been preserved, is, that the trade at SIAM had failed, in consequence of disputes between the Factors, fomented by an inferior servant of the Company, a Mr. Phaulkon, who had run away in their debt, and who, by presents to the King, had obtained possession of the remains of their property, and endeavoured to entrap Mr. Strange,

(1)—Letter from Mr. John English to the Court, dated Surat, 25th November 1684.

**CHAP. II.** Strange, the Agent, by pretensions to act for the Company's  
1684-85. interest. After vexatious delays, for a month, on the part  
of the King, Mr. Strange, at last, sailed from Siam, and  
arrived at Carwar in May 1684.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from Mr. Strange to the Court, dated Carwar, 11th May 1684.

## 1685-86.

THE accession of King James II. to the Throne, confirmed the opinion of the Company, that they would receive the same protection which they had formerly enjoyed, and be enabled, more effectually, to oppose the Interlopers. From the information sent to the President of SURAT, the Court appear to have resolved to prosecute, in the Court of King's Bench, forty-eight of the principal Interlopers; several of whom had, by confessions, and by petitions to the King, admitted their guilt, and saved the Company the trouble and expence of adducing evidence against them. Jealous, and with reason, of the fidelity of many of their servants at Surat and Bombay, the Court directed the Judge Advocate to try the commanders or officers of the interloping ships, agreeably to his instructions; but the Presidency were to avoid all questions, in India, on the legality of the proceedings, and to order, that the sentences pronounced by him, should be carried into execution:—To assist the Judge in discharging these duties a code of martial laws, the same as observed in the British army, was forwarded, to become the rule of his conduct.

To render the civil and military administration more defined, the Company obtained the King's Patent, authorizing them to

CHAP. II.

1685-86.  
Resolution of  
the Company  
to institute  
prosecutions  
in England  
against the  
Interlopers.

Sir John  
Child ap-  
pointed,  
under the

to



CHAP. II.  
1685-86.  
King's au-  
thority, Cap-  
tain General  
and Admiral  
of the Com-  
pany's Settle-  
ments in In-  
dia.

to appoint the President (now Sir John Child, Bart.) to be  
“ Captain General and Admiral of all their forces by sea and  
“ land, in the northern parts of India, from Cape Comorin to  
“ the Gulf of Persia;” he was to be attended by a guard of  
thirty English grenadiers, while at Bombay, and this guard was  
to be commanded by Ensign Shaxton, with the rank of Cap-  
tain:—Sir John Wyborne was appointed to be Vice Admiral,  
within the same limits, and Deputy Governor of Bombay,  
with a salary of £250 per annum.

The charges of sending recruits from England to India  
having been expensive, and, from the mortality among them,  
the supply inefficient, it was ordered, that the troops should be  
recruited in India, from the crews of the shipping, with con-  
sent of the commanders, and that such Scotch, Dutch, and  
Danes, as might be disposed to enter into the service, should  
be engaged.

Discretionary  
powers gi-  
ven to him to  
recover, by  
force, the ar-  
rears of cus-  
toms at Gombroon.

A considerable force having been embarked in the pre-  
ceding season, to assist in the reduction of Bombay, the  
Court desired that it might be first employed to recover  
the arrears of customs at Gombroon, and next, to act, ac-  
cording to circumstances, for the protection of trade, which,  
notwithstanding the Phirmaunds which had, from time to  
time, been granted to the English, had been oppressed by the  
Native Governors; but explained, that these two measures should  
be left to the discretion of the Presidency, because local know-  
ledge, rather than instructions from England, must direct  
their

their servants :—this force was farther to act in repelling the encroachments of the Portuguese and Dutch.

CHAP. II.  
1685-86.

In the course of the season, more defined instructions were framed, arising out of events which will be afterwards detailed :—to protect the Factories in Bengal, and to defend the Presidency of Surat, a large equipment was prepared, which was to bring a reinforcement of two hundred English soldiers for Bombay, under a Lieutenant and Ensign, who was to act as Adjutant.

Seat of Government ordered to be transferred from Surat to Bombay.

The seat of the English Government was, at this time, ordered to be transferred from Surat to BOMBAY :—all the Company's stores were to be kept in the Castle, and the larger ships were to lay in the harbour, but a subordinate Agent and Council were to remain at Surat, which was to be reduced to a Factory only, to preserve the communication of trade, between Surat and Swally.

The Court were aware, that such a change of system might offend the Mogul Government, or excite its jealousy; but the measure was considered to be necessary to support the English character, and to afford its trade an impregnable retreat, which they trusted would satisfy the Mogul, and the Malabar Powers, that their exactions and depredations on shore, could be counterbalanced, by the capture of their vessels, at sea : and it was explained, that, in all treaties which might be formed with Sambagee Rajah, for trade in his dominions, par-

CHAP. II. particularly at Rajahpore and Carwar, Bombay should be  
 1685-86. mentioned as the independent seat of the English government,  
 at which a maritime force would be stationed, to retaliate on  
 his subjects and on his trade, any injuries or extortions the  
 English might experience.

Court's regu-  
 lations for the  
 internal ad-  
 ministration  
 of Bombay.

The orders of the Court to the President and Council of  
 Bombay, for the internal administration of the Island, were  
 equally precise:—as the Company had been vested with au-  
 thority to exercise Admiralty Jurisdiction and martial law,  
 the Court resolved to bring to justice any of their Com-  
 manders, who might be guilty of disobedience, or refuse to  
 act against their enemies, whether European Interlopers, or  
 Dutch or Portuguese rivals; and the President was ordered to  
 enforce strict discipline in the troops, either regular, or mi-  
 litia, that the force on the Island might be adequate to its  
 defence against any enemy.

To defray the charges of this naval and military force,  
 the customs on all goods were to be encreased to five per cent.,  
 and the President and Council were, in future, to observe  
 such orders as they might receive from the Secret Committee,  
 appointed for the purpose of rendering the orders of the Court  
 less known to their domestic or foreign enemies:—in all treaties  
 with the Country Powers, it was to be a preliminary, that  
 they should deliver up all English subjects in their territories,  
 without reserve (whether they were Company's servants or  
 not),

not), to the respective Presidencies or Factories, which might demand them.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1685-86

The commercial instructions, during this season, were formed on a more limited scale than in the preceding years, on account of the great quantity of Surat goods in the Company's warehouses in London; a considerable stock, however, was to be sent, on the shipping consigned to Surat, and on those intended to make an experiment of trade to China:—all old debts (as had been done at the Company's other Settlements) were to be cleared off, leaving only a small floating debt, to keep up the connexion with the Native Merchants.

Commercial instructions for Surat, Bombay, and Persia.

The Court renewed their orders for large quantities of pepper and cardamoms, and desired that the Surat cloths might be of greater breadths and finer qualities, and that the prices specified should not be exceeded.<sup>(2)</sup>

Towards the close of the season, the Court, on receiving information that the Madras Government had fixed an Agent and Council at Priaman, on the Island of Sumatra, resolved to afford this station every support, in preference to that on Hippen's Island, in the Straits of Sunda, at which Sir Thomas Grantham had left an officer and a small detachment. As a

4 B 2.

supply

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council at Surat or Bombay, 28th October and 23d December 1685, and 26th March 1686.— Commission to Sir John Child, Bart., and Sir John Wyborne, 3d February 1684-85.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the General, or President and Council, at Surat, 6th and 13th May 1685.

**CHAP. II.**  
**1685 - 86.** supply of salt had been required for Sumatra, the Bombay Council were ordered to direct the ships from Persia to touch at Ormus, and bring from that Island as large a quantity of salt, as their spare tonnage would hold; and that a country ship should be hired at Bombay, to carry it to Priaman and Tekoo; one half of the cargo to pay the charges of freight, and the other to be delivered to the Company's Factories in Sumatra.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Agents in PERSIA were censured, for not having afforded the Court information of the events and consequences of the war between the Persians and the Dutch, and for neglecting to let out the Company's ships on freight, during this war, which would have yielded considerable profit.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Agents in Bengal censured for their timidity respecting the Nabob.

The opinion of the Court, respecting the depressed situation of their Factories in BENGAL, was prefaced with a censure of their Agents, for having been too submissive and timid towards the Nabob and his officers.

Orders to Fort St. George, for strengthening the fortifications and improving the revenues.

It was, therefore, ordered, that the Presidency at **FORT ST. GEORGE**, should, if possible, obtain a Phirmaid for some of the uninhabited islands in the Ganges, and that Ingellee should be fortified; a plan having been formed, of which due notice would be given, by the Secret Committee, for re-asserting

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 17th June and 12th August 1685.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors in Persia, 12th August and 23d December 1685.

re-asserting the Company's rights of trade in Bengal, and for preventing, in future, the oppressions of their Agents, either by the Nabobs or the Dutch, in the exercise of those rights, which they had acquired by Phirmaunds. The fortifications at Fort St. George, with a view to this plan, were ordered to be strengthened, the Black Town to be surrounded with a wall, and St. Thomé rented, which would enable the Presidency to raise the customs to five per cent. :—it was by this policy, that the Dutch had acquired the whole of their Eastern trade, rendered their power the foundation of their commerce, and drawn profits sufficient to defray the expence of equipments in Europe, and yet to pay large dividends on their stock. On this principle, therefore, the Court ordered Fort St. George to be considered, in future, as the principal seat of the Company's trade on the Coast, and the Factory at Masulipatam to be dissolved, as the stations at Madapollam and Pettipolee would be sufficient for obtaining the goods formerly collected at Masulipatam. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1685-86.

### The

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President of Fort St. George, 28th March, 1st and 9th April, 12th and 26th August, 14th October 1685, and 14th January 1685-86. — Letters to the Agent and Council at Bengal, 17th June, 15th October 1685, and 14th January 1685-86.— (Note). On the marriage of the Princess Anne to Prince George of Denmark, the Court directed the Presidency of Fort St. George to grant permission to four Danish merchants to reside at Madras, and the Danish trade to be free of customs at that port; reciprocal privileges having been granted by the King of Denmark, to the English at Tranquebar. (Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 14th October 1685.)

CHAP. II.  
 1685-86. Court's secret instructions to commence hostilities against the Mogul, and the Nabob of Dacca, with the object of obtaining possession of Chittagong; and an expedition fitted out for that service.

The instructions from the Secret Committee, disclose the resolution of the Company, (approved of by the King,) to retaliate the injuries sustained, and the loss of their privileges in Bengal, by hostilities against the Nabob of Dacca, and the Mogul, his superior. An expedition had been fitted out from England for this service, consisting of ten ships, from seventy to twelve guns, and the command given to Captain Nicholson, with the rank of Vice Admiral, till his arrival in the Ganges, when the Agent in Bengal was to act as Admiral, and Commander-in-chief of the land forces. On board this fleet were embarked six complete companies of infantry, without captains, it being intended, that the Members of Council in Bengal should act in that capacity:—this force was to be joined by a company from Priaman, and a detachment from the garrison of Fort St. George, and by the seamen from the fleet, so as to form an effective regiment of ten companies, or a thousand men:—the fleet was to be assisted by the Company's other ships, making, in the whole, nineteen sail:—King's commissions were given to Captain Nicholson, and to eighteen other commanders for this particular service; but, in the event of meeting any of the King's ships in India, the chief naval command was to devolve on the captain:—the place of debarkation was to be Chittagong, which was to be taken possession of, and fortified in the best manner:—two hundred pieces of cannon were to be mounted on it; and when in the possession of the Company, a mint was

to

to be established, under the direction of the Shroffs from CHAP. II. Rajahmahl, and five per cent. customs levied on the in- 1685-86. habitants.

To co-operate with this enterprize, a treaty of friendship was to be formed with the King of Aracan, with whom, from the local situation of his dominions, with respect to Chittagong, and from the constant warfare between his subjects and those of the Mogul, an useful and efficient alliance might be expected:—in like manner, treaties were to be formed with the lesser Hindoo Chiefs, whose assistance might second the enterprize:—The President of Surat was, also, to negotiate a treaty with Sambagee Rajah, and to furnish him with cannon and military stores:—the knowledge of this plan was to be confined to the Presidents and Secret Committees at Surat and Fort St. George, to prevent the Mogul, or the Dutch, from concerting measures, or preparing a force to oppose its execution:—as soon as the fleet and forces should arrive, the Mogul's ships, of every description, were to be seized, and a Court of Admiralty appointed at Bengal (Captain Nicholson to be Judge Advocate) to condemn the prizes. A letter was written by the Court, to the Nabob of Dacca, and another to the Mogul, explaining the grievances the Company had sustained, by the breach of the Phirmaunds under which they had so long acted, by the seizure of their property, and by the repeated extortions made on their servants.

As soon as Chittagong should be captured, and put in a  
state



**CHAP. II.** state of defence, the troops were to proceed against Dacca ;  
**1685 -86.** and as it was presumed the Nabob and his troops would fly from that city, peace was then to be offered to him, on the following conditions :—that he should cede the city and territory of Chittagong to the Company, and pay the debts due by him ; that he should allow the rupees coined at Chittagong to pass current in his district, and restore all privileges, according to ancient Phirmaunds ; each party to bear their respective losses and expences in the war :—on these conditions, alone, the Company would agree to resettle the Factories in Bengal :—if a treaty to this effect should be concluded, it was to be ratified by the Mogul, on the part of the Nabob, and by the President of Surat, on the part of the Company :—one-sixth of the prizes taken in this expedition was to be distributed among the commanders, and one-third of the money received from the Nabob, divided among the fleet and forces.

Subordinate objects of the expedition, to attack the King of Siam, and to attempt the conquest of Salsette.

Besides this principal object, this armament was to retaliate on the King of Siam, by seizing his vessels, to compensate for the losses which the Company had sustained in his dominions ; and should the Portuguese continue to exact customs at Tannah and Caranjah, the Presidency of Surat were to refuse payment, and to employ the fleet and military forces against them, for the recovery of Salsette, and the other dependencies of Bombay, originally ceded by the treaty between Charles II. and the Crown of Portugal ; and should they

they not have force sufficient for this service, at Bombay, they were authorized to bring one hundred topasses from Fort St. George.<sup>(1)</sup> CHAP. II.  
1685-86.

The commercial orders for FORT ST. GEORGE, during this season, were more limited than in the preceding years, as the Court, from the interruption of the investment from Bengal, and the large quantity of Coast goods in the warehouses in London, did not require the usual supply of Coromandel goods.

Regulations for the new Factory at Priaman, for rendering it the centre of the Pepper trade.

After the Bengal expedition should have completed that service, the ships were to come round to the Fort, and assist in the favorite plan of extending the trade from the Coromandel Coast to the Southern Seas, and in supporting the new Factory at PRIAMAN, for which three hundred soldiers, and forty-nine pieces of ordnance had been embarked:—the coins in circulation at Fort St. George, were to be current at Priaman, at the following rates;—the Pagoda to be valued at ten shillings; the Spanish Dollar, at six shillings; the Dutch Dollar, at five shillings and six-pence; the Rupee, at three shillings; the Fanam, at four-pence; and the Pice at one halfpenny.

As it was hoped, that the quantity of pepper and cardamoms, formerly got from Bantam, might be obtained at  
VOL. II. 4 C Acheen,

(1)—King's Commission to the Captains of the Company's Ships destined for India, 28th December 1685.— Letters and Instructions from the Court, and from the Secret Committee, to the Presidencies of Surat and Fort St. George, and to the Agent in Bengal, 14th and 20th January, 24th February, and 16th March 1685-86, and 31st March 1686.— Court's Letter to the Nabob of Dacca, 20th January 1685-86.— Court's Letter to the Great Mogul, Aurungzebe, 31st March 1686.

CHAP. II.  
1685-86. Acheen, this station was to be encouraged, which, with Priaman, was to remain subordinate to Fort St. George:—trade was also to be attempted between China and Japan, and with Johore, at the extremity of the Peninsula of Malacca, near the Straits of Sincapore. <sup>(1)</sup>

Experience having shewn the perilous situation in which a commercial Factory was placed, when protected only by grants from a Native Prince, liable to interruptions, according to his interests or caprice, or to rebellions against his power, as in the case of Bantam, the Court resolved, that the settlement at Priaman should be rendered respectable, by fortifications, and by a garrison sufficient to resist any Native, or even European enemy:—the fort was to be built on a larger scale than that at Fort St. George, and a dock constructed, to accommodate shipping in the necessary repairs, or for building such country vessels, as the Company's service might require, timber being in plenty in the country:—an arsenal and barracks also were to be erected, for the accommodation of the troops, and sufficiently large for the three hundred soldiers which had been embarked, and on a scale for five hundred men:—as non-commissioned officers had been obtained from the King's guards, to train the men to discipline, the

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 12th and 26th August, and 14th October 1685.— Letter from the Secret Committee to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 14th January 1685-86.

EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

the Chief and Members of Council were to be captains of the companies ; an engineer to superintend the works, and gunners, trained to the service, were appointed, and the whole Settlement, in conformity to the Company's charter, was to be regulated by civil and martial law :—Mr. Ord, the Chief, was appointed Judge Advocate, and it was expected, four of the Company's ships would be, annually, loaded from this port, with pepper and cardamoms, for the Coast, and thence sent to England. <sup>(1)</sup>

To preserve the trade at TONQUIN, and to establish a connexion between the Fort and Priaman, exchanges with the Japan junks, for copper, to be sent to Priaman, was to be encouraged, that an indirect trade might be established, through these vessels, between Sumatra, Japan, and China. <sup>(2)</sup>

It would appear, that a mutiny had taken place in the Island of ST. HELENA, among some of the soldiers and inhabitants, but that the garrison had been able to suppress it :—a few of the ringleaders had been tried, and found guilty, but had been pardoned; this lenity the Court disapproved of, having, from experience, found, that such forbearance led only to a repetition of the offence; and as the Company, by the late royal grant, were vested with the power of exercising

4 C 2

civil

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Chief and Council at Priaman, 21st October 1685, and 20th January 1685-86.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Chief and Council at Tonquin, 15th October 1685.

CHAP. II.  
1685-86. civil and martial law, all such crimes were ordered, in future, to be punished, and the lands of the offenders forfeited to the Company, and let out on lease for their benefit;—the soldiers who could not be detained beyond the term of their covenants, were to be allowed to return to England, and, in the event of recruits not arriving, one or two men were to be drafted from each of the Company's ships, to keep up the garrison to its full establishment. <sup>(1)</sup>

Bombay not recovered from the effects of the revolt.

The transactions at SURAT and BOMBAY, from being intermixed in this season, form only one subject. The Island of Bombay had not recovered from the effects of the rebellion, and measures were rather in progress for its improvement, than carried into practice:—the fortifications required repairs and additions, and the garrison needed a supply of recruits to render it efficient, that the Island might become a centre for trade. Though the wars between the Mogul and Sambagee, and between both and the Portuguese, had the appearance of coming to a close, they still rendered the transit of goods from the inland provinces to Surat difficult, provisions dear, and left it in the power of the Portuguese still to levy customs at Tannah.

Doctor

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Governor and Council at St. Helena, 6th May 1685.

Doctor St. John, from the President having appointed Mr. Vaux to be Judge in civil actions, in Bombay, and limiting him to maritime cases, had taken part with some of the Interlopers, and evidence had been found of his irregular conduct; Dr. St. John, however, in a letter to Sir Leoline Jenkins, Secretary of State, complained of the appointment of Mr. Vaux, as encroaching on his office, and represented him, from his ignorance of the law, to be unqualified for the duties of a civil Judge, and that this appointment had deprived him of that reward which he had been promised, on his undertaking the duty. Under all these embarrassments, the President found it difficult, both at Surat and Bombay, to restore trade, but had dispatched one ship, to endeavour to fix a Factory at Amoy, in China, and another with Factors, to re-settle the trade at Siam.

Accounts reached Bombay and Surat, in October 1685, of the death of King Charles II., when King James II. was proclaimed, with all possible solemnity, at Surat, on the 25th October 1685, and a congratulatory address sent to His Majesty, on his accession, by the President and Council. <sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat, and the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, to the Court, 21st, 28th, and 30th April, 9th May, 27th October 1685, and 27th January 1685-86.— Address of the President and Council of Surat to His Majesty, 27th January 1685-86.— Letter from Dr. St. John to Sir Leoline Jenkins, 10th May 1685. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, part. ii. No. 18.)

CHAP. II.  
1685-86.  
Disputes between Dr. St. John, Judge of Bombay, and Sir John Child.

CHAP. II.  
1685-86. Deficiency of  
intelligence  
from Fort St.  
George and  
Bantam.

The letters to the Court from FORT ST. GEORGE and from BENGAL, during the season 1685-86, have not been preserved among the Company's records ; but, from the reciprocal communications between the Agencies in Bengal, there is evidence, that this important seat of trade continued to be oppressed, as the Factory of Hughly was surrounded by horse and foot :— Although Perwannahs, for inland trade, were given by the Nabob and his officers, it became impossible to use them with any commercial advantage ;—and to add to these evils, an interloping ship had arrived at Ballasore, and orders only could be given from Hughly, to that Factory, to obstruct the captain, in the purchase of his investments. <sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Hughly to the Chief and Factory at Ballasore, 29th June and 3d October 1685.

## 1686-87.

THE orders of the Court, in the season 1686-87, appear to have been the sequel of the resolutions under which they had adopted a new system of politics for India, and fitted out a large armament, with instructions to copy the Dutch at Batavia, who had brought the whole of their foreign interests under the control of their Governor General:—this example the Court required might be followed at SURAT, or rather at BOMBAY, to which the orders were repeated, to remove the seat of trade. The Court explained to the Presidency of Surat, that the large fleet destined for India had been detained by contrary winds, but had at last sailed;—that, feeling for the oppressions which their servants in Bengal had experienced from the Nabob and his Officers, the Company persevered in their determination to levy war on him, and, in the sequel, on the Mogul. As the Dutch were at war with the King of Golcondah, the Company's garrison at Fort St. George had orders to assist him, and, in return, to solicit a Phirmaund for coining rupees, and a grant of St. Thomé, as an English possession;—demands which discover, even at this early period, that the Company were assuming a political and military character, that they

CHAP. II.  
 1686-87.  
 Court perse-  
 vere in their  
 resolution to  
 levy war on  
 the Mogul  
 and Nabob of  
 Dacca, and  
 vest Sir John  
 Child with  
 the powers of  
 Director Ge-  
 neral of all  
 their Settle-  
 ments in In-  
 dia.



CHAP. II. they might acquire such territories, as would furnish supplies  
 1686-87. to their fortified seats of trade, and give them respectability, and influence, in the political contests of the Native Powers :—hence the reference to the example of the Dutch, who owed their prosperity to the plan which the Company were, at this period, induced to adopt.

With this object, the Court, with the approbation of the King, constituted Sir John Child their President, or General at Surat, to be, what in modern times has been termed, the Governor General of the countries within their limits, and also the Director of their trade, and ordered, that implicit obedience should be paid to him :—he was to proceed, for three months, to Fort St. George, and, if necessary, to go to Bengal, to bring the whole under a regulated administration, the fullest responsibility being attached to him and to his Council ;—he was vested, farther, with discretionary powers to continue the war, or to make peace with the Mogul, according to circumstances ;—he was, next, to seize the goods and vessels of the Kings of Siam, Bantam, and Jambee, as a reparation for injuries, and to bring them, for condemnation, into any of the Courts of Admiralty in India. Mr. Zinzan was to act as President at Surat, during the absence of Sir John Child.

King's Proclamation for withdrawing British subjects from the service of the Native Powers.

To enable the Governor General to carry the orders of the Court into full effect, the Company made application to the King, who issued a Royal Proclamation, in July 1686, requiring all

all the Company's servants, whether civil, military, or seamen, who had been employed in their shipping, and, in general, all English subjects, who had entered into the service of the Country Powers, particularly the Mogul, the King of Siam, the Queen of Acheen, and Sambagee Rajah, to return to the Company's settlements at Bombay or Madras, within six months after the publication of this Proclamation in India;—the King's subjects who had been in a civil capacity, were to be allowed to remain, as free merchants, and the seamen or soldiers were to be received into the Company's service, at the usual rate of pay:—such persons as did not accept this offer, were to be sent to England, within one year, and to be proceeded against by law, for contempt of the King's Proclamation.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP II.  
1686-87.

In addition to the force in India, the Court made application to the King to have an entire company of regular infantry, with their officers, transferred to their service; and got, in consequence, a company from the Marquis of Worcester's regiment, commanded by Captain Clifton, the Adjutant, to whom, and to the other officers, the Court granted commissions, with power to Sir John Child to select from the privates, such men as were recommended, for good behaviour and skill, to be afterwards promoted to be commissioned officers:—Captain Clifton was to have a salary of £30 per annum, with

Reinforce-  
ments of  
troops sent to  
India.

VOL. II.

4 D

captain's

(1)—Original Order of Council, with annexed Copy of Proclamation, for recalling all English subjects in the Service of the Native Powers in India, 11th July 1686. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, part ii, No. 21.)

CHAP. II.  
1686-87.

captain's pay, and a seat, as Junior Member of Council, and all captains of infantry were, in future, to have seats in Council ; a measure which originated in the experience of the undisciplined state of the Company's forces, and in the repeated applications of the Presidency to have a supply of recruits, to render the garrison of Bombay efficient.

Commercial  
orders to  
Surat.

The commercial orders to Surat, were nearly the same with those in the preceding season, with the following additions :—to promote the sale of English cloths, and to increase the imports of silk from Persia ; the cloths to be exchanged, by barter, for silk :—as the China trade was becoming more promising, teas and spices were, in future, to form a part of the Company's imports, and not to be articles of private trade :—and a Factory was to be fixed at Attinga, on the Malabar Coast, at which it was expected a considerable quantity of pepper might be purchased.<sup>(1)</sup>

—to Persia.

The instructions of the Court, to the Agent and Council in PERSIA, in this season, were ;—that regular information should be sent to England, every six weeks, by an overland dispatch to Aleppo, the Interlopers having derived advantages from earlier information than the Company had hitherto received ;—

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council at Surat or Bombay, 24th April, 10th May, 14th and 28th July, 25th August, 3d September, 15th and 22d October (Secret), 6th December 1686, 3d February, and 23d March 1686-87.—Sir John Child's Commission to be General, President, and Director of all Presidencies, Forts, &c. in India, 22d October 1686.

ceived;—that application should be made to the King of Persia, to encourage the carrying trade in his dominions, on English bottoms, with an offer to contract for the whole of the silk and Caramania wool, which the Dutch formerly purchased; in return, English cloths, of the fineness and colours he might require, would be sent:—In these important matters, the Agents, however, were to act under the instructions, which they might, from time to time, receive from the President, or the General and Council, at Bombay.<sup>(1)</sup>

The deficiency of information from FORT ST. GEORGE and BENGAL, in the preceding season, is, in some measure, explained, by the orders of the Court to dismiss Mr. Gyfford, who had formerly so much of their confidence, and the appointment of Mr. Yale to be President; and, by this Presidency, instead of complying with the Court's directions to establish a Fort and Settlement at PRIAMAN, having diverted the force and stock, intended for it, to the formation of a Settlement at BENCOOLEN:—without, therefore, relinquishing the project of a Fort and Factory at Priaman, it was ordered, (notwithstanding the formation of a Factory at Bencoolen and Indrapore), that it should be the principal Settlement in Sumatra, for which a Judge Advocate was appointed, and a Court of Admiralty constituted.

From these circumstances it is obvious, that, during the

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whole

CHAP. II.  
1686-87.

Mr. Gyfford dismissed, and Mr. Yale appointed President of Fort St. George and Bengal, with orders to improve the stations of Priaman and Bencoolen.

A Factory to be settled at Mergee, in Siam.

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council in Persia, 3d September and 30th December 1686.

CHAP. II. whole of this season, the Company were unacquainted with  
1686-87. the result of the expedition under Captain Nicholson, and that, proceeding upon the instructions they had given to him, and to the President at Surat, they could only repeat such orders to Fort St. George, as were compatible with their former measures; or, that hostilities should be continued against the King of Siam and his subjects, till he should cede a station at MERGEE, at which a Fort and Settlement could be established, as a seat of trade, in the event of the failure of the project of getting possession of Chittagong;—that the Bengal manufacturers should be encouraged to resort to Madras, as, in time, they might be able to supply the investment;—that the Factory at Pettipolee should be dissolved, and the farm at Vizagapatam improved;—that all English subjects should be recalled from the service of foreign powers; and that every encouragement should be given to the soldiers (two hundred of whom had been embarked on the ships of the season) to marry the native women, to whom a present of one pagoda was to be given for every child they might have, to promote colonization. These expedients mark the resolution of the Court to obtain fortified stations, with efficient garrisons, in the countries in which a fixed trade could be established; experience having shewn, that, without such fortifications, no reliance could be placed on treaties with, or grants from, the Native Powers.

As

It having been a subject of fruitless negotiation, for many years to obtain permission from the Native Powers to coin the country money, the Court, in this season, adopted the bolder measure of obtaining authority from the King, to institute a mint for this express purpose;—His Majesty, in consequence of the application of the Company, granted to them a new Charter, or Letters Patent, dated the 12th April 1686, by which all the former Charters of the Company were renewed and confirmed, and they were further empowered to erect Courts of Judicature, and to exercise martial law, during the war in India, in any place within their limits, and, in a particular manner, “to coin any species of “money in their forts, usually coined by the Princes of the “country, provided it should be equal in weight and fineness “to such Prince’s standard,” which money was to be current in all places within their limits. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1686-87.  
Orders, under the King’s Charter, to establish a mint at Madras.

Under this authority, the Court directed the President and Council of Fort St. George to take particular care, that the coins, in stamps, inscriptions, and fineness, should resemble those issued by the Mogul at Rajahmahl, particularly the rupees, it being of inferior moment to offend that sovereign, in this respect, from the war which had been resolved on against his dominions:—application, at the same time, was to be made to the King of Golcondah, for a Phirmaund, giving his

(1)—Letters Patent granted to the East-India Company, 12th April 1686, 2nd James II. (Printed Collection of Charters, page 125.)

**CHAP. II.** his authority to the Company to coin rupees, and other  
 1686-87. money, in the mint at Madras, and that this money might  
 be current in his dominions; and in all future treaties with the  
 Country Powers, an article was to be introduced, stipulating  
 that the Company's coin should be allowed to be current in  
 their territories. As a general rule for the internal adminis-  
 tration of the Settlements in India, the Agents were, in  
 future, to consider the King's Charters and the Company's  
 orders to be the only constitution or laws, under which they  
 were to act. <sup>(1)</sup>

Difficulty of  
 acting in In-  
 dia, on the  
 Court's plans.

The large equipment which had been sent from England,  
 last season, under the approbation of the King, who had  
 given commissions to the officers commanding it, prepares us  
 to look for the events, in the Company's foreign Settlements,  
 with anxiety and interest. In this, as in many other cases,  
 it will be found more easy to form specious plans, than, under  
 all the circumstances in which foreign settlements are placed,  
 to

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 14th April, 9th  
 June, 3d September, 22d October 1686, (Secret); 7th January, 22d March 1686-87,  
 and 3d April 1687.— Commission for settling the Presidency of Fort St. George, 22d  
 October 1686.— Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council in Bengal, 9th June  
 1686, 7th January 1686-87, and 8th April 1687.— Letters from the Court to the  
 Agent and Council at Priaman, 29th March and 9th June 1686.

to execute them; for though it might be practicable, in Bengal, with so large a force, to acquire Chittagong, or some other stations, which might be fortified, and become an asylum to the Company's servants, or a deposit of their goods, and though Bombay was a retreat, to which their servants at Surat might retire, and their property, if brought from Surat and Swally, placed in security, it was soon discovered, that it was a delicate and more difficult matter, to keep on terms with the Mogul in the Western provinces, after hostilities were commenced in the central provinces, or on the Ganges.

CHAP. II.  
1686-87.

The events at SURAT, before the intentions of the Court, and of the King, reached that Presidency, discover, that this seat of the Company's government in India had been disturbed, by the intrigues of the Dutch and French, laying hold of every incident which could embarrass the trade, or excite the jealousy of the Mogul Governors against them.

Two Danish vessels, one of forty-four, and another of twenty guns, sailing under English colours, had committed the most unjustifiable piracies in the Red Sea:—the Dutch and French ascribed this outrage to the Company, and excited a suspicion against the English Presidency at Surat:—Governor Child, with much address, by offering to send English ships against them, averted the violence which otherwise must have ensued:—Improving on this event, the Dutch endeavoured to engross the whole of the pepper trade, and to act at Masulipatam, as they had done at Bantam.

Presidency of Surat distressed by piracies committed in the Red Sea, by Danish vessels, under English colours.

Affairs



## CHAP. II.

1686-87.  
 Imprudence  
 of Sir John  
 Wyborne, at  
 Bombay, in  
 opening the  
 Court's secret  
 orders to Sir  
 John Child.

Affairs were in this situation, when Sir John Wyborne arrived, and was put in possession of the Island of Bombay, as Deputy Governor. The ship Worcester next arrived, and brought the letters of the Secret Committee, to Governor Child, disclosing the whole of the Court's intentions respecting the armament which had proceeded from England, and the objects of the King, and of the Court, in sending it:—these dispatches were addressed to Sir John Child, and, in his absence, to Sir John Wyborne, who opened them, and communicated the contents to the Council at Bombay; a rashness, from which the President apprehended much danger, because so imprudent a disclosure of the intentions of the Court might not only put the Mogul, and his officers, on their guard, but render ineffectual the objects of the expedition, and expose, in a particular manner, the Company's servants and property, at Surat, to hazard and to danger.

Able mea-  
 sures of Sir  
 John Child  
 at this crisis.

The precaution and public principles on which Sir John Child acted, under such critical circumstances, discover a high sense of duty, and a provident concern for the interests of the Company. He expressed his intention, on the one hand, to avoid hostilities with the Mogul, till he should receive intelligence of the events attending the armament in Bengal, and, on the other, regretted, that the Court's orders had arrived so late, because the Mogul ships from Mocha and Bussorah had returned to Surat; but resolved, should circumstances oblige him to commence hostilities, to take the responsibility on himself,

EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

self, and, apparently, to incur the Court's displeasure, that, in the event of adverse fortune attending the expedition, an opening might be given to the Company to negotiate with the Mogul, for the restoration of their privileges and trade, upon the same basis as they were, anterior to his, apparently, unwise proceedings:—he farther explained, that when the force should arrive, it might be employed against the Portuguese, to attempt the conquest of Salsette, and to resist the projects of the Dutch of engrossing the whole of the West Coast trade in pepper; and that he would endeavour to cultivate the friendship of Sambagee Rajah, and supply him with the ammunition, as ordered, because he considered his friendship both in a political and commercial view, under existing circumstances, to be of the highest importance;—that, however even in actual service, he would rather employ the topasses which they could easily engage at Surat, from having a good opinion of their fidelity, than bring a reinforcement, of this description of troops, from Fort St. George. <sup>(1)</sup>

The commercial transactions of the Presidency of Surat, during this season, from these circumstances, were few and uninteresting, and went only to keep up commercial relations, and to provide for the investments.

From the intrigues of the Dutch at Amoy, the commerce between China and Surat, and with Europe, had been interrupted;

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat, 3d July and 3d October 1686, and 10th February 1686-87 (Secret).

CHAP. II.  
1686-87.  
under the  
management  
of Fort St.  
George.

rupted; Sir John Child, therefore, recommended, that this branch of the trade should be placed under Fort St. George, more particularly, as a resolution had been taken to resist the encroachments of the Portuguese, on the Company's privileges and trade, as soon as the Bengal armament should enable them to act with effect; and that, under so many political and commercial embarrassments, the Presidency would do whatever was possible, to complete the investments.<sup>(1)</sup>

Dutch endeavour to excite jealousy between the Company and the Persian Government,

The information from PERSIA affords a detail of the intrigues of the Dutch, to create a misunderstanding between that Court and the English; but, by the efforts of the Company's Armenian linguist at Ispahan, protection to trade, and a confirmation of the privileges, at Gombroon, had been obtained.<sup>(2)</sup>

Premature commencement of hostilities at Hughly.

If the intelligence of the intentions of the Court, respecting the Bengal expedition, had been improvidently disclosed at Bombay, and exposed the President and Council of Surat to local and commercial difficulties, unforeseen incidents, and the partial arrival of the fleet in the river Ganges, obstructed the measures of the armament, in the country in which its beneficial effects had been anticipated, in Europe. After the Agent at Hughly was informed of the Court's intentions,

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th February 1686-87.

(2)—Letter from the Company's Linguist at Ispahan to the President at Surat, 11th December 1686.

tentions, and after a part, but not the whole of the fleet, arrived, an affray at Hughly brought on hostilities, in a premature and unexpected manner:—on the 28th October 1686, three English soldiers had quarrelled, in the Bazar, with some of the Nabob's Peons, and were wounded:—a company of soldiers were called out for their defence; afterwards a second company, and then the whole of the English troops:—an action took place, in which the Nabob's troops were defeated with loss, sixty of them killed, and a considerable number wounded, a battery of eleven guns spiked and destroyed, the town of Hughly cannonaded by the fleet under Captain Nicholson, and five hundred houses burnt. The Phousdar affected alarm at this defeat, and solicited a cessation of arms, which was granted, on condition of his giving his assistance to convey the Company's goods on board the ships, particularly the saltpetre, of which a very large quantity was in store.

CHAP. II.  
1686-87.

During this suspension, the Nabob seized the English Factory at Patna, and made their servants prisoners; but the property, at this station, was inconsiderable, not exceeding two thousand rupees.

Before the action took place, orders had come from the Nabob, Shastah Khan, to compromise the differences with the English, and to submit their claims to arbitration:—to this proposition, the Agent and Council were disposed to accede, had not the orders of the Court been so positive, for taking possession

Demands of  
the Compa-  
ny on the  
Nabob of  
Bengal.

CHAP. II. possession of Chittagong, and to obtain compensation for their  
1686-87. losses, estimated according to the following account :

	Rupees.
“ For what Bulchund forced from Mr. Vincent at Cas- “ sumbuzar . . . . .	14, 000
“ For what Sief Cawn plundered out of our Factory at “ Pattana, by 1000 foot and 500 horse, and putting “ Mr. Meverill in irons . . . . .	80,000
“ For detaining y <sup>e</sup> Agent with y <sup>e</sup> silk at Cassumbuzar ..	400,000
“ For protecting Haggerston from justice . . . . .	45,000
“ For what forced out of Dacca Factory, account Picars	44,000
“ For what forced from our merchants at Hughly . . . . .	12,000
“ For demolishing and plundering Malda Factory . . . . .	150,000
“ For custome paid at the mintt at Hughly, contrary to “ our Phirmaund . . . . .	150,000
“ To demorage of shipping the three last years .. . . .	2,000,000
“ For what extorted from us in presents, &c. . . . .	200,000
“ For debts remaineing and owing us in the country . . . .	800,000
“ For besieging of Hughly Factory, y <sup>e</sup> death of the “ Agent and four men . . . . .	300,000
“ For burning y <sup>e</sup> old Factory and the goods in it, in y <sup>e</sup> “ latter skirmish . . . . .	300,000
“ For charge of 1000 men and 20 ships for y <sup>e</sup> war . . . .	2,000,000
“ For y <sup>e</sup> charges of our Factorys and buildings, if we “ leave the country . . . . .	130,000
	“ 6,625,000”

The

The Phousdar and his officers, though they offered to restore privileges of trade to the English, and to give their Perwannahs to that effect, till a Phirmaund could be procured from the Mogul, acted only to gain time; the Agent and Council, therefore, considering that Hughly was an open town, retired, on the 20th December 1686, to CHUTANUTTEE, or CALCUTTA, from its being a safer situation, during any negotiation with the Nabob, or Mogul.

CHAP. II.

1686-87.

English retire to Chutanuttee, or Calcutta.

In this situation of the English affairs in Bengal, the Dutch and French took advantage of the dispute, particularly the former, who having eleven ships in the river, obtained valuable investments, and resettled their Factories, which they were disposed to abandon.

That part of the shipping which had arrived in Bengal, required considerable repairs, and much apprehension was entertained for the safe arrival of the remainder, having on board the greater part of the troops:—it was now the opinion, that the force would not be sufficient for the principal object of the expedition, or the reduction of Chittagong.

Affairs at FORT ST. GEORGE, during these events, excited much anxiety in the President and Council:—on receiving the Court's instructions, they had detached the principal part of the garrison to assist the armament intended for Bengal, and with it, a large proportion of arms and military stores:—and they advised the General, or President, to retire, with the Company's property and servants to Bombay, because the Factory

Part of the garrison of Fort St. George dispatched to Bengal.

CHAP. II. tory at Surat might be seized by the forces of the Mogul, for  
 1686-87. reparation of injuries sustained in Bengal; and though they  
 expressed their conviction, that, had all the force arrived from  
 England, it might have been sufficient for the object, yet as  
 the enemy were prepared, even should it arrive, it would be  
 unequal; and what rendered these circumstances more alarm-  
 ing, was, that, at this crisis, the Mogul's army had conquered  
 Visiapore, and would soon, in all probability, conquer Gol-  
 condah, which might lead to an attack on Madras.

President  
 Gyfford re-  
 presents to  
 the Mogul  
 the object of  
 the English  
 armament in  
 Bengal.

To avert these evils, President Gyfford addressed the  
 Mogul, explaining, that what had happened at Bengal was for  
 the recovery of their ancient privileges, only, and praying for  
 his protection, and the confirmation of the privileges which  
 had been granted at Madras:—at the same time, he earnestly  
 requested a reinforcement from Bombay, of men, money,  
 and ammunition, as they had only fifteen English soldiers in  
 garrison, and could place no reliance on the Portuguese soldiers,  
 or topasses.

In a similar manner as in Bengal, the Dutch took advan-  
 tage of the perilous situation in which Fort St. George was  
 placed:—seized on the town of Masulipatam from the King  
 of Golcondah, (against which the President protested,) but  
 agreed to redeliver it, on condition of his paying a debt of  
 1,20,000 pagodas; a demand to which his distresses, from  
 the conquests of the Mogul, obliged him to accede.

On

**EAST-INDIA COMPANY.**

On the Company's connexions in the Southern parts INDIA, the Presidency of Fort St. George reported,—that they had made a settlement at BENCOOLEN, in the Island Sumatra, and obtained a Phirmaund for the sole government of it;—that the war with the King of Siam had, agreeable to the Court's orders, been declared, and one of his galleons, with seventy Europeans and an English captain on board, had been seized, and the ship condemned at Hughly, and that they had made another experiment to settle a Factory at AMOY, in China.

It does not appear, that any regular account of the investment was transmitted from Fort St. George, during the season.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Fort St. George, and from the Agent and Council at Hughly, to the Court, and from Hughly and Patna to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 28th June, 19th August, 16th, 22d, and 24th November, 20th and 21st December 1686, 17th February and 8th March 1686-87.— President Gyfford's Letter to Aurnungzebe, 17th February 1686-87.



1687-88.

CHAP. II. **THE** opposite opinions which had subsisted, for a series  
 1687-88. of years, whether the East-India Company ought to be  
 Court deter- considered, as merchants only, or as merchants, who had  
 mine to con- legally acquired, by purchase and by grants from the Native  
 stitute Bom- Powers, property, consisting of fortified stations, in which  
 bay a Regen- their European exports or Indian imports had been placed  
 cy, in imita- in safety, and in readiness for their ships on their arri-  
 tion of the val, appear, in this season, to have terminated in a de-  
 Dutch at Ba- cided judgment :—this event, as may be collected from the  
 tavia. instructions of the Court to the Presidency of Surat, had  
 arisen out of an examination of the progress of the Portuguese  
 and of the Dutch, during a rivalry of above eighty years.  
 It was now decided, that though the London East-India Com-  
 pany had, by presents and by bribes, purchased Phirmaunds  
 and grants, favourable to trade, and though they had  
 been often duped, on the basis of these Phirmaunds, or  
 grants, into hazardous speculations, by encreasing their ship-  
 ping and their stock, yet experience had proved, that such  
 grants were temporary only, and not perpetual, like char-  
 tered rights in England, or exclusive privileges founded on  
 them.

It

It had frequently happened, before the equipments and stock reached India, and before either sales or purchases could be effected, that these Phirmaunds and grants were evaded, counteracted, or withdrawn by the Native Governors, who, holding a temporary power only, sought to realize, by extortion, sums to enable them to give bribes to the Emperor, or his ministers, for their continuance in office, or, in the event of being displaced, to be in a situation to renew their applications for another command. It was this character of the Governments in the East, which had enabled the Dutch, from their better knowledge of the Native Princes, to take advantage of the decline of the Portuguese power, and to get possession of fortified settlements, as the only means by which they could render trade safe and productive.

CHAP. II.  
1687-88.

In imitation of this practice, the Court had ordered, that Bombay should be declared a Regency, like those of the Dutch at Batavia and Columbo, and become the seat of the Company's government, or, that they might assume the rank of an Indian power, and, as such, negotiate and act for the interests of England.

To give dignity to their Governor General, in the opinion of the Natives, he was to be constantly attended by a life-guard, of fifty grenadiers, commanded by a captain.

Sir John Child, who was then General, or Governor, was, on this principle, to have unlimited power over all

Sir John  
Child ap-  
pointed Go-

CHAP. II. their Settlements, and Sir John Wyborne and Mr. Zinzan  
 1687-88. were dismissed the service, for disputing his authority :—the  
 vernal Ge- armament in India was to make every effort to get possession  
 neral, with of the Island of Salsette, conceiving that, with this island  
 control over all the Settle- and Bombay, they would have a seat of government, which  
 ments and would not only give the Company safety to their trade, but  
 Factories. influence with the Indian Powers ; but Bombay, which the  
 Court held to be the key of India, was to be fortified (to  
 use their expression) “ as strong as art and money could  
 “ make it.” If Salsette should be acquired, the garrison  
 was to be increased to ten companies of infantry, exclusive  
 of militia :—one hundred and twenty soldiers were em-  
 barked on the ships of the season, and all the subjects  
 of England, who might be in the service of the Country  
 Powers, were to be invited to enter into that of the Com-  
 pany.

The opposition of the Dutch to these measures was fore-  
 seen, and had been provided against, by the force sent from  
 England ; for though it was admitted, that they held one  
 hundred and seventy fortified stations in India, yet one hundred  
 and forty of them had not strength to resist the attack of a  
 man of war, for twelve hours :—their continuing to engross the  
 pepper trade was, however, considered of consequence, not  
 in a commercial view only, but as a resource which might  
 have the worst political tendency, because the gain from pep-  
 per would enable them to equip a fleet, which would not only  
 be

be formidable in India, but might contest the sovereignty of the seas in Europe :—that this consequence might be averted, CHAP. II  
1687-88. the Court directed the Presidency to use every effort to obtain a fortified settlement in the Queen of Attinga's country, on the Malabar Coast, and always to have a thousand tons of pepper in store, at Bombay.

In appreciating the extent of the instructions of the Court to the Governor General, Sir John Child, it is to be recollected, that, almost, in every season, it had been a recommendation to obtain Phirmaunds from the Native Princes, empowering the Company's Agents to coin money, and it appeared in the Annals of the preceding season, that, worn out with the expences of purchasing this permission, the Court had obtained authority from the King, to coin Indian money, such money to resemble the impressions on the coins of the Native Powers ; —the Presidency of Surat, therefore, were directed to use such stamps, dies, and tools, as were common in the country, and to issue a coinage, which might facilitate equally the administration of the Company's affairs in Bombay, and their commercial transactions at the ports, where corresponding coins were current :—the Court, at the same time, ordered, that all English ships, trading in India, the property of individuals, should take out the Company's passes from Bombay, and pay a duty of one rupee per ton, with the exception of vessels laden with timber, or provisions, for this Island.

Court's orders to coin money at Bombay, and for all country ships to take passes from the Governor General.

On intimating these orders, the Court desired the opinion

CHAP. II. of the President, or General, whether it would be expedient  
 1687-88. that a Charter of Incorporation should be obtained from the King, for the town of Bombay, similar to that lately procured for the town of Madras, or Fort St. George, to be explained under its proper head.

Commercial orders for Surat and Bombay.

The commercial instructions were, in this season, nearly a repetition of those which have been so frequently mentioned, with the following variation, only:—apprehending, from the continuance of the war in Bengal, that silk could not be expected from that quarter, purchases of that commodity were to be attempted at Ahmedabad; and as the Surat Banians (notwithstanding the war) were allowed to trade to Bengal, it was recommended, that, through them, a proportion of this valuable part of the investment might be procured. As teas, also, had been made an article of the Company's trade, the Court desired, “ that very good Thea might be putt up in tutineague potts, and “ well and closely packed in chests or boxes, as it will always “ turn to accompt here, now it is made the Compa<sup>s</sup>. commo- “ dity; whereas, before, there were so many sellers of that “ comōdity, that it would hardly yield half its cost, and “ some trash Thea, from Bantam, was forc't to be thrown “ away, or sold for 4<sup>d</sup>. or 6<sup>d</sup>. per pound.”<sup>(1)</sup>

Court resolve, that

The same plan, of assuming the rank of an independent power

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President of Surat, and Governor and Council of Bombay, 13th May, 6th and 8th June, 3d and 8th August (Secret), 28th September 1687, and 7th January 1687-88.

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

power in India, which the Court had adopted at Bombay, was ordered for FORT ST. GEORGE. In the series of instructions of this season, they stated, that an improper fear of the Mogul had led to proceedings in the President and Council, inconsistent with the resolution of assuming this rank;—that the war against the Mogul should continue, till Chittagong, or some strong station in Bengal, should be acquired—that though the twelve hundred pagodas of quit-rent, for the territory round Madras, hitherto paid to the King of Gondah, might be continued, the future payment must depend on his keeping St. Thomé in such situation, as not to become an annoyance to the Fort; and if he would not let it on lease, or farm, to the Company, (considering his power as much decreased, by the recent victories of the Mogul, and his having been driven from Masulipatam by the Dutch,) the President, as representing an independent power, was not only to refuse payment of the quit-rent, but to declare the place the property of the Company; the Court assigning, in one of the letters, the remarkable reason, that it was impracticable to carry on trade, or maintain a seat of government, without revenue; and that this revenue must be levied on the inhabitants of the towns, or districts, under the Company's protection.

The Court disapproved of the conduct of the President of Fort St. George, for not having followed up the order, with respect to Priaman, and having, in preference, made a Settlement

mer

CHAP. II. ment at BENCOOLEN; but, towards the close of this season,  
 1687 - 88. they altered this opinion, and recommended that YORK FORT,  
 which had been built near Bencoolen, should be strengthened,  
 both by fortifications, and by a garrison, that it might become  
 the principal port from which pepper might be expected. As  
 this fort could not withstand an attack of the Dutch, three days,  
 the strengthening the fortifications had become indispensable;  
 and should the Dutch capture it, they were to employ all their  
 means to regain this station, to make reprisals on their shipping,  
 and to attack all their small forts in India. In the event of  
 the report of the King of Siam's death being true, the war  
 was to continue, till possession should be obtained of TENAS-  
 SERY, which, also, was to be fortified, that, from this port, and  
 Bencoolen, a share might be regained in the pepper and  
 Southern trades.

The relations between Fort St. George, as a seat of government, and the Indian Powers in the Islands, or more distant stations, to which the Court wished its influence and trade to be extended, were intimately connected with the internal administration to be established at the Fort, as a Regency; for it was laid down as a fixed principle, that by force (imitating the practice of the Dutch) they could, alone, render the trade and power of the English permanent.

The Union  
 flag to be  
 used at the  
 Fort.

Considering Madras as a Regency, under the protection of the King, whose authority had been delegated to the Company, the Court ordered the King's Union flag to be al-

ways

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

ways used at the Fort;—the fortifications to be extended and strengthened, and the charges defrayed by a revenue levied on the inhabitants, and a duty of five per cent., on the lands, to be farmed, from year to year; a tax intended to be made general over all the English Settlements in India;—two hundred soldiers, drafted from the King's troops in Ireland were to proceed on the ships of the season; and provisions (rice, &c.) were always to be in store, that the inhabitants might have sufficient for a six months' siege.

That the internal administration of Madras might correspond with its new character of a Regency, application was made to the King, to erect it, by Charter, into a Corporation and the question had been agitated in the Privy Council whether such Charter should proceed from the King, under the Great Seal of England, or from the Company under its Broad Seal; from being vested with a right to exercise a delegated sovereignty in India. The arguments on this case are detailed with such accuracy, in the Council letter to President Yale, of the 12th December 1687, that the subject will be most correctly described, in their words.

“ The Governour and Deputy were commanded,  
“ night, being Sunday, to attend His Majesty, at the Council  
“ next Council, when our intended Charter, for incorporating  
“ Fort St. George into a body politique, consisting  
“ mayor, alderman, and burgesses, was largely debated be

“



CHAP. II. “ His Majestie :—One of the Council (being a lawyer),  
 1687-88. “ seemed to be of opinion, that it was best the Charter should  
 “ pass immediately by the King, under the Great Seal of  
 “ England :—His Maj<sup>tie</sup> asked the Governour his opinion, who  
 “ replied, that what His Maj<sup>tie</sup> thought best, the Comp<sup>a</sup> would  
 “ alwais think so ; but if His Maj<sup>tie</sup> expected the Governour’s  
 “ private opinion, he had ever been of opinion, that no person,  
 “ in India, should be employed by immediate commission from  
 “ His Maj<sup>tie</sup>, because, if they were, they would be prejudi-  
 “ ciall to our service, by their arrogancy, and prejudiciall to  
 “ themselves, because the wind of extraordinary honour in  
 “ their heads, would probably make them so haughty and  
 “ overbearing, that we should be forced to remove them ; and  
 “ we instanced, particularly, Sir John Wyborne and Dr. St.  
 “ John :—in conclusion, His Maj<sup>tie</sup> did so apprehend it, as  
 “ to think it best, that the Charter should go under our own  
 “ seale, because the corporation must be always, in some  
 “ measure, subject to the control of our President and Coun-  
 “ cil ; and so, at length, it was agreed, and the Charter is  
 “ now engrossing.” <sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letter from the Court to Mr. Yale, President of Fort St. George, 12th December 1687.— (*Note.*) The population of the city of Madras, town of Fort St. George, and the villages within the Company’s bounds, was, at this period, reported to amount to three hundred thousand ; and the Court, by this letter, required an exact enumeration of them to be made, for His Majesty’s information, distinguishing the English, Portuguese, Moors, and Gentoos, both male and female, and their several professions, or occupations.

The Corporation of Madras, under this Charter, were to consist of a Mayor and ten Aldermen (three to be Company's servants, and seven Natives) who were to be Justices of the Peace, and to wear thin silk scarlet gowns, and of one hundred and twenty Burgesses, to wear black silk gowns;— a Town Clerk and a Recorder were to be appointed, and all the subordinate officers were to be elected by the Mayor and Aldermen, subject to the approbation of the President:— a sword and mace were to be carried before the Mayor, and a silver oar before the Judge Advocate:—a record was to be kept of their proceedings, and regularly transmitted to the Court.

CHAP. II.  
1687-88.  
Constitution  
of the Corporation  
of Madras.

Instructions, relative to the Mint at Madras, were given, similar to those for Bombay; or, that this Presidency should make use of the country stamps and dies, under the King's authority, and coin small copper money, proportions of which were to be circulated at Bencoolen.

The commercial instructions of the season, though few, are important, from being founded, partly on the political circumstances of India, and partly on the improved practice of trade in England. From the existing war, between the King of Golcondah and the Dutch, the Court expected, that Coast goods could be purchased at more reasonable rates, in this, than in former years; and as the war, in Bengal, had obstructed the purchase of silks in that country, it was recommended, that the weavers, in the employment of the Presidency, might

Commercial  
instructions  
for Fort St.  
George.

CHAP. II. be induced, by encouragements, to manufacture goods in  
 1687-88. imitation of those sent from Bengal :—blue long-cloths were  
 to be purchased, of the best quality, as the demand for  
 them was considerable in England :—In imitation of the  
 home practice of insurance against sea risks, an Insurance  
 Office was to be established at Madras, under the sanction  
 of the Company, to underwrite policies, on the Company's  
 account, for Europe, to the amount of £5,000, on each of  
 their three decked ships, at the premium of five per cent. on  
 ordinary risks :—these insurances were to be certified by the  
 President and Council.<sup>(1)</sup>

Court disap-  
 prove of the  
 truce made by  
 Mr. Char-  
 nock with  
 the Nabob of  
 Bengal, and  
 send a rein-  
 forcement  
 under Captain  
 Heath.

Though the substance of the Court's instructions to  
 BENGAL can only be collected from the orders conveyed to  
 the Presidencies of Bombay and Fort St. George, they dis-  
 cover the resolution to persevere in the war against the  
 Mogul, in Bengal, till a fortified station, with a district  
 round it, could be obtained. On receiving the first advices  
 of the events which occurred, on the arrival of a part  
 of the armament, the effect, which naturally might have  
 been expected, was produced :—after reviewing the losses  
 which had been experienced, and the probable disappoint-  
 ment of obtaining a seat of trade, the Court attributed the  
 blame to the timid conduct of the Members of the Agency in  
 Bengal ;

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council at Fort St. George, 6th  
 June, 3d August, 28th September, 12th October and 12th December 1687-88, 25th  
 January and 6th February 1687-88.

Bengal; to their selfish conduct in applying the stock to their own projects of acquiring wealth, instead of giving obedience to orders; and to their having no sense of the honor, or the interests, of the King and Company, who had confided in them:—reprobating, thus, construction given by the Agency in Bengal of the Court's orders for negotiating peace, they declared the whole to be an excuse, and not any good reason for their proceedings; and should, by their sinister schemes, the objects of the war not be accomplished, they intimated a determination to send an additional force, to ensure the acquisition of them, and desired, that the Members of the Agency might hold themselves in readiness to embark, with the Company's property, for Fort St. George. For this purpose, a large ship, the Defence, fully armed, commanded by Captain Heath, and a small frigate, were dispatched with a reinforcement of one hundred and sixty soldiers to assist in the war, should it have been continued, or to bring off their servants and property, should they have made any temporary truce, or treaty, with the Mogul; the Court farther determined, that, unless a fortification, and district round it, should be ceded, to be held as an independent sovereignty, the charges of the armament be defrayed, and permission to coin money in Bengal, to pass current in the Mogul's and Nabob's dominions, be granted, they would not consent to a peace, or send any more stock, or goods, to the Ganges.

IAP. II.  
87-88. Though the Court approved of Agent Charnock's general conduct, they condemned the irresolution with which he had acted, in this instance, and considered, that, however expedient the armistice granted to the Phousdar, after the affair of Hughly, might be, it was unwise to have prevented the soldiers from plundering the inhabitants, which would have convinced the Natives of their power;—that the delay which this armistice had occasioned, had given an opportunity to the enemy to collect his force, and to be in circumstances to resist that of the Company, which, otherwise, would have been adequate to the attainment and defence of Chittagong;—that, besides, the vessels of the King of Aracan, in co-operation with the Company's armed ships, would have distressed the Mogul's ships and salt-boats, and compelled him to cede a settlement, which might become as independent, as those of Fort St. George or Bombay;—a sudden attack, therefore, was to be made on Dacca, the conquest of which would be an additional motive with the Mogul, to acknowledge the rights of the Company to Chittagong, and to allow the trade to Dacca and Malda to be part of their privileges, and render Malda such a seat of power, as, in a few years, would draw to it the staples, manufactures, and merchandize of the neighbouring provinces;—on the whole, that the Indian Powers, however insolent and oppressive they might be to the Company's servants and trade, when apparently without the means of resisting that insolence and oppression, yet if effectually opposed,

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

opposed, they would become obsequious, when they saw force ready to retaliate injuries, or redress wrongs.

The Court, aware, under the circumstances in which their servants and trade were placed, in Bengal, that an investment was impracticable, had retained the stock, but hoped that the ships would not return empty:—to obtain however, some supply of Bengal goods for the European market, permission was to be given to private merchants during the war with the Mogul, and six months after a peace to import into England, Bengal produce, on the Company's ships, on paying single freight, and eighteen per cent. additional, for permission, demorage, and sale charges, which goods were to be insured at the Company's new office at Fort St. George; an indulgence which was extended to the French and Dutch merchants in Bengal.

In the event of Chittagong, or any other fortified station being acquired, the Agency were ordered to use every expedient to encourage the silk and cotton manufacture, and always to have six months' provisions laid up in store, in case of a siege.<sup>(1)</sup>

The first instructions of the Court, to the Agent and Council at BENCOLEN, appear in the records of this season; and it is necessary only to recur to the orders of the preceding year, for fixing a Factory at Priaman, after all hopes of recovering

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bengal, 28th September and 12th December 1687.

CHAP. II.  
1687-88. vering the trade at Bantam had failed, and to the measures of the Presidency of Fort St. George, who had established a Factory at this station, to appreciate the resolutions of the Court on this subject. The Agent, who had erected the fortifications, for the defence of Bencoolen, was ordered, by every practicable means, to strengthen them, and an officer, who had a knowledge of engineering, was appointed, to assist;—storehouses were to be built, for a large quantity of pepper to be ready for the Company's ships, that the imports of this valuable article might counter-balance those of the Dutch.

As the Company had adopted the plan of finding revenues at their Settlements, to defray the charges, they granted permission to individuals to load pepper at Bencoolen and Indrapore, on condition of paying one halfpenny of customs, per pound of pepper, for what was loaded for China or India, and one penny per pound, for what was sent to England, on the Company's ships:—particular care was to be taken, to place the stations of Bencoolen and Indrapore in a state of defence against any sudden attack from the Dutch, and always to have six months' provisions, of rice, &c., in store, in case of a siege. <sup>(1)</sup>

As the Factory and trade at TONQUIN had been continued (Bantam being lost) pepper was to be sent from Bencoolen, to enable

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bencoolen, 9th September, and 30th December 1687, 6th February 1687-88, and 4th April 1688.

EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

enable this Factory to revive trade; the returns to consist chiefly of lacquered-ware and pelong silk. <sup>(1)</sup>

The sedition of a few planters at ST. HELENA, having happily been suppressed, and some of the ringleaders tried and executed, a similar plan, with that which had been adopted in India, was required for this Island:—to give respect to the Governor and Council, the King's flag was to be hoisted, that the Island, though under the management of the Company, might appear a Royal Settlement;—freeholds were, in future, not to be granted, but the property to remain in the Company only;—the estates of the late delinquents were to be forfeited, but their personal property given to their families, and such of the planters as would engage to go to Berbice, with their families, were to be allowed twenty acres of land at that new Settlement;—a certain number of negroes and some live stock, cows, hogs, &c., were to be embarked annually, from St. Helena, for that station, on the ships of the season. <sup>(2)</sup>

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The critical circumstances under which, at the conclusion of the preceding year, Sir John Child and the Council of SURAT were

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Tonquin, 9th November 1687.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Governor and Council of St. Helena, 3d and 31st August, 6th and 9th September 1687.



CHAP. II. were placed, prepares us to resume the detail of events at  
 1687-88. BOMBAY, and to describe the prudent and provident expedients  
 which were adopted for maintaining the English character, as  
 an armed but commercial people, who were endeavouring to  
 repair former errors in Bengal, and to re-establish the English  
 privileges and trade on the West Coast of India.

property at  
 Surat, when  
 intelligence  
 should arrive  
 of the war in  
 Bengal.

Sir John Child, and the Council, continued at SURAT, while not only the Company's warehouses, but the lives of their servants, were exposed to hazard, by the orders which the Mogul might issue, irritated (as he was presumed to be,) by the rash and indecisive conduct of the Company's servants in Bengal: the President, therefore, had a most difficult public duty to discharge; on the one hand, to carry the Court's orders into execution, of commencing hostilities against the Mogul, and capturing the Siam vessels; and, on the other, to keep, if possible, on such terms with the Governor of Surat, as might postpone extremities against the English; and when intelligence of the operations in Bengal should reach Surat, to find a plausible pretext for offensive measures.

It will be recollected, that Sir John Child had determined to act on the principle of ascribing the war to the injuries which the Company had received from the Interlopers, favoured by the Mogul, and to the insidious representations of the Dutch, who had endeavoured to persuade the Native Governors, that the English were acting without controul, and committing depredations, for which they could not be made responsible.

Affairs

Affairs were in this situation, when Sir John Child and his Council quitted Surat, on the 25th of April, and arrived at BOMBAY, on the 2d May 1687, leaving Mr. Harris at Surat, in quality of Agent, with a Council. On his arrival, he found that though he could act with more decision, his measures were embarrassed by many of the Company's servants being at Surat, and therefore he dispatched the Charles the Second and the Modena, two of the Company's largest ships, commanded by Captain Andrews, and Captain Wildey, on freight to Mocha and Bussorah, with secret orders to seize all Mogul or Siam vessels at those ports, and also two ships to China, to trade, under like instructions.

It was intended, before any intelligence could reach Surat, of the captures which these vessels might make, to endeavour, by address, in the first instance, and next by force, to bring off the remaining Factors, and the Company's property:—for this purpose, the Cæsar, Captain Wright, was sent to Surat, with orders to lay off the river's mouth, and to endeavour, by every possible scheme, to release the Agent and Factors; but, should that be impracticable, and the design of the General, in sending the expedition up the Gulf of Persia, be discovered, then to seize on all ships belonging to the Mogul, or King of Siam, notwithstanding they might be under French, Dutch, or Danish colours, and to detain the principal persons on board, as hostages, for the safety of the Agent and Factors at Surat.

CHAP. II.

1687-88.

Sir John Child proceeds to Bombay, and dispatches a fleet to the Persian and Arabian Gulfs.

CHAP. II.  
 1687-88.  
 Mr. Harris  
 and the Com-  
 pany's pro-  
 perty detain-  
 ed at Surat.

The incident, however, of the Dragon having seized a Surat vessel going to Siam, gave an alarm, that the English intended hostilities, and rendered the escape of the Agent and Factors from Surat impracticable, for they were carefully watched, and detained by the Governor, though no violence had hitherto been offered to their property or persons. On this intelligence reaching Sir John Child, he detained, by way of reprisal, all the Surat ships which were then in the port of Bombay:—this decisive conduct convinced the Governor of Surat, that conciliatory measures must be resorted to, or open war be inevitable; but, as yet, he had not learned, that any captures had been made by the English ships sent to the two Gulfs.

Negotiations  
 between Sir  
 John Child  
 and the Go-  
 vernor of Su-  
 rat.

The Governor of Surat, on this occasion, released Mr. Bonnel, one of the Factors, and sent him with a complimentary letter to Sir John Child, in substance, expressive of his wishes to come to an accommodation, and to know what terms would satisfy the General, or induce him to return, and re-assume the trade at that port. Cozée Ibrahim and Dungee Vorah, two eminent Surat merchants, were subsequently sent to Bombay, to treat with the General:—in reply, Sir John Child transmitted to the Governor of Surat, by these merchants, a statement of grievances sustained by the English from the Governors of Surat, comprized in thirty-five articles, prefaced with the observation, that reparation was only asked for the injury done to the character  
 of

of the English, who had been represented as having committed depre-  
 dations on the Mogul subjects, inconsistent with the probity of their dealings; satisfaction was, therefore, re-  
 quired, for the losses sustained, by their goods being stopped at the custom-house; their investments obstructed; their payment of interest, to the amount of a lack of rupees; the demorage of twelve ships detained in the Indies; the refusing to deliver up the Interlopers and their ships; the stoppage of goods, and exaction of duties on them; the raising the customs, from two per cent., (as fixed by the King's Phirmaund,) to three and a half per cent.; the prohibiting the import and export of provisions; the refusing the Company permission to collect their debts, to coin money, and to clear their custom-house accounts; the imposing, annually, arbitrary taxes on goods, in their transit to Surat, and searching their boats coming from Swally; and the seizing horses and goods, for the King's use, without paying for them; concluding with a requisition, that liberty should be given to the English, to have free passage to and from Surat, without being examined or detained.

Leaving these propositions to have their effect on the Governor of Surat, Sir John Child, without expecting immediate compliance, dispatched Agents, to negotiate a treaty with Sambagee Rajah, which was effected on the following terms:—that the Rajah should pay the English fifty thousand

CHAP. II.  
 1687-88.

Treaty with Sambagee Rajah, to counteract the oppressions of the Mogul.

CHAP. II.  
1687-88. rupees, and two thousand candy of "*batty*," on condition that they protected the "*Corrys*" by sea.

Sir John Child applies for support to the French and Dutch Factories, and sends instructions to Fort St. George to co-operate in the war.

Sir John Child next wrote to the "Directore," or Chief of the French East-India Company at Surat, explaining the sources of the war with the Mogul, and requiring his good offices, conformably to the fourth article of the Marine Treaty between France and England; and, through him, to Mynheer Van Vogel, the Chief of the Dutch Factory, requiring, that he, also, should conform to the Marine Treaty between England and the States General.

This energy, and these precautions, were connected with the instructions sent by Sir John Child to the President and Council of Fort St. George, of whose want of activity and courage he had complained, in the preceding season, but whose situation, this year, became more perilous, from the conquest which Aurungzebe had made of the kingdoms of Visiapore and Golcondah, his menacing the subjugation of the Carnatic, and the extirpation of Sambagee Rajah, from his dominions in that quarter. Under these circumstances, Sir John Child desired that the garrison should be put in the best state of defence; that the Portuguese and topasses, in the service, should do duty, during the day, to preserve the English soldiers, as much as possible, from the effects of the sun, and that the commanding officer should be sparing of ammunition, and in readiness to repel, by force, any attack which might be made

on

on the Fort, and above all, to maintain the character of the English nation, by defending Fort St. George to the last extremity. CHAP. II.  
1687-88.

These precautions being adopted, Sir John Child next tried conciliatory overtures with the Governor of Surat, by directing Mr. Harris, who still was detained there, to use every means to prevent the Siddee's fleet (which was reported to consist of two hundred gallivats) from putting to sea, because their sailing must be considered as hostile to Bombay; adding, the kindness with which the Mogul's subjects had always been treated by the English, and the unwillingness of the Presidency to proceed to actual hostilities.

Negotiations continued with the Governor of Surat.

Affairs were in this critical situation, when Captain Andrews, in the Charles the Second, returned from Persia to Bombay, with an Interloping ship, and six Mogul vessels, under Dutch colours, detained during his voyage:—this event rendered it impossible to conceal actual hostilities, and, therefore, Captain Andrews was dispatched to Surat, to act in conjunction with the Cæsar, to seize on all Mogul vessels he might meet with, on his passage, or attempting to enter the port, and to watch the Siddee's fleet, which it was not the intention of the General to destroy, if he kept in port, as this would irritate the Mogul, who had recently been victorious in Visiapore and Golcondah; but if this fleet attempted to put to sea, it must be presumed to be under the orders of the Mogul, and with  
hostile

CHAP. II. hostile intentions to Bombay, and, therefore, the Charles the  
 1687-88. Second and the Cæsar were to attack them, in crossing the Bar  
 of Surat. In the event of Captain Andrews conceiving the  
 force of the Siddee to be too great, he was to retire to Bom-  
 bay, where he would be joined by fire ships, which were equip-  
 ping to oppose the lesser fleet of grabs, fitting at Cambaya,  
 for the invasion of the Island.

Mucktar  
 Khan, the  
 new Gover-  
 nor, opens  
 an insidious  
 communica-  
 tion with Mr.  
 Harris.

At this crisis, Mucktar Khan, a nobleman of the highest  
 rank, and related to the Mogul, was appointed Governor of  
 Surat, and as, on former occasions, he had manifested the  
 most friendly disposition towards the English, he now ex-  
 pressed the same disposition, by opening a conference with  
 Mr. Harris, for the accommodation of differences :—at this  
 conference, after expressing his wishes to restore the English  
 to their privileges and trade at Surat, he desired to know the  
 conditions upon which Sir John Child would return, and  
 re-settle the trade :—reference was made to the thirty-five  
 articles, which had been transmitted to the late Governor,  
 and a copy of them delivered to him :—the result of the con-  
 ference was, that, in the opinion of the Agent, the dis-  
 positions of the new Governor were highly favorable, and it  
 would be expedient, that, accompanied by the fleet, and with  
 every demonstration of power, Sir John Child should appear  
 off Surat, and conduct the negotiation with the new Gover-  
 nor, which, as far as they were able to judge from his  
 behaviour,

behaviour, appeared to them to be practicable; matters were left in this situation, at the close of the season 1687-88.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1687-88.

In this state of the war at Bombay, and while the Mogul vessels were seized on their return from the Gulfs, the trade at GOMBRON, or in PERSIA, could be carried on, in a limited degree only:—provision was made of various kind of gums, and English cloths (had they been of proper colours and qualities) might have been disposed of, to the amount of a thousand half pieces annually; but as the Armenians had brought cloth from Turkey, in exchange for silk, it was inferred, that silk could be procured more advantageously, by barter for cloth, than by money.<sup>(2)</sup>

Trade in Persia very limited.

There is an inexplicable deficiency of information in the Company's records, both from FORT ST. GEORGE and from BENGAL, the theatre of the war, in this season; hence we can only collect from the letters from Surat, the state of affairs at the Fort, or in Bengal, at this crisis; or the Mogul's conquest of Visiapore and Golcondah, and his menacing the Carnatic;

Deficiency of information, this season, from Fort St. George.

(1)—Letters from the General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 17th and 18th May, 26th September, and 7th October 1687.— Letter from the General and Council at Bombay to the President and Council at Fort St. George, 30th November 1687.— Letter from the Agent and Factors at Surat to the General at Bombay, 24th December 1687.— Commission from the General and Council at Bombay to Captain Wright, 22d August 1687.— Letter from Sir John Child to the French Directors at Surat, 8th October 1687.

(2)—Letter from the Factors at Ispahan to the General and Council at Bombay, 10th October 1687.



CHAP. II. Carnatic; events which were mentioned in the Surat dis-  
 1687-88. patches, as having created alarm in the Madras Presidency, and  
 produced their application for a reinforcement of men, money,  
 and military stores, from Bombay.

Truce con-  
 cluded by  
 Mr. Char-  
 nock with  
 the Nabob of  
 Bengal, and  
 recommence-  
 ment of hos-  
 tilities, on  
 the violation  
 of it by the  
 Nabob's Ge-  
 neral.

The state of affairs in Bengal was not less unfavourable :  
 —The English had retired from Hughly to Chutanuttee, and  
 during the armistice to which they had acceded, after repelling  
 the Phousdar's forces at Hughly, a kind of a truce had been  
 effected, in December 1686, and, in some measure, a treaty  
 agreed on, between Mr. Charnock, and three of the Nabob's  
 ministers, on conditions sufficiently plausible; or that a grant  
 of land would be given to build a fort, liberty to erect a mint,  
 payment of debts, and freedom of trade; but when Mr.  
 Charnock required that this treaty should be ratified by the  
 Nabob and by the Mogul, the demand was evaded, till the  
 Nabob could collect a sufficient force to attack the Factories.

In February 1686-87, the Nabob's General appeared  
 suddenly before Hughly, with a large army of horse:—the  
 English forces, on this infraction of the armistice, imme-  
 diately stormed and took the fort of Tanna, and plundered  
 and destroyed every thing between that place, and the Island  
 of Ingellee, of which they took possession without resistance,  
 and in which they fortified themselves:—they, subsequently,  
 burnt Ballasore, and destroyed above forty sail of the Mogul's  
 ships; and, notwithstanding the sickly state of the troops  
 on the Island of Ingellee, repulsed the repeated attacks  
 of

of the Nabob's General, with very little loss. It was at this crisis, that the Agent at Patna informed the General and Council at Bombay, that the Nabob had confiscated the Company's goods at the Factory of Cossimbuzar, to the amount of twenty-three thousand rupees, and had compelled their debtors to pay to him the money they owed to the Factory; by the secret connivance of the Governor of Patna, however, the Agent was preparing privately to leave that city, and proceed to Surat. CHAP. II.  
1687-88.

Affairs remained in this situation, till the month of September 1687, when a Perwannah was issued by the Nabob, granting permission to the English to return to Hughly, and enjoy their ancient privileges; but it can be collected from the instructions of the Court, and the foreign dispatches of the subsequent season, that this indulgence did not form the basis of a treaty, for the renewal of the Company's commerce in the Bay of Bengal, but arose only from the arrival of the large armament from England.<sup>(1)</sup>

While Fort St. George and BENGAL were in these precarious circumstances, the commerce of the Company, whether considered with regard to the sales of its exports from Europe, or the purchase of investments for the home market, was

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necessarily

(1)—Letter from the General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 26th September 1687.— Letter from the Agent at Patna to the General and Council at Bombay, 25th June 1687.— Copy of Perwannah from the Nabob Shastah Khan, dated Dacca, 4th September 1687.

CHAP. II. necessarily irregular, if not suspended. No accounts appear to  
1687-88. have been transmitted from the new Settlement at BENCOOLEN,  
or from any of the Factories in the SOUTHERN SEAS, or the  
Agencies attempting trade with CHINA.

## 1688-89.

THE measures of the Court, in the memorable season 1688-89, as far as regarded their foreign Settlements, furnish only a continuation of the expedients which they had adopted in the preceding year, but varied, from the effect which the disappointment in the Bengal expedition had produced. Without receding from their fixed purpose of obtaining fortified seats of trade, their Governor or General, Sir John Child, and his Council, were ordered, in future, to reside at BOMBAY only:—the ships for Europe were to clear out from this port, and not, as formerly, from Surat or Swally:—the commercial intercourse between Surat and Bombay was to be kept open, by the residence of a Company's Agent and Factors, and by small vessels, carrying to that city such of their exports as would sell at this market, and to bring off the articles which were collected for the investment, or were purchased by the Company's brokers. It was expected, by this plan, that when peace should again give confidence, or enable them to negotiate sales or purchases, or to draw articles from the inland provinces, which the Company had been in the practice

CHAP. II.  
 1688-89.  
 Court determine to make Bombay the chief seat of trade and power, and reduce Surat to an Agency.

CHAP. II. of purchasing, they might make up full assortments for the  
1688 - 89. investment.

Sir John Child was directed, should a peace in Bengal have been concluded with the Mogul, on terms below what had been expected, from the expedition, to endeavour, by all means, to get possession of the Island of Salsette, and to fortify it in such a manner, as to render it a barrier to Bombay: —if, however, this acquisition should be unattainable, Bombay was to be fortified in the strongest manner, and become the capital of the Company's Indian possessions, and the seat of their government and trade. The General was, on no occasion, (even the probably important one of negotiating a peace with the Mogul) to leave the seat of Government, it being considered, that his going, in person, to negotiate a peace, would be inconsistent with the dignity of the Regency, and not less with sound policy; because, if he and his Council should again reside in any, but the seat of government, they could neither deliberate with wisdom, nor conclude with efficacy; more particularly, as he was now to exercise a controlling power over the other Presidencies and Agencies. If the urgency of the case should require his presence at Fort St. George or Bengal, he was to issue such orders and instructions, as would connect the whole political and commercial interests of the Company into a fixed system, understood by the Court at home, and, with time and practice, intelligible to the Indian Powers.

The

The Court, in the early part of the season 1688-89, being ignorant of the events which had taken place in Bengal, repeated the order, that if the possession of Chittagong and Mergee had been acquired, those stations were to be retained, as seats of the Company's power and trade; and if a peace had not been concluded, the conditions prescribed were,—the possession of a station to be fortified, and the currency of the money which the Company coined at their several mints in India; but should Chittagong be acquired, and the Mogul have acquiesced in the Company keeping possession of it, the General was to lower the demands for reparation of injuries, if not to recede from them altogether.

As the season advanced, and information arrived, that a treaty had been made with the Mogul in Bengal (events which will be subsequently detailed), the Court ordered Sir John Child not to re-deliver any of the prizes which had been taken from the Mogul's subjects, on the West of India, although Mr. Charnock had imprudently made such a concession in Bengal:—when, however, they received intelligence, that Sir John Child had negotiated a Provisional Convention with Muchtar Khan, the new Governor of Surat, (to be explained in the foreign Annals) on the basis of the thirty-five articles presented to him by Mr. Harris, and that this Convention was to become the basis of a treaty with the Mogul, they not only approved of it, but voted a present of a thousand guineas to Sir John Child, as a mark of approbation, for the

CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

Approve of  
the Provi-  
sional Con-  
vention with  
the Governor  
of Surat.

CHAP. II. the wisdom of his proceedings, during the war, and for his  
1688-89. general services.

By this Convention, the Company were allowed to coin money at Surat, in the Mogul's mint-house; but the Court rather preferred acting on the authority given by their Charter, of having a mint at Bombay, because this would strongly impress the Natives with the importance of the place; and they trusted, that, in time, they should be enabled to supply the Bengal market with rupees, coined at Bombay, or if that should not be practicable, that they might exchange their Bombay rupees for those coined at Surat, which would pass current in Bengal, or in any part of the Mogul's dominions. On this occasion, they submitted to the consideration of the General, whether the coinage at Bombay ought not to include gold mohurs, as the Company had the Mogul's Phirmaund, and the King's authority, by their Charter, to exercise this branch of delegated sovereignty.

These instructions to Sir John Child were intended to direct his conduct, in the general administration of the whole of the Company's affairs in the Indies, on the principle of Bombay being the seat, equally of their power, and of their trade; it will, therefore, be proper to trace, in the order of the Company's several Settlements, the views which the Court took of the actual circumstances, under which their authority was placed.

The views of the Court, at this time, were necessarily  
connected,



**EAST-INDIA COMPANY.**

connected, not only with the appearances of alliance, or war with the Maritime Powers of Europe, but with the probable changes which might take place in the government of England, and the effect which those changes might have, on the administration of Indian affairs. This uncertainty of the situation of the Company, at home, made them consider the Convention between Sir John Child and the Governor of Surat as of more consequence than it appeared to be, when the Court first received information of its having been concluded because, from the relative circumstances of France and Holland, in Europe, there was a strong probability of a war between those two Nations; and though the first effect of such a war would be ruinous to the French affairs in the East-Indies, the next, probably, would be a war between the Dutch and the Mogul, from which the Dutch might obtain more favourable terms, for their trade and Settlement in his dominions, than the English had acquired from the Convention, or might derive from any treaty, of which it had been the projected basis.

With the object, therefore, of rendering Bombay a more efficient Regency and seat of trade, and to enable it to protect the Agency left to keep up the commercial relations between Surat and Bombay, it was ordered, that a dry dock should be built, and a duty of one dollar, per ton, levied on every ship that might be repaired, or careened, at it;—that a wharf and piers should be erected, for loading and unloading



CHAP. II.  
1688-89. unloading vessels, and rates established, to be paid on landing or shipping goods;—that, to make the revenues balance the charges, a progressive duty should be imposed, of from one shilling, to two shillings and sixpence, on every house in Bombay;—that the English inhabitants, not in the Company's service, should be liable to a duty of consulage;—that a Post-Office should be established, and reasonable rates for letters imposed, either in the Island, or sent and received in the Company's commercial stations, and that an Insurance Office should be constituted, on the same principle as that at Fort St. George;—that the fortifications should be increased, and the garrison strengthened, by recalling all Europeans who might be in the service of the Native Powers, and offering to such men encouragement to engage in the Company's military service, because, from having constitutions habituated to the climate, they would be of more use, than recruits brought from Europe, “one seasoned man being worth two fresh ones.”

Factories on  
the Malabar  
Coast to be  
fortified.

Under these arrangements for the seat of the Regency, Sir John Child was directed to be particularly attentive to the out-factories on the Malabar Coast; the station at Retorah, in the Queen of Attinga's country, was to be fortified, and the same privileges, if possible, obtained for it; as the Company enjoyed at Madras. In the same manner, the Factory at Tellicherry was to be strengthened, that the Com-  
pany



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pany might be certain of receiving an investment in pepper, and cardamoms.

The commercial views of the Company, in 1700, were necessarily connected with the plan of rendering Bombay the seat of their government and trade, on the West Coast—all the goods purchased at the subordinate settlements were to be sent, with the least possible delay, to Bombay, particularly the pepper and cardamoms, and the warehouses, to be ready for the ships, that it might be enabled, in Europe, to counteract the monopoly system of the Dutch.

As Bengal goods had lately been in great demand at the Company's sales, and as the imports of them, from the East, were uncertain, the General and Council of Bombay held out every encouragement to the Armenian merchants, that they should receive not only protection, but a free market: any charges which might be incurred in consequence of such encouragement, would be fully compensated by the trade this people would introduce: the reasons were, that the Armenian merchants carried on trade on their own funds and credit, and that they traversed the provinces in India, and collected, (though in small quantities, and in a manner which had not excited the jealousy of the Natives) the most valuable commodities; if, therefore, they could be induced to make Bombay their principal place of trade, the commercial effect would be incalculable; and

CHAP. II. induce them to accept of this offer, they were to be allowed to  
 1688-89. send their goods, on the Company's shipping, to Europe, for sale.

Encourage-  
 ment to be  
 given to the  
 Armenians, in  
 Persia.

As the Armenians were also the principal merchants in PERSIA, similar encouragements were to be held out to them, to bring silks and Caramania wool to Bombay, to be sent to Europe, as part of the Company's investment, by which means they would receive greater profits, than by sending Persian produce, through Turkey, to Aleppo.

If this commercial system could be established, the Court concluded, that, with the large stock which would be annually sent, a valuable investment might be in store, ready to be shipped for Europe, and arrive to pre-occupy the market, before the Dutch imports could depress the prices.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Govern-  
 ment of Ma-  
 dras blamed,  
 for not co-  
 operating in  
 the war in  
 Bengal.

As Sir John Child had been vested with unlimited control over all the Company's Settlements and trade in the Indies, he was, after establishing the new system at Bombay and Surat, to proceed to FORT ST. GEORGE, and to frame regulations for the Settlements and trade on the Coromandel Coast, and, at his discretion, to confirm, or to remove from their stations, their servants of all ranks. The Court, on intimating this appointment of their General, to the President and Council at Madras, condemned their conduct,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the General and Council of Bombay, 11th April 1st May, 26th July, 27th August, 27th September, 8th October, 5th December 1688, 11th January, 15th February, and 19th March 1688-89.

conduct, for not having, at the time the armament commenced its operations in Bengal, declared war against the Mogul and the King of Siam; a measure which would have seconded its operations, and probably enabled it to fulfil the orders of the Court, for acquiring a fortified station;—and, farther, for having acceded to the terms which the Mogul had granted, particularly when they must have known of the spirited efforts which had been made by Sir John Child, at Bombay, and at Surat; and when they must have observed, that, after the conquest of Golcondah by the Mogul, Madras had become of more importance, than it had been on any former occasion. To prevent this Presidency falling into a similar error, in the war with the King of Siam, they were prohibited from concluding a treaty with this Chief, unless he consented to pay an equivalent, as a reparation of injuries, and to cede Tenassery to the Company, to become a fortified station, in which case, it was to be rendered as strong as Fort St. George.

To render Fort St. George an efficient seat of power and trade on the Coromandel Coast, the President and Council were, if possible, to obtain from the Nabob the station of St. Thomé, to be held as a farm, in perpetuity:—a Factory was to be established at Vizagapatam, under a Chief and Council;—the licences given to private merchants, during the war, were to be withdrawn;—the trade in diamonds revived, and the investment to be as full as might be practicable, in long cloths,

CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

Directions to  
farm St.  
Thomé from  
the Nabob.

**CHAP. II.**  
**1688-89.** pepper, and cardamoms; but only one ship was to proceed from England to the Fort, the charges for seamen's wages having risen very high, in consequence of a general impression that war with France was inevitable; and instead of sending stock on this ship, this Presidency would be supplied with funds by Sir John Child, from Bombay. <sup>(1)</sup>

Sir John  
 Child to proceed to Bengal, as Supervisor of the Company's Affairs.

Sir John Child, after settling affairs at Madras, was directed to proceed to BENGAL, and, in the same manner, to exercise his discretion, in continuing, or removing from their stations, the Company's servants of all ranks, and to endeavour to re-settle the Factories at Cossimbuzar and Malda, and the new station at Chutanuttee. If he should find, that the French had got possession of Mergee, he was not to attempt to dislodge them, but to solicit a station in the Aracan country, to be fortified; and, if the Company had acquired possession of Mergee, it was to be fortified, and made a depôt for their Bengal goods.

The conduct of Mr. Charnock, the chief Agent, and his Council, in Bengal, was blamed by the Court, as having been dilatory in the extreme, which had been the true cause of his having been obliged to accept of terms from the Nabob, and from the Mogul, which neither coincided with the intentions of the Court, when they sent out the armament, nor placed

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Fort St. George, 11th April, 27th August 1688, and 15th February 1688-89.— Letter from the Court to the Great Mogul, 7th September 1688.

EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

placed the trade in a better situation than it had been, by coercive measures were adopted; for, instead of getting possession of Chittagong, and being able to treat as an Independent Power, the Company would be obliged to offer new b for a station which they might have conquered:—the C however, confirmed Mr. Charnock as Agent at Bengal (withstanding his errors) and directed him to solicit a maund, for re-establishing the Factories at Cossimb Dacca, and Malda, and for the town of Uleaburrah, held of the Nabob, on the same terms as Fort St. Georg

The commercial orders recommended similar encouragement to be given to the Armenians, as authorized in the instructions to Sir John Child, at Bombay, but, more especially, to offer them thirty per cent. profit on the prime cost such fine Bengal goods, as they might furnish for the importment, and to send as many taffaties as they could procure but neither raw-silk, nor cotton-yarn, unless they could be purchased from twenty to thirty per cent. cheaper than the present season. <sup>(1)</sup>

The only new instructions of the Court to the Government and Council of ST. HELENA, during this season, were to permit such of the inhabitants, with their families, as might be disposed to chuse, to remove to the Company's Island of Bombay (previously with the view of increasing its population) to procure

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council in Bengal, 27th August 1688 and the 15th February 1688-89.

CHAP. II. on the Company's ships, on payment of £4 each, for their  
1688-89. passage; the men, on their arrival, to be allowed soldier's pay. <sup>(1)</sup>

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Interesting  
proceedings  
of the East-  
India Com-  
pany, during  
the successive  
events which  
terminated in  
the revolu-  
tion.

The proceedings of the East-India Company, during the memorable year 1688-89, as far as regarded their foreign Settlements and trade, appear to have been dictated with equal spirit and prudence; and it will be interesting to trace the conduct of the Company, at a period when it could not but be daily influenced by the important events which affected the Constitution, and the trade of their Country.

It will be recollected, that the Company had acquired their Charter and privileges from the Crown, and though oppressed, in the early periods of their progress, by licences contradictory to their rights, particularly during the reigns of James I. and Charles I., when their exclusive privileges were invaded, they still had preserved a direct commerce between England and the East-Indies. It will also be recollected, that, during the Interregnum, the innovating prejudices of the times, first partially, and then directly, went to deprive the Company of their privileges; though, on fully examining the evidence adduced by the Company, and by the Merchant Adventurers, Cromwell, and his Council of State, confirmed the

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Governor and Council of St. Helena, 5th April 1689.

the Charter and privileges of the London East-India Com-  
pany. It has, also, appeared, that during the reigns of 1688-89.  
Charles II. and James II., the Company experienced, from  
those Sovereigns, the most positive protection, at home and  
abroad, and were enabled to check, by authority, and, by legal  
means, to punish the Interlopers; and, that the Company,  
acting under this royal protection, had endeavoured to main-  
tain the character of the English Nation, by employing force  
to repel the injuries and breach of grants by the Mogul and  
his officers, as well as by the lesser Indian Powers, who had  
excluded them from the trade, or deprived them of their  
Factories.

Under impressions arising out of these events, the  
Court of Directors, (when the civil liberties of the country,  
and the maintenance of the established religion, were  
assailed by that sect which had been proscribed by  
their great founder, Queen Elizabeth,) proceeded, as  
might have been expected a great commercial body would  
do, whose rights had been conferred by the Crown, who  
held every consideration, but the preservation of their  
trade, to be extraneous to their duty, and whose con-  
duct was to be guided by their obligations to the Pro-  
prietors, and to the public:—on the one hand, they partici-  
pated in the general sense of national liberty, civil and reli-  
gious; and, on the other, they were influenced by the cau-  
tion of Merchants.

The



CHAP. II.  
1688-89. The East-India Company, also, were in a more embarrassed situation than any other corporate body in the Kingdom; for they could not but apprehend, that their ancient rival and enemy, the Dutch, might divide the partiality of the Sovereign, between his new subjects and his countrymen; and, of course, might render the rights of the Company less a national object, than involve them in the common interests of the two Maritime States, between whom the trade and power, in the East-Indies, might be divided;—a division which the experience of events, in 1619, had taught them to consider as hazardous, and exposed to perilous results.

When, therefore, the first intelligence arrived of the armament of the Prince of Orange, in Holland, the East-India Company were alarmed, and, (as appeared in their instructions to their foreign governments,) influenced more by commercial caution, than taking an active part in the general opinions of the kingdom:—they only described to their servants, that the Prince of Orange was expected in England, “to secure his succession to the Crown, and establish the Protestant religion,” and that the Dutch fleet were very strong at sea, and had a great army embarked on it;—that this expedition was reported to be, exclusively, with those objects, and at the sole charge of the Prince of Orange, but not an act of the States General, for an hostile invasion of the realm;—that the first effect had been to prevent the equipments of the Company from being fitted out, or proceeding to India,  
the



EAST-INDIA COMPANY

the impress of men being so general, on the King's account that none of their vessels could proceed on their voyages.

After the landing, however, of the Prince of Orange and his army, at Dartmouth, on the 4th November 1688, and after King James had sent Lords Halifax, Nottingham, and Godolphin, to treat with him, and, by proclamation, summoned a Parliament, the Court continued the same caution, divided between their ancient allegiance, the general expectation of reforming the government, and the hope of reconciliation between the King and the Prince;—in their letters, therefore, at this crisis, they informed their servants, that the Dutch fleet had abstained from war, and from making prizes, and that their army preserved the strictest discipline, and paid for every thing which they required.<sup>(1)</sup>

While the following memorable events were occurring—or, that hostilities, between the King and the Prince were rendered impracticable, by the greatest part of the Royal forces having joined the Prince of Orange;—that the opinions of the majority of the nation were favourable to his enterprize;—that his army had proceeded to London and had taken possession of St. James's;—that the Protestant Lords had met, and agreed to address the Prince, to assume the government, civil and military, and to summon a parliament

(1)—Letters of the Court to the Presidency of Bombay, 8th October and 5th December 1688.

CHAP. II.  
1688-89. ment, (to which address all the Commons, who had sat in any Parliament during the reign of Charles II., assisted by the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and fifty of the Common Council of London, assented;) and that the King and Queen had fled to France, and the Lord Chancellor, and the principal Popish Lords, were imprisoned, the Court of Directors of the East-India Company confined themselves, in their instructions to their foreign Settlements, to their peculiar object, commerce.

A general stagnation of trade had been the effect of these events, but the Court trusted commerce would revive, and that they should be enabled to take such measures as were necessary, for providing the stock and shipping for the season; but added, that a large fleet and army were collecting, to be sent to Ireland, for the purpose of supporting the Protestant interest in that kingdom; that the quota of English troops, which, by the treaty of Nimeguen, had been stipulated to serve in Holland, were about to embark; and that the City of London had advanced the sum of £150,000 to the Prince, to enable him to pay his army and navy.

It was under these circumstances, that the Court directed the General at Bombay, if he had made a peace with the Mogul, to endeavour to get possession of Salsette, there being, under the new government of England, no fear of any intrigues of the Jesuits, or Popish priests, to obstruct his retaining it, and to continue the war against the King of Siam, till the  
the

the Company received full satisfaction for the debts due to them, as he could not expect assistance from any of the European Maritime Powers. CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

When the Convention of Parliament assembled, on the 22d January 1688-89, and offered the Crown to the Prince and Princess of Orange, as the next Protestant heirs, and when they accepted it, agreeably to the conditions in the Bill of Rights, and were proclaimed King and Queen of England, on the 13th February 1688-89, the Court of Directors, on the 15th February, dispatched the Chandos, with copies of the Proclamation, to their seat of Government at Bombay, to the Presidency of Madras, and to the Agency at Bengal, and ordered them to be published, with all due solemnity, not only at those places, but at all their subordinate Settlements in India. <sup>(1)</sup>

It was noticed, on the first approach of the Revolution, by the appearance of the Dutch fleet and army, that the general impress of men ordered by King James II., had prevented the sailing of the Company's ship, Chandos, Captain Bonnell, the only vessel which, in the existing circumstances of the Company, they then proposed to dispatch :—the Court had, even at this time, become apprehensive of the re-appearance of the Interlo-

4 L 2

pers,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the General and Council at Bombay 11th and 14th January, 15th and 22d February, and 19th March 1688-89.— Letter from the Court to the President and Council at Fort St. George, 15th February 1688-89.— Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bengal, 15th February 1688-89.

CHAP. II.  
1688-89. pers, always ready to take advantage of any circumstance or event, which, they might apprehend, would injure the Company in the exercise of their exclusive privileges of trade; and though this vessel did not sail, till after the settlement of the government in England, yet by secret advices, as well as by the instructions sent by Captain Bonnel, they warned their servants in India, to be on their guard against the intrusions or interferences of the Private Traders;—a class of men who had, upon so many occasions, been the means of involving them in disputes with the Country Powers, and had often brought great losses on their Factories and trade. Such apprehensions were most natural, as the immediate result of the first aspect of a change in the government, and were confirmed, by the re-appearance of interloping equipments, as soon as that change had taken place.

The Court, thus, with a steady attention to their rights, and probably anticipating questions regarding them, gave a commission to Captain Bonnell, the preamble to which enumerated the different grants which had been obtained by the Company, from Charles II. and James II., with the actual circumstances regarding the war with the Mogul and the King of Siam, and authorized him to make prizes, not only of the vessels of the Indian Powers, with whom they were at war, but of the ships employed by the Interlopers, and to seize on the individuals who might attempt to trade in their limits, without the Company's licence. The letter, furnishing the directions

directions for this conduct, takes, though a short, yet so comprehensive a view of the East-India Company, at this juncture, that it forms a striking example of the good sense of English merchants, as well as irrefragable evidence of the actual situation of their interests.

CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

The Court, in their letter to Fort St. George, of the 15th February 1688-89, say:—" that the Interlopers and other  
 " maligners of the Company are very busy, and pretend  
 " great matters they will doe shortly, by complaints of the  
 " Company's management ; a lightness and vanity which they  
 " have always abounded in, especially upon every change of  
 " the government, or lesser changes of ministers of state or  
 " favorites : but their boastings have always come to nought,  
 " and so will they now, all governments being wiser than to  
 " be swayed by such irregular, and disorderly vain men,  
 " though they may sometimes seem to give them a little ear  
 " and countenance, for reasons not to be mentioned, as also  
 " for the inlargement of their own understanding, in so  
 " abstruse an affaire as y<sup>t</sup> of the East-Indies is, to noblemen  
 " and gentlemen, y<sup>t</sup> have not been conversant in busyness of  
 " that nature. We hint this to you, to prevent you, or any  
 " of our other servants, being deceived or perverted, by  
 " such advices as may be writt by discontented men, as some  
 " windy heads of our servants in India have been often al-  
 " ready, to their own, as well our detriment ; yet such is the  
 " folly of some unstable minds, that are uneasy under a  
 " steady

CHAP. H. “ steady, righteous government, that though they have  
 1688-89. “ been frequently frustrated of their expectations, they are  
 “ capable of being deceived againe, by the self-same methods  
 “ as they have often been deceived with already ; which cau-  
 “ tion we give you, for your own sakes, more than for the  
 “ Companyes.”<sup>(1)</sup>

Political and  
 commercial  
 events at Su-  
 rat and Bom-  
 bay.

It will be necessary, in reviewing the foreign transactions of the East-India Company, to extend the Annals beyond the season 1688-89, to bring into view the complicated proceedings at each of the Presidencies, the effect of those proceedings on the Company's Settlements and trade, and the measures adopted, on receiving intelligence of the Revolution in England.

When the Court had determined to levy war against Aurungzebe, to resist his breach of Phirmaunds and grants, and had appointed Sir John Child to be General, or superior of the whole of the Company's Settlements, with the object of acquiring a fortified station in Bengal, they were ignorant of the conquest of the kingdoms of Visiapore and Golcondah, and of the decline of Sambagee's power.

In

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Fort St. George, 15th February 1688-89. — Commission and Instructions to Captain Bonnell, of the Company's ship Chandos, 15th February 1688-89.

In the Foreign Annals of the preceding year, the judicious and active measures of Sir John Child were described, till the period when he assumed the government of BOMBAY, and when the return of the Company's ships from the two Gulfs, with their prizes, convinced the Governor of Surat, that hostilities were commenced. On the departure of Sir John Child from SURAT, he left Mr. Harris, as Agent, with a Council, to preserve the Company's house and property, and to avail himself of any opportunity which might occur, of opening negotiations with the Governor; but to this precaution of Sir John Child, which put the English Factory, at Surat, into the power of the Governor, as hostages, may be ascribed the ultimate failure of all the plans for which the war had been commenced.

Under these circumstances, conferences commenced between Mr. Harris and the new Governor, Muchtar Khan, the result of which induced this Agent to recommend, that the Governor General should come to Swally, to adjust the terms, in person; a copy of the conditions, which had formerly been proposed by him, having been delivered to the Governor, who had affected to give them a favourable reception.

The Convention between Muchtar Khan and Mr. Harris, an artifice to gain time.

Though there remains no evidence, in the dispatches from Bombay, of the conferences which took place, between Muchtar Khan and Sir John Child, who came from Bombay to lay off Surat, for the purpose of negotiating, it appears from the letters of the Court to Bombay, of this season, that

Muchtar



CHAP. II. Muchtar Khan had acceded to those terms, and that a Pro-  
1688-89. visional Agreement had been made with him, on the basis of the thirty-five articles drawn up by the General ; or, that the English should, in future, pay only two per cent. customs, (agreeably to their old Phirmaunds,) instead of three and a half per cent., which had been recently exacted ; and it was as a reward for concluding this agreement, that the Court voted Sir John Child, a present of one thousand guineas, as stated in the home transactions of this season.

This agreement, however, was, in a short time, discovered to be an artifice on the part of Muchtar Khan, who intended only to gain time, either till he should hear of the progress of the English in Bengal, or receive instructions from the Mogul, to confirm, or to break off the negotiation. This duplicity was suspected by Sir John Child, who, on the 9th October 1688, embarked at Bombay, and again appeared off Surat, with a fleet of seven ships ; and though, on this occasion, he might have taken, or destroyed, the whole of the Siddee's fleet, he avoided hostilities, both because he deemed them imprudent at the moment, from the precarious circumstances in which the Government of Madras, and the expedition to Bengal, were placed, and because the capture of this fleet might render negotiation, at either of those places, impracticable ; but hoped, that his appearance, with such a force, might induce Muchtar Khan to adhere to the terms of the Provisional Agreement.

This

This prudence, and these expectations, were rendered unavailing, for Muchtar Khan, in a short time, threw off the mask of friendship which he had assumed, seized and imprisoned Mr. Harris and Mr. Gladman, on the 26th December 1688, ordered all the Company's goods in Surat to be sold, and offered a large reward for seizing Sir John Child, alive or dead.

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Muchtar Khan seizes the Company's servants and property at Surat.

Sir John Child continued with the fleet, off Swally, in the hope of finding some means to rescue Mr. Harris and the Council; but, on the 16th January 1688-89, finding all his attempts at negotiation ineffectual, he returned to Bombay, and, in his passage, fell in with a Mogul convoy of trading vessels, and captured forty of them:—Still, however, he endeavoured to act on the possibility of bringing the Mogul to terms, for he detained the ships only, and addressed a letter to Aurungzebe, representing his pacific disposition, and complaining of the false and oppressive conduct of Muchtar Khan; adding, that he had twice gone to Swally, to prove his readiness to accede to any reasonable accommodation, but that, instead of meeting with the friendly reception which the Governor professed, the English Agents had been imprisoned, the Company's property seized and sold, and a contribution demanded of five lacks of rupees.

While matters were in this situation, the Siddee's fleet, consisting of eleven ships and seventy gallivats, were at Danda-Rajahpore; comparing, therefore, the recent conduct of

Sir John Child intimates to the Siddee, that the movement of his

**CHAP. II.** Mughtar Khan with the appearance of this fleet near Bombay, and the report, that his intention was to invade the Island, the General intimated to the Siddee, that if the fleet should put to sea, he must conclude it was with hostile intentions against Bombay, and would, therefore, consider him as an enemy.

1688-89. fleet would be considered as an act of hostility against Bombay.

At this crisis, also, the General addressed the President of Fort St. George, and severely reprehended his imprudent application to the Mogul, to open a treaty, for that Settlement, as manifesting apprehensions of the issue of the war, unfavorable to its progress; and that he held this application to be the probable source of the violent proceedings against the Company, at Surat. When Sir John Child transmitted the substance of this letter to the Court, he avowed his resolution to continue hostilities, and, by no means, to yield to the dishonorable expedient of purchasing a peace; but explained, that he would delay attacking the Siddee's fleet, as long as the safety of the Island of Bombay would admit of it, because he found, that the power of the Mogul had been increased by the conquest of Golcondah and Visiapore, and the probable reduction of Sambagee's country, which made it expedient to avoid those extremities, which might render accommodation difficult, if not impossible.

Court's order to occupy Salsette impracticable, and the deli-

In this situation of affairs, the General, though prepared for war, made several ineffectual attempts to negotiate with the Mogul, and informed the Court, that though he had a force which

which could have fulfilled their orders for obtaining possession of Salsette, he had considered it hazardous to make the attempt, on account of the great power of the Mogul, and the probability of his conquering Sambagee's country:—should these events take place, he had not a sufficient body of English troops to defend the Island of Salsette, or even Bombay, and could place no dependence on the native militia, who, when the Siddee made a shew of attacking Bombay, deserted; and, in like manner, that he could not fulfil the Court's orders, to take enemies' goods, as prizes, out of the ships of the Native States with whom the Company were in amity.

CHAP. II.  
1688-89.  
very of their  
letter to the  
Mogul, inex-  
pedient.

It was under these embarrassments, that Sir John Child received the Company's letter to the Mogul, of the 5th December 1688, which, though conformable to the objects of the war, he doubted of the expediency of delivering, to so imperious a Prince, whose success had rendered him despotic, and who, from the dilatory proceedings in Bengal, and the unfortunate applications to negotiate, at Fort St. George, would be less disposed to reasonable terms, than at the time when he received intelligence of the first naval successes of the English, on the western coasts of his dominions.

From this period, the English, at Bombay, acted on the defensive only, and, whether from the sailing of part of their ships for Europe, or from other causes, did not persevere in the resolution of attacking the Siddee's fleet; on the contrary, this fleet made several descents on the Island, in which

Bombay acts  
on the defen-  
sive.

CHAP. II.  
1688-89. they had been repulsed by the English troops, notwithstanding the disobedience of Captain Consett, of the Berkeley Castle, who refused to co-operate with the garrison. If any thing could add to this perplexity, desertion prevailed among the European troops; which drew from the General the natural reflection, "that the loss of one European " was of more consequence to him, than the death of one hundred blacks," and that he almost regretted having employed native troops in the Company's service, because, in the moment of danger, neither their fidelity nor courage could be relied on. Hence his opinion, that Bombay, from its local vicinity to the Mogul's dominions (where his power had become almost uncontrolled), could not be considered of that importance which the Company had supposed, as they had not received from the British Government the same support, as the Dutch Company did from the States General; a support which, in fact, had been the true source of their power, and of their prosperity.

Sir John Child attempts negotiation with Ettimand Khan, the new Governor of Surat;

In this crisis of affairs, a new Governor (Ettimand Khan) was appointed for Surat; an incident which gave an opportunity to Sir John Child to attempt another negotiation, and, therefore, he addressed letters to this officer, conceiving that, from a stranger, he might expect that impartiality, and those concessions, which, in vain, he had looked for from Muchtar Khan; expectations, however, which evidently proceeded rather from the urgency of circumstances, than from his experience

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experience of the duplicity which characterized the Mogul officers; for, in their late transactions, they had in one object only,—to bring the English Agent into that situation, in which he could only oppose ineffectual remonstrances but make no resistance.

It was under these circumstances, that Sir John ( ) on the 10th December 1689, dispatched Mr. Weldon and Navarro, two of the Company's servants, accompanied Meah Nizammy (an eminent merchant, who had lately negotiated a treaty between the Company and the Nab Damaun) to the Mogul's camp at Visiapore, to endeavour to open a negotiation with him for a treaty of peace, and to obtain a Phirmaund, for the restoration of the ancient privileges of the Company, and the recovery of the property, which had been seized by Muchtar Khan.

Negotiations could not have been attempted under circumstances more unfavorable; for Aurungzebe, at this time had taken Rairee castle, and seized the family and treasure of Sambagee, and it was even uncertain, to what country Sambagee, himself, had fled, though a few of his small forces still held out against the Mogul armies. From the Mogul conduct towards the Portuguese, it was also evident, that they had (as they were unable to resist him) determined to reduce the pretensions of the European Maritime Powers to a positive dependence on his authority; and it was in this state of affairs, that the Dutch obtained from

CHAP. II. a Phirmaund, enabling them to hold Pullicat, on the same  
1688-89. terms as they formerly held it, under the King of Golcondah.

This complicated state of the Company's affairs obliged Sir John Child to retain, this year, on demorage, several of the Company's ships, for the defence of the Island of Bombay and the Malabar Coast.

Death of Sir John Child, and succession of Mr. Harris, at this time a prisoner at Surat.

In this perilous situation, Sir John Child, who had, for so many years, by his firmness and integrity, been the real support of the Company's interests in India, and who, alone, was capable to have extricated them from the difficulties in which they were involved, died at Bombay, on the 4th February 1689-90, the office of President devolving on Mr. Harris, at this time a prisoner at Surat, and that of Deputy Governor of Bombay on Mr. Vaux, who, from his subordinate situation, was, of course, to take his directions from Mr. Harris, already duped by Muchtar Khan, and from being under constraint, obliged to yield to any terms which might be imposed on him.

A consultation, on this occasion, was held at Bombay, on the 25th February 1689-90, at which it was agreed, that Mr. Vaux, the Deputy Governor of Bombay, should, in consequence of advices received from Mr. Weldon and Mr. Navarro, the Commissioners at Visiapore, proceed to Surat, and there receive the Phirmaund which they had procured from the Mogul. Mr. Vaux left Bombay on the 6th March 1689-90 for Surat, where he remained till the 4th April 1690, on which day the Phirmaund arrived, and Mr. Harris, and the Company's  
other

other servants, were released from their long imprisonment in irons.

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This apparent reconciliation of the Mogul to the Company, was an arbitrary act of despotism towards the English; for, instead of the Phirmaund proceeding upon the propositions which had been made by Sir John Child, either for liberty of trade, in general, or any specification of the conditions, under which that able servant of the Company deemed it expedient to entrust their stock or servants at Surat, in which they had experienced successive and exorbitant oppressions, it was expressed in terms and with conditions, more humiliating, and more oppressive, than any which had occurred, from the first settlement of an English Factory in India. The Company were now to be admitted, not as the subjects of an independent sovereign, or as having a retreat at Bombay, at which they could be protected, but as criminals, whose Chief had been proscribed, and themselves admitted to live in vassalage or slavery, only.

The Phirmaund granted by Aurungzebe, at this period, reduces the Presidency of Surat to the most degraded situation.

The translation of the Phirmaund of Aurungzebe to the Company, dated February 27th 1689-90, is as follows:

“ All the English having made a most humble submissive  
 “ petition, that the crimes they have done may be pardoned,  
 “ and requested another Phirmaund, to make their being for-  
 “ given manifest, and sent their Vakkeels to the heavenly  
 “ palace, the most illustrious in the world, to get the royal  
 “ favor; and Ettimand Caun, the Governor of Suratt’s peti-  
 “ tion



CHAP II. 1688-89. " tion to the famous court, equal to the skie, being arrived,  
 " that they would present the great King with a fine of one  
 " hundred and fifty thousand rupees, to his most noble trea-  
 " sury, resembling the sun, and would restore the merchants  
 " goods they had taken away, to the owners of them, and  
 " would walk by the ancient customs of the port, and behave  
 " themselves, for the future, no more in such a shameful  
 " manner; therefore His Majesty, according to his duly favor  
 " to all the people of the world, hath pardoned their faults,  
 " mercifully forgiven them, and out of his princely conde-  
 " scension agrees, that the present be put into the treasury of  
 " the port, the merchants goods be returned, the town flou-  
 " rish, and they follow their trade, as in former times, and  
 " Mr. Child, who did the disgrace, be turned out and expel-  
 " led. This order is irreversible." (1)

This Phirmaund discovers, that though the Mogul might employ temporizing measures with the Company, while his conquests of Golcondah and Visiapore were unfinished, and though he might continue the like duplicity, while he was subverting the power of Sambagee, by directing the successive Governors of Surat to affect conciliation with the English, that their naval power might not be employed to assist his enemies, yet the moment he found them  
 brought

(1)—Copy of a Phirmaund, " dated the 23d day of the month, Jammaudull Aubull, " in the thirty-third year of a Most Glorious Reign," 27th February 1689-90. (MSS. in Indian Register Office, vol. xlii, 1689-1690, No. 3973).

brought to the humiliating situation of petitioning for peace, he granted it as a Prince pardons a criminal, whose labours might be useful, but whose character was no longer respectable; and, perhaps, the most honorable eulogy which could have been pronounced on Sir John Child, was Aurungzebe's orders, that the peace should depend on his being dismissed from the Company's service.

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At the time when this Phirmaund was delivered, the Siddee's fleet and army had invaded Bombay, and got possession of Mahim, Mazagon, and Sion, and the Governor and his garrison, in fact, were besieged in the town and castle, and (as will immediately appear) unable to take any measures for carrying into execution the orders of the Court, for the improvement of the Island.

The Siddee's fleet and forces invade Bombay, but evacuate the Island, on payment of the fine imposed by the Phirmaund.

The Phirmaund of Aurungzebe was accompanied with an order to the General of the forces in the Island of Bombay, to withdraw his troops, and to attack the country, formerly in the possession of Sambagee, which still held out against the Mogul power.

Mr. Harris, and the Council at Surat, expected a Phirmaund, containing different conditions of peace from those conceded by this grant; for, instead of redressing any of the grievances which had led the English to the war, or defining the conditions under which they were to trade, it authorized them only to return to Surat, on condition of the payment of a large fine, and the dismissal of the General, to whom

CHAP. II.  
1688-89. all their crimes were ascribed; and in so arbitrary a manner were the conditions of this Phirmaund acted on, that the Governor of Surat refused to issue his order for recalling the Siddee from Bombay, till the goods taken by the English, should be restored, and the fine paid to the Mogul, at Surat; and with these demands the Agent and Council were, at last, obliged, most reluctantly, to comply.

The Agent and Council at Surat, on this occasion, requested, as their affairs on the West of India had never been in so distressed a situation, that a large supply of shipping, stock, and servants, might be sent to them, as the only means by which they could be enabled to regain a proportion of the trade, or, by degrees, the benefits of the former Phirmaunds or grants.

It was not, however, till the 6th May 1690, that orders were sent, from the Governor of Surat to the Siddee, to evacuate Bombay, or till the 22d June, that he quitted the Island, or that the English again took possession of Mazagon, Mahim, and Sion.

The revenues and trade at Bombay depressed by these events.

During these public transactions, it was impossible the measures recommended by the Court, for improving the revenue of the Island, could be carried into effect. The Natives, it was found, would not undertake the coining of the money, or managing of the mint, as it had been supposed they would; and during the period of actual or threatened invasion, the revenues from lands or houses could

could not be collected, or the projects of establishing a Post Office, or Insurance Office, attempted;—hence it was impossible to raise a revenue equal to the Company's estimate, which had erroneously been adopted, in imitation of the Dutch, without reflecting, that what had been practicable in old establishments, could not apply to Bombay, as yet only held by the Company for a short time, and, during that period, exposed to the insubordination of the garrison and inhabitants, and to opposition by the Portuguese, occupying the stations from which supplies could be brought to the Island, or liable to perpetual alarms of invasion, by the contending powers on the neighbouring continent of India.

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The commercial transactions of the Presidency of Bombay were farther impeded, by the ships being employed in the war, and by the heavy demorage which was incurred, from its being impracticable to dispatch them to the ports, at which the investments were collected, or to order them to proceed from Bombay to Europe;—the prospect, also, (even supposing peace restored in India) was discouraging, from the number of French, Dutch, and country vessels employed in the trade, which had advanced the price of freight, beyond what any competition would allow:—mean time, the encouragement ordered by the Court to be given to the Armenians, would be offered to them, that, by indirect means, a remedy for the evils, under which trade was placed, might be found. A cargo, however, of pepper from the Malabar Coast

**CHAP. II.** had been shipped, and was to be sent to England; but no  
**1688-89.** Bengal goods could be procured, to make up an investment.

As considerable difficulties had arisen, from the objections made by the commanders of freighted ships, to accommodate their services to the actual state of affairs, the Presidency of Bombay recommended, that the Company should employ their own ships, only, because the captains would be obliged to conform to circumstances, without pretending to act according to the strict terms of their charter-party.

The instructions of the Court, to form a Settlement in the Attinga Country, had not been carried into execution, on account of the wars which had prevailed in its vicinity, and the commercial intercourse between Carwar, Calicut, and Bombay, had not been open, either during the war, or during the negotiations at Surat. <sup>(1)</sup>

Trade in Persia obstructed by the Dutch, and by Pirates.

The trade at Gombroon, in 1688, was less obstructed by the existing war in India, than the trade at Bombay, or on the Malabar Coast:—the Agents in PERSIA, therefore, informed the Court, that they were making every exertion to obtain an exclusive

(1)—Letters from the General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 5th December 1688, 10th February 1688-89, 7th June, and 16th December 1689, 25th February 1689-90, 22d June 1690.— Letters from Mr. Harris, &c., at Surat, to the Court, 27th February 1689-90, 28th April, and 6th May 1690.— Letter from the General and Council of Bombay to the President and Council at Fort St. George, 5th December 1688.— Letter from Sir John Child to the Mogul, February 1688-89.

sive trade in silk, by bartering broad-cloth for it, imitating the practice of the Dutch, who had formerly tried this method, by exchanging the finer spices for silk;—that they were making similar efforts to procure the exclusive trade in Caramania wool, and should these exchanges, by barter, continue, they were of opinion, they might annually dispose of two thousand pieces of English broad-cloth;—that the Dutch were, by means of imports of Indian goods, rivalling them in this market; but from their being, at this juncture, not respected by the Persians, the Agent hoped to prevent their obtaining, as formerly, Caramania wool, and would continue to resist their engrossing this article.

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In the following year (November 1689) the Agents in Persia stated, that the trade had further been distressed, by the appearance of an English pirate vessel in the Gulf, the crew of which had landed, and plundered the Portuguese Factory at Cong, and that the Company's ship, *Cæsar*, had been dispatched, with instructions, if possible, to capture her, but had been unsuccessful. At the close of this season, however, the same good understanding does not appear to have prevailed between the English Agent and the Persian Government at Gombroon, which refused payment of the stipulated customs, to compensate the losses which the Persian trade had experienced, during the maritime war between the English and the Mogul. <sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Agent at Gombroon to the Court, 9th October 1688, 10th May, 30th November and 7th December 1689.

CHAP. II. **The Company's transactions at FORT ST. GEORGE and in**  
 1688-89. **BENGAL**, during the season 1688-89, and part of 1689-90,  
 were so blended, that to furnish a view of them, during the  
 period in which those of Bombay and Surat have been detailed,  
 it will be necessary to follow the events, regarding the war in  
 Bengal, in the first instance, and to connect those events  
 with the occurrences at Madras, that we may ascertain the  
 situation in which those Settlements were left, when a dis-  
 astrous peace was the result of all the projects of the Court  
 to become an Independent Power in India.

Affairs of  
 Fort St.  
 George and  
 Bengal  
 blended, at  
 the period of  
 the disastrous  
 Phirmaund of  
 Aurungzebe.

It will be recollected, that when the armament under Captain Nicholson sailed, the object of the Court was to obtain Chittagong, or some station which could be fortified, to become the seat of their power and trade; and, in the Annals of the preceding years, the operations of this armament, and the timid and irresolute proceedings of Mr. Charnock, the Company's Agent in Bengal, were described to have brought about, first, a kind of truce with the Phousdar, which, as soon as he could collect a force, was violated, and next a treaty with the Nabob, of which the Court disapproved; and, subsequently, had dispatched a large armed ship, the Defence, Captain Heath, attended by a frigate, with instructions to proceed direct for Bengal, and, on his arrival, to carry the original intentions of the Court into execution, or, to retire with their servants and property to Madras:—we have, therefore, to trace the events as they occurred, after  
 Captain

Captain Heath's arrival, that we may perceive the real state of CHAP. II. the Company's affairs, both in Bengal and at Madras, at the 1688-89. close of this eventful period.

Captain Heath arrived in Bengal, in October 1688, and acted rather from the impulse of his own feelings, than in concert with the Agent and Council, or in obedience to the Court's commands. It is true, that in recommencing the war with the original object, he conformed to the Court's instructions, but by his imprudence (for it cannot be termed his want of courage), he lost all the advantages which might have been obtained, and, for a time, the continuance of the Company's trade in the Ganges.

Proceedings of Captain Heath in Bengal, who retires with the Company's servants to Madras.

On resuming the war in Bengal, the Company's servants and property were embarked at Calcutta, on board the Defence, which, with the other ships, proceeded, on the 8th November 1688, to Ballasore Roads:—a conference was opened with the Governor, who offered to release the English, whom he had seized in the Factory, and to adjust all matters in dispute:—without, however, waiting to learn the terms which would be granted, or to procure the liberation of the English in the Governor's power, Captain Heath, on the 29th November 1688, (contrary to the opinion of the Agent and Council, and notwithstanding a Perwannah for peace with the English had been received by the Governor from the Nabob,) landed the troops and seamen, attacked and took a battery of  
thirty.



CHAP. II. thirty guns, and plundered the town of Ballasore. The  
1688-89. English Factory, on this occasion, was burned by the Governor, and the Company's servants, who had been previously taken prisoners, were carried up the country, where all subsequent efforts for their release were unavailing. The troops and seamen being reimbarcked, the fleet proceeded, on the 13th December 1688, to Chittagong, where they arrived on the 17th January 1688-89 ;—a council of war, was assembled, in which it was resolved to delay proceeding to farther hostilities, and again to write to the Nabob, stating their grievances and demands, and to await his answer, whether he would redress them, or not.

Captain Heath, however, instead of waiting for an answer, or making any effort to have the Company's privileges or trade restored, or endeavouring to seize on Chittagong, proceeded with the fleet to Aracan, where he arrived on the 31st January 1688-89, and sent proposals to the King, for a settlement in his dominions, according to the instructions of the Court, in case of failure of the attack on Chittagong. These propositions were rejected, when, as a last expedient, applications were made by Captain Heath to a revolted Chief in Aracan, offering assistance to him against the King :—this offer would have been accepted, and might probably have obtained for the Company, the original object of the war, but the same impatience in this, as in the preceding cases, marked the conduct of this officer, who,  
without

without waiting for an answer to his proposals, sailed with the whole fleet, consisting of fifteen sail, (having the Agent and Council of Bengal, and the Company's effects on board,) from Aracan to Fort St. George, where they arrived on the 4th March 1688-89.<sup>(1)</sup>

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The Agent and Council of Bengal, on their arrival at Madras, reported to the Court, in answer to their letters, censuring them for not having attacked Chittagong, when Captain Nicholson commanded the fleet, that Captain Heath, on his arrival, deemed it unadvisable to attempt the siege, although he had a force superior to that which Captain Nicholson had under his command; but could give no reason why such attack had not been previously made, in obedience to the original order; contenting themselves with offering an opinion, that should the trade in Bengal be re-assumed, Chutanuttee, or Calcutta, would be a preferable station to Uleaburrah, about which they acknowledged they had been deceived.

Report of the Agent and Council of Bengal, on the failure of the attack on Chittagoag.

Connecting these events with the political circumstances under which Madras was placed, at the period when the large fleet from Bengal arrived at that port, we discover, that to prevent the increase of expences, by demorage or dead freight, the President and Council sent two ships to Bencoolen

Expedients of the Agency of Fort St. George, on this emergency.

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and

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Fort St. George to the Court, January and 3d April 1668-89.— Agent Charnock's answer to Captain Heath's report, 22d March 1668-89.

**CHAP. II.** and one to China, to procure investments, and to proceed  
**1688-89.** from thence to England, and had let three or four ships  
 on freight to Persia, to the Jews and native merchants of  
 Madras.

During these unfortunate events at Bombay and in Bengal, notwithstanding the Mogul conquests of Visiapore and Golcondah, it does not appear that his army made any attack on Fort St. George. It was, under the apprehension of this event, that the President and Council had made those approaches to conciliation, which were reprobated by Sir John Child, and by the Court. From the probability of a siege, the Fort had been strengthened, a precaution, which, considering the Mogul's conduct, at Surat and in Bengal, had averted the expected attack; and so confident were the President and Council of the strength of the place, that they sent a supply of military stores to the Island of Bombay, when it was invaded by the Siddee.

Mogul's order for expelling the English from his dominions.

Though the Mogul did not besiege Fort St. George, he issued orders to expel the English from his dominions; and, under these orders, the Factory at Vizagapatam had been suddenly seized, Mr. Stables, the Chief, and four Factors, killed, and the Company's stock and effects plundered:—at this time, also, the Governor of Masulipatam seized on the English Factory, though hopes were entertained that matters might be accommodated with him.

Sambagee betrayed, and

During these transactions in the Company's different  
 Presidencies

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

Presidencies or Settlements, an event occurred, in the end of the year 1689, or early in 1689-90, which, in the first aspect, promised to consolidate the empire which Aurungzebe had obtained by his conquests in the Decan. The treachery of one of Sambagee's generals, who betrayed him into the power of the Mogul, by whom he was crucified to death. This barbarous policy, instead of depressing the spirit or animosity of the Hindoos, produced the opposite effect; for, continuing their allegiance to the family of Sambagee, they declared for the Ram-Rajah, or the second son of this great chief, who assumed the administration of the Hindoo interests, and, with the remains of Sambagee's army, took position in the strong fortress of Gingee; the vicinity of this place to Madras gave that Presidency an opportunity to receive authentic information respecting this apparently last struggle of the Hindoos, against Aurungzebe. Whether the Mogul army which attempted to reduce the Ram-Rajah in Gingee, was composed, in part, of levies from the countries which the Mogul had recently conquered, or were the remains of the army with which he had subdued Visiapore and Golcondal is uncertain; but the fact was, that this army, instead of pursuing the Mogul conquests, revolted in great numbers, joined the standard of the Ram-Rajah, whom they proclaimed King of India, under the title of "the Gentoo King." At this event, Aurungzebe was in danger of losing the fruit of his victories in the Decan, for the Ram-Rajah was prepa-

CHAP. II. to invade the kingdom of Golcondah, at the time when  
 1688-89. the army of Prince Acbar was menacing the interior Mogul provinces, from Persia and Candahar.

Such was the impression, at Madras, of the stability of power which the Ram-Rajah had acquired, that an Agent was sent to him, on his accession, with a present of eight hundred pagodas, to solicit his friendship and protection :—in return, he granted a Phirmaund, for a fortified settlement and liberty of trade at Conimere. The Presidency, from this reception, hoped they might procure a like Phirmaund, for liberty of trade in any part of his dominions.

Stipulations  
 regarding  
 Madras evaded in the  
 Mogul's  
 Phirmaund.

Affairs were in this situation, when the Presidency of Madras received information, in February 1689-90, from Mr. Weldon and Mr. Navarro, the Commissioners sent by Sir John Child to negotiate a treaty with the Mogul, at his camp in Visiapore, that a peace had been concluded, and a Phirmaund granted, with the evasive apology of not including Madras, till the ancient Phirmaunds, under which that Settlement had been originally granted by “ the Gentoo King,” and King of Golcondah, should be consulted :—to obviate this difficulty, the President sent the two ancient original Phirmaunds to the General at Bombay. The whole of this conduct discovers, that the Commissioners themselves were ignorant of the spirit or terms of the Phirmaund, which, (from the events at Bombay,) reduced the Company under more abject circumstances,

circumstances than they had been placed, since the first establishment of the English trade in India.

CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

The Company's interest and trade in Bengal had been abandoned; for after Mr. Charnock and his Council left Chutanuttee, and proceeded with Captain Heath and the fleet to Madras, and when there was no prospect of opening any communication with that country, an offer was unexpectedly received from the new Nabob of Bengal (the one with whom the Company had their disputes being removed) to allow the English to return, and resettle their Factories and trade, and to grant Perwannahs for that purpose. Aware of the deceptions which had been practised, and reasoning correctly from the past, that, admitting the Nabob to be sincere in his offers, the Agent and the Company's stock would be exposed to vexatious mandates, should this officer be removed, and to the avarice and oppressions of his successor, they replied, that they could not accede to the proposition, unless a Phirmaund should be previously sent by the Mogul, specifying the degree of protection under which the Company's servants and trade would be placed.

The new Nabob of Bengal's offer to the English, to resettle their Factory at Hugly, declined.

On hearing a report, that the General had concluded a treaty with the Mogul, it was intended to send Mr. Charnock and his Council to Bengal, after the Monsoon, with a stock of a lack and a half of pagodas, to re-assume the Factories and recommence the trade; but this plan shewed, that they were ignorant of the terms of the reported treaty; and, had their servants proceeded with this stock, they must have suffered the

CHAP. II. the evils anticipated, from the precarious tenure under which  
 1688-89. the Nabob held his office.

Revolution  
 in Siam obvi-  
 ates the ne-  
 cessity of the  
 war against  
 that country.

As the war with SIAM had been one of the original objects of the Court, it only appears, that, in the course of hostilities, several vessels belonging to that country had been captured by the Company's ships, and, during this season, it was understood at Fort St. George, that a revolution had taken place, in which the King of Siam, and Mr. Phaulkon, who had betrayed the Company's interests, had been put to death by the Siamese General, who had assumed the power, and given expectations, that commercial relations with that country might again be practicable.

The com-  
 mercial ef-  
 forts at Fort  
 St. George,  
 and its sub-  
 ordinate sta-  
 tions, depres-  
 sed by these  
 political  
 events;

The commercial transactions at Fort St. George consisted, during these political events, rather of expedients, than of any fixed plan upon which the trade could be prosecuted. The Carnatic, as well as the Decan, had been the theatre of war; the connexion between Bengal and Madras, so necessary for making up the investments for Europe, had been interrupted, by the Agents leaving that country; and the Factories, more immediately connected with the Fort, either had been exposed to extortions, or to suppression, by the Mogul's orders:—hence the sales of Europe produce, and the provisions of Indian investments, were equally uncertain.

From the political confusions in the country, in the vicinity of the Fort, and the stations depending on it, the Presidency, in August 1688, found, that it was impracticable to

collect

collect investments, agreeably to the order of the Court, or to obtain that proportion of them from Bengal, which, hitherto, had formed the most valuable part of the assortment. CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

Referring to the dependencies, which had hitherto furnished proportions of the investment, the Presidency informed the Court, that they had been obliged to withdraw the Factories from Madapollam and Pettipolee, but the Factories at Conimere, and Porto Novo, continued in a prosperous state;— that the pepper trade, between Bencoolen and China, had been improved, three hundred tons of that article having been shipped from Bencoolen for Amoy, which sold at a profit; and, from this circumstance, a more extensive trade to China might have been expected, had not accounts from Mr. Styleman, one of the Company's servants at Amoy, to Mr. Navarro, in November 1689, intimated, that the James, an interloping ship from England, had arrived, with a very large stock, the captain of which sold his cloth at low rates, which compelled the Company's Factors to do the same.

As the season advanced, new difficulties in procuring the investment occurred. The conquest of Golcondah had obliged the weavers to fly for shelter to Masulipatam. The French were now fortifying Pollicherry or Pondicherry, and had resisted the English in seizing two Mogul vessels, which had taken shelter in that port; an event which marks the first opposition of interests between the two nations on the Coromandel Coast. In September 1689, from the arrival of the  
Company's



CHAP. II. Company's Agents and property from Bengal, which hitherto  
1688-89. had contributed so largely to the investment, the Presidency of Fort St. George considered, that the amount of stock intended for that quarter (till this trade could be re-established) had rendered any additional supply unnecessary, the surplus in their possession being sufficient, for such proportion of the investment as they might be able to procure; adding, that they would readily obey instructions to give encouragement to the Armenians, in the hope, through indirect means, to collect some part of the investment for Europe, which, from the war in the Carnatic, they could not expect through the ordinary channels; but the loss of Vizagapatam (already described to be of so much commercial importance) would deprive them of the proportion of goods which it furnished.

These circumstances did not alter, for some time; for, in January 1689-90, the Presidency, from the anarchy in the Carnatic, (the effects of which they stated would be felt for ten years) despaired of being able to obtain an investment:—in illustration, they observed, that so essential an article as long-cloth could not be procured; and though they had offered five per cent. advance upon their contracts of the preceding year, the merchants would not enter into engagements, for the ensuing season:—the French and Dutch had been obliged to give an advance of ten per cent. on their contracts, and the President could only resort to the expedient of engaging about one hundred

dred families of skilful weavers to settle at Madras, in the hope, from the protection held out to them, that this number might be doubled, and, in progress of time, that the manufacture of Coast goods could be carried on, in the Company's settlement, to supply the home market:—that, however, the Court's idea of manufacturing Bengal taffaties, at Madras, was impracticable, as it could not be done without incurring an expence of fifty per cent. difference, on the prime cost.

CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

To add to the commercial embarrassments of the Presidency, new and serious obstructions had arisen, from the appearance of piratical vessels, of considerable force, under English colours, in the Indian Seas:—these vessels had been fitted out in the West-Indies, and had taken shelter in the ports of Aden, Muscat, and Madagascar. One of them, of twenty-two guns, had captured a valuable vessel belonging to Madras (the principal part of her cargo being the property of the President), and information had been received of five other English pirates cruising off Acheen. Such was the state of commerce at Fort St. George, and in its dependencies, at the close of this eventful period.

— and by the appearance of English pirates on the Coromandel Coast.

Referring to the commercial dependencies or relations of the Presidency, it had been found, that the produce from Bencoolen and Indrapore had become of considerable value, but that it was almost impossible to persuade any of the Company's servants, civil or military, to be removed to these unhealthy situations:—that it would be advisable to

State of trade of the European Maritime Powers, in the East-Indies, at this juncture.

CHAP. II. open a trade with Canton, rather than continue that at Amoy;  
 1688-89. —that the French trade was encreasing on the Coast, and that they were fortifying Pollicherry (or Pondicherry) where they had a force of seven hundred men; but that this place was threatened by the Dutch;—that the French intended to dispatch three ships, this season, to Europe, and were forming a Settlement at Junkselon;—that the Dutch had been making every effort to improve their trade in Bengal, and had sent an Ambassador to the Mogul, to solicit a Phirmaund,—but the presents intended to have been offered by him, had been intercepted by Sambagee's troops, and the object of the mission disappointed;—that their trade on the Coromandel Coast was on the decline, but that they were fortifying Negapatam, intended to become their principal port on the Coast;—that their power had been disturbed, by a revolt at Batavia, but, that they still kept possession of Bantam, where they had lately built a fort, or battery, mounting one hundred guns, and that they were at war, in Ceylon, with the King of Candy, the issue of which was uncertain;—that the Portuguese trade on the Coast was also on the decline, and that no reliance could be placed on any of that nation who were in the service of the Company;—and that the Danes, at this period, although they continued their Factory at Tranquebar, had scarcely any trade.

Report on the  
 improving  
 state of Fort

In describing the state of Fort St. George and Madras, at this period, the President and Council attributed the internal

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internal tranquillity which it had enjoyed, to the strength of its fortifications, and that, by the arrival of sixty recruits in Chandos, the number of its garrison had become respectable;—that the revenue was increasing, but the tax on houses, and the payment of quit-rents, had been oppressive; hence it was submitted, that a less exceptionable method of raising a revenue applicable to the charges of the place, might be devised;—that the establishment of the Corporation of Madras had been acceptable to the inhabitants, the benefit of which they were now beginning to understand;—that though the Duan had offered St. Thomé to be farmed by the Company, the offer was rejected, from the opinion that it would be of no material benefit to the Settlement;—that the mint at Fort St. George was in a very prosperous state, and the Company's rupees in considerable request, but on account of their intrinsic value, they had been melted down by the country people, under the idea of deriving profit, from the sale of the bullion;—and that the project of establishing an Insurance Office at Madras had hitherto been answered, from the benefit arising from it, not being sufficiently understood by the merchants. <sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Fort St. George to the Court, 27th April 1688, January 1688-89, 3d April, 20th July, 21st September 1689, and 1st February 1689-90.— Letter from the Presidency of Fort St. George to the Governor and Council at Bombay, 25th March 1690.— Private letter from Mr. Styleman to Mr. Naudin, dated Amoy, 27th November 1689.

CHAP. II.  
 1688-89. Trade at Ben-  
 coolen and  
 Indrapore in-  
 creased and  
 the settle-  
 ment in an  
 improving  
 condition.

During this period, the commercial intercourse, between Madras and the Factories to the southwards, was interrupted, probably on account of the war with Siam; but it appears, from the advices from YORK FORT, or BENCOOLEN, that however unhealthy that station had been hitherto found, its commercial importance was on the increase, as, in the month of October 1689, the ship Williamson's cargo of pepper had been procured there, and that the Agents were in expectation of annually obtaining large quantities of that article; and hoped, as the ground could be cleared, that the place would become more healthy;—that, from the Factory at INDRAPORE the same advantages could not be expected, while the Dutch, who obstructed its trade, continued in possession of Quallo, at the mouth of the river on which Indrapore is situated;—that, with the object of improving the trade of Bencoolen, they had invited several Chinese traders to settle there, under their protection; and, to obviate the difficulty of making drafts of soldiers from Madras, recommended, that Caffres should be procured from Madagascar, to serve as soldiers, their constitutions being better adapted to the climate;—on the whole, that this Settlement was in a flourishing condition, but required a supply of accountants and writers, to complete the civil establishment. <sup>(1)</sup>.

It,

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at York Fort to the Court, 26th October and 6th November 1689.

If, in the domestic Annals of the East-India Company, in this season, it was expedient to keep as distinct subjects, the measures which the Court of Directors adopted for their affairs in England, and the instructions to their Foreign Settlements, during the first appearance, progress, and accomplishment of the Revolution, the same arrangement is required, in tracing the first and full effects of this great event, in the Company's foreign possessions.

CHAP. II.

1688-89.

Interesting proceedings of the Company's Foreign Settlements, on receiving intelligence of the successive events which terminated in the Revolution.

It was natural for the servants of the Company, in whom the administration of their affairs, at their different Presidencies, were vested, to be actuated by the same commercial caution as the Court of Directors: They had been trained up in the service, from an early period of life, and habituated, by a sense of duty, to rely on the information they received from their superiors, respecting the political relations, between the Maritime Powers of Europe; and, for twenty-eight years, (or from the Restoration,) had considered the protection of the Crown, to be their principal defence against the Interlopers, Private-Traders, and Pirates, and, therefore, listened, with doubt, to the first reports of a change in the government at home, as an insidious project of the Dutch, from whom they had, since their establishment

as

CHAP. II: as a Company, suffered so many commercial grievances and  
 1688-89. positive disasters.

This opinion was necessarily strengthened, by the instructions received from the Directors, for commencing a war against the Mogul and King of Siam, of which the general object was to raise them from a precarious dependency on Phirmaunds, to become, at Bombay, at Madras, and at Chittagong (if it could be acquired), *Regencies*, or seats of power and trade, which, under the Royal protection, might balance the similar establishments of the Dutch in Java, and the Eastern Islands.

The foreign Governments of the Company had, besides, seen the armament arrive, bringing letters to the Mogul, desiring of that Sovereign, redress of the grievances experienced from the Governors of Surat, and the Nabobs and Phousdars in Bengal; and had felt, even at Madras, the menaces of ruin which the Mogul, after his conquest of Visiapore and Golcondah, was holding over them, but had escaped from the effects of those menaces, rather by circumstances in their enemy's wars, than by power to ward them off, or to resist them, and therefore were unprepared for a change at home, which, in a remote country, they could as little comprehend, as believe.

In the domestic Annals it was noticed, that, on the first appearance of the armament in Holland, the Court were prevented from dispatching their ships, by the crews being  
 impressed

impressed into the King's service; and that the equipments of the season were suspended for many months; hence the anxieties of the General and his Council, at Bombay, were on the utmost stretch, for, at this juncture, the expedition sent to Bengal had miscarried, and the Agents at Surat were under control, and even imprisoned, by the Governor, who had deceived them by a pretended truce, or treaty. CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

It was under these distressing circumstances, that, on the 7th June 1689, the Agent and Council at Surat informed the Court, they had received a report from a Dutch vessel from Batavia, that the Prince of Orange had landed with a large army, and had made a conquest of England:—these reports they held to be as vague, as impossible, and intended, probably, to add to their embarrassments, from the calamitous occurrences in the war with the Mogul.

This disbelief, however, was soon shaken, by the letters from the Court, of the 5th December 1688, confirming the report, that the Prince had actually landed in England, and that affairs at home were in the greatest confusion;—intelligence which could not fail to distract a Presidency like Bombay, in a remote situation, ignorant of the conduct they ought to pursue, and, therefore, they could only express their attachment to their country, and apologize for any confusion that might appear in their commercial invoices. In this painful uncertainty, they remained for many months, for,  
in



CHAP. II. in their letters, dated on the 26th December 1689, they in-  
1688-89. formed the Court, that no ship had arrived from England, that season, though they had learned, that the Prince had proceeded to St. James's, but they trusted the true Protestant religion would be maintained and established.

In this situation, another report reached Bombay, by a Dutch ship from Batavia, of the coronation of the Prince and Princess of Orange, as King and Queen of England, and that this event had rendered a war with France inevitable.

It will be recollected, that the Chandos could not be dispatched from England, till February 1688-89, and that, on this ship, the Court had sent the first positive instructions to their servants, respecting the establishment of the civil and religious liberties of their Country.

The Presidency at Fort St. George disbelieved the first reports of the armament in Holland, of the landing of the Prince of Orange, and of the subsequent events, in the same manner as the General and Council at Bombay, but had been more fortunate in obtaining authentic information.

In their letter of the 21st September 1689, they acknowledged the receipt of the Court's letter, of the 5th December 1688, (detailed in the review of the home transactions of this season,) and gave assurances, that the orders for observing the most prudent and cautious conduct would be obeyed, under circumstances which were equally new, and  
equally

equally difficult. On the 5th November 1689, the Chandos CHAP. II.  
reached Madras, and on that day (the anniversary of the 1688-89.  
landing of the great and wise King William in England) the  
King and Queen were proclaimed at Madras, with every  
practicable solemnity, and orders issued to all the subordinate  
Factories, to publish the Proclamation in due form.

In January 1689-90, this intelligence was communicated  
by the President and Council of Madras to the General and  
Council at Bombay; but, whether it was owing to the Siddee's  
fleet and army having, at this time, invaded Bombay,—to the  
distracted state of that Island, when the tenor of the Mogul's  
Phirmaund was known,—or to the natural confusion occasioned  
by the death of Sir John Child, it was not till the 22d June  
1690, that the Proclamation of King William and Queen  
Mary was published at Bombay, and orders issued for the same  
ceremony to be observed at Surat, and at all the subordinate  
Settlements on the Malabar Coast:—the date of this Procla-  
mation is, perhaps, rendered more memorable, from its having  
taken place on the very day on which the Siddee's army re-  
tired from the Island, and the Company's forces took posses-  
sion of Mahim, and the other stations which the Siddee had  
evacuated.

If the circumstances which attended the Revolution in  
England, as a great national event, authenticated by public  
records, be compared with the effects of that event on the  
East-India Company, at home and abroad, drawn from the

CHAP. II. 1688-89. undisguised communications of the Court of Directors to their Foreign Presidencies, and the equally open communications of those Presidencies to their superiors, we discover the caution of merchants, who had received successive Charters from the Crown, and the upright sentiments of a great commercial body, which had embarked a large property, under the authority of the wise Elizabeth; and, though thwarted by her immediate successors, and depressed by the open trade introduced by the Usurper, had been encouraged at the Restoration, protected against an European rival, and been enabled to preserve to their country valuable rights of trade to the East-Indies, notwithstanding the dangerous opposition of individuals, who, without property and without principles, had been undermining their best efforts, and aiding the projects of a Foreign Company, to monopolize the whole of the European power and trade in the East-Indies.

The Court of Committees judiciously observed the first appearances of the Revolution, without mingling in it; acted under the protection they had received, yet were sensible of the more general rights and prosperity of their country; afraid, if not in some degree jealous, of their former rival; and, with the good sense of Englishmen, still more afraid of the re-appearance of those Interlopers, by whom the reasonable returns of a hazardous enterprize had been so often frustrated;—and thus exhibited caution and firmness, at home;—  
while

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while their Presidencies abroad, under the calamitous events which had disappointed their hopes of becoming an Independent Power in the East-Indies, mingled their commercial prudence with loyal deference to the enlightened and public spirit, which had placed the British Constitution on new and broad foundations. <sup>CHAP</sup><sub>1688</sub> (1)

(1)—Letters from the General and Council to the Deputy Governor of Bombay, 7th June, and 26th December 1689, and 22d June 1690.— Letters from the Presidency of Fort St. George to the Court, 21st September 1689, and 1st February 1689-90.— Letter from the Presidency of Fort St. George to the General and Council at Bombay, January 1688-89.

## CHAP. II.

**RESULTS**  
from the preceding detail of events, ascertaining the Company's rights, from the Restoration of King Charles II. to the Revolution, 1688-89.

If the results from the detail of events, affecting the rights and trade of the London East-India Company, from their establishment by Queen Elizabeth to the Restoration of Charles II., afforded inferences exhibiting the actual state of East-Indian affairs, those which may be drawn from the events which occurred from the Restoration to the Revolution, will afford, in like manner, a succinct view of the real history of the East-India Company. In connecting this authenticated information, it must always be recollected, that the Company had, by their Charters, been vested with the perpetual right of being a Corporate Body, with succession, and the temporary right of enjoying exclusive privileges of trade, on a Joint Stock.

*I.*—From the preceding detail of events it appears, that, from the changing aspects of the political relations between England and the Maritime Powers, having trade or Factories in the East-Indies, the London East-India Company could not adopt fixed regulations, either for the administration of their affairs in Europe or in India; but were obliged, according to circumstances, to adopt broader or narrower commercial plans, corresponding with the encouragement or depression which they experienced at home, or the encouragement or opposition which they expected, or received, abroad, from the Sovereigns,

Sovereigns, or their Governors, in the countries in which the  
seats of their trade, or Factories, were situated.

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*II.*—That, on the Restoration, or the re-establishment of the ancient Government of England, under King Charles II., the great objects with which he commenced his reign were, first, the adoption of the Act of Navigation, which was of so much importance to the commercial interests of the realm, and, next, the revival of the former treaties with the European States, to establish a Balance of Power on the continent of Europe;—that though, under this principle, treaties were formed between England, the States General, France, Spain, and Portugal, yet, very early in his reign, the King gave proofs of political partialities, and, therefore, excited political jealousies; for, at one time, he supported the Dutch in repelling the invasions of France, that the States General, and the north of Germany, might not fall under the dominion or control of that ambitious monarchy; and, at another, he depressed them, and afforded to France an opportunity to extend her northern frontier; and thus, though the Treaties of Breda and Nimeguen partially promoted the aggrandizement of France, and though the King still kept in view the principle of a Balance of Power, yet neither the one, nor the other of those treaties, sufficiently guarded against the encroachments of France, or of the States General, on the colonies or settlements of  
England,

CHAP. II. England, particularly those within the limits of the East-  
 RESULTS. India Company.

*III.*—That though King James II., in his treaty with Louis XIV., proceeded on the same principle of preserving a Balance of Power, yet, when he stipulated that, in the event of a war in Europe, a neutrality should be observed in the colonial and foreign possessions of the two Crowns, he gave a general impression to the European Sovereignities and States, that his intentions were to act in subservience to the views of France; an impression which led to the League of Augsburgh among the German Princes, elevated the Prince of Orange to be the head of the Powers coalesced against France, and paved the way for the Revolution which took place in England.

*IV.*—That though treaties were formed, to restore commercial relations between the European Sovereignities or States, and to define the colonial or relative rights of the European nations, having trade or authorized Companies in the East-Indies, they were often in spirit, and frequently in conditions, inconsistent with the Balance of Power in Europe, and, in practice, led to vague and undefined regulations, which were the sources of successive complaints and remonstrances of the weaker against the stronger party (that is, of the London East-India Company, against the States General and Portugal,) which were uniformly evaded, notwithstanding the public orders given by those sovereignties for

for the reparation of wrongs, or for the redress of injuries in the East-Indies.

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*V.*—That the treaty of Alliance and Marriage, between Portugal and England, by which Bombay and its dependencies were ceded to King Charles II., though specious in its conditions, was in practice inefficient, for the Portuguese were as jealous of the English, as they were inimical to the Dutch;—hence the armament sent to take possession of Bombay was obstructed equally by the friends, and by the enemies of England; and the Island of Bombay, only, but not its dependencies, at last ceded, on conditions not less repugnant to the treaty itself, than to the object of the King, in acquiring for the nation seats of trade and power in the East-Indies. The jealousies, thus, of the Portuguese destroyed the commercial balance in the East-Indies, which it was the object of the treaty to establish; and rendered Bombay, when it was granted by the King, to the London East-India Company, an inefficient and unproductive seat of power and trade.

*VI.*—That, in all the commercial and marine treaties, between England and the States General, though the conditions stipulated by the contracting parties were observed in Europe, the articles, as far as they checked the Dutch system of exclusion, were uniformly evaded in the East-Indies, and that, by a commanding maritime force, and considerable military establishments, the Dutch persevered in the fixed plan of maintaining their exclusive possession of the  
Spice



CHAP. II. *Spice Islands*; for the Dutch Company obstructed, by in-  
 RESULTS. *trigues*, the English trade on the Coromandel Coast; har-  
 rassed, in conjunction with the Native Powers, their Agen-  
 cies and Factories on the Malabar Coast; prevented their  
 settling on the unappropriated Banda or Molucca Islands;  
 rendered the restitution of Polaroon, though stipulated by  
 treaty in Europe, of no avail, by desolating that Island; ex-  
 cluded them, by conquering Macassar, from Siam, Tonquin,  
 Japan, and nearly from China; expelled them from Bantam,  
 the first seat of their trade; compelled them to attempt the  
 pepper trade at Bencoolen, on the unhealthy coast of Su-  
 matra; and, finally, by every insidious art, endeavoured to  
 exclude them from commerce, in the rich provinces bordering  
 on the Ganges.

VII.—That the period when Aurungzebe became Em-  
 peror of the Moguls (or 1659) nearly coincided with the  
 Restoration of Monarchy in England, and the revival of the  
 Company's Charter and exclusive privileges; but the large  
 equipments and stock which this event encouraged the Com-  
 pany to embark, to improve their old, and to establish new  
 Settlements and Factories, were affected, by the continued  
 wars between the Mogul and the Hindoo Chiefs:—that all  
 the Phirmaunds and grants, which had been purchased, or  
 which had been the reward of services, were either observed  
 or violated, as suited the varied success or disasters of these  
 belligerent powers;—that, under these circumstances, the  
 English

English Presidencies, Agencies, and Factories, at Surat, <sup>CHAP. II.</sup>  
 Fort St. George, and in Bengal, were obliged to accommodate <sup>RESULTS.</sup>  
 themselves to the prospects of success, or defeat, of the Mogul  
 or of the Hindoo Princes, at one time obtaining grants and ex-  
 emptions from each, and, at another, having them withdrawn ;  
 —that, in the first war attempted by the English against the  
 Native Powers, partly from the misconduct of those to whom  
 it was entrusted, partly from the Factors in the distant Settle-  
 ments, though understanding the particular, not appreciating  
 the general interest of the Company, and, chiefly, from the  
 controlling power of their General (or Governor General) not  
 being understood or obeyed, the Company's officers were com-  
 pelled to yield to the harsh conditions in the Phirmaund of  
 Aurungzebe, which scarcely granted them personal safety,  
 and inconsiderable, if any encouragement to continue the  
 trade ;—that these events led the Company to an opinion,  
 founded on experience, that unless fortified stations, yielding  
 a revenue equal to the charges of them, could be obtained,  
 and unless a naval and military force could be employed, to  
 impress the Sovereigns in India, that the English could reta-  
 liate the wrongs they were suffering, the trade and possessions  
 of the Company could not be preserved ; because the Native  
 Powers considered them as merchants only, who might be  
 useful, by their contributions and services, but who could not  
 bring a force to redress, or to revenge, the injuries they  
 might sustain.

CHAP. II. *VIII.*—That, during the reigns of Charles II. and James  
*RESULTS.* II., though the domestic and foreign administration of the  
 Company's affairs were affected by the treaties in Europe, and  
 by the rivalship of European Companies in the East, they  
 were uniformly protected by the Crown;—that, during the  
 wars between the Indian Powers, they received the recom-  
 mendations of the King to the Sovereigns in whose dominions  
 the seats of their trade were situated;—that the Crown, as  
 a farther encouragement, conferred on them the Islands  
 of Bombay and St. Helena, in full property, vested them with  
 the power of making war or peace with the Native Princes or  
 States; gave them authority to coin money, current in the  
 countries in which they traded; empowered them to erect  
 Courts of Judicature in their Settlements, and to exercise  
 Admiralty Jurisdiction; erected Madras into a Corpora-  
 tion, under the Company's seal, that questions respecting  
 their authority over English subjects, within their limits,  
 might be prevented, and enabled them to prosecute Interlopers  
 in courts of law in England, and, by a more summary pro-  
 cedure, to bring them to justice in India;— and that,  
 though they relinquished to the Crown the Settlements they  
 had established on the Coast of Africa, during their union  
 with the Assada Merchants, they were subsequently pro-  
 tected by the King against the Levant Company, endeavour-  
 ing to check their imports from the countries within their  
 limits.

*LX.*—

*IX.*—That Charles II. and James II. uniformly protected the Company against the Interlopers, who, when they found that licences for trade to India could not be obtained from the Crown, assumed three distinct characters ;—the Interlopers, who fitted out ships in England, and carried stock to trade in India (as they pretended) at ports not resorted to by the Company's ships ;—the Interlopers, who fitted out ships in England, and had formed illicit connections with some of the Company's servants in India, who, in violation of their covenants and their duty, engaged to aid in defrauding their masters ;—and the Interlopers, who fitted out ships and took in cargoes on English capital, in foreign ports, and proposed to bring home Indian produce, to be sold in foreign markets : —that each of those classes of Interlopers acted, according to the amount of their stock or equipments, against the Company's trade, and frequently occasioned the exactions and contributions to which their Foreign Settlements were subjected : —that the Crown, on discovering these illegal and fraudulent proceedings, and on finding that the abettors of the Interlopers were chiefly Company's servants, who had violated their covenants, granted full protection to the Company, against the losses and the ruin which such frauds must inevitably have brought on a Corporation, which, by public efforts, and by a large Joint Stock, had created, and continued, a direct commerce between England and the East-Indies.

CHAP. II.

RESULTS.

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RESULTS.

X.—That the East-India Company, after finding Phirmaunds, or grants of privileges, and exemptions from customs, insufficient to protect either the seats of their trade, or the transit of their goods, through the interior provinces, resolved to commence hostilities against the Mogul, and to assume the rank of an Independent Power, by constituting *Regencies* at Bombay and Fort St. George, and a similar *Regency* at Chittagong, should the large armament sent to the East-Indies, succeed in obtaining possession of that station:—that, to consolidate this system, it was necessary to incur the charges of erecting fortifications and maintaining garrisons, for the protection of trade, and not less so, to have, in the Indian Seas, a naval force, superior to that possessed by any of the Native Princes, and equal to resist (in the event of war in Europe) the armaments of the Maritime Powers, having Settlements or trade in the East-Indies.

XI.—That, at the close of this period, when the Revolution established the free constitutional government of the realm, the Court of Committees, or Directors, at home, observed the commercial caution and prudence which were dictated to them by their particular duty, of acting for the interests of a great commercial body, of whose rights they were the guardians; and as they had, from their establishment, on no occasion, been parties in the changes which the government of their country had experienced, they directed their whole views to the maintenance of their trade, and the preservation

preservation of their settlements, a line of conduct in which they were imitated by their foreign Presidencies and Agencies; —but when events, in their native country, called upon them to act for the general interests of the nation, they united in loyalty and in principles, in approving and in supporting, both at home and abroad, the free constitution, which this great event so happily accomplished.


CHAP. II.

RESULTS.

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
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












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